Unless otherwise provided in writing signed by the obligor, a commercial account becomes due and payable upon the date a statement of the account is rendered to the obligor. The owner of a commercial account may charge interest on that portion of a commercial account which has been due and payable for 30 days or more at a rate not in excess of 1 1/2 percent per month calculated on the amount owed from the date upon which it became due and payable until paid. "Commercial account" means an obligation for the payment of money arising out of a transaction to sell or furnish, or the sale of, or furnishing of, goods or services other than a "retail installment transaction" as defined in paragraph (10) of subsection (a) of Code Section 10-1-2.
(Ga. L. 1858, p. 90, § 1; Code 1863, § 2030; Code 1868, § 2031; Ga. L. 1873, p. 22, § 1; Code 1873, § 2057; Code 1882, § 2057; Civil Code 1895, § 2885; Civil Code 1910, § 3435; Code 1933, § 57-111; Ga. L. 1980, p. 514, § 1.)
Law reviews.- For survey article on recent developments in Georgia law of remedies, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 397 (1982). For annual survey on construction law, see 65 Mercer L. Rev. 67 (2013).
JUDICIAL DECISIONSANALYSIS
General Considerations
No application to security deposit.
- O.C.G.A. § 7-4-16 was inapplicable in the case of a "security deposit" which represented one party's obligation to return money to another party arising out of the termination of their business relationship; since the security deposit did not represent an obligation for the payment of any goods or services, the first party's right to secure a refund of its security deposit did not render it the owner of a "commercial account." Race, Inc. v. Wade Leasing, Inc., 201 Ga. App. 340, 411 S.E.2d 56 (1991).
O.C.G.A. § 7-4-16 is applicable only to obligations to pay for goods and services on a commercial account and is inapplicable to obligations to return money arising out of the termination of a business agreement. Hayden v. Sigari, 220 Ga. App. 6, 467 S.E.2d 590 (1996).
Commercial account due and payable.
- Summary judgment was properly granted to a buyer as: (1) a seller's claim was time-barred under O.C.G.A. § 11-2-725 since a document dated May 5, 2000, was not an invoice to the buyer, but was a compilation of invoices previously submitted to the buyer; (2) even if the seller provided the buyer with services in conjunction with the goods it sold, § 11-2-725 applied as the predominant element of the agreement was the sale of goods; (3) under O.C.G.A. § 7-4-16, a commercial account became due and payable upon the date a statement of the account was rendered to the obligor; and (4) the seller's claim that the six-year limitation period contained in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24 applied was rejected as there was no contract and the claim was not raised before the trial court. All Tech Co. v. Laimer Unicon, LLC, 281 Ga. App. 579, 636 S.E.2d 753 (2006).
In a case brought under the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, 1930 (PACA), 7 U.S.C. §§ 499(a)-499(o), in which: (1) a produce company's president had defalcated within the meaning of the law on the president's trust duties; (2) the president was personally liable to a produce wholesaler in the amount of the company's PACA trust for the president's failures as trustee; (3) the wholesaler's invoices provided for interest on unpaid accounts at the rate of one and one-half percent per month; and (4) the invoices provided that the customer must pay the attorney fees and costs incurred in the collection of all past due invoices, in its grant of summary judgment in favor of the wholesaler, the district court awarded the wholesaler the principal amount that was owed; in addition, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 13-1-11, the wholesaler was entitled to attorney fees and under O.C.G.A. § 7-4-16 the wholesaler was entitled to interest payments at the rate stated on the invoices. Cee Bee Produce, Inc. v. Tucker, F. Supp. 2d (M.D. Ga. Sept. 12, 2007).
Because account invoices sued upon by two contractors represented obligations for the payment of money arising out of transactions to furnish labor and materials, none of which involved a retail installment transaction, and involved liquidated claims, the trial court did not err in determining that those accounts were commercial accounts. Thus, an award of prejudgment interest as to the amounts owed was upheld on appeal. Hampshire Homes, Inc. v. Espinosa Constr. Servs., 288 Ga. App. 718, 655 S.E.2d 316 (2007).
Appellate court properly dismissed an attorney's direct appeal in a case wherein the attorney sued a client for attorney fees as the judgment the attorney recovered was one for damages in an amount under $10,000, and as such, it was subject to appeal as a matter of discretion under O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(6), rather than of right. The failure of the attorney to recover on the claims of prejudgment interest or attorney fees did not transform the judgment into a finding on liability adverse to the attorney so as to render an appeal of the matter outside the ambit of § 5-6-35(a)(6). Cooney v. Burnham, 283 Ga. 134, 657 S.E.2d 239 (2008).
Trial court did not err in awarding a seller pre-judgment interest under O.C.G.A. § 7-4-16 in the seller's breach of contract action against a buyer to recover damages for unpaid principal on shipped material and unpurchased material because the seller's invoices were a due and payable liquidated debt on a commercial account subject to interest under § 7-4-16; because certain materials were delivered by the seller and accepted by the buyer, the buyer was responsible for payment according to the agreed-upon price. Scovill Fasteners, Inc. v. Northern Metals, Inc., 303 Ga. App. 246, 692 S.E.2d 840 (2010).
Jury's interest award on a supplier's claim against a guarantor was not arbitrary as the claim was based on a collection of commercial interest that had accrued on a customer's unpaid invoices and the amount of award was within the range of evidence. Fletcher v. C. W. Matthews Contr. Co., 322 Ga. App. 751, 746 S.E.2d 230 (2013).
Section inapplicable in action for breach of contract.
- Maximum allowable interest on past due licensing fees was $117,373 as provided in the parties' licensing agreement. The trial court erred in using the calculation allowed under O.C.G.A. § 7-4-16 because that statute applied in actions for open account, not actions for breach of contract. Noons v. Holiday Hospitality Franchising, Inc., 307 Ga. App. 351, 705 S.E.2d 166 (2010).
Maximum interest rate not mandatory.
- O.C.G.A. § 7-4-16 merely authorizes, but does not mandate, charging the maximum interest therein specified. Nodvin v. West, 197 Ga. App. 92, 397 S.E.2d 581 (1990).
Physician comes within purview of former Code 1933, § 57-111. Martin v. Mayer, 63 Ga. App. 387, 11 S.E.2d 218 (1940).
Section inapplicable to suits based on quantum meruit.
- When the plaintiff sought recovery on a quantum meruit basis and not for a liquidated demand former Code 1933, §§ 57-110 and 57-111 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 7-4-15 and7-4-16) were not applicable. Noble v. Hunt, 95 Ga. App. 804, 99 S.E.2d 345 (1957).
What constitutes "statement," in the defendant's business is clearly a commercial account and is not a retail installment transaction. McNair v. Gold Kist, Inc., 166 Ga. App. 782, 305 S.E.2d 478 (1983).
Statement.
- Farm supplies supplied to a farmer in the farmer's business is clearly a commercial account. The owner of a commercial account can charge interest on that portion of the commercial account which had been due and payable for 30 days or more at a rate not in excess of 1-1/2% per month calculated on the amount owed from the date upon which the amount became due and payable until paid and that a commercial account is classified or defined as an obligation for the payment of money arising out of a transaction to sell or furnish, or the sale of, or furnishing of goods and services other than a retail installment. McNair v. Gold Kist, Inc., 166 Ga. App. 782, 305 S.E.2d 478 (1983).
Trial court erred in failing to award interest at 18 percent per annum on the amount proved by the undisputed invoices for materials purchased by the plaintiff/subcontractor from the defendant/general contractor since the plaintiff conceded that the invoices might be construed as a "statement" within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 7-4-16. American Aluminum Prods. Co. v. Binswanger Glass Co., 194 Ga. App. 703, 391 S.E.2d 688 (1990).
Claim for interest not novation.
- Creditor's claim for interest in an action against the debtor and personal guarantor on an open account agreement did not result in a novation of the agreement. Charles S. Martin Distrib. Co. v. Berhardt Furn. Co., 213 Ga. App. 481, 445 S.E.2d 297 (1994).
Action between contractor and subcontractor.
- Evidence that the contractor and subcontractor had been doing business for several years, that their relationship was invoice-based and not contract-based, combined with an explicit statement on the subcontractor's bid that it did not cover the entirety of the work, supported the latter's claim based on O.C.G.A. § 7-4-16. Wheat Enters., Inc. v. Redi-Floors, Inc., 231 Ga. App. 853, 501 S.E.2d 30 (1998).
Subcontractor was entitled to recover from an insurer on a payment bond because a pay-when-paid clause in a contract of the contractor and subcontractor could not be used as a defense by the insurer when the insurer denied the subcontractor a federal remedy under the Miller Act. Thus, the subcontractor met the requirements of 40 U.S.C. §§ 3131 and 3133, and was entitled to summary judgment for the amount of the contractor's outstanding debt plus prejudgment interest under O.C.G.A. § 7-4-16. United States ex rel. McKenney'S, Inc. v. Gov't Tech. Servs., LLC, 531 F. Supp. 2d 1375 (N.D. Ga. 2008).
Action by subcontractor's supplier against general contractor.
- When the sums owed to the subcontractor's supplier arose out of the furnishing of goods to the subcontractor on the project, not out of the furnishing of goods by the supplier to the general contractor, the supplier's action against the general contractor and the surety on the lien bond was not based on a commercial account with the subcontractor but on the supplier's rights under the lien bond - that is, the supplier's rights as a lien claimant. Accordingly, the general contractor's liability did not arise out of failure to pay the amounts owed to the supplier on a commercial account, and O.C.G.A. § 7-4-16 thus was not applicable. Turner Constr. Co. v. Electrical Distribs., Inc., 202 Ga. App. 726, 415 S.E.2d 325 (1992).
Contractor's claim against owner.
- Although a jury did not ultimately award the entire amount of a contractor's original claim against an owner, the amount of the unpaid balance as determined by the jury was a due and payable liquidated debt on a commercial account, and therefore subject to prejudgment interest under O.C.G.A. § 7-4-16. The trial court erred in declining to award prejudgment interest under the statute. Elec. Works CMA, Inc. v. Baldwin Tech. Fabrics, LLC, 306 Ga. App. 705, 703 S.E.2d 124 (2010).
Action for unpaid sales commissions under an employment contract was not based on a commercial account and the trial court erred in charging the jury that the jury could award prejudgment interest at the rate of 1.5 percent a month. Southern Water Techs., Inc. v. Kile, 224 Ga. App. 717, 481 S.E.2d 826 (1997).
Retail installment contract for purchase of automobile.
- After the plaintiff filed a verified complaint, the trial court erred in granting the plaintiff's motion to strike the defendant's unverified answer and for judgment on the pleadings as the retail installment contract for the purchase of an automobile was not the type of contract that was the appropriate subject matter for a suit on an open account, and the defendant was not required to verify the defendant's responsive pleadings because retail installment transactions were expressly excluded from the definition of a commercial account; and the contract provided a number of remedies to the plaintiff in the event of non-payment by the defendant that deviated from the traditional understanding of what constituted an open account. Scott v. Prestige Fin. Servs., 345 Ga. App. 530, 813 S.E.2d 610 (2018).
Action between attorney and client for attorney fees.
- Attorney was authorized by statute to charge interest at the rate charged and to apply the client's payments first to the interest due and then to the principal. At all times, the client could have avoided any obligation to pay interest by paying the principal in full each month as the client agreed to do. Cooney v. Rowland, 240 Ga. App. 703, 524 S.E.2d 730 (1999).
Trial court did not err in denying the client's motion for a directed verdict on the attorney's claim for prejudgment interest on attorney fees the attorney sought from the client for legal representation of the client because the fees requested were liquidated as the client did not object to the actual amount of the bill and were subject to pre-judgment interest. Patton v. Turnage, 260 Ga. App. 744, 580 S.E.2d 604 (2003).
Interest on Retail Installment and Home Solicitation Sales Act transactions.
- Charges of one and a half percent per month on the unpaid balance on a commercial account were not authorized by the Retail Installment and Home Solicitation Sales Act, O.C.G.A. § 10-1-1- et seq., even though the agreement involved was the form set forth in that Act because that statute applied only to purchases for personal, family, or household use. Gold Kist, Inc. v. McNair, 166 Ga. App. 66, 303 S.E.2d 290 (1983) (decided prior to 1980 amendment).
Once there is usury, the usury infects any renewal note for the same debt or any part thereof unless the usury is purged. A determination as to the application of former O.C.G.A. § 7-4-7, which provided for no limit of interest rates on loans of $100,000.00 or more, cannot be decided without a complete accounting to purge all usurious interest (to be applied to principal, if paid) and then a determination made as to whether or not the principal of the original note was for $100,000 or more, which would insulate it against the defense of usury. McNair v. Gold Kist, Inc., 166 Ga. App. 782, 305 S.E.2d 478 (1983).
Application of rule that change in law will not change transaction's usurious nature.
- Rule that change in the law will not change the usurious character of a transaction applies only to renewals of an originally usurious transaction, and is not applicable when separate purchases are made on an open account, resulting in an entirely new indebtedness. Gold Kist, Inc. v. McNair, 166 Ga. App. 66, 303 S.E.2d 290 (1983).
Interest charged outside of agreement.
- When the supplier made no attempt to charge interest prior to trial, an instruction to the jury, and consequent award, to increase damages by one and a half percent per month was error. Prince v. Lee Roofing Co., 161 Ga. App. 181, 288 S.E.2d 135 (1982).
When the creditor made no attempt to collect interest on the overdue account prior to filing suit, but alleged in the creditor's complaint that the creditor was entitled to interest, there was no error in permitting evidence concerning the accrual of interest on the indebtedness or in charging the provisions of O.C.G.A. § 7-4-16. Tench v. United States Tsubaki, Inc., 191 Ga. App. 248, 381 S.E.2d 319 (1989).
Summary judgment precluded.
- When evidence in an action against a defendant-farmer on open account indicated that the plaintiff was basing the plaintiff's estimation of the defendant's indebtedness on the business records of another corporation it had purchased and the defendant denied indebtedness in the amount claimed by the plaintiff, and since the plaintiff's affidavit failed to establish the defendant's account to be a commercial one authorizing a certain annual finance charge pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 7-4-16, there were issues of material fact yet to be resolved and the plaintiff was precluded from summary judgment. Paulk v. Carolina E. Inc., 172 Ga. App. 669, 324 S.E.2d 527 (1984).
Disallowing interest on open accounts does not affect law of set-off. Meriwether v. Bird, 9 Ga. 594 (1851).
Claim not barred.
- Trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of a debtor on all of the invoices that made up a creditor's claim against the debtor on the ground that the complaint was barred by the four-year limitation period for a suit on account because the trial court's grant of summary judgment was based on a purported admission by the creditor that its claims accrued on April 3, 2001, but the trial court misread the document, and the creditor submitted authenticated invoices, which showed dates more recent than four years prior to the date suit was filed; unless otherwise provided in the agreement, claims are barred if the claims are asserted more than four years after invoices are submitted to the buyer. Avery Enters. v. Lyndhurst Builders, LLC, 304 Ga. App. 353, 696 S.E.2d 389 (2010).
Cited in Woodfield v. Colzey, 47 Ga. 122 (1872); Prentice v. Elliott, 72 Ga. 154 (1883); Adkins v. Hutchings, 79 Ga. 260, 4 S.E. 887 (1887); McCarthy v. Nixon Grocery Co., 126 Ga. 762, 56 S.E. 72 (1906); Wimbush v. Curry, 8 Ga. App. 223, 68 S.E. 951 (1910); McCluskey v. Still, 32 Ga. App. 641, 124 S.E. 548 (1924); Donalsonville Chevrolet Co. v. Dickenson, 41 Ga. App. 392, 153 S.E. 106 (1930); Mendenhall v. Nalley, 81 Ga. App. 517, 59 S.E.2d 283 (1950); Housing Auth. v. New, 220 Ga. 1, 136 S.E.2d 732 (1964); Gregory v. Townsend Roofing Co., 163 Ga. App. 836, 296 S.E.2d 154 (1982); Belvin v. Houston Fertilizer & Grain Co., 169 Ga. App. 100, 311 S.E.2d 526 (1983); C & H Couriers, Inc. v. American Mut. Ins. Co., 170 Ga. App. 684, 318 S.E.2d 77 (1984); Lee v. Fuerst & Davis, 173 Ga. App. 362, 326 S.E.2d 482 (1985); King v. AMOCO, 182 Ga. App. 838, 357 S.E.2d 291 (1987); National Cos. Health Benefit Plan v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 929 F.2d 1558 (11th Cir. 1991); Lundy v. Low, 200 Ga. App. 332, 408 S.E.2d 144 (1991); Stedry v. Mitchell, 201 Ga. App. 682, 411 S.E.2d 735 (1991); Tom Barrow Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 205 Ga. App. 10, 421 S.E.2d 85 (1992); Dalcor Mgt., Inc. v. Sewer Rooter, Inc., 205 Ga. App. 681, 423 S.E.2d 419 (1992); Contract Sales & Serv. Int'l, Inc. v. American Express Travel Related Servs. Co., 216 Ga. App. 61, 453 S.E.2d 62 (1994); Crotts Enters., Inc. v. John Payne Co., 219 Ga. App. 173, 464 S.E.2d 844 (1995); Haughton v. Namano, Inc., 222 Ga. App. 644, 476 S.E.2d 31 (1996); Sanders v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 226 Ga. App. 119, 485 S.E.2d 264 (1997); Owens v. McGee & Oxford, 238 Ga. App. 497, 518 S.E.2d 699 (1999); Colonial Bank v. Boulder Bankcard Processing, Inc., 254 Ga. App. 686, 563 S.E.2d 492 (2002); Imex Int'l v. Wires Eng'g, 261 Ga. App. 329, 583 S.E.2d 117 (2003); Schoenbaum Ltd. Co., LLC v. Lenox Pines, LLC, 262 Ga. App. 457, 585 S.E.2d 643 (2003); Kitchen Int'l, Inc. v. Evans Cabinet Corp., 310 Ga. App. 648, 714 S.E.2d 139 (2011).
Prejudgment Interest
Error in calculating pre-judgment interest.
- Because the trial court in an action involving a tax lien encumbrance erred in calculating pre-judgment interest pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 7-4-16, which applies to commercial accounts, remand for re-calculation based on O.C.G.A. § 7-4-15 was required. Homeland Communities, Inc. v. Rahall & Fryer, 235 Ga. App. 440, 509 S.E.2d 714 (1998).
Trial court erred in modifying a judgment to add prejudgment interest as the court could not award prejudgment interest for the debt which was based on a contract claim, an asset purchase agreement; therefore, the debt was not a commercial debt to which O.C.G.A. § 7-4-16 applied. Capital Cargo, Inc. v. Port of Port Royal, 261 Ga. App. 803, 584 S.E.2d 54 (2003).
In the action involving the City of Griffin and the Commissioners of the Board of Commissioners of Spalding County in which an unlawful tax was alleged, the trial court improperly assessed prejudgment interest under O.C.G.A. § 7-4-16 because that statute applied only to commercial accounts. McDaniel v. City of Griffin, 281 Ga. App. 350, 636 S.E.2d 62 (2006).
Heating system installer's invoices did not specify terms per O.C.G.A. § 7-4-16 as the invoice did not define the interest sought as that applicable to commercial accounts, and did not list a specific rate of interest; therefore, the trial court erred when the court granted prejudgment interest at the rate allowed by that statute. Carrier Corp. v. Rollins, Inc., 316 Ga. App. 630, 730 S.E.2d 103 (2012).
When contract specified no rate of interest and complaint merely prayed for "interest" without specifying the rate thereof, pre-judgment interest only at the applicable "legal rate" of seven percent was authorized pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 7-4-2(a)(1). Gold Kist Peanuts v. Alberson, 178 Ga. App. 253, 342 S.E.2d 694 (1986).
Request for prejudgment interest must be specific.
- If the rate allowed under O.C.G.A. § 7-4-16 is sought before trial, the trial court is authorized to grant pre-judgment interest at that rate, but the request must specify the interest rate sought. Spears v. Allied Eng'g Assocs., 186 Ga. App. 878, 368 S.E.2d 818 (1988).
Defendant was not entitled to pre-judgment interest under O.C.G.A. § 7-4-16 on the defendant's suit on account counterclaim because the defendant did not comply with the requirement that a commercial creditor make a pre-trial invocation of the applicability of that provision (while the standard terms and conditions provided that outstanding amounts would bear one and a half percent interest, it did not apply to the debts underlying the defendant's counterclaim); the defendant's pre-trial efforts to seek interest under O.C.G.A. § 7-4-16 did not specify the rate of interest being sought. Discrete Wireless, Inc. v. Coleman Techs., Inc., F.3d (11th Cir. Apr. 5, 2011)(Unpublished).
Prejudgment interest not excessive.
- Prejudgment interest based on unpaid rent and unpaid taxes was not excessive. Georgia Color Farms, Inc. v. K.K.L., Ltd. Partnership, 234 Ga. App. 849, 507 S.E.2d 817 (1998).
Prejudgment interest on invoices.
- Invoices which were a liquidated debt on a commercial account were subject to prejudgment interest. Trebor Corp. v. Nutmeg Indus., Inc., 208 Ga. App. 697, 431 S.E.2d 402 (1993).
Prejudgment interest awarded by a jury in an action on an account should have been stricken by a trial judge because a fixed sum was owed by a purchaser and the fact that the jury did not award the entire amount sought did not make the damages unliquidated; further, the parties stipulated that interest under O.C.G.A. § 7-4-16 was a matter for the court to decide. Kroger Co. v. U.S. Foodservice of Atlanta, Inc., 270 Ga. App. 525, 607 S.E.2d 177 (2004).
Post-judgment interest.
- A commercial account is not, by virtue of O.C.G.A. § 7-4-16, transformed into such an "obligation" as would come within the exception to the standard post-judgment interest rate of 12 percent per year that is established by O.C.G.A. § 7-4-12. ADC Constr. Co. v. Hall, 202 Ga. App. 119, 413 S.E.2d 522 (1991).
O.C.G.A. § 7-4-16 does not authorize a creditor to recover both pre-judgment and post-judgment interest at the same rate. It would only permit creditor to recover pre-judgment interest at a rate which is "greater than the post-judgment rate" of 12 percent per year that "all judgments in this state shall bear" pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 7-4-12. ADC Constr. Co. v. Hall, 202 Ga. App. 119, 413 S.E.2d 522 (1991).
Portion awarding interest in a foreclosure judgment was vacated and the case remanded for recalculation of the interest rate pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 7-4-2 because § 7-4-2 governed the rate of interest in contracts when the interest rate was not specified and since the maximum legal rate specified in the declaration, which was not a commercial account, was not definite and ascertainable, the trial court erred in awarding 18 percent interest rather than the seven percent. Northside Bank v. Mountainbrook of Bartow County Homeowners Ass'n, 338 Ga. App. 126, 789 S.E.2d 378 (2016).
Procedure
In the absence of a liquidated demand, O.C.G.A. § 7-4-16 is inapplicable. Typo-Repro Servs., Inc. v. Bishop, 188 Ga. App. 576, 373 S.E.2d 758 (1988).
When there was a question of adequate statement of account regarding charges to a subcontractor, the debts were not liquidated because it was not certain how much was due to the general contractor from the subcontractor. American Aluminum Prods. Co. v. Binswanger Glass Co., 194 Ga. App. 703, 391 S.E.2d 688 (1990).
Pretrial pleading is an adequate means of invoking O.C.G.A. § 7-4-16. Jack V. Heard Contractors, Inc. v. Moriarity, 185 Ga. App. 317, 363 S.E.2d 822 (1987).
Request for repudiation must be specific.
- When a sales contract was not repudiated, and the due date was not extended as to any of the invoices at issue, the statute of limitations began to run on the date the last invoice was received; a letter requesting an offset did not qualify as repudiation since the letter only requested, but did not condition repayment upon an offset. Advance Tufting, Inc. v. Daneshyar, 259 Ga. App. 415, 577 S.E.2d 90 (2003).
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Unpaid interest as liquidated demand.
- When a commercial account provides that unpaid interest becomes a "liquidated demand," such interest may be treated as part of that portion of the account which has been due and payable, within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 7-4-16; when such interest has been due and payable for 30 days or more, it may itself accrue interest at the contract rate. 1983 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U83-9.
ADVISORY OPINIONS OF THE STATE BAR
Interest charged by attorneys on overdue bills.
- State Disciplinary Board is of the opinion that an attorney may ethically unilaterally charge interest on client's overdue bills. A lawyer may ethically do so provided that the lawyer complies with all applicable law, specifically O.C.G.A. § 7-4-16, the Federal Truth in Lending and Fair Credit Billing Acts contained in Title I of the Consumer Credit Protection Act as amended (15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq.) and EC 2-19. Adv. Op. No. 85-45 (March 15, 1985).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
C.J.S.
- 47 C.J.S., Interest and Usury; Consumer Credit, § 101.