(a) The following system of records is exempted pursuant to the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) from subsections (c) (3) and (4), (d), (e)(1), (2), (3), (5), and (8), and (g) of 5 U.S.C. 552a. In addition, the following system of records is exempted pursuant to the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(1) and (k)(2) from subsections (c)(3), (d), and (e)(1) of 5 U.S.C. 552a:
(1) Office of the Inspector General Investigative Records (JUSTICE/OIG-001).
These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in this system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a (j)(2), (k)(1) and (k)(2). Where compliance would not appear to interfere with or adversely affect the law enforcement process, and/or where it may be appropriate to permit individuals to contest the accuracy of the information collected, e.g., public source materials, the applicable exemption may be waived, either partially or totally, by the Office of the Inspector General (OIG).
(b) Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for the following reasons:
(1) From subsection (c)(3) because release of disclosure accounting could alert the subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of the investigation and the fact that they are subjects of the investigation, and reveal investigative interest by not only the OIG, but also by the recipient agency. Since release of such information to the subjects of an investigation would provide them with significant information concerning the nature of the investigation, release could result in the destruction of documentary evidence, improper influencing of witnesses, endangerment of the physical safety of confidential sources, witnesses, and law enforcement personnel, the fabrication of testimony, flight of the subject from the area, and other activities that could impede or compromise the investigation. In addition, accounting for each disclosure could result in the release of properly classified information which would compromise the national defense or disrupt foreign policy.
(2) From subsection (c)(4) because this system is exempt from the access provisions of subsection (d) pursuant to subsections (j) and (k) of the Privacy Act.
(3) From the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d) because access to the records contained in this system of records could inform the subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or regulatory violation, of the existence of that investigation; of the nature and scope of the information and evidence obtained as to his activities; of the identity of confidential sources, witnesses, and law enforcement personnel, and of information that may enable the subject to avoid detection or apprehension. These factors would present a serious impediment to effective law enforcement where they prevent the successful completion of the investigation, endanger the physical safety of confidential sources, witnesses, and law enforcement personnel, and/or lead to the improper influencing of witnesses, the destruction of evidence, or the fabrication of testimony. In addition, granting access to such information could disclose security-sensitive or confidential business information or information that would constitute an unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of third parties. Finally, access to the records could result in the release of properly classified information which would compromise the national defense or disrupt foreign policy. Amendment of the records would interfere with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring investigations to be continuously reinvestigated.
(4) From subsection (e)(1) because the application of this provision could impair investigations and interfere with the law enforcement responsibilities of the OIG for the following reasons:
(i) It is not possible to detect relevance or necessity of specific information in the early stages of a civil, criminal or other law enforcement investigation, case, or matter, including investigations in which use is made of properly classified information. Relevance and necessity are questions of judgment and timing, and it is only after the information is evaluated that the relevance and necessity of such information can be established.
(ii) During the course of any investigation, the OIG may obtain information concerning actual or potential violations of laws other than those within the scope of its jurisdiction. In the interest of effective law enforcement, the OIG should retain this information, as it may aid in establishing patterns of criminal activity, and can provide valuable leads for Federal and other law enforcement agencies.
(iii) In interviewing individuals or obtaining other forms of evidence during an investigation, information may be supplied to an investigator which relates to matters incidental to the primary purpose of the investigation but which may relate also to matters under the investigative jurisdiction of another agency. Such information cannot readily be segregated.
(5) From subsection (e)(2) because, in some instances, the application of this provision would present a serious impediment to law enforcement for the following reasons:
(i) The subject of an investigation would be placed on notice as to the existence of an investigation and would therefore be able to avoid detection or apprehension, to improperly influence witnesses, to destroy evidence, or to fabricate testimony.
(ii) In certain circumstances the subject of an investigation cannot be required to provide information to investigators, and information relating to a subject's illegal acts, violations of rules of conduct, or any other misconduct must be obtained from other sources.
(iii) In any investigation it is necessary to obtain evidence from a variety of sources other than the subject of the investigation in order to verify the evidence necessary for successful litigation.
(6) From subsection (e)(3) because the application of this provision would provide the subject of an investigation with substantial information which could impede or compromise the investigation. Providing such notice to a subject of an investigation could interfere with an undercover investigation by revealing its existence, and could endanger the physical safety of confidential sources, witnesses, and investigators by revealing their identities.
(7) From subsection (e)(5) because the application of this provision would prevent the collection of any data not shown to be accurate, relevant, timely, and complete at the moment it is collected. In the collection of information for law enforcement purposes, it is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate, relevant, timely, and complete. Material which may seem unrelated, irrelevant, or incomplete when collected may take on added meaning or significance as an investigation progresses. The restrictions of this provision could interfere with the preparation of a complete investigative report, and thereby impede effective law enforcement.
(8) From subsection (e)(8) because the application of this provision could prematurely reveal an ongoing criminal investigation to the subject of the investigation, and could reveal investigative techniques, procedures, or evidence.
(9) From subsection (g) to the extent that this system is exempt from the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d) pursuant to subsections (j)(2) and (k)(1) and (k)(2) of the Privacy Act.
(c) The Data Analytics Program Records System (JUSTICE/OIG-006) system of records is exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) and (4); (d); (e)(1), (2), (3), (5) and (8); and (g) of the Privacy Act. These exemptions apply only to the extent that information in this system is subject to exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j) and/or (k). Where compliance would not appear to interfere with or adversely affect the law enforcement process, and/or where it may be appropriate to permit individuals to contest the accuracy of the information collected, e.g., public source materials, the applicable exemption may be waived, either partially or totally, by OIG.
(d) Exemptions from the particular subsections are justified for the following reasons:
(1) From subsection (c)(3), the requirement that an accounting be made available to the named subject of a record, because release of disclosure accounting could alert the subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of an investigation and the fact that the individual is the subject of the investigation. Such a disclosure could also reveal investigative interests by not only OIG, but also by the recipient agency or component. Since release of such information to the subjects of an investigation would provide them with significant information concerning the nature of the investigation, release could result in the destruction of documentary evidence, improper influencing of witnesses, endangerment of the physical safety of confidential sources, witnesses, and law enforcement personnel, the fabrication of testimony, flight of the subject from the area, and other activities that could impede or compromise the investigation. In addition, providing the individual an accounting for each disclosure could result in the release of properly classified information which would compromise the national defense or disrupt foreign policy.
(2) From subsection (c)(4) notification requirements, for the same reasons that justify exempting this system from the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d), and similarly, from the accounting of disclosures provision of subsection (c)(3). The DOJ takes seriously its obligation to maintain accurate records despite its assertion of this exemption, and to the extent it, in its sole discretion, agrees to permit amendment or correction of DOJ records, it will share that information in appropriate cases.
(3) From subsection (d), the access and amendment provisions, because access to the records contained in this system of records could inform the subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or regulatory violation, of the existence of the investigation; of the nature and scope of the information and evidence obtained as to the subject's activities; of the identity of confidential sources, witnesses, and law enforcement personnel, and of information that may enable the subject to avoid detection or apprehension. These factors would present a serious impediment to effective law enforcement where they prevent the successful completion of the investigation, endanger the physical safety of confidential sources, witnesses, and law enforcement personnel, and/or lead to the improper influencing of witnesses, the destruction of evidence, or the fabrication of testimony. In addition, granting access to such information could disclose security-sensitive or confidential business information or information that would constitute an unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of third parties. Finally, access to the records could result in the release of properly classified information that would compromise the national defense or disrupt foreign policy. Amendment of the records would interfere with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities and impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring investigations to be continuously reinvestigated.
(4) From subsection (e)(1), because the application of this provision could impair investigations and interfere with the law enforcement responsibilities of the OIG for the following reasons:
(i) It is not possible to determine the relevance or necessity of specific information in the early stages of a civil, criminal or other law enforcement investigation, case, or matter, including investigations in which use is made of properly classified information. Relevance and necessity are questions of judgment and timing, and it is only after the information is evaluated that the relevance and necessity of such information can be established.
(ii) During the course of any investigation, the OIG may obtain information concerning actual or potential violations of laws other than those within the scope of its jurisdiction. In the interest of effective law enforcement, the OIG should retain this information in accordance with applicable record retention procedures, as it may aid in establishing patterns of criminal activity, and can provide valuable leads for Federal and other law enforcement agencies.
(iii) In interviewing individuals or obtaining other forms of evidence during an investigation, information may be supplied to an investigator which relates to matters incidental to the primary purpose of the investigation but which may also relate to matters under the investigative jurisdiction of another agency. Such information cannot readily be segregated.
(5) From subsection (e)(2), because, in some instances, the application of this provision would present a serious impediment to law enforcement for the following reasons:
(i) The subject of an investigation would be placed on notice as to the existence of an investigation and would therefore be able to avoid detection or apprehension, to improperly influence witnesses, to destroy evidence, or to fabricate testimony.
(ii) In certain circumstances the subject of an investigation cannot be required to provide information to investigators, and information relating to a subject's illegal acts, violations of rules of conduct, or any other misconduct must be obtained from other sources.
(iii) In any investigation it is necessary to obtain evidence from a variety of sources other than the subject of the investigation in order to verify the evidence necessary for successful litigation.
(6) From subsection (e)(3), because the application of this provision would provide the subject of an investigation with substantial information which could impede or compromise the investigation. Providing such notice to a subject of an investigation could interfere with an undercover investigation by revealing its existence, and could endanger the physical safety of confidential sources, witnesses, and investigators by revealing their identities.
(7) From subsection (e)(5), because the application of this provision would prevent the collection of any data not shown to be accurate, relevant, timely, and complete at the moment it is collected. In the collection of information for law enforcement purposes, it is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate, relevant, timely, and complete. Material that may seem unrelated, irrelevant, or incomplete when collected may take on added meaning or significance as an investigation progresses. The restrictions of this provision could interfere with the preparation of a complete investigative report, and thereby impede effective law enforcement.
(8) From subsection (e)(8), because to require individual notice of disclosure of information due to compulsory legal process would pose an impossible administrative burden on OIG and may alert the subjects of law enforcement investigations, who might be otherwise unaware, to the fact of those investigations. Such notice could also reveal investigative techniques, procedures, or evidence.
(9) From subsection (g), to the extent that this system is exempt from the access and amendment provisions of subsection (d), pursuant to subsections (j)(2), (k)(1), and (k)(2) of the Privacy Act.
[Order No. 63-92, 57 FR 8263, Mar. 9, 1992, as amended by Order No. 64-92, 57 FR 8263, Mar. 9, 1992; AG Order No. 006-2018, 83 FR 66126, Dec. 26, 2018]