The Secretary of Energy, acting through the Administrator, shall establish a stewardship program to ensure-
(1) the preservation of the core intellectual and technical competencies of the United States in nuclear weapons, including weapons design, system integration, manufacturing, security, use control, reliability assessment, and certification; and
(2) that the nuclear weapons stockpile is safe, secure, and reliable without the use of underground nuclear weapons testing.
The program shall include the following:
(1) An increased level of effort for advanced computational capabilities to enhance the simulation and modeling capabilities of the United States with respect to the performance over time of nuclear weapons.
(2) An increased level of effort for above-ground experimental programs, such as hydrotesting, high-energy lasers, inertial confinement fusion, plasma physics, and materials research.
(3) Support for new facilities construction projects that contribute to the experimental capabilities of the United States, such as an advanced hydrodynamics facility, the National Ignition Facility, and other facilities for above-ground experiments to assess nuclear weapons effects.
(4) Support for the use of, and experiments facilitated by, the advanced experimental facilities of the United States, including-
(A) the National Ignition Facility at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory;
(B) the Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory;
(C) the Z Machine at Sandia National Laboratories; and
(D) the experimental facilities at the Nevada National Security Site.
(5) Support for the sustainment and modernization of facilities with production and manufacturing capabilities that are necessary to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile, including-
(A) the nuclear weapons production facilities; and
(B) production and manufacturing capabilities resident in the national security laboratories.
(
Section was formerly set out as a note under section 2121 of Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare, prior to renumbering by
2013-Subsec. (a).
Subsec. (b)(4)(D).
Subsec. (b)(5).
"(A) the Pantex Plant;
"(B) the Y–12 National Security Complex;
"(C) the Kansas City Plant;
"(D) the Savannah River Site; and".
Subsec. (b)(5)(E).
2009-Subsec. (a).
Subsec. (b)(1).
Subsec. (b)(4), (5).
Subsec. (c).
1997-Subsec. (d).
"(a)
"(1) In January 2016, the co-chairs of a congressionally mandated study panel from the National Academies of Science testified to the following before the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives:
"(A) 'The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) complex must engage in robust design competitions in order to exercise the design and production skills that underpin stockpile stewardship and are necessary to meet evolving threats.'.
"(B) 'To exercise the full set of design skills necessary for an effective nuclear deterrent, the NNSA should develop and conduct the first in what the committee envisions to be a series of design competitions that integrate the full end-to-end process from novel design conception through engineering, building, and non-nuclear testing of a prototype.'.
"(2) In March 2016 testimony before the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives regarding a December 2016 Defense Science Board report entitled, 'Seven Defense Priorities for the New Administration', members of that Board said the following:
"(A) 'A key contributor to nuclear deterrence is the continuous, adaptable exercise of the development, design, and production functions for nuclear weapons in both the DOD and DOE. . . . Yet the DOE laboratories and DOD contractor community have done little integrated design and development work outside of life extension for 25 years, let alone concept development that could serve as a hedge to surprise.'.
"(B) 'The Defense Science Board believes that the triad's complementary features remain robust tenets for the design of a future force. Replacing our current, aging force is essential, but not sufficient in the more complex nuclear environment we now face to provide the adaptability or flexibility to confidently hold at risk what adversaries value. In particular, if the threat evolves in ways that favorably change the cost/benefit calculus in the view of an adversary's leadership, then we should be in a position to quickly restore a credible deterrence posture.'.
"(3) In a memorandum dated May 9, 2014, then-Secretary of Energy Ernie Moniz said the following:
"(A) 'If nuclear military capabilities are to provide deterrence for the nation they need to be relevant to the emerging global strategic environment. The current stockpile was designed to meet the needs of a bipolar world with roots in the Cold War era. A more complex, chaotic, and dynamic security environment is emerging. In order to uphold the Department's mission to ensure an effective nuclear deterrent. . . . we must ensure our nuclear capabilities meet the challenges of known and potential geopolitical and technological trends. Therefore we must look ahead, using the expertise of our laboratories, to how the capabilities that may be employed by other nations could impact deterrence over the next several decades.'.
"(B) 'We must challenge our thinking about our programs of record in order to permit foresighted actions that may reduce, in the coming decades, the chances for surprise and that buttress deterrence.'.
"(b)
"(1)
"(A) examine options for warhead design and related delivery system requirements in the 2030s, including-
"(i) life extension of existing weapons;
"(ii) new capabilities; and
"(iii) such other concepts as the Administrator and the Chairman determine necessary to fully exercise and create responsive design capabilities in the enterprise and ensure a robust nuclear deterrent into the 2030s;
"(B) assess how the capabilities and defenses that may be employed by other countries could impact deterrence in 2030 and beyond and how such threats could be addressed or mitigated in the warhead and related delivery systems;
"(C) exercise the full set of design skills necessary for an effective nuclear deterrent and responsive enterprise through production of conceptual designs and, as the Administrator determines appropriate, production of non-nuclear prototypes of components or subsystems; and
"(D) examine and recommend actions for significantly shortening timelines and significantly reducing costs associated with design, development, certification, and production of the warhead, without reducing worker or public health and safety.
"(2)
"(A) during fiscal year 2018, develop a plan to carry out paragraph (1); and
"(B) during fiscal year 2019, implement such plan.
"(c)
"(a)
"(b)
"(1) the development of a prototype exascale computer for the stockpile stewardship program; and
"(2) mitigating disruptions resulting from the transition to exascale computing.
"(c)
"(d)
"(1) address, in the estimated expenditures and proposed appropriations reflected in each future-years nuclear security program submitted under section 3253 of the National Nuclear Security Administration Act (50 U.S.C. 2453) during the 10-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act, the costs of-
"(A) developing exascale computing and incorporating such computing into the stockpile stewardship program; and
"(B) mitigating potential disruptions resulting from the transition to exascale computing; and
"(2) include in each such future-years nuclear security program a description of the costs of efforts to develop exascale computing borne by the National Nuclear Security Administration, the Office of Science of the Department of Energy, other Federal agencies, and private industry.
"(e)
"(f)