980.09 Petition for discharge.
(1) A committed person may petition the committing court for discharge at any time. The court shall deny the petition under this section without a hearing unless the petition alleges facts from which the court or jury would likely conclude the person's condition has changed since the most recent order denying a petition for discharge after a hearing on the merits, or since the date of his or her initial commitment order if the person has never received a hearing on the merits of a discharge petition, so that the person no longer meets the criteria for commitment as a sexually violent person.
(1m)
(a) If the person files a petition for discharge under sub. (1) without counsel, the court shall serve a copy of the petition and any supporting documents on the district attorney or department of justice, whichever is applicable. If the person petitions for discharge under sub. (1) through counsel, his or her attorney shall serve the district attorney or department of justice, whichever is applicable.
(b) If the person files a petition for a discharge under sub. (1) without counsel, as soon as circumstances permit, the court shall refer the matter to the authority for indigency determinations under s. 977.07 (1) and appointment of counsel under s. 977.05 (4) (j).
(c) If a person files a petition for discharge under sub. (1), the person may use experts or professional persons to support his or her petition. The district attorney or the department of justice may use experts or professional persons to support or oppose any petition filed under sub. (1).
(d) After receiving a petition for discharge under sub. (1) and upon the request of the person filing the petition, unless the court previously appointed an examiner under s. 980.031 (3) or 980.07 (1) for the current reexamination period, the court shall appoint for the person an examiner having the specialized knowledge determined by the court to be appropriate. If an examination conducted under s. 980.07 (1) within the 6 months preceding the filing of the petition supports discharge, the court may appoint the examiner who conducted that examination as the examiner for the person. The examiner shall have reasonable access to the person for purposes of examination and to the person's past and present treatment records, as defined in s. 51.30 (1) (b), and patient health care records, as provided in s. 146.82 (2) (c). The county shall pay the costs of an examiner appointed under this paragraph as provided under s. 51.20 (18) (a).
(2) In reviewing the petition, the court may hold a hearing to determine if the person's condition has sufficiently changed such that a court or jury would likely conclude the person no longer meets the criteria for commitment as a sexually violent person. In determining under this subsection whether the person's condition has sufficiently changed such that a court or jury would likely conclude that the person no longer meets the criteria for commitment, the court may consider the record, including evidence introduced at the initial commitment trial or the most recent trial on a petition for discharge, any current or past reports filed under s. 980.07, relevant facts in the petition and in the state's written response, arguments of counsel, and any supporting documentation provided by the person or the state. If the court determines that the record does not contain facts from which a court or jury would likely conclude that the person no longer meets the criteria for commitment, the court shall deny the petition. If the court determines that the record contains facts from which a court or jury would likely conclude the person no longer meets the criteria for commitment, the court shall set the matter for trial.
(3) The court shall hold a trial within 90 days of the determination that the person's condition has sufficiently changed such that a court or jury would likely conclude that the person no longer meets the criteria for commitment as a sexually violent person. At trial, the state has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the person meets the criteria for commitment as a sexually violent person.
(4) If the court or jury is satisfied that the state has not met its burden of proof under sub. (3), the person shall be discharged from the custody of the department. If the court or jury is satisfied that the state has met its burden of proof under sub. (3), the court shall proceed under s. 980.08 (4) to determine whether to modify the person's existing commitment order by authorizing supervised release, unless the person waives consideration of the criteria in s. 980.08 (4) (cg). If the person waives consideration of these criteria, the waiver is a denial of supervised release for purposes of s. 980.08 (1).
(5) If a court orders discharge of a committed person under this section, the court shall stay the execution of the order so that the department may comply with its statutory duties under s. 980.11 (2) and (3). The stay of execution may not exceed 10 working days and shall be for as short a period as necessary to permit the department to comply with s. 980.11 (2) and (3).
History: 1993 a. 479; 1999 a. 9; 2003 a. 187; 2005 a. 434; 2013 a. 84 ss. 10 to 12, 21 to 25; 2013 a. 168 s. 20.
Persons committed under ch. 980 must be afforded the right to request a jury for discharge hearings under this section. State v. Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279, 541 N.W.2d 115 (1995), 94-2356.
Progress in treatment is one way of showing that a person is not still a sexually violent person under [former] sub. (2) (a). A new diagnosis is another. A new diagnosis need not attack the original finding that an individual was sexually violent, but focuses on the present and is evidence of whether an individual is still a sexually violent person. State v. Pocan, 2003 WI App 233, 267 Wis. 2d 953, 671 N.W.2d 680, 02-3342.
Under sub. (1), the circuit court engages in a paper review of the petition only, including its attachments, to determine whether it alleges facts from which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the petitioner does not meet the criteria for commitment as a sexually violent person. This review is a limited one aimed at assessing the sufficiency of the allegations in the petition. If the petition does allege sufficient facts, the circuit court proceeds to a review under sub. (2). State v. Arends, 2010 WI 46, 325 Wis. 2d 1, 784 N.W.2d 513, 08-0052.
Sub. (2) requires the circuit court to review specific items enumerated in that subsection. The court need not seek out items not already within the record. Nevertheless, it may request additional enumerated items not previously submitted, and also has the discretion to conduct a hearing to aid in its determination. The court's task is to determine whether the petition and the additional supporting materials before it contain facts from which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the petitioner does not meet the criteria for commitment as a sexually violent person. State v. Arends, 2010 WI 46, 325 Wis. 2d 1, 784 N.W.2d 513, 08-0052.
Sub. (2) explicitly prescribes a different procedure than that for summary judgment set forth in s. 802.08. As such, summary judgment is not available in discharge proceedings under this section. The state's burden of proof is implicated only during a hearing under sub. (3). When a trial court granted summary judgment prior to a hearing under sub. (3), no one could say with any certainty whether the state possessed enough evidence to meet its burden of proof. State v. Allison, 2010 WI App 103, 329 Wis. 2d 129, 789 N.W.2d 120, 09-1232.
A research paper is not sufficient evidence to demonstrate that a sex offender's condition has changed. New actuarial research, absent a psychological examination, is not enough to demonstrate that an offender is no longer a sexually violent person. State v. Richard, 2011 WI App 66, 333 Wis. 2d 708, 799 N.W.2d 509, 10-1188.
The only reasonable construction of the “condition has changed" in sub. (1) is that it encompasses all the changes that a fact finder could determine result in the person not meeting the criteria for commitment as a sexually violent person. This language includes not only a change in the person himself or herself, but also a change in the professional knowledge or research used to evaluate a person's mental disorder or dangerousness if the change is such that a fact finder could conclude the person does not meet the criteria for commitment. The circuit court may not deny a discharge petition without a hearing if the petition alleges facts from which a fact finder could determine that, as a result of any one of those changes, the person does not meet the criteria for a sexually violent person. State v. Ermers, 2011 WI App 113, 336 Wis. 2d 451, 802 N.W.2d 540, 10-2634.
When determining whether to hold a hearing on a petition for discharge, the circuit court must determine whether the petitioner has set forth new evidence, not considered by a prior trier of fact, from which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the petitioner does not meet the criteria for commitment as a sexually violent person. An expert's opinion that is not based on some new fact, new professional knowledge, or new research is not sufficient for a new discharge hearing under sub. (2). A doctor's further reflection on past scoring of a test is not sufficient for a new discharge hearing because it is not new professional knowledge or research about how to predict dangerousness. State v. Schulpius, 2012 WI App 134, 345 Wis. 2d 351, 825 N.W.2d 311, 11-2565.
A petition alleging a change in a sexually violent person's status based upon a change in the research or writings on how professionals are to interpret and score actuarial instruments is sufficient for a petitioner to receive a discharge hearing, if it is properly supported by a psychological evaluation applying the new research. State v. Richard, 2014 WI App 28, 353 Wis. 2d 219, 844 N.W.2d 370, 12-2748.
The clear and convincing evidence standard under sub. (3) satisfies due process at a ch. 980 discharge trial. State v. Talley, 2015 WI App 4, 359 Wis. 2d 522, 859 N.W.2d 155, 13-0492.
The petitioner's socializing more with peers, joining a fitness group, and increased communication from family members were not changes from which a factfinder could determine that the petitioner was no longer a sexually violent person. These facts, which resulted in no change to the evaluating psychologist's ultimate conclusion or overall risk assessment, were not enough to satisfy the statutory threshold for a discharge hearing set forth in sub. (2), 2011 stats. State v. Talley, 2017 WI 21, 373 Wis. 2d 610, 891 N.W.2d 390, 13-0950.
Sub. (4) (d), (e), and (em) requires more than a formalistic general report on the physical residence slated for placement. The statute contemplates that the Department of Health Services will work with local law enforcement and the county entities and seek advice about a proposed placement of a particular sexually violent person in order to draft the supervised release plan. State v. McGee, 2017 WI App 39, 376 Wis. 2d 413, 899 N.W.2d 396, 16-1082.
This section vests in the county of intended placement an interest in supervised release proceedings as a matter of right; the county has the absolute right to be a party to the action. The county also has a substantial interest in the well-being of the residents and property located within its boundaries. Those interests would be impaired if a court denied intervention. State v. McGee, 2017 WI App 39, 376 Wis. 2d 413, 899 N.W.2d 396, 16-1082.
Sub. (2) allows a circuit court to consider the entire record — not just the facts favorable to the petitioner — when determining whether the statutory criteria for a discharge trial have been met. A circuit court may carefully examine those portions of the record the court considers helpful to its consideration of the petition, which may include facts both favorable and unfavorable to the petitioner. State v. Hager, 2018 WI 40, 381 Wis. 2d 74, 911 N.W.2d 17, 15-0330.
2013 Wis. Act 84 increased the burden of production under sub. (2) necessary for a committed individual to receive a discharge trial. The burden of production is a procedural matter that does not implicate a committed person's fundamental right to freedom from bodily restraint and does not violate the right to due process. State v. Hager, 2018 WI 40, 381 Wis. 2d 74, 911 N.W.2d 17, 15-0330.