(2) The following periods of delay shall be excluded from the 91-day period within which the court must issue a final order on a petition:
(a) Any period of delay resulting from a motion properly before the court; or
(b) Any reasonable period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the court on the court’s own motion or at the request of one of the parties, if the court granted the continuance on the basis of findings that the ends of justice served by granting the continuance outweigh the best interest of the public and the parties in having a decision within 91 days.
(3) No period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the court under subsection (2)(b) of this section shall be excludable under this section unless the court sets forth, in the record, either orally or in writing, its reasons for finding that the ends of justice served by granting the continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the other parties in a decision within the 91 days. The factors the court shall consider in determining whether to grant a continuance under subsection (2)(b) of this section in any case are as follows:
(a) Whether the failure to grant a continuance in the proceeding would be likely to make a continuation of the proceeding impossible or result in a miscarriage of justice; or
(b) Whether the case is so unusual or so complex, due to the number of parties or the existence of novel questions of fact or law, that it is unreasonable to expect adequate consideration of the issues within the 91-day time limit.
(4) No continuance under subsection (2)(b) of this section shall be granted because of general congestion of the court calendar or lack of diligent preparation or attention to the case by any member of the court or any party. [1983 c.827 §35a]