Appeals from superintendent.

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Any order made by the superintendent pursuant to Section 59A-17-34 NMSA 1978, or by the superintendent's refusal to hold a hearing, shall be subject to review by appeal to the court of appeals. The decision of the superintendent shall be set aside only if it is shown that the decision is arbitrary or capricious or reflects an abuse of discretion; is not supported by substantial evidence; or is otherwise not in accordance with the law. Upon institution of the appeal and for good cause shown upon motion and hearing, the court may, in the following cases, stay operation of the superintendent's order:

A. where, pursuant to the Insurance Rate Regulation Law, an advisory organization has been refused a license or an insurer has been refused a certificate of authority or had its license or certificate of authority suspended, it may, with leave of court, be allowed to continue to engage in business, subject to the provisions of the Insurance Rate Regulation Law, pending final disposition of its application for review; or

B. where any order of the superintendent shall provide for a change in a rate or rating system that results in an increase or decrease in rates, an insurer affected may, with leave of court pending final disposition of the proceedings in the court of appeals, continue to charge rates that existed prior to the order, on condition that the difference in the rates be deposited in a special escrow or trust account with a reputable financial institution by the insurer affected, to be held in trust by the insurer and to be retained by the insurer or paid to the holders of policies issued after the order of the court, as the court may determine.

History: Laws 1984, ch. 127, § 330; 1990, ch. 110, § 2; 1998, ch. 55, § 63; 1999, ch. 265, § 67; 1999, ch. 289, § 26; 2007, ch. 367, § 34; 2013, ch. 74, § 21.

ANNOTATIONS

Cross references. — For procedures governing administrative appeals to the district court, see Rule 1-074 NMRA.

The 2013 amendment, effective March 29, 2013, provided for appeals from decisions of the superintendent of insurance; in the title, deleted "commission" and added "superintendent"; in the introductory paragraph, in the first sentence, after "order made by the", deleted "commission" and added "superintendent", after "NMSA 1978", added "or by the superintendent's refusal to hold a hearing", after "appeal to the", deleted "district", and after "appeal to the court", deleted "pursuant to the provisions of Section 39-3-1.1 NMSA 1978" and added "of appeals", added the second sentence, and in the third sentence, after "stay operation of the" deleted "commission's" and added "superintendent's"; and in Subsection B, after "any order of the", deleted "commission" and added "superintendent", after "shall provide for", deleted "or sustain the superintendent's order for", after "the proceedings in the", deleted "district", and after "proceedings in the court", added "of appeals".

The 2007 amendment, effective July 1, 2007, changed "rate service organizations" to "advisory organizations".

The 1999 amendment, effective June 18, 1999, substituted references to the public regulation commission for references to the insurance board throughout the section and updated the second statutory reference in the introductory language.

The 1998 amendment, effective September 1, 1998, rewrote this section to the extent that a detailed comparison is impracticable.

Appeal of rate determination. — This section governs appeals from rate determinations made by the insurance board under this article. National Council on Comp. Ins. v. Mew Mexico SCC, 1993-NMCA-025, 103 N.M. 707, 712 P.2d 1369.

Time limit for filing appeal. — A dispute concerning whether a class of employees will be classified as oil field workers or supervisory personnel for purposes of tabulating workers' compensation insurance premiums was a dispute under Article 17 of this chapter, and not Article 4 of this chapter. Therefore, the appeal filed by the aggrieved party 40 days after the decision of the insurance fraud was properly dismissed as untimely pursuant to the time limit for the filing of action set forth in this section. Home Indem. Co. v. Arapahoe Drilling Co., 1993-NMCA-025, 115 N.M. 204, 848 P.2d 1131.

Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. — 2 Am. Jur. 2d Administrative Law § 302 et seq.

73 C.J.S. Public Administrative Bodies and Procedure § 160.


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