[Issuance or refusal to issue deeds; contesting right of possession.]

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If no protest should be filed with the city clerk against the granting of said deed to any applicant, within the time and manner as above provided, or if the said protest should be filed and the party whose duty it is fails or neglects to institute his proceeding in the district court contesting the right of said applicant to said deed within the time as above provided, the said city council shall be authorized to make, execute and deliver a deed for the said land to the person who shall have first applied for said deed: and provided, further, that should any person make application for a deed to any portion of said land within the limits of said grant, and should said city council, upon investigation thereof, be not satisfied that the land for which such deed is applied for is in fact owned by said applicant, then said city council shall refuse to execute or cause to be executed a deed to said applicant for said land until the court shall determine, in a proceeding properly instituted therefor, that the city should execute said deed to said applicant; or in case any individual, company or corporation shall be in possession of or shall claim any part or portion of the land within the limits of said grant to which they or it may be not entitled as against said city holding said lands in trust as aforesaid, then the city council of said city shall direct the city attorney, or other attorney or attorneys, to institute on behalf of said city and said trustees a proper proceeding in the district court in which the said grant is situated to contest the right and title of said individual, company or corporation to any of said lands so held or claimed, which suit shall be instituted by said city against said parties within twelve months after February 23, 1893, or within twelve months after the said claim is so set up to said lands by said individual, company or corporation.

History: Laws 1893, ch. 77, § 6; 1909, ch. 143, § 5; Code 1915, § 871; C.S. 1929, § 29-1006; 1941 Comp., § 9-906; 1953 Comp., § 8-9-6.

ANNOTATIONS

Bracketed material. — The bracketed material was inserted by the compiler and is not part of the law.

Deed not subject to collateral attack. — Where the city council of Socorro, which was created a special tribunal by the legislature for the purpose of investigating and determining who were entitled to deeds to lands within the limits of the grant, after due notice and investigation, had adjudged that applicant's predecessor in title was entitled to a deed for lands claimed, and deed was executed and delivered pursuant to such finding, and no direct proceeding was instituted by anyone to test the right of such claimant or his title to such lands within twelve months after the passage of Laws 1893, ch. 77, or the assertion of said claim as authorized and limited by this section and Section 2 of the act (49-9-2 NMSA 1978), question of applicant's predecessor's right and title to the land in dispute became res judicata and not subject to collateral attack. City of Socorro v. Cook, 1918-NMSC-072, 24 N.M. 202, 173 P. 682; distinguished in Petroleum Club Inn Co. v. Franklin, 1963-NMSC-133, 72 N.M. 347, 383 P.2d 824.


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