Every person imprisoned or otherwise restrained of his liberty, except in the cases in the following section specified, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus, according to the provisions of this chapter, to obtain relief from such imprisonment or restraint, if it proves to be unlawful.
History: Laws 1884, ch. 1, § 1; C.L. 1884, § 2012; C.L. 1897, § 2781; Code 1915, § 2589; C.S. 1929, § 63-101; 1941 Comp., § 25-1101; 1953 Comp., § 22-11-1.
ANNOTATIONSCross references. — For when the petitioner will be discharged, see 44-1-15 NMSA 1978.
For causes for discharge of petitioner in custody under civil process, see 44-1-17 NMSA 1978.
For release on bail, see 44-1-19, 44-1-23, 44-1-24 NMSA 1978.
For constitutional provisions relating to habeas corpus, see N.M. Const., art. II, § 7 and N.M. Const., art. VI, §§ 3, 13.
For the necessity, before applying for a writ of habeas corpus, of exhausting post-conviction motion remedies attacking sentence, see 31-11-6 NMSA 1978 and Rule 5-802B NMRA.
For mentally ill or deficient patients retaining the right to habeas corpus after commitment, see 43-1-12 and 43-1-13 NMSA 1978.
Meaning of "this chapter". — The term "this chapter" appeared in the original act, which was divided into three unnumbered divisions, to-wit: habeas corpus, §§ 1 to 36; mandamus, §§ 37 to 50; prohibition, §§ 51 to 56; and apparently referred to §§ 1 to 36, the operative provisions of which are compiled as 44-1-1 to 44-1-22, 44-1-25 to 44-1-37 NMSA 1978.
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.
Habeas corpus claims not barred by appeal. — If a habeas corpus petitioner's claim was addressed on appeal, but was denied, the habeas claim is not banned if it is grounded in facts beyond the record previously presented on appeal and if the additional facts are those which could not, or customarily would not, be developed in a trial on criminal charges. A habeas corpus petitioner will not be precluded from raising issues that could have been raised on direct appeal either when fundamental error has occurred or when an adequate record to address the claim properly was not available on direct appeal. Campos v. Bravo, 2007-NMSC-021, 141 N.M. 801, 161 P.3d 846; State v. Sutphin, 2007-NMSC-045, 142 N.M. 191, 164 P.3d 72.
New Mexico does not impose a statute of limitations on habeas corpus petitioners. State v. Sutphin, 2007-NMSC-045, 142 N.M. 191, 164 P.3d 72.
Laches do not apply to habeas corpus proceedings. State v. Sutphin, 2007-NMSC-045, 142 N.M. 191, 164 P.3d 72.
Criteria to determine if a new rule has been established. — A case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final. Thus, a court establishes a new rule when its decision is flatly inconsistent with the prior governing precedent and is an explicit overruling of an earlier holding. Kersey v. Hatch, 2010-NMSC-020, 148 N.M. 381, 237 P.3d 683.
Standard to determine whether new rule applies retroactively to finalized criminal convictions. — New rules should not be afforded retroactive effect unless (1) the rule is substantive in nature, in that it alters the range of conduct or class of persons that the law punishes; or (2) although procedural in nature, the rule announces a watershed rule of criminal procedure. Kersey v. Hatch, 2010-NMSC-020, 148 N.M. 381, 237 P.3d 683.
New rule in felony murder cases cannot be applied retroactively. — The court's opinion in State v. Frazier, 2007-NMSC-032, 142 N.M. 120, 164 P.3d 1, which held for the first time that multiple separate convictions of felony murder and the predicate felony violate the double jeopardy clause, announced a new rule that is procedural in nature and is not subject to retroactive application in habeas corpus proceedings. Kersey v. Hatch, 2010-NMSC-020, 148 N.M. 381, 237 P.3d 683.
Where petitioner's multiple separate convictions of felony murder and the predicate felony of kidnapping had been finalized more than ten years before the court's opinion in State v. Frazier, 2007-NMSC-032, 142 N.M. 120, 164 P.3d 1 was filed, the rule announced in Frazier did not apply to defendant's convictions. Kersey v. Hatch, 2010-NMSC-020, 148 N.M. 381, 237 P.3d 683.
New rule in double jeopardy cases cannot be retroactively applied. — The supreme court's opinion in State v. Montoya, 2013-NMSC-020, which held that the double jeopardy clause of the United State Constitution, U.S. Const. amend. V, precludes a defendant from being cumulatively punished for both voluntary manslaughter and shooting at or from a motor vehicle resulting in great bodily harm in a situation where both convictions are based on the same shooting of the same victim, announced a new rule concerning a new methodology for reviewing double jeopardy claims; the new rule announced in State v. Montoya, which is neither a substantive change in the law nor a watershed rule, is not subject to retroactive application in habeas corpus proceedings. Dominguez v. State, 2015-NMSC-014.
Where petitioner's convictions for voluntary manslaughter and shooting at or from a motor vehicle resulting in the death of one person, and aggravated battery and shooting at or from a motor vehicle resulting in great bodily injury to a second person had been finalized eight years before the supreme court's opinion in State v. Montoya, 2013-NMSC-020 was filed, the new rule announced in State v. Montoya did not apply retroactively to petitioner's convictions. Dominguez v. State, 2015-NMSC-014.
Lack of advice concerning immigration consequences of plea is an old rule. — The ineffective assistance of counsel rules stated in State v. Paredez, 2004-NMSC-036, 136 N.M. 533, 101 P.3d 799 and Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.Ct. 1473 (2010), which require criminal defense attorneys to determine the immigration status of their clients and advise non-citizen clients of the specific immigration consequences of pleading guilty, including whether deportation would be virtually certain, is an old rule and applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. State v. Ramirez, 2012-NMCA-057, 278 P.3d 569, aff'd, Ramirez v. State, 2014-NMSC-023.
Lack of advice concerning immigration consequences of plea. — Where petitioner filed a writ of coram nobis requesting the court to vacate petitioner's 1997 misdemeanor convictions for possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia, and concealing identity; petitioner was facing definite deportation at the time petitioner plead guilty to the charges; and petitioner's counsel failed to advise petitioner about any immigration consequences of pleading guilty and petitioner was prejudiced by that, petitioner should have been advised, as required by State v. Paredez, 2004-NMSC-036, 136 N.M. 533, 101 P.3d 799 and Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.Ct. 1473 (2010), that deportation would almost certainly result from petitioner's convictions and because petitioner established ineffective assistance of counsel and prejudice, petitioner should have an opportunity to withdraw the guilty plea. State v. Ramirez, 2012-NMCA-057, 278 P.3d 569, aff'd, Ramirez v. State, 2014-NMSC-023.
Proceeding in habeas corpus is in restricted sense a civil proceeding. In re Fullen, 1913-NMSC-036, 17 N.M. 405, 132 P. 1137.
Habeas corpus is not a special statutory proceeding. In re Forest, 1941-NMSC-019, 45 N.M. 204, 113 P.2d 582.
Must apply to district court before proceeding in supreme court. — Where although no direct appeal is taken from the judgments of conviction which are now attacked, the prisoner has the right under New Mexico law to bring habeas corpus in the state courts, and he must apply to a district court for habeas corpus before an original proceeding may be brought in the New Mexico supreme court. Cox v. Raburn, 314 F.2d 856 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 853, 83 S. Ct. 1920, 10 L. Ed. 2d 1074 (1963).
Denial of petition for habeas corpus by district court not appealable. State v. Clark, 1971-NMCA-176, 83 N.M. 484, 493 P.2d 969, cert. denied, 83 N.M. 473, 493 P.2d 958 (1972).
No constitutional right to transcript. — Absent a showing of special circumstances, defendant had no federal constitutional right to a copy of the transcript for use in preparation of a motion for post-conviction relief or a petition for habeas corpus. State v. Toussaint, 1973-NMCA-027, 84 N.M. 677, 506 P.2d 1224.
State remedies not exhausted when grounds not presented to state. — When grounds urged for federal habeas corpus relief may be but are not presented to a state court, the state remedies have not been exhausted. Where the state district court habeas corpus is dismissed by counsel for the prisoner with the knowledge and acquiescence of the prisoner, the subsequent denials of original proceedings in the state supreme court conformed with the state practice and do not detract from the availability of a state court remedy. Cox v. Raburn, 314 F.2d 856 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 853, 83 S. Ct. 1920, 10 L. Ed. 2d 1074 (1963).
Petition from juvenile court need not be presented to district. — To require presentation of a petition for habeas corpus in the first instance, in a juvenile court case, to the district judge would be a vain and useless prerequisite. Peyton v. Nord, 1968-NMSC-027, 78 N.M. 717, 437 P.2d 716.
Cumulative doctrine has no merit in habeas corpus proceeding, particularly when each of the claimed points has been specifically ruled upon by the highest court of the jurisdiction and is found to be without merit. Nelson v. Cox, 1960-NMSC-005, 66 N.M. 397, 349 P.2d 118.
In habeas corpus proceedings, movant has burden of showing that he is entitled to the writ and the writ should be denied where the allegations are insufficient. Roberts v. Staples, 1968-NMSC-109, 79 N.M. 298, 442 P.2d 788.
Burden to prove testimony false and used to procure conviction. — In habeas corpus proceedings the burden is on the petitioner to prove not only that the testimony admitted was false but that it was knowingly, willfully and intentionally used by the prosecution to procure the conviction. Johnson v. Cox, 1963-NMSC-058, 72 N.M. 55, 380 P.2d 199, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 855, 84 S. Ct. 117, 11 L. Ed. 2d 82.
With confessions court looks only to behavior of police officers. — In determining whether there has been a denial of due process by the admission into evidence of a confession alleged to have been involuntarily obtained, the court is not concerned with the motive of the petitioner in confession or whether the signed confession contained the truth, but only with whether the behavior of the law enforcement officers was such as to overbear petitioner's will to resist and bring about a confession not freely determined. Johnson v. Cox, 1963-NMSC-058, 72 N.M. 55, 380 P.2d 199, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 855, 84 S. Ct. 117, 11 L. Ed. 2d 82.
Habeas corpus does not lie where guilty plea made intelligently. — Habeas corpus relief did not lie on claim that guilty plea was not intelligently made where record showed that defendant answered both by himself and through an interpreter to questions put by the judge to be sure that defendant knew what he was doing when he pleaded guilty. Orosco v. Cox, 359 F.2d 764 (10th Cir. 1966).
No relief where absence of attorney causes no prejudice. — Habeas corpus relief was refused where defendant was not furnished counsel at a preliminary hearing nor upon arraignment where he pleaded not guilty to an indictment, since no prejudice was shown where defendant did not testify at the preliminary hearing, and no contention is made that any incriminating statements were made then or upon his arraignment. Gallegos v. Cox, 341 F.2d 107 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 918, 85 S. Ct. 1548, 14 L. Ed. 2d 438 (1965).
No relief where no ground for collateral attack occurred. — Where the record fails to establish any prejudice resulting from anything which happened at the preliminary hearing, where defendant was without representation by counsel, and since upon the defendant's arraignment before the state district court counsel was appointed for him and he pleaded guilty, and no question is raised as to the voluntary nature of that plea or as to the competence of counsel, in the circumstances nothing which occurred at the preliminary hearing is any ground for collateral attack, and the trial court acted properly in dismissing the petition without a hearing. Downing v. New Mexico State Supreme Court, 339 F.2d 435 (10th Cir. 1964).
Restoring good-time credits. — A petition for a unit of habeus corpus is the proper avenue to challenge the unconstitutional deprivation of good-time credits, even if it would not result in an immediate release. Lopez v. LeMaster, 2003-NMSC-003, 133 N.M. 59, 61 P.3d 185.
Remedy when prison discipline is vindicated by subsequent events. — Where the corrections department forfeited petitioner's earned good time and placed petitioner in a maximum security facility after a hearing officer determined that petitioner had raped another inmate; the corrections department violated petitioner's due process rights by denying petitioner an opportunity to call witnesses or elicit their written testimony at the prison disciplinary hearing; petitioner was subsequently tried and convicted of the rape in district court; and in petitioner's habeas corpus proceeding, the district court ordered the corrections department to restore petitioner's good-time credits, remove the disciplinary hearing findings from petitioner's record, never to use findings of the disciplinary hearing against defendant, and never to pursue the same factual allegations that were the subject of the disciplinary hearing in later proceedings against petitioner, the district court's remedies for the violation of petitioner's due process rights was an abuse of discretion because the discipline of the corrections department was vindicated by petitioner's intervening criminal conviction. Perry v. Moya, 2012-NMSC-040, 289 P.3d 1247.
II. JURISDICTION OF COURT.
Writ available only when lower court exceeds jurisdiction. — A writ of habeas corpus is available only when the lower court has exceeded its jurisdiction and cannot take the place of a writ of error or an appeal, however irregular or erroneous the judgment may be. Notestine v. Rogers, 1914-NMSC-001, 18 N.M. 462, 138 P. 207; In re Cica, 1913-NMSC-093, 18 N.M. 452, 137 P. 598; In re Canavan, 1912-NMSC-012, 17 N.M. 100, 130 P. 248; In re Peraltareavis, 1895-NMSC-010, 8 N.M. 27, 41 P. 538, appeal dismissed, 18 S. Ct. 945, 42 L. Ed. 1207 (1897).
Deficiency in indictment not grounds for review. — In habeas corpus proceeding the information or indictment under which a petitioner was sentenced is not open to review on grounds of deficiencies therein. Such proceeding is a collateral attack upon the judgment, and the only question for decision is whether the trial court possessed jurisdiction of the parties, jurisdiction of the subject matter and the power to impose the sentence. Roehm v. Woodruff, 1958-NMSC-083, 64 N.M. 278, 327 P.2d 339.
Writ not used for collateral attack on contempt proceedings. — Attack on contempt proceedings collaterally for violation of a writ of mandamus may not be made by writ of habeas corpus, since the inquiry in habeas corpus is limited to the jurisdiction of the court. Delgado v. Chavez, 1891-NMSC-012, 5 N.M. 646, 25 P. 948, aff'd, In re Delgado, 140 U.S. 586, 11 S. Ct. 874, 35 L. Ed. 578 (1891).
Writ of habeas corpus is in nature of collateral attack on a judgment upon which commitment has issued, and would lie only when the judgment under attack was absolutely void because the court which rendered the judgment was without jurisdiction. Orosco v. Cox, 1965-NMSC-098, 75 N.M. 431, 405 P.2d 668.
Writ lies only when judgment absolutely void. — Writs of habeas corpus are collateral attacks upon the judgments upon which commitments are issued and will lie only when the judgment attacked is absolutely void for the reason that the court rendering it was without jurisdiction to do so. Johnson v. Cox, 1963-NMSC-058, 72 N.M. 55, 380 P.2d 199, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 855, 84 S. Ct. 117, 11 L. Ed. 2d 82.
Inquiry directed to fairness of entire proceedings. — In determining whether the deprivation of constitutional rights amounts to a denial of due process, the inquiry on habeas corpus is directed to a review of the entire proceedings, and if the total result was the granting to accused of a fair and deliberate trial, then no constitutional right has been invaded, and the proceedings will not be disturbed. Johnson v. Cox, 1963-NMSC-058, 72 N.M. 55, 380 P.2d 199, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 855, 84 S. Ct. 117, 11 L. Ed. 2d 82.
Function of writ of habeas corpus is not to review record for errors of the trial court, and where the petition states no facts showing petitioner is unlawfully deprived of his liberty, it will be denied. Smith v. People, 1962-NMSC-152, 71 N.M. 112, 376 P.2d 54.
Incorrect assessment of fines curable by appeal not by writ. — Assessing fines for several acts and omissions on the part of relators, with alternative imprisonment, where such acts constituted but one offense, though irregular, does not make the entire punishment void, and is curable in the court below, or on appeal, but not by habeas corpus. In re Sloan, 1891-NMSC-011, 5 N.M. 590, 25 P. 930.
Without prejudice, form of indictment not subject to writ. — In habeas corpus the form of an indictment or information is not open to review unless the petitioner has suffered prejudice from it. Roehm v. Woodruff, 1958-NMSC-083, 64 N.M. 278, 327 P.2d 339.
Extradition. — In a habeas corpus proceeding in the asylum state to determine whether to deliver the fugitive, the asylum state may only consider whether the extradition documents on their face are in order, whether the petitioner has been charged with a crime in the demanding state, whether the petitioner is the person named in the request for extradition, and whether the petitioner is a fugitive. The proceeding cannot be transformed into an inquiry into the appropriateness of the demanding state's actions. Colfax Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. State of N.M., 16 F. 3d 1107 (10th Cir. 1994).
III. CUSTODY OF CHILD.
Writ used to consider custody of infant issues. — It is fundamental that under appropriate circumstances, habeas corpus is an available remedy by which to consider controversies involving the issue of custody of infants. Roberts v. Staples, 1968-NMSC-109, 79 N.M. 298, 442 P.2d 788.
When determining custodial rights of children inquiry is generally broader. — The writ of habeas corpus finds its origin in common law. It issues as a matter of right and not as a matter of course. When prosecuted as a means of determining custodial rights of children, however, the inquiry is generally broader than that normally involved in habeas corpus. The child's welfare becomes a prime consideration irrespective of the parties' interests, although the natural rights of parents, guardians or lawful claimants are entitled to due consideration. Roberts v. Staples, 1968-NMSC-109, 79 N.M. 298, 442 P.2d 788.
Custody granted only when prima facie legal right shown. — In cases dealing with infants, it is uniformly held that a writ of habeas corpus will be granted only in those cases where the applicant shows a prima facie legal right to the custody of the child. Roberts v. Staples, 1968-NMSC-109, 79 N.M. 298, 442 P.2d 788.
Judgment from proceeding appealable. — A judgment in habeas corpus proceedings instituted to test the right of respective claimants to the custody of a minor is appealable. Evens v. Keller, 1931-NMSC-059, 35 N.M. 659, 6 P.2d 200.
Former judgment in habeas corpus is res judicata. — A former adjudication in habeas corpus on the rights of rival claimants to the custody of a minor is conclusive between such parties in a subsequent proceeding involving the same question on the same state of facts existing at the time of the former adjudication. Evens v. Keller, 1931-NMSC-059, 35 N.M. 659, 6 P.2d 200.
Grandparents have legal right to apply for writ of habeas corpus when the issue of custody of infants is involved. Roberts v. Staples, 1968-NMSC-109, 79 N.M. 298, 442 P.2d 788.
Law reviews. — For note, "Post-Conviction Relief After Release From Custody: A Federal Message and a New Mexico Remedy," see 9 Nat. Resources J. 85 (1969).
For article, "Habeas Corpus in New Mexico," see 11 N.M.L. Rev. 291 (1981).
For article, "Separation of Powers and the Judicial Rule-Making Power in New Mexico: The Need for Prudential Restraints," see 15 N.M.L. Rev. 407 (1985).
Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. — 39 Am. Jur. 2d Habeas Corpus § 117.
Right of one detained pursuant to quarantine to habeas corpus, 2 A.L.R. 1542.
Loss of jurisdiction by delay in imposing sentence, 3 A.L.R. 1003.
Right of state or public officer to appeal from an order in habeas corpus releasing one from custody, 10 A.L.R. 385, 30 A.L.R. 1322.
Habeas corpus to test constitutionality of ordinance under which petitioner is held, 32 A.L.R. 1054.
Right to discharge on ground that prosecution was barred by limitations, where defendant had pleaded guilty after statute had run, 37 A.L.R. 1116.
Habeas corpus in case of sentence which is excessive because imposing both fine and imprisonment, 49 A.L.R. 494.
Right to prove absence from demanding state or alibi on habeas corpus in extradition proceedings, 51 A.L.R. 797, 61 A.L.R. 715.
Power to grant writ of habeas corpus pending appeal from conviction, 52 A.L.R. 876.
Habeas corpus as remedy for exclusion of eligible class or classes of persons from jury list, 52 A.L.R. 927.
Habeas corpus to test the sufficiency of indictment or information as regards the offense sought to be charged, 57 A.L.R. 85.
Habeas corpus as remedy for delay in bringing accused to trial or to retrial after reversal, 58 A.L.R. 1512.
Arresting one who has been discharged on habeas corpus or released on bail, 62 A.L.R. 462.
Illegal or erroneous sentence as ground for habeas corpus, 76 A.L.R. 468.
Bar of limitations as proper subject of investigation in extradition proceedings or in habeas corpus proceedings for release of one sought to be extradited, 77 A.L.R. 902.
Determination in extradition proceedings, or on habeas corpus in such proceedings, whether a crime is charged, 81 A.L.R. 552, 40 A.L.R.2d 1151.
Pending suit for annulment, divorce or separation as affecting remedy by habeas corpus for custody of child, 82 A.L.R. 1146.
Motive or ulterior purpose of officials demanding or granting extradition as proper subject of inquiry on habeas corpus, 94 A.L.R. 1496.
Discharge on habeas corpus after conviction as affecting claim or plea of former jeopardy, 97 A.L.R. 160.
Jurisdiction of court in divorce suit to award custody of child as affected by orders in, or pendency of, proceedings in habeas corpus for custody of child, 110 A.L.R. 745.
Habeas corpus as remedy in case of insanity of one convicted of crime, 121 A.L.R. 270.
Disqualification of judge who presided at trial or of juror as ground of habeas corpus, 124 A.L.R. 1079.
Failure to examine witnesses to determine degree of guilt before pronouncing sentence upon plea of guilty as ground for habeas corpus, 134 A.L.R. 968.
Change of judicial decision as ground of habeas corpus for release of one held upon previous adjudication or conviction of contempt, 136 A.L.R. 1032.
Mistreatment of prisoner lawfully in custody as ground for habeas corpus, 155 A.L.R. 145.
Defective title to office of judge, prosecuting attorney, or other officer participating at petitioner's trial or confinement as ground for habeas corpus, 158 A.L.R. 529.
Denial of relief to prisoner on habeas corpus as bar to second application, 161 A.L.R. 1331.
Right to aid of counsel in application or hearing for habeas corpus, 162 A.L.R. 922.
Invalidity of prior condition or sentence as ground for habeas corpus where one is sentenced as second offender, 171 A.L.R. 541.
Jurisdiction of habeas corpus proceedings for custody of child having legal domicil in other states, 4 A.L.R.2d 7.
Former jeopardy as ground for habeas corpus, 8 A.L.R.2d 285.
Habeas corpus on ground of deprivation of right to appeal, 19 A.L.R.2d 789.
Habeas corpus to review commitment for contempt for failure to obey court order or decree either beyond power or jurisdiction of court or merely erroneous, 12 A.L.R.2d 1059.
Nonresidence as affecting one's right to custody of child in habeas corpus proceedings, 15 A.L.R.2d 432.
Existence of other remedy as affecting habeas corpus on ground of restoration of sanity of one confined as an incompetent other than in connection with crime, 21 A.L.R.2d 1004.
Habeas corpus on ground of restoration to sanity of one confined as an incompetent other than in connection with crime, 21 A.L.R.2d 1004.
Insanity of accused at time of commission of offense (not raised at trial) as ground for habeas corpus after conviction, 29 A.L.R.2d 703.
Waiver or loss of accused's right to speedy trial, 57 A.L.R.2d 302.
Child custody provisions of divorce or separation decree as subject to modification on habeas corpus, 4 A.L.R.3d 1277.
Habeas corpus as remedy for infringement of right of accused to communicate with attorney, 5 A.L.R.3d 1360.
Support of child, power of court in habeas corpus proceedings relating to custody of child to adjudicate amount which shall be paid for, or to modify agreement in that regard, 17 A.L.R.3d 764.
Withholding or suppression of evidence by prosecution in criminal case as vitiating conviction, 34 A.L.R.3d 16.
Modern status of rule relating to jurisdiction of state court to try criminal defendant brought within jurisdiction illegally or as result of fraud or mistake, 25 A.L.R.4th 157.
When is a person in custody of governmental authorities for purpose of exercise of state remedy of habeas corpus - modern cases, 26 A.L.R.4th 455.
Relief available for violation of right to counsel at sentencing, 65 A.L.R.4th 183.
Abuse of writ as basis for dismissal of state prisoner's second or successive petition for federal habeas corpus, 60 A.L.R. Fed. 481.
Effect of escape from state custody on petitioner's rights in federal habeas corpus proceedings, 61 A.L.R. Fed. 938.
Availability of postconviction relief under 28 U.S.C.S. § 2254 based on alleged governmental violation of Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act (18 U.S.C.S. Appx), 63 A.L.R. Fed. 155.
Review by federal civil courts of court-martial convictions, 95 A.L.R. Fed. 472.
39A C.J.S. Habeas Corpus § 163.