Verdict and judgment.

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Notwithstanding the provisions of the Relocation Assistance Act [Chapter 42, Article 3 NMSA 1978]:

A. for the purposes of assessing compensation and damages, the right thereto shall be deemed to have accrued as of the date the petition is filed, and its actual value on that date shall be the measure of compensation for all property taken, and also the basis of damages for property not taken but injuriously affected in cases where such damages are legally recoverable; the amount of the award shall be determined from the evidence and not be limited to any amount alleged in the petition or set forth in the answer;

B. whenever just compensation shall be ascertained and awarded in such proceeding and established by judgment, the judgment shall include as a part of the just compensation awarded, interest at the rate of six percent a year from the date of the date the petition is filed to the date of payment or the date when the proceedings are finally abandoned;

C. the court shall have the power to direct the payment of delinquent taxes, special assessments and rental or other charges owed out of the amount determined to be just compensation, and to make such orders with respect to encumbrances, liens, rents, insurance and other just and equitable charges; and

D. when two or more estates or divided interests in any tract are the subject of a trial by a jury, and the court has determined that there shall be no division of the causes, the verdict shall be in one sum and shall be the amount of just compensation for the tract affected as of the date of the filing of the petition, and the court shall thereafter proceed to hear and determine the value of the respective interests or ownerships in said tract, and shall apportion the amount of the verdict between the defendants according to their various interests therein.

History: 1953 Comp., § 22-9-52, enacted by Laws 1959, ch. 324, § 14; 1972, ch. 41, § 21.

ANNOTATIONS

Emergency clauses. — Laws 1972, ch. 41, § 25 contained an emergency clause and was approved February 28, 1972.

Severability. — Laws 1972, ch. 41, § 23 provided for the severability of the act if any part or application thereof was held invalid.

Valuation date distinct from date of taking. — Valuation date, or the date as of which damages are assessed, fixed or determined, is different, separate and distinct from the date of taking, and is fixed by Subsection A as the date of filing the petition in condemnation. State ex rel. State Hwy. Comm'n v. Hesselden Inv. Co., 1972-NMSC-071, 84 N.M. 424, 504 P.2d 634.

Date of taking is date preliminary order effective. — In a proceeding brought under the Special Alternative Condemnation Procedure, a preliminary order of entry permits the state or any political subdivision thereof to immediately enter and occupy the premises sought to be condemned pending the action and to do such work thereon as may be required. A preliminary order of entry, therefore, effectively vests the condemnor with possession, dominion, and control over the premises. Consequently, the date the preliminary order becomes effective is the proper date to use in assessing the value of property taken under the Special Alternative Condemnation Procedure and, therefore, in fixing the compensation to which the owner is constitutionally entitled. County of Dona Ana ex rel. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Bennett, 1994-NMSC-005, 116 N.M. 778, 867 P.2d 1160.

Date of filing cannot be date of taking. — The legislature's selection of the date of filing of the condemnation petition as the valuation date is impermissible because, as of that date, there has been no taking in the constitutional sense, i.e., vesting the legal right to possession of the property in the condemnor. County of Dona Ana ex rel. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Bennett, 1994-NMSC-005, 116 N.M. 778, 867 P.2d 1160.

Special advantages to condemnor not proper consideration for damages. — Special advantages or value to the condemnor of the property taken is not a proper consideration in arriving at an award of damages to an owner. State ex rel. State Hwy. Comm'n v. Pelletier, 1966-NMSC-141, 76 N.M. 555, 417 P.2d 46; Board of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Vargas, 1966-NMSC-106, 76 N.M. 369, 415 P.2d 57.

Projected use proper consideration. — The projected use of property to be considered as an element in arriving at value should be possible and probable, but must not be based upon mere speculation that at some time in the remote future a particular use might be made of the property. State ex rel. State Hwy. Comm'n v. Pelletier, 1966-NMSC-141, 76 N.M. 555, 417 P.2d 46.

Loss based on unfounded fears. — In a partial condemnation action, a property owner is entitled to receive as compensation the diminution in value of the remainder of the property caused by public perception of the use to which the condemned property will be put. Under this view, compensation is awarded for loss of market value even if the loss is based on fears not founded on objective standards. City of Santa Fe v. Komis, 1992-NMSC-051, 114 N.M. 659, 845 P.2d 753.

Use of earlier appraisal reports not barred. — There is no New Mexico law barring the introduction of appraisal reports made prior to the date of the original petition. State ex rel. State Hwy. Dep't v. First Nat'l Bank, 1977-NMSC-104, 91 N.M. 240, 572 P.2d 1248.

Fair market value of soil. — Where soil is taken in an eminent domain proceeding, fair market value is the measure of compensation and not the replacement cost of the soil. Board of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Vargas, 1966-NMSC-106, 76 N.M. 369, 415 P.2d 57.

Interest accrues from date owner's possession invaded. — The owner of land taken in condemnation proceedings should have interest from the time his possession is invaded, either with or without an order of the court. State ex rel. State Hwy. Comm'n v. Peace Found., Inc., 1968-NMSC-173, 79 N.M. 576, 446 P.2d 443.

Payment of interest. — This section calls for interest to be paid on the unpaid balance of the original compensation awarded, but does not provide for interest to be paid on the interest accrued on the award with the filing of the judgment. State ex rel. State Hwy. Dep't v. First Nat'l Bank, 1977-NMSC-104, 91 N.M. 240, 572 P.2d 1248 (1977).

Where damages are awarded, interest will accrue at the rate of 6% on the unpaid portion of the principal from the date the petition in condemnation is filed until paid in full. State ex rel. State Hwy. Dep't v. First Nat'l Bank, 1977-NMSC-104, 91 N.M. 240, 572 P.2d 1248.

Suspension of interest improper. — It is clear that Subsection B does not allow a trial court to suspend interest in condemnation proceedings under the Special Alternative Procedure Act. State ex rel. State Hwy. Comm'n v. Peace Found., Inc., 1968-NMSC-173, 79 N.M. 576, 446 P.2d 443.

The allowance of interest from the date the petition was filed is essential to just compensation and the trial court erred by suspending interest from date of continuance until jury verdict. State ex rel. State Hwy. Comm'n v. Peace Found., Inc., 1968-NMSC-173, 79 N.M. 576, 446 P.2d 443.

Landowners are permitted to call, as adverse witness, appraiser, who was employed and paid by the state highway commission (now state transportation commission), to appraise the property taken. State ex rel. State Hwy. Comm'n v. Steinkraus, 1966-NMSC-134, 76 N.M. 617, 417 P.2d 431.

Jury cannot award damages in excess of highest testimony as to such damages. State ex rel. State Hwy. Comm'n v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 1966-NMSC-146, 76 N.M. 587, 417 P.2d 68.

Jury instruction proper statement of law. — When there is a partial taking of a larger tract of land, the landowner's damages are measured by the value of the entire tract before the taking less the value of the remaining tract after the taking. N.M.U.J.I. Civ. 13-704 is thus a correct statement of law. County of Dona Ana ex rel. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Bennett, 1994-NMSC-005, 116 N.M. 778, 867 P.2d 1160.

Amendment of petition by state, within trial court's discretion. — The trial court did not err in allowing the state to amend its petition where it did not change the date of valuation, only the extent of the condemnation on the valuation date. Amendments of pleadings are within the sound discretion of the trial court. State ex rel. State Hwy. Comm'n v. Grenko, 1969-NMSC-051, 80 N.M. 691, 460 P.2d 56.

Law reviews. — For survey of 1990-91 property law, see 22 N.M.L. Rev. 783 (1992).

For note, "Property Law Property Owners in Condemnation Actions May Receive Compensation for Diminutation in Value to their Property Caused by Public Perception: City of Santa Fe v. Komis," see 24 N.M. L. Rev. 535 (1994).

Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. — 27 Am. Jur. 2d Eminent Domain §§ 678, 699 et seq., 736, 738, 899.

Eminent domain: unity or contiguity of separate properties sufficient to allow damages for diminished value of parcel remaining after taking of other parcel, 59 A.L.R.4th 308.

Method of determining rate of interest allowed on award to owner of property taken by United States in eminent domain proceeding, 56 A.L.R. Fed. 477.

29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain §§ 270, 303 to 313, 410.


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