The owner, licensee or operator of a visual or sound radio broadcasting station or network of stations, and the agents or employees of any such owner, licensee or operator, shall not be liable for any damages for any defamatory statement published or uttered in or as a part of a visual or sound radio broadcast, by one other than such owner, licensee or operator, or agent or employee thereof, unless it shall be alleged and proved by the complaining party, that such owner, licensee, operator or such agent or employee, has failed to exercise due care to prevent the publication or utterance of such statement in such broadcast. Provided, however, the exercise of due care shall be construed to include a bona fide compliance with any federal law, or the regulation of any federal regulatory agency, including those laws and regulations fixing the rates that may be charged for use of such facilities for visual or sound broadcasts.
History: 1953 Comp., § 40-27-35, enacted by Laws 1955, ch. 32, § 1; 1978 Comp., § 30-34-6, recompiled as 1978 Comp., § 41-7-6.
ANNOTATIONSBracketed material. — The bracketed material was inserted by the compiler and is not part of the law.
Qualified privilege retained. — This section does not purport to divest broadcast media owners of their qualified privilege in libel actions nor to change the rule that proof of malice is required before those having a qualified privilege may be held responsible for defamation. Anderson v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 543 F.2d 732 (10th Cir. 1976).
More than negligence required for liability. — The assertion that this section recognizes the negligence doctrine in regard to radio and television broadcasts is untenable; the section may not be cited for the proposition that New Mexico requires only a showing of negligence in a defamation action against owners and employees of broadcast media facilities for their defamatory statements. Anderson v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 543 F.2d 732 (10th Cir. 1976).
Due care standard. — This section deals with the liability of the owner of a broadcast media facility for defamatory broadcasts made by unauthorized persons, absolving the owner from liability if the owner has used due care in preventing broadcasts by those persons. Anderson v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 543 F.2d 732 (10th Cir. 1976).
Law reviews. — For comment on Reed v. Melnick, 81 N.M. 14, 462 P.2d 148 (Ct. App. 1969), see 1 N.M. L. Rev. 615 (1971).
Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. — 50 Am. Jur. 2d Libel and Slander § 370.
Defamation by radio or television, 50 A.L.R.3d 1311.
Invasion of privacy by radio or television, 56 A.L.R.3d 386.
Waiver or loss of right of privacy, 57 A.L.R.3d 16.
What constitutes special damages in action for slander of title, 4 A.L.R.4th 532.
Libel and slander: necessity of expert testimony to establish negligence of media defendant in defamation action by private individual, 37 A.L.R.4th 987.
Criticism or disparagement of character, competence, or conduct of candidate for office as defamation, 37 A.L.R.4th 1088.
What constitutes "single publication" within meaning of single publication rule affecting action for libel and slander, violation of privacy, or similar torts, 41 A.L.R.4th 541.
Criticism or disparagement of attorney's character, competence, or conduct as defamation, 46 A.L.R.4th 326.
Libel or slander: defamation by gestures or acts, 46 A.L.R.4th 403.
Defamation: privilege attaching to news report of criminal activities based on information supplied by public safety officers - modern status, 47 A.L.R.4th 718.
Intrusion by news-gathering entity as invasion of right of privacy, 69 A.L.R.4th 1059.