Any judgment, or decree, except in cases where trial by jury is necessary, may be rendered by the judge of the district court at any place where he may be in this state, and the district courts, except for jury trials, are declared to be at all times in session for all purposes, including the naturalization of aliens. Interlocutory orders may be made by such judge wherever he may be in the state, on notice, where notice is required, which notice, if outside of his district, may be enlarged beyond the statutory notice, for such time as the court shall deem proper. Final judgments and decrees, entered by district courts in all cases tried pursuant to the provisions of this section shall remain under the control of such courts for a period of thirty days after the entry thereof, and for such further time as may be necessary to enable the court to pass upon and dispose of any motion which may have been filed within such period, directed against such judgment; provided, that if the court shall fail to rule upon such motion within thirty days after the filing thereof, such failure to rule shall be deemed a denial thereof; and, provided further, that the provisions of this section shall not be construed to amend, change, alter or repeal the provisions of Sections 4227 or 4230, Code 1915.
History: Laws 1897, ch. 73, § 103; C. L. 1897, § 2685 (103); Code 1915, § 4185; Laws 1917, ch. 15, § 1; C. S. 1929, § 105-801; 1941 Comp., § 19-901; 1953 Comp., § 21-9-1.
ANNOTATIONSCross references. — For rules concerning judgments, see Rules 1-054 to 1-070 NMRA.
For motion for new trial, see Rules 1-059 and 5-614 NMRA.
For motion to amend findings and conclusions, see Rule 1-052 NMRA.
Compiler's notes. — Sections 4227 and 4230 of Code 1915, referred to in this section, were superseded by Rules 60(c) and (d), N.M.R. Civ. P. respectively. The 1949 amendment to Rule 60, N.M.R. Civ. P. (now see Rule 1-060) substituted a rewritten division (b) for former divisions (b), (c) and (d).
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.
Motion to enforce a judgment. — Neither Section 39-1-1 NMSA 1978 nor Rule 1-060B NMRA preclude the district court from considering a wife's motion to enforce a final decree regarding survivor benefit annuity of civil service retirement and the court had jurisdiction to grant relief to wife by approving the stipulated qualified civil service order and it also had jurisdiction to consider attorney fees. Palmer v. Palmer, 2006-NMCA-112, 140 N.M. 383, 142 P.3d 971.
Motion to alter or amend a judgment. — Rule 1-059E NMRA supersedes Section 39-1-1 NMSA 1978, and according to the plain language of Rule 1-059E NMRA, post-judgment motions are not subject to automatic denial. Albuquerque Redi-Mix, Inc. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 2007-NMSC-051, 142 N.M. 527, 168 P.3d 99.
Effect of civil rules. — The 2006 amendment to Rule 1-054.1 NMRA, providing that civil courts have sixty days to enter a judgment or order after submission, superseded that portion of Section 39-1-1 NMSA 1978 which states that many post-judgment motions are automatically denied if not granted within thirty days of filing. State v. Moreland, 2008-NMSC-031, 144 N.M. 192, 185 P.3d 363.
Express contract. — An express contract is to be enforced as written in regard to contractual obligations of the parties unless the court has determined that equity should override the express contract because of fraud, real hardship, oppression, mistake, unconscionable results, and the other grounds of righteousness, justice and morality. Arena Res., Inc. v. OBO, Inc., 2010-NMCA-061, 148 N.M. 483, 238 P.3d 357.
Judgment granting equitable relief in action based on express contract. — Where plaintiff, who was the operating-interest owner, redeveloped an oilfield unit and sought reimbursement from defendant, who was a working-interest owner; plaintiff unilaterally redeveloped the unit without obtaining the consent of defendant as was required by the operating agreement of the parties; the redevelopment project increased oil and gas production, enhanced the unit, and netted favorable revenue consequences for defendant; although the district court concluded that plaintiff had breached the operating agreement, the court granted judgment for plaintiff based on unjust enrichment; plaintiff's action was for breach of contract and to enforce a contractual lien; plaintiff never asserted a claim for unjust enrichment, the case was not tried on the theory of unjust enrichment, and plaintiff did not request findings of fact and conclusions of law on unjust enrichment; and the court never mentioned the existence of any evidence or entered any findings of fact that supported its conclusion of unjust enrichment or otherwise provided any basis for invoking the unjust enrichment theory in the face of the parties' express contract, the court was not permitted to exercise its equitable powers to grant plaintiff relief under the equitable unjust enrichment theory of recovery. Arena Res., Inc. v. OBO, Inc., 2010-NMCA-061, 148 N.M. 483, 238 P.3d 357.
Oral ruling on a motion within thirty days. — Where the district court orally ruled on a motion within thirty days after the motion was filed, but did not actually enter a final order disposing of the motion within thirty days, the court ruled on the motion within thirty days and the motion was not automatically denied. Chapel v. Nevitt, 2009-NMCA-017, 145 N.M. 674, 203 P.3d 889.
Order relating to values and recommendation of distribution of community property assets was not a final order. — In a divorce proceeding, where the court refused to adopt findings of fact specifying the amount of the wife's community property share and entered an order which divided the parties' assets and debt and which provided that if the husband did not accept the proposed distribution of assets and debts, the court would appoint a receiver to liquidate the family business, the proceeds would first be paid to satisfy the wife's share of the community assets, and if that share was not satisfied, the husband's separate property would be used to make the wife whole, and where the court did not retain jurisdiction to reconsider the amount of the wife's community share, the court had jurisdiction to subsequently enter an order in which the court determined the specific amount of the wife's community share entitlement. Muse v. Muse, 2009-NMCA-003, 145 N.M. 451, 200 P.3d 104.
Motion filed after notice of appeal. — The filing of a notice of appeal divests the district court of jurisdiction to rule on a motion directed to the judgment or order subject to the appeal that was filed after the notice of appeal. State v. McClaugherty, 2007-NMCA-041, 141 N.M. 468, 157 P.3d 33, aff'd, 2008-NMSC-044, 144 N.M. 483, 188 P.3d 1234.
Section applies only to bench trials, thus, when cases are decided by a jury this section is not applicable. State v. Neely, 1994-NMSC-057, 117 N.M. 707, 876 P.2d 222.
This section only applies to nonjury trials, as its plain language suggests. Valley Bank of Commerce v. Hilburn, 2005-NMCA-004, 136 N.M. 741, 105 P.3d 294.
Application in criminal cases. — This section applies to non-jury trials in criminal proceedings. State v. Roybal, 2006-NMCA-043, 139 N.M. 341, 132 P.3d 598, cert. denied, 2006-NMCERT-003, 139 N.M. 353, 132 P3d 1039.
Word "deemed", as used in this section, is synonymous with the words "considered," "determined" and "adjudged". King v. McElroy, 1933-NMSC-035, 37 N.M. 238, 21 P.2d 80.
Distinction between judgment and decree. — The code (compilation) still preserves, or at least recognizes, the distinction between a judgment and a decree. Crowell v. Kopp, 1919-NMSC-065, 26 N.M. 146, 189 P. 652.
Rule 52(B)(b), N.M.R. Civ. P. (now see Rule 1-052B(2)), is not applicable to case where no findings of fact were made by the court. Gilmore v. Baldwin, 1955-NMSC-003, 59 N.M. 51, 278 P.2d 790.
Section not in conflict with Rule 1-060B. — This section does not conflict with the right to grant relief from judgments under Rule 60(b), N.M.R. Civ. P. (now see Rule 1-060B), since that statute only restored to district courts the absolute control they had over their judgments during the term at which they were entered. Laffoon v. Galles Motor Co., 1969-NMCA-006, 80 N.M. 1, 450 P.2d 439; Martin v. Leonard Motor-El Paso, 1965-NMSC-060, 75 N.M. 219, 402 P.2d 954; In re Will of Bourne, 1983-NMCA-046, 99 N.M. 694, 662 P.2d 1361; Gengler v. Phelps, 1976-NMCA-114, 89 N.M. 793, 558 P.2d 62.
Section not invalidated by Rule 5-802 NMRA. — This section was not in any way invalidated by Rule 5-802 NMRA, which governs the procedure for filing a writ of habeas corpus. State v. Peppers, 1990-NMCA-057, 110 N.M. 393, 796 P.2d 614, cert. denied, 110 N.M. 260, 794 P.2d 734.
Appearance of defendant at post-conviction hearing. — It is implicit from the language of this section that it is within the sound discretion of the trial court whether to direct that a defendant be physically present before the court at a hearing to reconsider or modify a prior sentence. Construing the pertinent rules and statutes together, a defendant need not be present at a hearing to reconsider a sentence, except where the hearing results in the terms of the sentence being made more onerous. State v. Sommer, 1994-NMCA-070, 118 N.M. 58, 878 P.2d 1007.
Rule authorizing appeals is to be construed in conjunction with rule permitting district court to vacate an order, judgment or decree (including order allowing appeal), when it interferes with powers granted under this section. Fairchild v. United Serv. Corp., 1948-NMSC-048, 52 N.M. 289, 197 P.2d 875.
Section applicable when case tried. — When there is a judicial examination of the issues both of law and fact, as made up by the pleadings, a case is tried so that this section applies. Board of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Wasson, 1933-NMSC-076, 37 N.M. 503, 24 P.2d 1098.
Section not applicable in case of fraud. — Statutes limiting time for opening or vacating final judgments do not apply in cases of extrinsic fraud or collusion. Kerr v. Southwest Fluorite Co., 1930-NMSC-104, 35 N.M. 232, 294 P. 324.
Court retained jurisdiction for final accounting. — Where the court in determining that the liquor license was an asset of the partnership functioned under its retained jurisdiction for the purpose of a final accounting and dissolution of the partnership, this section did not deprive the court of jurisdiction. Cantrell v. Curnutt, 1969-NMSC-114, 80 N.M. 519, 458 P.2d 594.
Authority to issue order in other district. — An order signed by the associate justice of the territorial supreme court, in a district other than his own, reciting that such judge was acting in the absence of the presiding judge, sufficiently disclosed his authority. Mayes v. Bassett, 1912-NMSC-021, 17 N.M. 193, 125 P. 609.
Court may enter judgment when in other county. — This statute gives the court jurisdiction to enter a judgment in a cause pending in Rio Arriba county when in any other county in the state. Peisker v. Chavez, 1942-NMSC-004, 46 N.M. 159, 123 P.2d 726.
Including default judgment. — A default judgment may be rendered by a judge of the district court at any place where he may be in this state. Hoffman v. White, 1932-NMSC-046, 36 N.M. 250, 13 P.2d 553; Singleton v. Sanabrea, 1931-NMSC-034, 35 N.M. 491, 2 P.2d 119.
Setting aside default judgment. — With the exception of judgments still under the court's control pursuant to this section, judgments by default must be set aside in accordance with Rule 1-060 NMRA. Marinchek v. Paige, 1989-NMSC-019, 108 N.M. 349, 772 P.2d 879.
Terms of court. — A term of the district court begun and held by any judge, as required by law, for a county in the district, continues in existence until the day fixed by law for the beginning of another term of that court for the same county, unless same adjourned sine die, although another term of the same court for another county has been held, in the meantime, by the same judge. Territory ex rel. Hubbell v. Armijo, 1907-NMSC-013, 14 N.M. 205, 89 P. 267.
Court open at all times for nonjury cases. — The fact that the district court is open at all times for the trial of nonjury cases has reference to the court (not the judge alone) sitting at an authorized place for trying an action. Peisker v. Chavez, 1942-NMSC-004, 46 N.M. 159, 123 P.2d 726.
Since section covers nonjury cases only, the motion in this case was not denied by operation of law 30 days after it was filed. Scofield v. J.W. Jones Constr. Co., 1958-NMSC-091, 64 N.M. 319, 328 P.2d 389.
Section covers non-jury cases only. — When prisoner commenced serving his sentence for forgery in the state penitentiary, the court sentencing him lost jurisdiction, and its order vacating sentence is void, for this section applies only to nonjury cases. 1931 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 31-144.
Taking of appeal divests jurisdiction to change judgment. — The taking of an appeal from a judgment in a civil case completely divests the district court of jurisdiction except for the purpose of perfecting the appeal to an appellate court and for the purpose of passing upon motions pending when the appeal is taken, or for the timely vacating of an order granting appeal; therefore, trial court had no jurisdiction to set aside, allow the information to be amended and then enter new judgment. State v. Clemons, 1972-NMCA-052, 83 N.M. 674, 496 P.2d 167.
The trial court loses jurisdiction of the case upon the filing of the notice of appeal, except for the purposes of perfecting such appeal, or of passing upon a motion directed to the judgment pending at the time. Wagner Land & Inv. Co. v. Halderman, 1972-NMSC-019, 83 N.M. 628, 495 P.2d 1075.
After notice of appeal from judgment in workmen's compensation case was filed, trial court lost jurisdiction of the cause and acted properly in refusing to set aside its judgment. Ledbetter v. Lanham Constr. Co., 1966-NMSC-058, 76 N.M. 132, 412 P.2d 559.
II. INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS.
Thirty-day limitation not applicable. — Where a default judgment was only for compensatory damages, and the issues of punitive damages and costs were left open or pending, the default judgment was interlocutory, and consequently the 30-day limitation of this section was not applicable. Gengler v. Phelps, 1976-NMCA-114, 89 N.M. 793, 558 P.2d 62.
III. FINAL JUDGMENTS AND CONTROL.
Final order must dispose of the merits of the case. — Where the district court denied the defendant's motion to extend the redemption period in a foreclosure action, the order denying the motion was a final order even though the order did not dispose of two collateral issues that remained to be decided concerning the precise amount required to redeem the property from the purchaser and the disposition of the debtor's personal property. Chapel v. Nevitt, 2009-NMCA-017, 145 N.M. 674, 203 P.3d 889.
Claim of exemptions on execution as a motion challenging a final foreclosure decree. — Where the defendant asserted the defendant's right to a homestead exemption in response to the foreclosure of a money judgment on the defendant's property and where, subsequent to the entry of the final foreclosure decree, the defendant filed a claim of exemptions on execution pursuant to Rule 1-065.1 NMRA in which the defendant claimed that the defendant was entitled to a homestead exemption, the defendant's claim of exemptions on execution was a motion challenging the foreclosure decree and tolled the time for filing of a notice of appeal until the district court disposed of the claim of exemptions. Grygorwicz v. Trujillo, 2009-NMSC-009, 145 N.M. 650, 203 P.3d 865, rev'g 2008-NMCA-040, 143 N.M. 704, 181 P.3d 696.
Right of control over judgments is not absolute and there are restraints on its exercise. The action of a district court must always be supported by a good reason. Laffoon v. Galles Motor Co., 1969-NMCA-006, 80 N.M. 1, 450 P.2d 439.
District court's power under this section is discretionary. However, the discretion vested in the trial courts in the exercise of control over their judgments is extremely broad. Nichols v. Nichols, 1982-NMSC-071, 98 N.M. 322, 648 P.2d 780.
Court has full control of its judgment, jurisdiction and authority even upon its own motion to make any change, modification or correction thereof which it deems proper under the circumstances. Desjardin v. Albuquerque Nat'l Bank, 1979-NMSC-052, 93 N.M. 89, 596 P.2d 858.
Post-trial motions. — Motion for reconsideration not ruled on by judge was deemed denied by operation of law. Bank of N.Y. v. Regional Hous. Auth., 2005-NMCA-116, 138 N.M. 389, 120 P.3d 471.
Where one of the parties files post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law, the time for filing a notice of appeal does not begin to run until the district court enters an order ruling on the motion. Valley Bank of Commerce v. Hilburn, 2005-NMCA-004, 136 N.M. 741, 105 P.3d 294.
Common-law control over judgments. — The control which district courts formerly had over their judgments was the common-law control which courts had over their judgments during term time, and this control was a plenary power to vacate, set aside, modify and annul. This power was based upon the theory that until the term closed the whole matter of the determination of the rights of the litigant rested in the breast of the court, and, theoretically at least, all judgments became final as of the last day of the term. Laffoon v. Galles Motor Co., 1969-NMCA-006, 80 N.M. 1, 450 P.2d 439.
Control restored after abolition of terms of court. — Under this section control which district courts had over their judgments during term time but which had been destroyed as a result of abolition of terms of court except in jury cases was restored to the courts. Fairchild v. United Serv. Corp., 1948-NMSC-048, 52 N.M. 289, 197 P.2d 875.
Section is applicable to all final judgments unless by statute otherwise excepted. Board of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Wasson, 1933-NMSC-076, 37 N.M. 503, 24 P.2d 1098.
Court had discretion to consider new material as part of motion for reconsideration as long as the delay in presenting the new material was not just for strategic reasons, and its relevance outweighed any prejudice; further, if the trial court considered the new material, the appellate court could review the materials de novo. In re Estate of Keeney, 1995-NMCA-102, 121 N.M. 58, 908 P.2d 751, cert. denied, 120 N.M. 828, 907 P.2d 1009.
Oral judgments not final. — Oral rulings are not final and therefore not a proper basis for an appeal. There was no final order denying reinstatement until the judge issued a written order on November 23, 1992. Nor was worker's motion for reinstatement deemed denied by operation of law this section. Worker's motion for reinstatement was not filed pursuant to this section; it was filed pursuant to Rule 1-041E NMRA, which does not contain a provision saying that motions filed pursuant to it are deemed denied if not acted upon within a certain amount of time. Vigil v. Thriftway Mktg. Corp., 1994-NMCA-009, 117 N.M. 176, 870 P.2d 138.
Conditional dismissal not final judgment. — An order dismissing an action without prejudice but providing that if the parties failed to seek reinstatement within 60 days the dismissal would be deemed with prejudice was not a final order, since the condition was not satisfied. Universal Constructors, Inc. v. Fielder, 1994-NMCA-112, 118 N.M. 657, 884 P.2d 813.
Section does not provide for increased sentence. — A valid sentence imposed in accordance with a plea bargain approved by the district court could not be altered to the defendant's detriment by enhancing the penalty under this section. State v. Sisneros, 1981-NMCA-085, 98 N.M. 279, 648 P.2d 318, aff'd, 1984-NMSC-085, 101 N.M. 679, 687 P.2d 736, overruled on other grounds, State v. Saavedra, 1988-NMSC-100, 108 N.M. 38, 766 P.2d 298.
Habitual defender act prevails over this section. — Habitual offender charge was brought two months after final judgment. Specific provision of former 40A-29-6 NMSA 1953, permitting charges "at any time either after sentence or conviction", prevails over general 30 day rule of this section. State v. Padilla, 1978-NMCA-060, 92 N.M. 19, 582 P.2d 396, cert. denied, 92 N.M. 180, 585 P.2d 324.
Not error to refuse findings after jurisdiction lost. — An appellant cannot predicate error upon the refusal of the court to make findings or exceptions filed to findings made after the trial court has lost jurisdiction of the case. Frostenson v. Marshall, 1919-NMSC-010, 25 N.M. 215, 180 P. 287; Norment v. First Nat'l Bank, 1917-NMSC-042, 23 N.M. 198, 167 P. 731.
Court has authority to vacate final judgment during period of 30 days after its entry. Laffoon v. Galles Motor Co., 1969-NMCA-006, 80 N.M. 1, 450 P.2d 439.
Order permitting movants leave to file objections to will's probate not "final". — An order which does not grant Rule 60(b), N.M.R. Civ. P. (now Rule 1-060B), relief, but simply permits movants leave to file their objections to the probate of a will, is not an appealable final order. In re Will of Bourne, 1983-NMCA-046, 99 N.M. 694, 662 P.2d 1361.
Judgment disposing of separate cause as final. — In this state there are no terms of court except for jury trials, and a judgment which disposes of all, or one or more, of the separate and independent causes of action in the case becomes final upon rendition, and passes from the control of the court, except a default judgment or an irregularly entered judgment, and except for such purposes as all courts always retain control over their judgments. State ex rel. Baca v. Board of Comm'rs, 1916-NMSC-091, 22 N.M. 502, 165 P. 213.
A judgment which disposes of all, or one or more, of the separate and independent causes of action becomes a final judgment upon its rendition and entry, with certain exceptions. Coulter v. Board of Comm'rs, 1916-NMSC-040, 22 N.M. 24, 158 P. 1086; Fullen v. Fullen, 1915-NMSC-091, 21 N.M. 212, 153 P. 294.
Appointing receiver final judgment. — Judgment appointing receiver, issuing injunction and finding corporation to be insolvent was a final judgment. Upon its rendition, the matter passed from the control of the court, except for the 30-day period of additional control specified herein. Jones v. Page, 1920-NMSC-094, 26 N.M. 440, 194 P. 883, cert. denied, 256 U.S. 696, 41 S. Ct. 536, 65 L. Ed. 1176 (1921).
Judgments containing obvious errors not controlling. — The statutes give courts absolute control over their judgments for a period of 30 days, and limit their control over default judgments and irregularly entered judgments, but do not regulate their control over judgments containing palpable or obvious errors. De Baca v. Sais, 1940-NMSC-006, 44 N.M. 105, 99 P.2d 106.
Jurisdiction to reinstate case on docket. — Where district court dismissed complaint without prejudice for lack of prosecution and reinstated complaint by order of court, district court acted within its jurisdiction in reinstating the case on the docket. Martin v. Leonard Motor-El Paso, 1965-NMSC-060, 75 N.M. 219, 402 P.2d 954.
Where a case was dismissed with prejudice and the state filed a motion to reconsider, the district court had authority to reconsider and reverse its original dismissal. State v. Gonzales, 1990-NMCA-040, 110 N.M. 218, 794 P.2d 361, aff'd, 111 N.M. 363, 805 P.2d 630.
Opening or vacating final judgment after 60 days unauthorized. — The opening or vacating of a final judgment regularly entered on motion filed more than 60 days after rendition is unauthorized. Kerr v. Southwest Fluorite Co., 1930-NMSC-104, 35 N.M. 232, 294 P. 324.
Control not nullified by appeal. — It was never intended that the control which the district court holds over its orders, decrees and judgments for 30 days after their entry should be nullified by an appeal to the supreme court. Fairchild v. United Serv. Corp., 1948-NMSC-048, 52 N.M. 289, 197 P.2d 875.
Review time never from original judgment where amendment mere restatement. — When an amendment of the judgment does no more than restate what had been decided by the original judgment, so that there is no material change of substance, the time for review starts to run from the date of the original judgment. Rice v. Gonzales, 1968-NMSC-125, 79 N.M. 377, 444 P.2d 288.
Or subsequent judgment inharmonious. — Where a final judgment no longer remains under the control of the court for the purpose of considering or correcting alleged errors urged against it, a subsequent inharmonious judgment must be regarded as inadvertent and not a modification of the earlier judgment. Shortle v. McCloskey, 1935-NMSC-043, 39 N.M. 273, 46 P.2d 50.
Court may act on own motion. — The district court is authorized to change, modify, correct or vacate a judgment on its own motion. Nichols v. Nichols, 1982-NMSC-071, 98 N.M. 322, 648 P.2d 780.
Court may set aside on own motion without notice. — District court is authorized to set aside its judgment on its own motion, without notice to either party. Arias v. Springer, 1938-NMSC-025, 42 N.M. 350, 78 P.2d 153.
Court without authority where motion untimely. — Where motion to vacate judgment of dismissal was filed more than 17 months after the cause was dismissed, the court was without authority to render further judgment in the case. Chavez v. Ade, 1934-NMSC-054, 38 N.M. 389, 34 P.2d 670.
Motion for new trial terminates running of appeal time. — To terminate the running of the time for appeal, the timely motion pursuant to this section must be one seeking a new trial. Rice v. Gonzales, 1968-NMSC-125, 79 N.M. 377, 444 P.2d 288.
Defendant's negligent failure to appear held not to defeat discretion to vacate. — The granting of a motion to vacate a default judgment under the provisions of this section is a matter within the discretion of the trial court, and that discretion is not defeated by the fact that defendant's failure to appear was negligent. Laffoon v. Galles Motor Co., 1969-NMCA-006, 80 N.M. 1, 450 P.2d 439; Gilbert v. N.M. Constr. Co., 1930-NMSC-120, 35 N.M. 262, 295 P. 291.
Granting of a motion to vacate a default judgment and permit the interposition of a defense is a matter within the discretion of the trial court, even though defendant's failure to appear was negligent. Ambrose v. Republic Mortg. Co., 1934-NMSC-051, 38 N.M. 370, 34 P.2d 294.
A defendant's negligent failure to appear does not necessarily bar his right to have default set aside upon application filed within 30 days following its entry; and where court declined to set default aside and made no findings, this court will remand for hearing and evidence on the facts. Dyne v. McCullough, 1932-NMSC-019, 36 N.M. 122, 9 P.2d 385.
Discretion of court extremely broad. — The discretion vested in the trial courts in the exercise of control over their judgments under this section is extremely broad. The granting of a motion to vacate a judgment, although there may have been negligence in failing to appear and answer, does not necessarily constitute an abuse of this discretion. Laffoon v. Galles Motor Co., 1969-NMCA-006, 80 N.M. 1, 450 P.2d 439.
When dismissal sustained but vacate motion filed before judgment. — Where motion to dismiss was sustained, but, before entry of judgment of dismissal, plaintiff filed motion to vacate the order of dismissal, and to reopen the case, the entry of the judgment of dismissal, pending the motion to vacate, was not irregular, and court was without jurisdiction to vacate the judgment of dismissal several months after its entry, because the motion to vacate was ineffective either because filed against a nonexisting judgment or because overruled by operation of law as not ruled upon within 30 days after it was filed. Garcia v. Anderson, 1937-NMSC-054, 41 N.M. 517, 71 P.2d 686.
Setting aside decree held not to set aside findings of fact. — District court's setting aside of its decree did not operate to set aside the findings of facts upon which it was based, and on appeal from subsequently entered decree, those facts were the facts upon which the case should be determined. Arias v. Springer, 1938-NMSC-025, 42 N.M. 350, 78 P.2d 153.
Setting aside decree held as though no decree had been entered. — When district court set aside its decree, the status of the case was as though no decree had been entered, but evidence theretofore taken was not set aside or canceled by reason of the cancellation of the decree. Arias v. Springer, 1938-NMSC-025, 42 N.M. 350, 78 P.2d 153.
No new vacate motion upon overruling set aside motion, without appeal. — In moving to set aside a judgment on a cognovit note, the mover must urge all grounds tending to show bias in judgment, since the law does not look favorably on trying issues piecemeal. On overruling of the motion, without appeal, the mover cannot again file another motion to vacate. Hot Springs Nat'l Bank v. Kenney, 1935-NMSC-066, 39 N.M. 428, 48 P.2d 1029.
Motion to dismiss not abandoned by taking appeal. — Defendant did not abandon its motion to dismiss one of the plaintiffs as a party on the basis that he had no financial interest in the litigation and was not a real party in interest by taking an appeal before the trial court ruled on the motion, since defendant raised the issue in its requested findings and conclusions; the issue never having been decided by the trial court, the cause was remanded for such a ruling. Jesko v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 1976-NMCA-117, 89 N.M. 786, 558 P.2d 55.
Where two judgments former treated as vacated. — In eminent domain proceedings, where two judgments are entered, and the latter is made in lieu of the former, then the court will treat the former judgment as vacated. State ex rel. State Hwy. Comm'n v. Marquez, 1960-NMSC-099, 67 N.M. 353, 355 P.2d 287.
Court could correct error in foreclosure judgment months later. — Where judgment of foreclosure, through error or mistake, ordered only a part of the property described in the mortgage to be sold to satisfy the judgment, trial court had jurisdiction, five months after entry of the judgment, to correct and amend it to speak the truth, and erred in denying bill of review. De Baca v. Sais, 1940-NMSC-006, 44 N.M. 105, 99 P.2d 106.
Foreclosure actions. — In a foreclosure action, that part of the decree that directs the manner and terms of the sale of the mortgaged property does not become a final judgment until the judicial confirmation of the sale, whereupon it becomes final. Plaza Nat'l Bank v. Valdez, 1987-NMSC-105, 106 N.M. 464, 745 P.2d 372.
When intervention denied money judgment may be entered. — In suit upon promissory note, where intervention was denied on writ of error, there was no obstacle to the entry of the money judgment; and the time within which the court could entertain any motion directed to the modification of the judgment having elapsed, there is no longer jurisdiction over it. Clark v. Rosenwald, 1925-NMSC-062, 31 N.M. 443, 247 P. 306.
Denial of motion not suspend operation of judgment. — This section and the proceedings thereunder respecting motions "directed against the judgment" which result in denial of the motion do not have the effect of suspending the operation of the judgment after the date of its entry, so far as the running of the six months from entry of final judgment limited for appeal or writ of error is concerned. King v. McElroy, 1933-NMSC-035, 37 N.M. 238, 21 P.2d 80.
Modification of division of property in divorce decree. — Apart from the exceptions to the general rule contained in 40-4-7 NMSA 1978 and Rule 60(b), N.M.R. Civ. P. (now Rule 1-060B), once the time has lapsed within which an appeal may be taken from a divorce decree, a court cannot change the original division of the property as an exercise of its continuing jurisdiction. Higginbotham v. Higginbotham, 92 N.M. 412, 589 P.2d 196 (1979).
IV. THIRTY-DAY LIMITATION.
The automatic denial provision of Section 39-1-1 NMSA 1978 does not apply in civil cases. Rosales v. N.M. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, MVD, 2012-NMCA-098, 287 P.3d 353, cert. denied, 2012-NMCERT-008.
The automatic denial provision did not apply. — Where defendant filed a motion for reconsideration of the district court's order reinstating plaintiff's driving privileges and the district court failed to rule on the motion within thirty days, the motion was not deemed denied solely by the passage of time and the district court did not lose jurisdiction to consider the motion thirty days after the motion was filed. Rosales v. N.M. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, MVD, 2012-NMCA-098, 287 P.3d 353, cert. denied, 2012-NMCERT-008.
Workers' compensation appeals. — The Workers' Compensation Act, Sections 52-5-1 et seq. NMSA 1978 incorporates Section 39-1-1 NMSA 1978. Bianco v. Horror One Prods., 2009-NMSC-006, 145 N.M. 551, 202 P.3d 810.
Motion to modify an order to permit an interlocutory appeal was a motion to reconsider. — Where the defendant filed a motion to modify the district court's order, which denied the defendant's motion to extend the redemption period in a foreclosure action, to include language permitting an interlocutory appeal more than ten days, but less than thirty days, after the entry of the order, the motion asked the district court to reconsider its order and determine if an appeal was necessary and the motion should be deemed to be a motion for reconsideration, not a motion to alter or amend a judgment under Rule 1-059 NMRA. Chapel v. Nevitt, 2009-NMCA-017, 145 N.M. 674, 203 P.3d 889.
The thirty-day time limit is not triggered by the filing of a motion after a notice of appeal has been filed. State v. McClaugherty, 2008-NMSC-044, 144 N.M. 483, 188 P.3d 1234, aff'g 2007-NMCA-041, 141 N.M. 468, 157 P.3d 33.
Thirty days to file and to rule. — The aggrieved party has 30 days to prepare and file a motion "directed against such judgment," after entry thereof, which time may be employed in preparation of such motion and for its presentation to the court; and, after the filing of the motion, the court has 30 days to rule thereon. King v. McElroy, 1933-NMSC-035, 37 N.M. 238, 21 P.2d 80 (see now Rule 1-054.1 NMRA).
Time to file and rule. — Where motion to amend judgment was filed within 30 days after judgment was rendered, and the motion was sustained within 30 days after it was filed, the court acted within its authority and had full control over the judgment and authority to amend it. Pugh v. Phelps, 1932-NMSC-084, 37 N.M. 126, 19 P.2d 315.
Not applicable to collateral matters. — The necessity for further proceedings to carry the judgment into effect or otherwise to dispose of a matter that does not entail alteration or revision of decisions embodied in the judgment does not prevent finality of the judgment and the court does not lose jurisdiction, after 30 days have passed or an appeal has been taken, to dispose of such matters. Determining the amount of an attorney's fee award is one such matter. Kelly Inn No. 102, Inc. v. Kapnison, 1992-NMSC-005, 113 N.M. 231, 824 P.2d 1033 (see now Rule 1-054.1 NMRA).
Effect of motions authorized by other statutes. — The time limits set by this section for a district court ruling do not apply to a motion authorized pursuant to another provision of law, at least when the other provision ordinarily permits more time within which to file the motion than does this section. Archuleta v. New Mexico State Police, 1989-NMCA-012, 108 N.M. 543, 775 P.2d 745, cert. denied, 108 N.M. 384, 772 P.2d 1307.
The time limit for a court's ruling under this section does not apply to a motion that another statute authorizes to be brought within a period of time longer than 30 days. Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Candlewood, Ltd., 1991-NMSC-090, 112 N.M. 633, 818 P.2d 411.
Applicability to Rule 1-059 NMRA motion. — A motion brought under Paragraph D of Rule 1-059 NMRA was subject to the provisions of this section that a court's failure to rule on a motion within 30 days of its filing is deemed a denial thereof. Beneficial Fin. Corp. v. Morris, 1995-NMCA-076, 120 N.M. 228, 900 P.2d 977, overruled by Albuquerque Redi-Mix, Inc. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 2007-NMSC-051, 142 N.M. 527, 168 P.3d 99 (see now Rule 1-054.1 NMRA).
Timeliness of motion authorized by this section and Rule 1-060 NMRA. — When, after paying a judgment to avoid a foreclosure sale, a party decided he had paid more than the judgment required and sought relief by a motion filed in the same proceeding, if the motion was of a type authorized by both this section and Rule 1-060 NMRA, the court could consider the motion if it was timely filed under the rule, even if it was not timely under this section. Century Bank v. Hymans, 1995-NMCA-095, 120 N.M. 684, 905 P.2d 722.
Time of motion for mistake, inadvertence or neglect governed by Rule 1-060B. — Provision in this section that failure by the court to rule on a motion within 30 days shall be deemed a denial thereof, had no application as to the timeliness of an appeal from an order denying motion to set aside default judgment on grounds of mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect. Such appeal is governed by Rule 60(b) N.M.R. Civ. P. (now see Rule 1-060B), which provides that motions thereunder may be made within a reasonable time, with a one-year limitation as to some of the grounds therein specified. Wooley v. Wicker, 1965-NMSC-065, 75 N.M. 241, 403 P.2d 685.
Petition for certificate of redemption. — The 30-day time limit set by this section for the court's ruling on a motion does not apply to a petition for a certificate of redemption. Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Candlewood, Ltd., 1991-NMSC-090, 112 N.M. 633, 818 P.2d 411.
Failure to rule deemed denial. — This section provides that if the court fails to rule on a motion directed against a judgment of the court within 30 days after the filing of the motion, such failure to rule shall be deemed a denial thereof. Nat'l Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Baxter, 1963-NMSC-165, 73 N.M. 94, 385 P.2d 956, overruled on other grounds, Kelly Inn No. 102, Inc. v. Kapnison, 1992-NMSC-005, 113 N.M. 231, 824 P.2d 1033; King v. McElroy, 1933-NMSC-035, 37 N.M. 238, 21 P.2d 80.
Under this section, failure to rule on a motion is deemed a denial of the motion. Wagner Land & Inv. Co. v. Halderman, 1972-NMSC-019, 83 N.M. 628, 495 P.2d 1075.
Where judgment, announced on September 4, 1931, was entered on September 25, 1931, and motion directed against the judgment was filed September 10, 1931, even if the judgment became effective only upon its entry, the motion was, on October 26, 1931, through failure of the court to rule thereon prior thereto, in legal effect denied, and should thereafter have been so treated by the court, and all parties to the suit. King v. McElroy, 1933-NMSC-035, 37 N.M. 238, 21 P.2d 80.
Failure to rule cannot avoid review. — Since the trial court's ruling on the motion prior to the expiration of the 30-day period would be reviewable, the court will hold that its failure to rule cannot avoid review, and will consider a motion for new trial timely filed as having been denied by the court if denied by operation of law. Montgomery Ward v. Larragoite, 1970-NMSC-057, 81 N.M. 383, 467 P.2d 399.
Setting of hearing date not ruling. — District court's setting of a date for hearing on motion for rehearing was not a ruling on the motion and the district court lost jurisdiction to deal further with the motion for rehearing, as it had been denied by operation of law. Nat'l Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Baxter, 1963-NMSC-165, 73 N.M. 94, 385 P.2d 956, overruled on other grounds by Kelly Inn No. 102, Inc. v. Kapnison, 1992-NMSC-005, 113 N.M. 231, 824 P.2d 1033.
Thirty-day period of jurisdiction does not start anew upon order of remittitur. — Order of remittitur filed within 30 days of the judgment on the verdict does not become a new final judgment so as to give the trial judge a new 30-day period of jurisdiction over the judgment. Salinas v. John Deere Co., Inc., 1984-NMCA-121, 103 N.M. 336, 707 P.2d 27, cert. quashed, 103 N.M. 287, 705 P.2d 1138 (1985).
Judgments under court control for 30 days. — Judgments of the district court remain under control of that court for a period of 30 days under the provisions of this section. Marquez v. Wylie, 1967-NMSC-245, 78 N.M. 544, 434 P.2d 69.
The district court retains control of its judgments and decrees for a period of 30 days after the entry thereof, and for such further time as may be necessary to enable the court to pass upon and dispose of any motion directed against such judgment and this statute requires the court to rule upon such motions within 30 days after filing. Wagner Land & Inv. Co. v. Halderman, 1972-NMSC-019, 83 N.M. 628, 495 P.2d 1075 (see now Rule 1-054.1 NMRA).
Court can vacate judgment even if not under Rule 60(b). — This court need not enter a discussion whether the trial court correctly vacated the judgment under Rule 60(b), N.M.R. Civ. P., although it had the discretion under that rule to do so as to a judgment entered under the circumstances. But whether it did or not, it certainly had such power under this section giving district courts jurisdiction over judgments and decrees for 30 days after entry thereof. Wakely v. Tyler, 1967-NMSC-145, 78 N.M. 168, 429 P.2d 366.
Permissible for court to vacate appeal order if within time. — Within the time in which the trial court retains control over its judgments, orders and decrees it is permissible for the trial court which granted an order allowing appeal to vacate the same by a subsequent order. Fairchild v. United Serv. Corp., 1948-NMSC-048, 52 N.M. 289, 197 P.2d 875.
Even if to vacate its judgment. — A trial court could within the 30 days for allowing appeals, in order to permit it to vacate its judgment, vacate the order which it had granted permitting an appeal. Fairchild v. United Serv. Corp., 1948-NMSC-048, 52 N.M. 289, 197 P.2d 875.
Court not precluded from ruling after 30 days where statute inapplicable. — Court was not precluded from ruling on a motion to vacate a default judgment after 30 days had passed since filing of the motion because statute stipulating that court's failure to rule within 30 days constituted a denial was held to be inapplicable. McLachlan v. Hill, 1967-NMSC-041, 77 N.M. 473, 423 P.2d 992.
Motion to amend complaint. — Trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant a motion to amend the complaint more than thirty days after an order of summary judgment was entered. Corbin v. State Farm Ins. Co., 1990-NMSC-014, 109 N.M. 589, 788 P.2d 345.
Court's order after 30 days void. — Trial court's order made after more than 30 days after motion for rehearing was filed was void as court was without jurisdiction to enter order. National Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Baxter, 1963-NMSC-165, 73 N.M. 94, 385 P.2d 956, overruled on other grounds by Kelly Inn No. 102, Inc. v. Kapnison, 1992-NMSC-005, 113 N.M. 231, 824 P.2d 1033 (see now Rule 1-054.1 NMRA).
Proceedings for reversal commenced within 30 days. — If the judgment is not void or irregular and is rendered after due hearing, and there is no fraud in the cause resulting therein, or is not a default judgment, a proceeding in a district court seeking a reversal of the decree must be commenced within 30 days after the entry of the judgment or decree. Caudill v. Caudill, 1935-NMSC-040, 39 N.M. 248, 44 P.2d 724.
When court makes no findings of fact. — Cases in which the court has made no findings of fact would come under this section, which limits the time for modification of judgment to not more than 30 days after the date of its entry, that being the time during which the court retains jurisdiction. Gilmore v. Baldwin, 1955-NMSC-003, 59 N.M. 51, 278 P.2d 790 (see now Rule 1-054.1 NMRA).
Appeal taken on motion deemed denied not timely. — Where motion to set aside the judgment was not ruled upon within 30 days thereafter, it was deemed denied by operation of law. Therefore, appeal taken more than five months later was not timely under former version of Rule 3, N.M.R. App. P. (Civ.) N.M. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Blueher Lumber Co., 1969-NMSC-059, 80 N.M. 254, 454 P.2d 268 (see now Rule 1-054.1 NMRA).
Must show abuse of discretion when appealing after 30 days. — On appeal from refusal to vacate a judgment more than 30 days after its entry, movant must show something more than the motion; there must be evidence and a showing of abuse of discretion. Board of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Wasson, 1933-NMSC-076, 37 N.M. 503, 24 P.2d 1098, followed in Board of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Gardner, 1933-NMSC-077, 37 N.M. 514, 24 P.2d 1104.
Section 31-18-19 NMSA 1978 controls over this section. - As the provisions of the habitual offender statute are mandatory, the specific provision for filing charges "at any time" in Section 31-18-6 NMSA 1978 (now Section 31-18-19 NMSA 1978) controls over the general provision of this section which gives a trial court jurisdiction over its final judgment in a nonjury trial for 30 days after entry of final judgment. State v. Padilla, 1978-NMCA-060, 92 N.M. 19, 582 P.2d 396, cert. denied, 92 N.M. 180, 585 P.2d 324.
Jurisdiction over second supplemental judgment. — Although appellate court lost jurisdiction over the first supplemental judgment under this section, it nevertheless still had jurisdiction over second supplemental judgment under Rule 1-060(B), NMRA. English v. English, 1994-NMCA-090, 118 N.M. 170, 879 P.2d 802, cert. denied, 118 N.M. 256, 880 P.2d 867.
Law reviews. — For article, "The 'New Rules' in New Mexico," see 1 Nat. Resources J. 96 (1961).
For article, "Attachment in New Mexico - Part II," see 2 Nat. Resources J. 75 (1962).
For article, "Separation of Powers and the Judicial Rule-Making Power in New Mexico: The Need for Prudential Restraints," see 15 N.M.L. Rev. 407 (1985).
Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. — 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts § 21 et seq.; 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 71 et seq.
Grounds upon which entry of final decree of divorce may be contested after entry of interlocutory decree, 109 A.L.R. 1005, 174 A.L.R. 519.
Form of judgment against garnishee respecting obligation payable in installments, 7 A.L.R.2d 680.
Judgment as res judicata pending appeal or motion for new trial or during time allowed therefor, 9 A.L.R.2d 984.
Entry of final judgment after disagreement of jury, 31 A.L.R.2d 885.
Modern status of state court rules governing entry of judgment on multiple claims, 80 A.L.R.4th 707.
Filing of notice of appeal as affecting jurisdiction of state trial court to consider motion to vacate judgment, 5 A.L.R.5th 422.
49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 100, 228.