Those founded upon accounts and unwritten contracts; those brought for injuries to property or for the conversion of personal property or for relief upon the ground of fraud, and all other actions not herein otherwise provided for and specified within four years.
History: Laws 1880, ch. 5, § 4; C.L. 1884, § 1863; C.L. 1897, § 2916; Code 1915, § 3349; C.S. 1929, § 83-104; 1941 Comp., § 27-104; 1953 Comp., § 23-1-4.
ANNOTATIONSBracketed material. — The bracketed material was inserted by the compiler and is not part of the law.
Cross references. — For limitation on action for damages for injuries to person or reputation, see 37-1-8 NMSA 1978.
For limitations on wrongful death actions, see 41-2-2 NMSA 1978.
For limitations on actions to recover gambling losses, see 44-5-3 NMSA 1978.
For limitations on enforcement of mechanics' liens, see 48-2-10 NMSA 1978.
For limitations on actions to enforce liens on oil and gas wells and pipelines, see 70-4-7 NMSA 1978.
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.
Equitable tolling. — Equitable tolling doctrine does not apply where class actions against firm were alleged to have been initiated after limitations periods governing investor's claims had run. Ballen v. Prudential Bache Sec., Inc., 23 F.3d 335 (10th Cir. 1994).
Determination of fraudulent intent. — Where, in suit to cancel deed and settlement agreement entered into prior to divorce for lack of consideration, the only possible defense is the statute of limitations, or laches, to establish which the burden rested upon the defendant husband, trial court should determine, first, whether husband at time of execution of the deed and the agreement held a fraudulent intent not to perform on his part, and, second, when the wife first discovered this fraud. Primus v. Clark, 1944-NMSC-030, 48 N.M. 240, 149 P.2d 535.
Filing as conditional tolling of statute. — The filing of the complaint one week before the asserted cause of action would be barred by this section did not toll that statute where service of process was not procured for over 13 months, for although the act of filing a complaint usually conditionally suspends the statute of limitations, New Mexico has recognized the need for good faith in the filing of actions and of due diligence in the issuance of process in order to toll the statute of limitations; defendant's failure to issue process for over 13 months indicates a continued lack of reasonable diligence, an essential to the effective suspension of the statute of limitations. Murphy v. Citizens Bank, 244 F.2d 511 (10th Cir. 1957).
Abandonment of suit not shown. — While conduct of a plaintiff subsequent to a timely filing of complaint may constitute an abandonment of the action, failure to procure service of summons for slightly more than 60 days after the expiration of the period of limitation does not in itself constitute lack of due diligence or show abandonment of the cause of action. Isaacks v. Jeffers, 144 F.2d 26 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 781, 65 S. Ct. 270, 89 L. Ed. 624 (1944).
Service timely. — Where complaint was filed before period of limitations had expired, though process was not actually served until slightly more than 60 days after expiration of four years from the accrual of the action, the action was timely brought and running of the statute was interrupted. Isaacks v. Jeffers, 144 F.2d 26 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 781, 65 S. Ct. 270, 89 L. Ed. 624 (1944).
Computing timeliness. — When appellant filed suit herein exactly four years from the date of decedent's death, his claim was timely filed within the four years required by this section as under former 12-2-2 NMSA 1978 (see now 12-2A-7 NMSA 1978) in computing time, the first day is excluded and the last included unless the last falls on Sunday, in which case, the time prescribed is extended to include the whole of the following Monday. Skarda v. Skarda, 1975-NMSC-028, 87 N.M. 497, 536 P.2d 257.
Laches. — The four elements necessary to establish laches are: (1) conduct of the defendant giving rise to a situation for which the plaintiff seeks a remedy; (2) delay by the plaintiff in asserting his rights, though he has notice or knowledge of the defendant's conduct and has had the opportunity to institute suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the defendant's part that the plaintiff would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant should the plaintiff be accorded relief or the suit is not held to be barred. McCabe v. Hawk, 1982-NMCA-039, 97 N.M. 622, 642 P.2d 608, cert. denied, 98 N.M. 50, 644 P.2d 1039.
Relation back of amendments to complaint. — Where original complaint, filed before running of the statute, and amendments thereof filed after the period had run, all centered around the same transaction, the handling of certain branded cattle, the only difference being that in the earlier pleadings plaintiff also sought an accounting from others than the defendant, the last amended complaint dated back to the filing of the original complaint so that the statute constituted no bar. Isaacks v. Jeffers, 144 F.2d 26 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 781, 65 S. Ct. 270, 89 L. Ed. 624 (1944).
Effect of verbal promise. — Verbal promise to pay an old debt in monthly installments in consideration for extension of time for paying balance due was not a new contract superseding original loan contract and did not toll running of the statute of limitations. Petranovich v. Frkovich, 1945-NMSC-037, 49 N.M. 365, 164 P.2d 386.
Verbal promise to use monthly rentals from garage and filling station until their sale to pay on loan contracts, and payment of balance from sale proceeds, was without consideration and invalid since it amounted to an extension of time for repayment of loan as to which there was an existing obligation to pay. Petranovich v. Frkovich, 1945-NMSC-037, 49 N.M. 365, 164 P.2d 386.
Extinguishment of lien. — Lien created by the statute authorizing the recordation of a transcript of the docket thereof is a right as distinguished from a remedy, and if the remedy of foreclosure of the judgment lien prayed for in a counterclaim is barred, the lien has been extinguished. Pugh v. Heating & Plumbing Fin. Corp., 1945-NMSC-031, 49 N.M. 234, 161 P.2d 714.
Foreign judgments later domesticated. — Actions to domesticate a foreign judgment are governed by 37-1-2 NMSA 1978, and as such these actions must be brought within the applicable period of limitation for foreign judgments. Accordingly, a 1989 judgment on the domestication issue converted the foreign judgment into a New Mexico judgment from which date the applicable state statutes of limitations commenced running. Plaintiff's 1992 action for a charging order based on the 1989 judgment satisfied the three alternative state statutes of limitations (37-1-4, 39-1-20, 37-1-2 NMSA 1978) and does not force a decision on the "correct" statute. Galef v. Buena Vista Dairy, 1994-NMCA-068, 117 N.M. 701, 875 P.2d 1132.
II. APPLICABILITY.
A. IN GENERAL.
The four-year statute of limitations does not apply to a division of undivided retirement benefits under Section 40-4-20 NMSA 1978. Gilmore v. Gilmore, 2010-NMCA-013, 147 N.M. 625, 227 P.3d 115.
Trade Practices and Frauds Act. — The four-year statute of limitations applies to the private right of action under the Trade Practices and Frauds Act, 59A-16-1 NMSA 1978. Martinez v. Cornejo, 2009-NMCA-011, 146 N.M. 223, 208 P.3d 443, cert. denied, 2009-NMCERT-001, 145 N.M. 655, 203 P.3d 870.
Statutes of limitations apply to both complaints and counterclaims, whether they be compulsory or permissive. Hartford v. Gibbons & Reed Co., 617 F.2d 567 (10th Cir. 1980).
Appointment of receiver did not revive a stale state law claim. FDIC v. Schuchmann, 319 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 2003).
Nature of right dispositive. — The nature of the right sued upon, and not the form of action or relief demanded, determines the applicability of the statute of limitations. Taylor v. Lovelace Clinic, 1967-NMSC-234, 78 N.M. 460, 432 P.2d 816.
Subrogated insurer's action against third-party tortfeasor. — When a workers' compensation insurer settles with an injured worker, receives an assignment of his negligence cause of action to the extent of the payment, and seeks reimbursement from a third party, the relevant statute of limitations is not this section (four-year period), which governs unspecified actions, but § 37-1-8 (three-year period), which governs actions for personal injury, which begins to run on a subrogated insurer's action against a third-party tortfeasor at the same time that the statute of limitations would begin to run on an action by the insured, or his personal representative in the event of the death of the insured. American Gen. Fire & Cas. Co. v. J.T. Constr. Co., 1987-NMCA-094, 106 N.M. 195, 740 P.2d 1179.
Tort of misappropriation of likeness, which occurs when someone appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or likeness of another, is a property claim governed by this section. Benally v. Hundred Arrows Press, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 969 (D.N.M. 1985), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Benally v. Amon Carter Museum of W. Art, 858 F.2d 618 (10th Cir. 1988).
"Account" defined. — A mutual, open, current account of which the law takes cognizance in determining the rights and liabilities of debtor and creditor litigants in apparent qualification of the statute of limitations may be defined as an account usually and properly kept in writing, wherein are set down by express or implied agreement of the parties concerned a connected series of debit and credit entries of reciprocal charges and allowances. Gentry v. Gentry, 1955-NMSC-055, 59 N.M. 395, 285 P.2d 503.
Open account shown. — Where there is a record of a connected series of debit and credit entries and a continuation of a related series, along with evidence that the amount claimed to be due by plaintiff and defendant's payments thereon were intended by the parties as the beginning of a connected or related series, there was a mutual open account, and the four-year limitation period commenced with the last entry thereon. Hunt Process Co. v. Anderson, 455 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1972).
Loans not transformed to account. — The fact that defendant makes payments to plaintiff on loans works no change in the nature of plaintiff's rights or defendant's liability; it does not create an open current account between the parties. Gentry v. Gentry, 1955-NMSC-055, 59 N.M. 395, 285 P.2d 503.
"Other actions". — It was intended that actions on constructive trusts should be included within the all-inclusive words, "and all other actions not herein otherwise provided for and specified within four years," of this section. Reagan v. Brown, 1955-NMSC-064, 59 N.M. 423, 285 P.2d 789.
Prior to the 1988 enactment of 52-2-14 NMSA 1978, there was no specific period of limitations for actions against the Subsequent Injury Fund contained in the Subsequent Injury Act (52-2-1 to 52-2-13 NMSA 1978), and an employer's claim for reimbursement from the fund was not sufficiently analogous to a claim for personal injuries so as to justify invocation of the statute of limitations (37-1-8 NMSA 1978) on this theory. Therefore, the four-year limitations period in 37-1-4 NMSA 1978 for "all other actions not . . . otherwise provided for and specified" was the applicable statute. Hernandez v. Levi Strauss, Inc., 1988-NMCA-075, 107 N.M. 644, 763 P.2d 78 (Subsequent Injury Act repealed).
Section has application to ordinary action based upon fraud, such as suits to rescind contracts brought about by false representations of the defendant; it has no application to suits in which the fraud charged is a collateral matter. Trujillo v. Padilla, 1968-NMSC-090, 79 N.M. 245, 442 P.2d 203.
No application to collateral fraud. — This section does not apply to suits wherein the fraud charged is collateral in nature, but applies only to the ordinary action based on fraud, such as suits to rescind contracts which are the result of false representations by the defendant. Lotspeich v. Dean, 1949-NMSC-054, 53 N.M. 488, 211 P.2d 979.
Applicability to duress. — In an action to cancel a contract because of alleged duress, the same statute of limitations applies as controls in actions based on alleged fraud. Taylor v. Lovelace Clinic, 1967-NMSC-234, 78 N.M. 460, 432 P.2d 816.
Declaratory actions are governed by same limitations applicable to other forms of relief. Taylor v. Lovelace Clinic, 1967-NMSC-234, 78 N.M. 460, 432 P.2d 816.
Action for establishing paternity. — Trial court's sua sponte application of this section in an action to establish paternity was not error, despite the fact that the father never pled, presented evidence or argument, or requested a finding of fact dealing with this section, although the father did specifically present a statute of limitations defense by way of argument for the application of the prior Bastardy Statute, which was previously declared to be unconstitutional. Padilla v. Montano, 1993-NMCA-127, 116 N.M. 398, 862 P.2d 1257.
Applicability in federal court. — The law of New Mexico governs as to the time within which an action must be commenced when brought in federal court of that state, but the manner in which actions are commenced, when actions are deemed to have begun, the manner and method of serving process, all relate to procedure and are governed by the law of the forum. Isaacks v. Jeffers, 144 F.2d 26 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 781, 65 S. Ct. 270, 89 L. Ed. 624 (1944).
Statute of limitations applicable to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions. — An action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive use of force during an arrest is not governed by the limitations on actions contained in the Tort Claims Act but by the general statutory limitations on actions for personal injury, 37-1-8 NMSA 1978, or for miscellaneous claims, this section. Gunther v. Miller, 498 F. Supp. 882 (D.N.M. 1980).
Section 41-4-15 NMSA 1978 applicable to claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. — The two-year period under 41-4-15 NMSA 1978 is the applicable limitation period to claims under the Federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. DeVargas v. State ex rel. New Mexico Dep't of Cors., 1981-NMCA-109, 97 N.M. 447, 640 P.2d 1327 (overruled by Newcomb v. Ingle, 827 F.2d 675 (10th Cir. 1987)).
Application to claim against subsequent injury fund. — An employer's claim against the subsequent injury fund which accrued prior to the effective date of former 52-2-14 NMSA 1978, was governed by the four-year limitations period provided for in this section and not the two-year limitations period provided for in former 52-2-14 NMSA 1978. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Chavez, 1992-NMCA-005, 113 N.M. 504, 828 P.2d 416 (Subsequent Injury Act repealed).
Suits to divide personalty. — The four-year statute of limitations of this section applies to suits to divide personal property brought under 40-4-20 NMSA 1978. Plaatje v. Plaatje, 1981-NMSC-040, 95 N.M. 789, 626 P.2d 1286.
Receipt of payments for military retirement. — The statute of limitations applicable to the receipt of payments for military retirement is a four-year statute, this section, and it runs from the date of each installment of military retirement. Berry v. Meadows, 1986-NMCA-002, 103 N.M. 761, 713 P.2d 1017.
Deceit by attorney. — This section applied to a claim against an attorney for deceit. Duncan v. Campbell, 1997-NMCA-028, 123 N.M. 181, 936 P.2d 863, cert. denied, 123 N.M. 168, 936 P.2d 337.
Claim for breach of contract to procure insurance. — Where there was no written contract to procure insurance between surplus lines broker and businessman, claim for breach of contract to procure insurance was governed by the four-year statute of limitations for unwritten contracts, and the statute of limitations for claims based upon written contracts does not apply to this claim. Nance v. L.J. Dolloff Assocs., Inc., 2006-NMCA-012, 138 N.M. 851, 126 P.3d 1215.
Claims for violations of statutes. — Claims founded on violations of statutes fall within "other unspecified actions" under the four-year statute of limitations set forth in this section. Nance v. L.J. Dolloff Assocs., Inc., 2006-NMCA-012, 138 N.M. 851, 126 P.3d 1215.
Negligent misrepresentation. — Where claim of negligent misrepresentation arises from the common-law obligations among the parties, not from a contract, this claim cannot be viewed as being founded on a written contract, and it is governed either by the four-year statute of limitations in this section or by the three-year statute of limitations applicable to negligence actions in 37-1-8 NMSA 1978. Nance v. L.J. Dolloff Assocs., Inc., 2006-NMCA-012, 138 N.M. 851, 126 P.3d 1215.
Actual injury to limited partner. — Where plaintiff invested in a limited partnership based on accountant's advice, her cause of action for accountant malpractice based on the investment accrued when she received notice of Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment (FPAA) from the Internal Revenue Service; the FPAA is the functional equivalent of an individual IRS tax deficiency notice and constitutes actual injury to a partner in a limited partnership. Wiste v. Neff & Co., 1998-NMCA-165, 126 N.M. 232, 967 P.2d 1172, cert. denied, 126 N.M. 534, 972 P.2d 353.
B. ACTIONS BY STATE OR PUBLIC BODY.
Improper venue as negligence in prosecution. — An original suit does not fail for negligence in its prosecution when it is filed in an improper venue. A second suit filed in the proper venue is a continuation of the first action. AMICA Mut. Ins. Co. v. McRostie, 2006-NMCA-046, 139 N.M. 486, 134 P.3d 773, cert. denied, 2006-NMCERT-004, 139 N.M. 429, 134 P.3d 120.
Statute of limitations does not run against the state. Board of Educ. v. Standhardt, 1969-NMSC-118, 80 N.M. 543, 458 P.2d 795.
The state was not barred by the statute of limitations from intervening in a suit to compel compliance with 47-6-1 NMSA 1978 et seq. Even if the county, the original plaintiff, was barred by the limitations period, the state's status as a "real party in interest" precluded dismissal of the suit. State ex rel. Stratton v. Alto Land & Cattle Co., 1991-NMCA-146, 113 N.M. 276, 824 P.2d 1078.
Statute may run against localities. — Statutes of limitations do not run against the state unless the statute expressly includes the state or does so by clear implications, but will run against county and other political subdivisions, including school districts, unless such may be deemed to be an arm of the state because of the particular governmental functions or purposes involved. Board of Educ. v. Standhardt, 1969-NMSC-118, 80 N.M. 543, 458 P.2d 795.
Actions by municipal corporations. — The plea of the statute of limitations is no defense to actions by counties or municipal corporations involving public rights, such as taxation, unless the statute expressly so provides, and our statute contains no such provision. Hagerman v. Territory, 1901-NMSC-020, 11 N.M. 156, 66 P. 526.
Statute of limitations applies to actions by municipalities to enforce municipal liens. Hurley v. Village of Ruidoso, 2006-NMCA-041, 139 N.M. 306, 131P.3d 693.
Special assessments. — The four-year statute of limitations applies and runs against special assessments for street paving obligations, since such assessments are not levied for governmental purposes and are not "taxes," and actions to foreclose such improvement assessment liens are barred where for nearly six years there has been default in payment of annual installments. Altman v. Kilburn, 1941-NMSC-023, 45 N.M. 453, 116 P.2d 812.
School board as real party in interest. — If a school district or board of education has the power or duty to contract, lease, issue bonds, sue and be sued and hold both real and personal property then it is a body corporate and politic, and where the obligation sued upon is one owed solely to the school district as administered by the board of education, it is the real party in interest and the statute of limitations may run against it. Board of Educ. v. Standhardt, 1969-NMSC-118, 80 N.M. 543, 458 P.2d 795.
Statute does not run against directors of state insane asylum (now state hospital). Directors of Insane Asylum v. Boyd, 1932-NMSC-053, 37 N.M. 36, 17 P.2d 358.
C. ACTIONS BARRED.
Trusts founded on verbal agreements. — This limitation applies to equitable actions on trusts founded on verbal agreements or unwritten contracts when the defendant has not fraudulently concealed his cause of action, or the existence thereof. Patterson v. Hewitt, 1901-NMSC-012, 11 N.M. 1, 66 P. 552, aff'd, 195 U.S. 309, 25 S. Ct. 35, 49 L. Ed. 214 (1904).
Breach of warranty or products liability claim was barred by the four-year statute of limitation. Standhardt v. Flintkote Co., 1973-NMSC-040, 84 N.M. 796, 508 P.2d 1283.
Setting aside probated will. — Under the laws of the territory of New Mexico, a judgment of a probate court in that territory admitting a will to probate could not be annulled by the same court in a proceeding instituted by an heir more than 20 years after the original judgment was rendered and more than four years after the heir became of age. Bent v. Thompson, 138 U.S. 114, 11 S. Ct. 238, 34 L. Ed. 902 (1891).
Association membership. — Where plaintiff acquired whatever right he had to membership in cooperative association no later than 1956 by his own testimony, at which time he was rejected, the four-year limitation period provided in this section for the bringing of his suit to compel his acceptance to membership had expired long before the filing of his complaint in intervention. Moya v. Chilili Coop. Ass'n, Inc., 1974-NMSC-100, 87 N.M. 99, 529 P.2d 1220, cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965, 95 S. Ct. 1954, 44 L. Ed. 2d 452 (1975).
Legal malpractice suit barred where discoverable more than four years prior to filing of complaint. — Where the harm or damage from an alleged legal malpractice in drafting and supervising the execution of a will arose at the time the testatrix died, although the cause of action did not accrue until the harm or damage was ascertainable or discoverable, the executrix was in a position to ascertain or discover the harm or damage to her as a result of the alleged defect in the execution of the decedent's will each time she changed attorneys and also at the time the court set aside the order admitting the will to probate. So, if the executrix had a cause of action against her attorney, it was ascertainable or discoverable more than four years before she filed her complaint, the four-year statute of limitations had elapsed and the executrix's complaint was properly dismissed. Jaramillo v. Hood, 1979-NMSC-068, 93 N.M. 433, 601 P.2d 66.
Where plaintiff knew all the facts underlying his claim for legal malpractice more than four years before filing suit, the claim was time barred under both this section and 37-1-8 NMSA 1978. Delta Automatic Sys., Inc. v. Bingham, 1999-NMCA-029, 126 N.M. 717, 974 P.2d 1174, cert. denied, 126 N.M. 532, 972 P.2d 351.
Malpractice action against accountant for failure to file corporate tax returns was barred under this section where the taxpayer hired a new accountant who told him more than four years before the action was commenced that the returns in question had not been filed, regardless of the fact that the taxpayer did not receive an IRS notice of tax deficiency until later. Haas Enters., Inc. v. Davis, 2003-NMCA-143, 134 N.M. 675, 82 P.3d 42.
D. ACTIONS NOT BARRED.
Action to divide retirement benefits not barred. — Where plaintiff filed a divorce action against defendant in California in 1991; the California court granted plaintiff a default divorce in 1994; defendant retired and began receiving monthly retirement benefits in 2005; the California court issued a qualified domestic relations order awarding plaintiff a portion of defendant's retirement benefits in 2006; the California court set aside the qualified domestic relations order in 2006 for lack of personal jurisdiction; and plaintiff filed an action in New Mexico in 2007 for a division of the retirement benefits, plaintiff's right to sue accrued when the payment of each installment of retirement benefits became due and plaintiff's action was not barred by statute of limitation. Gilmore v. Gilmore, 2010-NMCA-013, 147 N.M. 625, 227 P.3d 115.
Section does not apply to actions founded on written instruments. Coler v. Board of Cnty. Comm'rs, 1891-NMSC-024, 6 N.M. 88, 27 P. 619.
Section inapplicable to personal injuries. — Where the action in its effect is one for the recovery of damages for personal injury, the statute of limitations for injuries to the person applies, even though the cause of action stated is ex contractu in its nature. Chavez v. Kitsch, 1962-NMSC-122, 70 N.M. 439, 374 P.2d 497.
Quiet title actions. — Plaintiffs' action, as heirs, to have title in property left by decedent quieted in them as against defendant creditors to whom, pursuant to compromise settlement, the administrator had executed deeds to the property, but who did not have possession thereof, was not barred by four-year statute of limitations, as bar of laches does not run in favor of one claiming real property, by or through a void deed, who is not in possession. Emblem v. Emblem, 1953-NMSC-062, 57 N.M. 495, 260 P.2d 693.
Cause of action to establish interest in real estate and to quiet title in plaintiff was not barred by this section. Apodaca v. Hernandez, 1956-NMSC-095, 61 N.M. 449, 302 P.2d 177.
Defendant's claims to the realty were not barred by the four-year statute of limitations where the trial court could properly determine that he possessed a superior claim to that asserted by plaintiff. Tres Ladrones, Inc. v. Fitch, 1999-NMCA-076, 127 N.M. 437, 982 P.2d 488, cert. denied, 127 N.M. 391, 981 P.2d 1209.
Statute of limitations does not apply to action for accounting and partition of real property. Martinez v. Martinez, 2004-NMCA-007, 135 N.M. 11, 83 P.3d 298.
Request for change in property tax schedule. — Because Section 7-38-78 NMSA 1978 does not contain a time limit for filing the request for a change in the property tax schedule, the general statute of limitations of four years pursuant to this section applies. Fed. Express Corp. v. Abeyta, 2004-NMCA-011, 135 N.M. 37, 84 P.3d 85, cert. granted, 2004-NMCERT-001, 135 N.M. 160, 85 P.3d 802.
Action by remaindermen. — Where remaindermen brought quiet title action against one to whom the life tenant had conveyed a "fee" and delivered quitclaim deed bearing the alleged forged signatures of the remaindermen, the four-year statute of limitations applicable to actions seeking relief against fraud is not applicable. Lotspeich v. Dean, 1949-NMSC-054, 53 N.M. 488, 211 P.2d 979.
Suit for balance of purchase price. — Where evidence lent support to the clear implication that initial agreement as to the times and amounts of payments on the purchase price had been changed, filing of suit after discovery of defendants' recording of quitclaim deed prior to full payment, in violation of this agreement, was timely. Romero v. Sanchez, 1974-NMSC-013, 86 N.M. 55, 519 P.2d 291.
Section does not bar suit to enforce restrictive covenant or negative easement brought within 10-year period applicable under 37-1-22 NMSA 1978. Jinkins v. City of Jal, 1963-NMSC-198, 73 N.M. 173, 386 P.2d 599.
Condemnation compensation. — This section was not applicable to action to recover compensation for condemned land. State Hwy. Comm'n v. Ruidoso Tel. Co., 1963-NMSC-150, 73 N.M. 487, 389 P.2d 606.
Promise to devise. — Where plaintiff in a cross-action claims title to land because of repeated promises of its owner to adopt plaintiff and leave her property to plaintiff at her death, such action is not barred by limitation of four years after ancestor's death, since the claim is not founded upon contract, and did not accrue at ancestor's death. Wooley v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 1935-NMSC-008, 39 N.M. 256, 45 P.2d 927.
Creditor's suit timely. — Where trial court found that transferee had accepted conveyance of title with fraudulent intent in order to assist debtor to defraud creditors, a creditor's suit which was brought within the statutory period of limitations was not barred by laches, where no change in property value or relationship of the parties had taken place. Consolidated Placers, Inc. v. Grant, 1944-NMSC-040, 48 N.M. 340, 151 P.2d 48.
In absence of a change in relationship of the parties or value of the property a creditor's suit against the debtor's transferee seeking to set aside a conveyance as fraudulent commenced two years and eight months after the conveyance and two months after debtor's death was not barred by laches. Consolidated Placers, Inc. v. Grant, 1944-NMSC-040, 48 N.M. 340, 151 P.2d 48.
Obstruction and appropriation of creek. — This section did not apply to a suit for damages for obstruction of flow and appropriation of waters of a creek. N.M. Prods. Co. v. N.M. Power Co., 1937-NMSC-048, 42 N.M. 311, 77 P.2d 634.
Collateral fraud. — Section did not apply to suit by former wife to set aside conveyance fraudulently procured by former husband on grounds that she did not have competent and independent legal counsel. Trujillo v. Padilla, 1968-NMSC-090, 79 N.M. 245, 442 P.2d 203.
III. ACCRUAL OF CAUSE OF ACTION.
Fraudulent issuance of stock certificates. — Where registered shareholders sold and transferred their certificates of shares in the defendant corporation; the original certificates were subsequently transferred to plaintiff in 1989; the intervening original certificate holders did not register the original certificates in their names; the registered shareholders obtained replacement certificates for the shares in 1987; when plaintiff attempted to register the original certificates in plaintiff's name in 1990, the corporation refused to register the original certificates; plaintiff did not inquire into the reason plaintiff was unable to register the certificates and took no action to compel the corporation to register the certificates; when plaintiff attempted to register the original certificates again in 2007, the corporation refused to register the certificates; and when plaintiff discovered in 2007 that the corporation had issued replacement certificates to the registered shareholders, plaintiff filed suit for fraud, plaintiff's claim accrued in 1990 because plaintiff's inability to register the certificates in 1990 constituted knowledge of facts that would have led a reasonable person to undertake further investigation into the reasons underlying the impediment to registration and to discover that the registered shareholders had obtained replacement certificates in 1987. Wilde v. Westland Dev. Co., Inc., 2010-NMCA-085, 148 N.M. 627, 241 P.3d 628.
Where a registered shareholder sold and transferred the shareholder's original certificate of shares in the defendant corporation; the original certificate was subsequently transferred to plaintiff in 1989; the intervening original certificate holders did not register the original certificate in their names; when plaintiff attempted to register the original certificate in plaintiff's name in 1990, the corporation refused to register the certificate; in 1998, a descendant of the registered shareholder inquired about buying the original certificate from plaintiff; in 2004, the descendant filed an affidavit with the corporation stating that the descendant was the successor of the estate of the registered shareholder and the corporation issued a replacement certificate to the descendant; plaintiff attempted to register the original certificate; and in 2007, when plaintiff discovered that the corporation had issued a replacement certificate to the descendant, plaintiff filed suit for fraud, plaintiff's claim accrued in 2004 because the earliest that plaintiff could have become aware of the descendant's misconduct in requesting the replacement certificate was 2004. Wilde v. Westland Dev. Co., Inc., 2010-NMCA-085, 148 N.M. 627, 241 P.3d 628.
Professional malpractice. — In cases of malpractice where the professional's alleged negligence has caused the plaintiff to be liable to a third party, the plaintiff's claim accrues when the liability is imposed. N.M. Pub. Schs. Ins. Auth. v. Gallagher & Co., 2008-NMSC-067, 145 N.M. 316, 198 P.3d 342, rev'g 2007-NMCA-142, 142 N.M. 760, 170 P.3d 998.
Where an insurance broker negligently drafted insurance policies which resulted in the imposition of liability on a state agency that provided risk-related insurance coverage to public schools, the state agency's malpractice claim against the insurance broker did not accrue until liability was imposed on the state agency. N.M. Pub. Schs. Ins. Auth. v. Gallagher & Co., 2008-NMSC-067, 145 N.M. 316, 198 P.3d 342, rev'g 2007-NMCA-142, 142 N.M. 760, 170 P.3d 998.
Action for accounts and unwritten contracts may be brought within four years after the cause of action accrues and where there is no specified time for the payment of loans, the action accrues upon the date of such loan. Akre v. Washburn, 1979-NMSC-017, 92 N.M. 487, 590 P.2d 635.
Unwritten contracts. — Where a contract is silent as to the time of performance, the law implies that it is to be performed within a reasonable time and the four-year statute of limitations does not begin to run until the lapse of a reasonable time for performance of the contract. Smith v. Galio, 1980-NMCA-134, 95 N.M. 4, 617 P.2d 1325.
Former spouse's share of military retirement benefits. — Military retirement benefits are a form of employee compensation and are community property if the period of employment upon which those benefits are based occurred during coverture. Although the right to receive benefits matured prior to divorce, the right to receive each monthly installment accrues when the installment becomes due. Thus the statutory time limitation upon a former spouse's right to sue for a portion of each installment commences to run from the time each installment comes due. Plaatje v. Plaatje, 1981-NMSC-040, 95 N.M. 789, 626 P.2d 1286.
Statute of limitations began to run with discovery of fraud in 1961 and did not bar suit in 1963 for fraud from 1957 to 1961 against finance company for payments made by house trailer dealers to finance company for insurance which was not obtained. Sw. Inv. Co. v. Cactus Motor Co., 355 F.2d 674 (10th Cir. 1966).
As to the common-law fraud, the limitations period commences to run upon discovery of the fraud or upon discovery of such facts as would, on reasonable diligent investigation, lead to a knowledge of fraud. Jones v. Ford Motor Co., 599 F.2d 394 (10th Cir. 1979).
Appointment of receiver for chartered state institution. — A cause of action accrued within four years of the date a receiver was appointed for chartered state institution on the grounds the institution had engaged in numerous unsound practices and was insolvent. FDIC v. Schuchmann, 319 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 2003).
Fraudulent concealment in fiduciary context tolls statute. In the context of a fiduciary relationship, a party with superior knowledge has a duty to disclose material information, and failure to disclose such information constitutes fraudulent concealment that tolls the statute of limitations. Martinez v. Martinez, 2004-NMCA-007, 135 N.M. 11, 83 P.3d 298.
Accrual of accountant malpractice claim. New Mexico has adopted a two-prong test to determine when a cause of action for accountant malpractice accrues: (1) when the client sustains an "actual injury" and (2) when the client discovers, or through reasonable diligence should discover, the facts essential to the cause of action. Haas Enters., Inc. v. Davis, 2003-NMCA-143, 134 N.M. 675, 82 P.3d 42.
A cause of action for accountant malpractice based on improperly prepared tax returns accrues when the taxpayer receives a notice of tax deficiency from the IRS; the IRS notice serves simultaneously as the injury itself and the notice to the client thereof. Haas Enters., Inc. v. Davis, 2003-NMCA-143, 134 N.M. 675, 82 P.3d 42.
In a malpractice action against an accountant for failure to file corporate tax returns, the cause of action accrued when the taxpayer hired a new accountant who told him the that returns in question had not been filed, not when he later received a notice of tax deficiency from the IRS. Haas Enters., Inc. v. Davis, 2003-NMCA-143, 134 N.M. 675, 82 P.3d 42.
Learning of fraud. — A demurrer based on 37-1-7 NMSA 1978 was not well taken where the complaint alleged that "it was not until about the month of July, 1902" that plaintiff learned of defendant's fraudulent claim to be the absolute owner of the real estate in question, in violation of an agreement made in 1898, which complaint was filed November 24, 1903. Alexander v. Cleland, 1906-NMSC-027, 13 N.M. 524, 86 P. 425.
When negligence cause arises. — The period of limitation begins to run when the cause of action accrues; and there is no cause of action for negligence until there has been a resulting injury to the plaintiff. Chisholm v. Scott, 1974-NMCA-106, 86 N.M. 707, 526 P.2d 1300; Spurlin v. Paul Brown Agency, Inc., 1969-NMSC-061, 80 N.M. 306, 454 P.2d 963.
Successive injuries from structure or nuisance. — Where a structure or nuisance is such that its construction and continuance are not necessarily injurious, damages may be awarded for successive injuries, and a new statute of limitations begins to run from the date of each injury. Valdez v. Mountain Bell Tel. Co., 1988-NMCA-039, 107 N.M. 236, 755 P.2d 80.
Successive injuries to property. — Where, in 1998, the municipality constructed a flood retention pond next to plaintiff's building; in the years following the construction of the retention pond, the building began to show signs of damage to the foundation, walls, roof and floor; in 2008, plaintiff filed suit against the non-municipal defendants for damages; defendants claimed that plaintiff's suit was time barred because plaintiff knew or should have known about the injuries to the property more than four years before plaintiff filed suit; plaintiff contended that the property incurred separate injuries and each new injury had its own discovery date and period of limitations; defendants failed to show that the retention pond and seepage from the retention pond were permanent and that the damages were ascertainable at the time the retention pond was constructed; and there was evidence that when the retention pond was full, particularly during the monsoon season, the water migrated beneath the surface of plaintiff's property and that different cracks and damage developed in the foundation, walls and ceiling of the building over time, summary judgment for defendants was not proper because material disputed facts existed regarding whether separate causes of action accrued with each new injury to the property. Yurcic v. City of Gallup, 2013-NMCA-039, 298 P.3d 500.
Notice of injuries to property. — Where, in 1998, the municipality constructed a flood retention pond next to plaintiff's building; in the years following the construction of the retention pond, the building began to show signs of damage to the foundation, walls, roof and floor; in 2008, plaintiff filed suit against the non-municipal defendants for damages; defendants claimed that plaintiff's suit was time barred because plaintiff knew or should have known about the injuries to the property more than four years before plaintiff filed suit; defendants argued that plaintiff was on notice of structural cracks in 1998 when plaintiff remodeled the building and plaintiff argued that plaintiff's tenant examined the premises in 1998 and found no noticeable problems with the structure of the building; defendant argued that in 2001, plaintiff's tenant reported a substantial crack in the tile floor, but offered no proof linking the crack with the retention pond; defendant argued that in 2002 or 2003, plaintiff's tenant informed plaintiff that the northeast side of the foundation of the building was substantially cracking, that the ground around it was saturated with water, and that the tenant believed that the retention pond caused the damage; and plaintiff contended that the tenant talked to plaintiff in 2004, summary judgment for defendants was not proper because material disputed facts existed about when plaintiff knew or should have known about the injuries to the property and the existence of plaintiff's claims against defendants. Yurcic v. City of Gallup, 2013-NMCA-039, 298 P.3d 500.
Failure to furnish insurance. — The cause of action arising out of negligent failure to furnish liability coverage could only accrue when legal liability materialized, that is, when negligence suit was filed, and since a policy of insurance such as defendant allegedly failed to furnish would have provided for the insurance company to furnish a defense; otherwise the loss would have accrued only after judgment had been entered, or possibly when settlement had been made or a judgment paid. Spurlin v. Paul Brown Agency, Inc., 1969-NMSC-061, 80 N.M. 306, 454 P.2d 963.
Action against insurer for failure to settle claim accrues upon judgment against insured. — An action against an insurer for wrongful failure to settle a claim does not accrue until judgment against the insured is final. It is only then that any liability in excess of the policy limits is established. Torrez v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 705 F.2d 1192 (10th Cir. 1982).
Tax deficiency. — Liability imposed by deficiency notice from the IRS was the injury which formed plaintiffs' cause of action against defendant accountants, as the deficiency was not owed until the IRS rendered its assessment in written notice to the taxpayer plaintiff; hence, the statute may not be deemed to have run until four years after this notice had been given. Chisholm v. Scott, 1974-NMCA-106, 86 N.M. 707, 526 P.2d 1300.
Discovery of breach of fiduciary duty. — In lessor's action against realtor for breach of fiduciary duty in connection with negotiation of lease on lessor's behalf, trial court properly submitted issues of whether lessor relied on realtor acting in fiduciary capacity and when lessor discovered or should have suspected fraud or negligence of realtor. Ramsey v. Culpepper, 738 F.2d 1092 (10th Cir. 1984).
Repudiation of constructive trust. — A statute of limitations does not run between a trustee and his beneficiary until there has been a repudiation of the constructive trust. Miller v. Miller, 1971-NMSC-104, 83 N.M. 230, 490 P.2d 672; Garcia v. Marquez, 1984-NMSC-074, 101 N.M. 427, 684 P.2d 513.
Equitable trust. — When suit is brought for imposition of an equitable trust, the statute of limitations does not run between a trustee and a beneficiary until there has been a repudiation of the trust, whether it be a constructive trust, or a resulting trust. To prove repudiation of the trust, the complaining party must show that there has been an open denial of the trust by the trustee who held the property for the benefit of the plaintiff. Granado v. Granado, 1988-NMSC-069, 107 N.M. 456, 760 P.2d 148.
Pretermitted heir suing executrix. — Plaintiff pretermitted heir could properly anticipate that executrix would administer the estate according to law; until executrix asserted unlawful dominion over plaintiff's property interest, which she must have done, if at all, after the entry of the decree approving the final account and ordering distribution to her as sole devisee and legatee, there was no dispute between them and nothing over which they had reason to contest; hence, suit filed well within the four-year period after entry of the decree was timely. Hagerman v. Gustafson, 1973-NMSC-058, 85 N.M. 420, 512 P.2d 1256.
Continuous representation does not toll statute of limitation. — New Mexico does not recognize the "continuous representation" doctrine as a principle that tolls the statute of limitations for legal malpractice. Sharts v. Natelson, 1994-NMSC-114, 118 N.M. 721, 885 P.2d 642.
Action against subsequent injury fund. — Where an employer seeks to file a suit against the subsequent injury fund for reimbursement, and where the 1988 statute of limitations (52-2-14 NMSA 1978) is not applicable, the period of limitations on such claim begins to run from the time the employer knew or should have known it had a claim against the fund. Hernandez v. Levi Strauss, Inc., 1988-NMCA-075, 107 N.M. 644, 763 P.2d 78 (Subsequent Injury Act repealed).
The four-year statute of limitations with respect to claims by an employer against the Subsequent Injury Fund, as announced in Hernandez v. Levi Strauss, Inc., 1988-NMCA-075, 107 N.M. 644, 763 P.2d 78, should be applied retrospectively. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Chavez, 1990-NMCA-002, 109 N.M. 439, 786 P.2d 53 (Subsequent Injury Act repealed).
Accrual at time of injury. — Where plaintiffs had sufficient water to irrigate their land until 1945 when the flow of water in the streams from which plaintiffs diverted water materially decreased so that the water was insufficient to irrigate their land, the four-year statute of limitations did not begin to run from the date water was used by defendants, but from the date defendants' use of the water deprived plaintiffs of their appropriated water in 1945. Bounds v. Carner, 1949-NMSC-008, 53 N.M. 234, 205 P.2d 216.
Accrual of legal malpractice claim. — The statute of limitations in a cause of action for legal malpractice commences when both elements of a two-part test have been satisfied, namely: (1) when the harm or damage is ascertainable or discoverable by the injured party; and (2) when actual loss or damage has occurred to the client. In this case, the plaintiffs' cause of action for legal malpractice accrued when the judgment was entered against them in the employment contract dispute. At that point the plaintiffs were aware that the law firm's legal advice had been determined to be erroneous and they had been damaged. While there was still a possibility both those decisions would be reversed on appeal, an unreversed judgment is final between the parties as to all matters to which the judgment relates. Brunacini v. Kavanagh, 1993-NMCA-157, 117 N.M. 122, 869 P.2d 821, cert. denied, 117 N.M. 215, 870 P.2d 753.
An invasion of a legally protected interest (an injury), without actual loss (harm), is insufficient to accrue a cause of action in legal malpractice. Sharts v. Natelson, 1993-NMCA-082, 1993-NMCA-082, 118 N.M. 330, 881 P.2d 690, rev'd on other grounds, 1994-NMSC-114, 118 N.M. 721, 885 P.2d 642.
A cause of action for legal malpractice is established when the client can allege the following facts: (1) the employment of the attorney; (2) the attorney's neglect of a reasonable duty; and (3) the negligence resulted in and was the proximate cause of loss to the client. Sharts v. Natelson, 1994-NMSC-114, 118 N.M. 721, 885 P.2d 642.
The limitations period for legal malpractice commences when the client sustains actual injury and the client discovers, or through reasonable diligence should discover, the facts essential to the cause of action. Sharts v. Natelson, 1994-NMSC-114, 118 N.M. 721, 885 P.2d 642.
Where plaintiffs lost the right to avoid liens on their property through a bankruptcy proceeding when they were discharged in bankruptcy, plaintiffs sustained actual injury in 1986 at the time of their discharge, but because the occurrence of actual injury is only one prong of the legal malpractice test, a legal malpractice claim did not accrue until the plaintiffs discovered, or through reasonable diligence should have discovered, the facts essential to their claim. Brown v. Behles & Davis, 2004-NMCA-028, 135 N.M. 180, 86 P.3d 605.
Discovery of injury by client. — The statute of limitations does not begin to run until the client discovers, or should discover, that he or she has suffered a loss and that the loss may have been caused by the attorney's wrongful act or omission. Sharts v. Natelson, 1994-NMSC-114, 118 N.M. 721, 885 P.2d 642.
The question of when a client is deemed to have discovered an attorney's malpractice and the resulting injury is generally a question of fact, but if the undisputed facts show that the client knew, or should have been aware of the negligent conduct on or before a specific date, the issue may be decided as a matter of law. Sharts v. Natelson, 1994-NMSC-114, 118 N.M. 721, 885 P.2d 642.
Continuing wrong doctrine. — In an action for fraud, misrepresentation and unfair trade practices, the fact that the plaintiff knew of his injuries, which he attributed to the risk of loss inherent in every contract, did not prevent application of the continuing wrong doctrine since the defendant held the plaintiff to the agreement while at the same time taking measures to dissolve it. Tiberi v. CIGNA Corp., 89 F.3d 1423 (10th Cir. 1996).
Tolling of legal malpractice claim. — A cause of action for legal malpractice is not tolled during the pendency of an appeal of the underlying action. Brunacini v. Kavanagh, 1993-NMCA-157, 117 N.M. 122, 869 P.2d 821, cert. denied, 117 N.M. 215, 870 P.2d 753 (1994).
Attorney's fees. — Where plaintiff in suit for attorney's fees was employed to perform services involved in the foreclosure of a mortgage, his right to compensation began when the sale of the mortgaged premises was confirmed by the court, not when the decree of foreclosure was signed, and suit begun within four years from the date of the order confirming the sale was not barred. Prichard v. Fulmer, 1919-NMSC-051, 25 N.M. 452, 184 P. 529.
Cancellation of liens by municipality. — Where municipality not merely failed to enforce collection of assessments but affirmatively accepted bonds higher in number than those held by plaintiff in satisfaction of the lien against the property of the persons surrendering the bonds and canceled the lien against the property, plaintiff was required to take notice of the records of the municipality pertinent to the time and manner of payments, defaults, etc., and in the absence of evidence that cancellation of the liens was surrounded by secrecy, cause of action accrued at time this wrong occurred and a suit initiated more than four years thereafter was barred by limitations. Freeman v. Town of Gallup, 152 F.2d 273 (10th Cir. 1945).
Action against void private land grant corporation. — A void private land grant corporation has no right to the proceeds from a land sale and no authority to pay such proceeds to its "shareholders." Conversion is present where the "shareholders" claim and erroneously receive proceeds of the sale. The party aggrieved cannot be deemed to have discovered she has a cause of action for conversion until the date of the judicial opinion which declares the company in question to be a void corporation. Apodaca v. Unknown Heirs of Tome Land Grant, 1982-NMSC-100, 98 N.M. 620, 651 P.2d 1264.
Pleading accrual of cause. — A general allegation in a complaint in an action for injury to property fixing the accrual of the cause of action within four years is controlled and limited by a specific averment showing the discovery of the injury at an earlier date. Mayer v. Lane, 1927-NMSC-078, 33 N.M. 18, 262 P. 178.
Injuries from continuing trespass. — The accrual date for a cause of action for a claim for a continuing trespass is each day of the trespass. McNeil v. Rice Engineering & Operating, Inc., 2006-NMCA-015, 139 N.M. 48, 128 P.3d 476, cert. denied, 2006-NMCERT-002, 139 N.M. 339, 132 P.3d 596.
Written accounts. — If a written contract is an account, the four-year limitation of 37-1-4 NMSA 1978 applies; hence, despite written agreements by hospital patients to be responsible for payment of their accounts, these accounts would still be subject to a four-year limitation. 1970 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 70-25.
Abstractor's bond. — Action on an abstractor's bond, by reason of a defect in the abstract, would probably be founded on an unwritten contract, and must be brought in four years. 1921 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 21-3003.
Law reviews. — For comment on Trujillo v. Padilla, 79 N.M. 245, 442 P.2d 203 (1968), see 9 Nat. Resources J. 101 (1969).
For survey, "Article VII of the New Probate Code: In Pursuit of Uniform Trust Administration," see 6 N.M.L. Rev. 213 (1976).
For article, "Survey of New Mexico Law, 1979-80: Torts," see 11 N.M.L. Rev. 217 (1981).
For comment, "A Survey of the Law of Strict Tort Products Liability in New Mexico," see 11 N.M.L. Rev. 359 (1981).
For article, "Constitutional Torts and the New Mexico Torts Claims Act," see 13 N.M.L. Rev. 1 (1983).
For annual survey of New Mexico law relating to torts, see 13 N.M.L. Rev. 473 (1983).
For note, "Federal Civil Rights Act - The New Mexico Appellate Courts' Choice of the Proper Limitations Period for Civil Rights Actions Filed Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: DeVargas v. State ex rel. New Mexico Department of Corrections," see 13 N.M.L. Rev. 555 (1983).
For annual survey of civil procedure in New Mexico, see 18 N.M.L. Rev. 287 (1988).
Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. — 1 Am. Jur. 2d Accounts and Accounting § 21 et seq.; 18 Am. Jur. 2d Conversion § 94; 37 Am. Jur. 2d Fraud and Deceit §§ 400 to 415; 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation of Actions §§ 84 to 85, 91, 100 to 101, 124 to 125.
Contract in writing within statute of limitations, what constitutes, 3 A.L.R.2d 809.
Effect of fraud to toll the period for bringing action prescribed in statute creating the right of action, 15 A.L.R.2d 500.
Commencement of running of statute of limitations respecting actions by owners of right of re-entry or actions against third persons by reversioners, 19 A.L.R.2d 729.
Question, as one of law for court or of fact for jury, whether oral promise was an original one or was a collateral promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another, 20 A.L.R.2d 246.
Action by passenger against carrier for personal injuries as based on contract or on tort, with respect to application of statutes of limitations, 20 A.L.R.2d 331.
Entry or indorsement by creditor on note, bond or other obligation as evidence of part payment which will toll the statute of limitations, 23 A.L.R.2d 1331.
Statute of limitations governing damage action against warehouseman for loss of or damage to stored goods, 23 A.L.R.2d 1466.
Estoppel to rely on statute of limitations, 24 A.L.R.2d 1413.
Statute of limitations governing action to recover unearned premium retained by insurer upon cancellation of policy, 29 A.L.R.2d 938.
Account stated, limitation of actions as applied to, 51 A.L.R.2d 331.
When limitation commences to run against action to recover, or damages for detention of, property deposited without definite date for its return, 57 A.L.R.2d 1044.
When statute of limitations or laches begins to run against action to set aside fraudulent conveyance or transfer in fraud of creditors, 100 A.L.R.2d 1094.
Action to recover money or property lost and paid to gambling as affected by statute of limitations, 36 A.L.R.3d 900.
Running of statute of limitations against claim for contribution or indemnity based on tort, 57 A.L.R.3d 867.
When does statute of limitations begin to run upon an action by subrogated insurer against third-party tort-feasor, 91 A.L.R.3d 844.
Delay in prosecution of disciplinary proceeding as defense or mitigating circumstance, 93 A.L.R.3d 1057.
Statute of limitations as bar to arbitration under agreement, 94 A.L.R.3d 533.
Limitation of action against insurer for breach of contract to defend, 96 A.L.R.3d 1193.
What statute of limitations governs damage action against attorney for malpractice, 2 A.L.R.4th 284.
Statutes of limitation: actions by purchasers or contractees against vendors or contractors involving defects in houses or other buildings caused by soil instability, 12 A.L.R.4th 866.
When statute of limitations begins to run against action based on unwritten promise to pay money where there is no condition or definite time for repayment, 14 A.L.R.4th 1385.
When statute of limitations commences to run on action under state deceptive trade practice or consumer protection acts, 18 A.L.R.4th 1340.
Oil and gas royalty as real or personal property, 56 A.L.R.4th 539.
Application of statute of limitations in private tort actions based on injury to persons or property caused by undergound flow of contaminants, 11 A.L.R.5th 438.
Physician's use of patient's tissues, cells or bodily substances for medical research or economic purposes, 16 A.L.R.5th 143.
Modern status of the application of "discovery rule" to postpone running of limitations against actions relating to breach of building and construction contracts, 33 A.L.R.5th 1.
Attorney malpractice - tolling or other exceptions to running of statute of limitations, 87 A.L.R.5th 473.
When does state statute of limitations begin to run in civil action for securities fraud under § 10(b) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 USCS § 78j(b)), 71 A.L.R. Fed. 257.
Limitations of actions applicable to action by trustees of employee benefit plan to enforce delinquent employer contributions under ERISA (29 USCS § 1132(a)), 90 A.L.R. Fed. 374.
54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions §§ 36, 64, 67, 68, 71.