A. The supreme court shall adopt separate rules of procedure for the metropolitan courts. The rules shall provide simple procedures for the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of any metropolitan court action.
B. Other than for actions brought pursuant to the Uniform Owner-Resident Relations Act [47-8-1 to 47-8-52 NMSA 1978], the metropolitan court is a court of record for civil actions. Any party aggrieved by a judgment rendered by the metropolitan court in a civil action may appeal to the court of appeals. The manner and method for the appeal shall be set forth by supreme court rule.
C. The metropolitan court is not a court of record for civil actions brought pursuant to the Uniform Owner-Resident Relations Act. Any party aggrieved by a judgment rendered by the metropolitan court in a civil action brought pursuant to the Uniform Owner-Resident Relations Act may appeal to the district court of the county in which the metropolitan court is located within fifteen days after the judgment was rendered. The appeal shall be de novo.
D. The metropolitan court is a court of record for criminal actions involving driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs or involving domestic violence. A criminal action involving domestic violence means an assault or battery under any state law or municipal or county ordinance in which the alleged victim is a household member as defined in the Family Violence Protection Act [Chapter 40, Article 13 NMSA 1978]. Any party aggrieved by a judgment rendered by the metropolitan court in a criminal action involving driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs or involving domestic violence may appeal to the court of appeals. The manner and method of appeal shall be set forth by supreme court rule.
E. The metropolitan court is not a court of record for criminal actions other than driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs or domestic violence actions. Any party aggrieved by a judgment rendered by the metropolitan court in a criminal action, other than driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs or domestic violence action, may appeal to the district court of the county in which the metropolitan court is located within fifteen days after the judgment was rendered. The appeal shall be de novo.
F. All judgments rendered in civil actions in the metropolitan court shall be subject to the same provisions of law as those rendered in district court.
History: Laws 1979, ch. 346, § 6; 1980, ch. 142, § 4; 1981, ch. 304, § 4; 1993, ch. 67, § 1; 2019, ch. 281, § 1.
ANNOTATIONSCross references. — For court automation fund, see 34-9-10 NMSA 1978.
For crime laboratory fee, see 31-12-7 NMSA 1978.
For crime laboratory fund, see 31-12-9 NMSA 1978.
For domestic violence offender treatment fund, see 31-12-12 NMSA 1978.
For court automation fee, see 35-6-1 NMSA 1978, 66-8-116.3 NMSA 1978, and 66-8-119 NMSA 1978.
For metropolitan court mediation fee, see 35-6-1 NMSA 1978.
For corrections fee to be imposed for all persons found guilty in the magistrate and metropolitan court, see 35-6-1 NMSA 1978.
For costs of criminal processes associated with domestic abuse offenses, see 40-13-3.1 NMSA 1978.
For payment of costs of any court ordered screening and treatment program, see 66-8-102 NMSA 1978.
For funding of local government corrections fund by penalty assessment fees, see 66-8-116 NMSA 1978 and 66-8-119 NMSA 1978.
For procedures governing appeals to the district court from metropolitan courts on the record, see 1-073 NMRA.
The 2019 amendment, effective June 14, 2019, provided that on-record proceedings in metropolitan courts may be appealed directly to the court of appeals, and provided that the metropolitan court is not a court of record for civil actions brought pursuant to the Uniform Owner-Resident Relations Act; in Subsection B, deleted "The" and added "Other than for actions brought pursuant to the Uniform Owner-Resident Relations Act, the", and after "may appeal to the", deleted "district court of the county in which the metropolitan court is located within fifteen days after the judgment was rendered" and added "court of appeals"; added a new Subsection C and redesignated former Subsections C through E as Subsections D through F, respectively; and in Subsection D, after "may appeal to the", deleted "district court of the county in which the metropolitan court is located within fifteen days after the judgment was rendered" and added "court of appeals".
The 1993 amendment, effective January 1, 1994, rewrote this section to the extent that a detailed comparison is impracticable.
State's right to appeal. — A trial court evidentiary ruling concluding that the evidence was insufficient to proceed against the defendant, is an acquittal and the state may not appeal. State v. Lizzol, 2007-NMSC-024, 141 N.M. 705, 160 P.3d 886.
Review of domestic violence actions. — Where the judgment of the metropolitan court does not include a statement indicating that a conviction results from the commission of domestic abuse, the metropolitan court has implicitly concluded that the conviction was not based on the commission of domestic abuse. This ruling by the metropolitan court, whether explicit or implied, is subject to review by the district court. The district court should therefore review the metropolitan court's factual conclusions with some deference, considering whether they are supported by substantial evidence in the record. The metropolitan court's application of law to these facts, however, is properly reviewed de novo. State v. Wilson, 2006-NMSC-037, 140 N.M 218, 141 P.3d 1271.
A defendant may not attack the validity of a metropolitan court plea for the first time in an on-the-record appeal to the district court. State v. Spillman, 2010-NMCA-019, 147 N.M. 676, 227 P.3d 1058, cert. denied, 2010-NMCERT-001, 147 N.M. 673, 227 P.3d 1055.
Attack on the validity of a plea for the first time on appeal. — Where defendant pled no contest in metropolitan court to a charge of battery against a household member pursuant to a plea and disposition agreement, and defendant appealed the sentence to district court, the district court, sitting as an appellate court, was without authority to address defendant's contention that defendant did not fully understand the basis of the plea. State v. Spillman, 2010-NMCA-019, 147 N.M. 676, 227 P.3d 1058, cert. denied, 2010-NMCERT-001, 147 N.M. 673, 227 P.3d 1055.
No appeal will lie from anything other than an actual written order or judgment signed by a judge and filed with the clerk of the court. State v. Lohberger, 2008-NMSC-033, 144 N.M. 297, 187 P.3d 162.
On-record trial of domestic abuse. — All acts of domestic abuse as defined in 40-13-2 NMSA 1978 of the Family Violence Protection Act should be tried on-record in metropolitan court. State ex rel. Schwartz v. Sanchez, 1997-NMSC-021, 123 N.M. 165, 936 P.2d 334.
Sexual assault convictions, whether the victim and defendant are household members or not, are entitled to on-record appeals in the district court. — Criminal sexual contact is sexual assault as the term is used in the Family Violence Protection Act (FVPA), 40-13-1 through 40-13-12 NMSA 1978, and is thus an act of domestic abuse as defined by the FVPA whether committed by a household member or not, and therefore a person convicted of criminal sexual contact against a non-household member in the metropolitan court is entitled to an on-record appeal in the district court pursuant to 34-8A-6(D) NMSA 1978. State v. Gonzales, 2017-NMCA-080, cert. denied.
Where defendant was convicted of criminal sexual contact against a non-household member, an act of domestic abuse as defined by the Family Violence Protection Act, 40-13-1 through 40-13-12 NMSA 1978, in the metropolitan court, he was not entitled to a de novo appeal, but was only entitled to an on-record review in the district court pursuant to 34-8A-6(D) NMSA 1978. State v. Gonzales, 2017-NMCA-080, cert. denied.
Subsection C does not unconstitutionally abridge right of appeal guaranteed by N.M. Const. art. VI, § 27. State v. Ball, 1986-NMSC-030, 104 N.M. 176, 718 P.2d 686.
"Aggrieved" party for purposes of appeal. — A defendant who properly has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere in metropolitan court is not an "aggrieved" party entitled, under Subsection C, to appeal to the district court for a trial de novo. State v. Ball, 1986-NMSC-030, 104 N.M. 176, 718 P.2d 686.
Although defendant stipulated to all the essential elements of the crime with which he was charged without reservation, the court declined to hold that the defendant was not an aggrieved party and therefore had no right to appeal; defendant's stipulation as to the essential elements of the crime is not the functional equivalent of a guilty or no contest plea where there is no showing that when defendant made his stipulations he understood that such action amounted to a guilty or no contest plea and that he would forego his right to appeal to the district court for a trial de novo. State v. Romero, 1992-NMCA-070, 114 N.M. 320, 838 P.2d 474.
One who agrees not to be aggrieved by entering into a plea and disposition agreement in the metropolitan court, who alleges no constitutional invalidity in the agreement, and who does not seek to have the plea and agreement withdrawn, is not an "aggrieved" party and cannot appeal to the district court. State v. Bazan, 1982-NMCA-018, 97 N.M. 531, 641 P.2d 1078, cert. denied, 98 N.M. 50, 644 P.2d 1039, overruled on other grounds by State v. Ball, 1986-NMSC-030, 104 N.M. 176, 718 P.2d 686.
Appeal governed by nature of offense. — Appeal from the metropolitan court is governed by the crime of which defendants are convicted rather than the type of trial, thus, defendant convicted of eluding an officer and reckless driving was entitled to a trial de novo, even though the trial was on the record. State v. Krause, 1998-NMCA-013, 124 N.M. 415, 951 P.2d 1076, cert. denied, 125 N.M. 146, 958 P.2d 104.
Where defendant was convicted in metropolitan court of battery against a household member in violation of 30-3-4 NMSA 1978, because the state did not prosecute the battery under 30-3-15 NMSA 1978, state could not contend, under Subsection D of this section, that defendant was convicted of a crime involving domestic violence; defendant was, thus, entitled to a de novo appeal in district court rather than just an on-record review of the proceeding. State v. Trujillo, 1999-NMCA-003, 126 N.M. 603, 973 P.2d 855.
Prosecution is not a "person" within the meaning of Subsection C. State v. Giraudo, 1983-NMCA-042, 99 N.M. 634, 661 P.2d 1333 (decided under prior law).
Limited authority to impose jail time on appeal. — In a criminal trial de novo, on appeal from the metropolitan court, the district court lacks the authority to impose jail time greater than the jail time imposed by the metropolitan court. State v. Haar, 1983-NMCA-140, 100 N.M. 609, 673 P.2d 1342.
No change in sentence allowed in de novo trial upon an appeal. — In a de novo trial upon an appeal from a metropolitan court, there is no statutory authority empowering the district court to impose a lesser or greater penalty than that imposed by the metropolitan court. State v. Lyon, 1985-NMCA-082, 103 N.M. 305, 706 P.2d 516, cert. denied, 103 N.M. 287, 705 P.2d 1138.
State can reduce charge in de novo trial even though effect is to avoid jury trial. — At a trial de novo on an appeal of a metropolitan court jury conviction, the state may reduce the charge against the defendant with the effect that the defendant would not be exposed to a term of confinement which would require a jury trial. State v. Lyon, 1985-NMCA-082, 103 N.M. 305, 706 P.2d 516, cert. denied, 103 N.M. 287, 705 P.2d 1138.
Standard of review to be applied by district court in a civil appeal from the metropolitan court to the district court is one of "substantial evidence" to support the finding of the metropolitan court. Johnson v. Southwestern Catering Corp., 1983-NMCA-020, 99 N.M. 564, 661 P.2d 56.
Extent of retention of jurisdiction by district court. — A district court may retain jurisdiction of an action filed in the former small claims court to the same extent as if originally filed in the district court. 1963 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 63-168 (opinion rendered under former law).
Liability for district court docket fee upon transfer. — A party instituting an action or causing it to be docketed in the former small claims court must pay the district court docket fee on transfer to the district court under certain circumstances. 1963 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 63-168 (opinion rendered under former law).
Law reviews. — For annual survey of New Mexico law relating to criminal procedure, see 12 N.M.L. Rev. 271 (1982).