A. At any time after the filing of a delinquency petition and before the entry of a judgment, the court may, on motion of the children's court attorney or that of counsel for the child, suspend the proceedings and continue the child under supervision in the child's own home under terms and conditions negotiated with probation services and agreed to by all the parties affected. The court's order continuing the child under supervision under this section shall be known as a "consent decree". An admission of some or all of the allegations stated in the delinquency petition shall not be required for a consent decree order.
B. If the child objects to a consent decree, the court shall proceed to findings, adjudication and disposition of the case. If the child does not object but an objection is made by the children's court attorney after consultation with probation services, the court shall, after considering the objections and the reasons given, proceed to determine whether it is appropriate to enter a consent decree and may, in its discretion, enter the consent decree.
C. A consent decree shall remain in force for six months unless the child is discharged sooner by probation services. Prior to the expiration of the six-month period and upon the application of probation services or any other agency supervising the child under a consent decree, the court may extend the decree for an additional six months in the absence of objection to extension by the child. If the child objects to the extension, the court shall hold a hearing and make a determination on the issue of extension.
D. If either prior to discharge by probation services or expiration of the consent decree the child allegedly fails to fulfill the terms of the decree, the children's court attorney may file a petition to revoke the consent decree. Proceedings on the petition shall be conducted in the same manner as proceedings on petitions to revoke probation. If the child is found to have violated the terms of the consent decree, the court may:
(1) extend the period of the consent decree; or
(2) make any other disposition that would have been appropriate in the original proceeding.
E. A child who is discharged by probation services or who completes a period under supervision without reinstatement of the original delinquency petition shall not again be proceeded against in any court for the same offense alleged in the petition or an offense based upon the same conduct and the original petition shall be dismissed with prejudice. Nothing in this subsection precludes a civil suit against the child for damages arising from the child's conduct.
F. A judge who pursuant to this section elicits or examines information or material about a child that would be inadmissible in a hearing on the allegations of the petition shall not, over the objection of the child, participate in any subsequent proceedings on the delinquency if:
(1) a consent decree is denied and the allegations in the petition remain to be decided in a hearing where the child denies the allegations; or
(2) a consent decree is granted but the delinquency petition is subsequently reinstated.
G. If a consent decree has been entered pursuant to the filing of a delinquency petition based on Paragraph (2), (3) or (4) of Subsection A of Section 32A-2-3 NMSA 1978 for a child who is fifteen years of age or older, a condition of the consent decree agreement may be the denial of the child's driving privileges or the revocation of the child's driver's license for a period of ninety days. For the second or subsequent adjudication, the child's driving privileges may be denied or the child's driver's license revoked for a period of one year. Within twenty-four hours of the entry by the court of a decree consenting to the revocation or denial of the child's driver's license or driving privileges, the court shall send the decree to the motor vehicle division of the taxation and revenue department. Upon receipt of the decree from the court consenting to the denial or revocation of the child's driving privileges or driver's license, the director of the motor vehicle division of the taxation and revenue department shall revoke or deny the delinquent child's driver's license or driving privileges. Nothing in this section shall prohibit the delinquent child from applying for a limited driving privilege pursuant to Section 66-5-35 NMSA 1978 or an ignition interlock license pursuant to the Ignition Interlock Licensing Act [66-5-501 to 66-5-504 NMSA 1978], and nothing in this section precludes the delinquent child's participation in an appropriate educational, counseling or rehabilitation program.
History: 1978 Comp., § 32A-2-22, enacted by Laws 1993, ch. 77, § 51; 1995, ch. 206, § 16; 2003, ch. 239, § 6; 2005, ch. 189, § 19.
ANNOTATIONSCross references. — For consent decrees, see Rule 10-228 NMRA.
The 2005 amendment, effective June 17, 2005, in Subsection A, provided that an admission of some or all of the allegation stated in the delinquency petition shall not be required for a consent decree order and deleted former Subsection H which provided that the court shall not order more than one consent decree for a child in a two year period.
The 2003 amendment, effective April 6, 2003, added "or an ignition interlock license pursuant to the Ignition Interlock Licensing Act" following "Section 66-5-35 NMSA 1978" in the last sentence of Subsection G.
The 1995 amendment, effective July 1, 1995, made a minor stylistic change in Paragraph (2) of Subsection D, substituted "32A-2-2" for "32-2-2" in Subsection G, and added Subsection H.
Time to hear petitions to revoke consent decrees. — The Children's Code explicitly mandates the use of Rule 10-226 NMRA (now 10-243 NMRA) for determining the applicable time limit within which the children's court must hear a petition to revoke a consent decree. State v. Katrina G., 2007-NMCA-048, 141 N.M. 501, 157 P.3d 66.
Appealability of consent decree. — Where there might be future consequences attendant upon a consent decree the consequences of the consent decree sufficiently aggrieve the child such that her appeal should be allowed. State v. Crystal B., 2001-NMCA-010, 130 N.M. 336, 24 P.3d 771.
Discretion of court. — Accepting a consent decree is entirely within the discretion of the court. In re Crystal L., 2002-NMCA-063, 132 N.M. 349, 48 P.3d 87, cert. denied, 132 N.M. 397, 49 P.3d 76.
Admission of guilt. — A consent decree may only be accepted by the court after the child has made an admission of guilt. In re Crystal L., 2002-NMCA-063, 132 N.M. 349, 48 P.3d 87 (decided under prior law).
Timeliness of decree. — A child who goes to trial and is adjudicated to have committed delinquent acts cannot avail herself of a consent decree after the court or jury has entered a verdict. In re Crystal L., 2002-NMCA-063, 132 N.M. 349, 48 P.3d 87, cert. denied, 132 N.M. 397, 49 P.3d 76.
Law reviews. — For survey, "Children's Court Practice in Delinquency and Need of Supervision Cases Under the New Rules," see 6 N.M.L. Rev. 331 (1976).