87-303.05. Attorney General; temporary restraining order; civil action; written assurance of voluntary compliance; deceptive practice; burden of proof.
(1) Whenever the Attorney General has cause to believe that a person has engaged in or is engaging in any deceptive trade practice or unconscionable act listed in section 87-302 or 87-303.01, the Attorney General may apply for and obtain, in an action in any district court of this state, a temporary restraining order, or injunction, or both, pursuant to the rules of civil procedure, prohibiting such person from continuing such practices, or engaging therein, or doing any act in furtherance thereof. The court may make such orders or judgments as may be necessary to prevent the use or employment by such person of any such deceptive trade practice, or which may be necessary to restore to any other person any money or real or personal property which may have been acquired by means of any such practice.
(2) When the Attorney General has authority to institute a civil action or other proceeding pursuant to the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, in lieu thereof, the Attorney General may accept an assurance of discontinuance of any deceptive trade practice or unconscionable act listed in section 87-302 or 87-303.01. Such assurance may include a stipulation for the voluntary payment by the alleged violator of the costs of investigation by the Attorney General and of any amount or amounts necessary to restore to any person any money or real or personal property which may have been acquired by such alleged violator by means of any such practice. Proof by a preponderance of evidence of a violation of such assurance shall constitute prima facie evidence of a deceptive practice as listed in section 87-302 or 87-303.01 in any civil action or proceeding thereafter commenced by the Attorney General.
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Annotations
Proceedings brought by the Attorney General under 87-303.05(1) are civil in nature. State ex rel. Douglas v. Ledwith, 204 Neb. 7, 281 N.W.2d 729 (1979).
The requirement in this section that the Attorney General must have cause to believe deceptive trade practices exist or have existed before he institutes an action is not an essential element of the action which must be proved at trial. State ex rel. Douglas v. Ledwith, 204 Neb. 7, 281 N.W.2d 729 (1979).