25-21,219. Forcible entry and detainer; jurisdiction; exceptions.
The district and county courts shall have jurisdiction over complaints of unlawful and forcible entry into lands and tenements and the detention of the same and of complaints against those who, having a lawful and peaceable entry into lands or tenements, unlawfully and by force hold the same. If the court finds that an unlawful and forcible entry has been made and that the same lands or tenements are held by force or that the same, after a lawful entry, are held unlawfully, the court shall cause the party complaining to have restitution thereof. The court or the jury, as the situation warrants, shall inquire into the matters between the two litigants such as the amount of rent owing the plaintiff and the amount of damage caused by the defendant to the premises while they were occupied by him or her and render a judgment or verdict accordingly. This section shall not apply to actions for possession of any premises subject to the provisions of the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act or the Mobile Home Landlord and Tenant Act.
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If the resolution of a forcible entry and detainer action requires a court to determine a title dispute, the court must dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. Federal Nat. Mortgage Assn. v. Marcuzzo, 289 Neb. 301, 854 N.W.2d 774 (2014).
The county court was not required to dismiss a forcible entry and detainer action where the defendants merely alleged the existence of a title dispute in a pending district court case, the plaintiff obtained a continuance without confessing the nature of the pending district court action, and the district court action had been resolved by the time the county court was presented with evidence regarding a title dispute. Federal Nat. Mortgage Assn. v. Marcuzzo, 289 Neb. 301, 854 N.W.2d 774 (2014).
The court has authority to proceed with the hearing of a forcible entry and detainer action until it is clearly established that the question to be determined is one of title. Federal Nat. Mortgage Assn. v. Marcuzzo, 289 Neb. 301, 854 N.W.2d 774 (2014).
When a forcible entry and detainer action is ongoing, the mere averment that the title is in dispute in another action involving the same property does not automatically divest the court hearing the forcible entry and detainer action of jurisdiction. Instead, the court may proceed until the evidence discloses that the question involved is one of title. Federal Nat. Mortgage Assn. v. Marcuzzo, 289 Neb. 301, 854 N.W.2d 774 (2014).
A district court's jurisdiction over forcible entry and detainer actions arises out of legislative grant, and it is inherently limited by that grant. Cummins Mgmt. v. Gilroy, 266 Neb. 635, 667 N.W.2d 538 (2003).
A forcible entry and detainer action does not try the question of title, but only the immediate right of possession. Cummins Mgmt. v. Gilroy, 266 Neb. 635, 667 N.W.2d 538 (2003).
Because of the limited scope of a forcible entry and detainer action, when a district court hears such an action, it sits as a special statutory tribunal to summarily decide the issues authorized by the statute, and not as a court of general jurisdiction with the power to hear and determine other issues. Cummins Mgmt. v. Gilroy, 266 Neb. 635, 667 N.W.2d 538 (2003).
If the resolution of a forcible entry and detainer action requires a district court to determine a title dispute, it must dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. Cummins Mgmt. v. Gilroy, 266 Neb. 635, 667 N.W.2d 538 (2003).
The general rules of interpretation applying to forcible entry and detainer actions under this section also apply to actions brought under the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act. Brennan v. Brennan, 214 Neb. 125, 332 N.W.2d 696 (1983).
The forcible entry and detainer statutes and the general stipulations for forfeiture in a lease are considered in equity for securing the rent, and not for forfeiting the lease, when the tenant acts in good faith and pays promptly on demand. McCombs Realty v. Western Auto Supply Co., 10 Neb. App. 962, 641 N.W.2d 77 (2002).