§702-215 Intentional or knowing causation; different result from that intended or contemplated. In the following instances intentionally or knowingly causing a particular result shall be deemed to be established even though the actual result caused by the defendant may not have been within the defendant's intention or contemplation:
(1) The actual result differs from that intended or contemplated, as the case may be, only in the respect that a different person or different property is injured or affected or that the injury or harm intended or contemplated would have been more serious or more extensive than that caused; or
(2) The actual result involves the same kind of injury or harm as the intended or contemplated result and is not too remote or accidental in its occurrence or too dependent on another's volitional conduct to have a bearing on the defendant's liability or on the gravity of the defendant's offense. [L 1972, c 9, pt of §1; am L 1975, c 163, §1; gen ch 1993]
COMMENTARY ON §702-215
As indicated in the commentary to §702-214 this section departs from the common-law concept of "proximate cause" (at best a poor label for a host of largely unarticulated considerations) and analyzes the question of whether a defendant will be held liable for having caused a particular result not in terms of factual or "scientific" causation (which has to be resolved according to the test set forth in §702-214) but in terms of those factors which properly bear on the defendant's culpability with respect to a result other than one which the defendant intended or contemplated. The factors to be considered are, as stated, whether the actual result is more serious or extensive than the intended or contemplated result and whether the actual result is too remote or accidental in its occurrence or too dependent on another's volitional conduct to have a bearing on defendant's liability (or the gravity of the defendant's offense).
The Code follows the Model Penal Code[1] as supplemented by the suggestion of Hart and Honore that provisions regarding liability for unintended or uncontemplated results must be separately stated for those instances when the difference in result is due to natural events and those instances when it is due to the volitional conduct of another.2 Although the commentary to the Model Penal Code would suggest that volitional conduct of another is adequately covered as a factor which might make the actual result "too remote or accidental," greater clarity is achieved by the language of this Code.
SUPPLEMENTAL COMMENTARY ON §702-215
Act 163, Session Laws 1975, amended this section in order to phrase the propositions in positive rather than negative language. It was felt that this change would make these propositions clearer when included in jury instructions. This amendment was not intended to change the section in substance but only in form. Conference Committee Report No. 19.
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§702-215 Commentary:
1. M.P.C. §2.03(2).
2. Hart & Honore, Causation in the Law 357 (1959).