All official duties should be faithfully performed, and whenever, from any cause, a defect of legal justice would ensue from a failure to perform or from improper performance, the writ of mandamus may issue to compel a due performance if there is no other specific legal remedy for the legal rights; provided, however, that no writ of mandamus to compel the removal of a judge shall issue where no motion to recuse has been filed, if such motion is available, or where a motion to recuse has been denied after assignment to a separate judge for hearing.
(Orig. Code 1863, § 3130; Code 1868, § 3142; Code 1873, § 3198; Code 1882, § 3198; Civil Code 1895, § 4867; Civil Code 1910, § 5440; Code 1933, § 64-101; Ga. L. 2009, p. 643, § 1/HB 221.)
The 2009 amendment, effective July 1, 2009, substituted a comma for a semicolon near the beginning, deleted a comma following "performance" in the middle, and added the proviso at the end.
Cross references.- Petitioning for mandamus to compel auditor in superior court to certify exceptions to report of auditor, § 9-7-15.
Applications for mandamus, Rules of the Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia, Rule 31.
Law reviews.- For article discussing the inefficiency of mandamus and impeachment as remedies for judicial inaction, see 5 Ga. St. B.J. 467 (1969). For annual survey of administrative law, see 38 Mercer L. Rev. 17 (1986). For article, "A Taxing Exception: Southern LNG, Inc. v. MacGinnitie's Narrow Interpretation of the Mandamus Exception," see 66 Mercer L. Rev. 855 (2015).
JUDICIAL DECISIONSANALYSIS
Mandamus is extraordinary legal remedy. Clear Vision CATV Servs., Inc. v. Mayor of Jesup, 225 Ga. 757, 171 S.E.2d 505 (1969).
Mandamus is an extraordinary common law writ, with which equity has nothing to do. Gay v. Gilmore, 76 Ga. 725 (1886); Bowen v. Whiddon, 143 Ga. 351, 85 S.E. 122 (1915); Richmond County v. Steed, 150 Ga. 229, 103 S.E. 253 (1920); Board of Educ. v. Fowler, 192 Ga. 35, 14 S.E.2d 478 (1941).
Under this section, as a general rule, scope of mandamus is very broad, and, though it is much restricted in special instances in other Code sections, these are only exceptions to the general rule. Wofford Oil Co. v. City of Calhoun, 183 Ga. 511, 189 S.E. 5 (1936) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-6-20).
This section gives judge of superior court power to issue writs of mandamus, and makes it the judge's duty to do so from any cause whereby a defect of legal justice would ensue if a mandamus be not issued, and if there be no other specific legal remedy. Wofford Oil Co. v. City of Calhoun, 183 Ga. 511, 189 S.E. 5 (1936) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-6-20).
Provisions of this section apply to public officers only. Bregman v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 213 Ga. 561, 100 S.E.2d 267 (1957) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-6-20).
Mandamus is a remedy for official inaction. City of Atlanta v. Wright, 119 Ga. 207, 45 S.E. 994 (1903); Touchton v. Echols County, 211 Ga. 85, 84 S.E.2d 81 (1954); Coastal Serv., Inc. v. Jackson, 223 Ga. 238, 154 S.E.2d 365 (1967).
Right to mandamus does not arise until officer defaults on duty.
- The right to invoke the aid of a court to compel by mandamus the performance of an official duty cannot, as a general rule, arise until the officer is in actual default. Pearce v. Bembry, 174 Ga. 86, 162 S.E. 125 (1932).
Whether mandamus will lie will depend upon nature of official acts: if the acts are purely ministerial or purely legislative, then mandamus will be the proper procedure to determine the petitioner's rights if the petitioner has no other specific remedy; however, if the acts complained of are of a judicial nature, then the writ of certiorari will lie for the correction of any errors. Anderson v. McMurry, 217 Ga. 145, 121 S.E.2d 22 (1961).
Rule as to immunity of state does not forbid suits against officers in their official capacity to direct their official action by mandamus, where such suits are authorized by law, and the act to be done or omitted is purely ministerial, in the performance or omission of which the plaintiff has a legal interest. Stanley v. Sims, 185 Ga. 518, 195 S.E. 439 (1937).
Except in case of clear legal right, writ of mandamus is discretionary remedy. Van Valkenburg v. Stone, 172 Ga. 642, 158 S.E. 419 (1931).
In order to entitle one to mandamus, it must appear that one has a clear legal right to have the particular act performed, the doing of which one seeks to have enforced. State ex rel. Waring v. Georgia Medical Soc'y, 38 Ga. 608, 95 Am. Dec. 408 (1869); Jackson v. Cochran, 134 Ga. 396, 67 S.E. 825, 20 Ann. Cas. 219 (1910); Adkins v. Bennett, 138 Ga. 118, 74 S.E. 838 (1912); Cureton v. Wheeler, 172 Ga. 879, 159 S.E. 283 (1931); Bowles v. Etheridge, 176 Ga. 660, 168 S.E. 769 (1933); West v. Lewis, 188 Ga. 437, 4 S.E.2d 171 (1939); Phillips v. Head, 188 Ga. 511, 4 S.E.2d 240 (1939); Wade v. Combined Mut. Cas. Co., 201 Ga. 318, 39 S.E.2d 681 (1946); Poole v. Duncan, 202 Ga. 255, 42 S.E.2d 731 (1947); Richardson v. Awtry & Lowndes Co., 204 Ga. 77, 49 S.E.2d 24 (1948); Trussell v. Martin, 207 Ga. 553, 63 S.E.2d 361 (1951); Pierce v. Rhodes, 208 Ga. 554, 67 S.E.2d 771 (1951); Veal v. Washington County Bd. of Educ., 211 Ga. 204, 84 S.E.2d 565 (1954); City of Decatur v. Fountain, 214 Ga. 225, 104 S.E.2d 117 (1958); Bradford v. Bolton, 215 Ga. 188, 109 S.E.2d 751 (1959); Garrett v. Board of Comm'rs, 215 Ga. 351, 110 S.E.2d 626 (1959); Weathers v. Stith, 217 Ga. 39, 120 S.E.2d 616 (1961); City of College Park v. Hamilton, 220 Ga. 629, 140 S.E.2d 878 (1965); Howard Simpson Realty Co. v. City of Marietta, 220 Ga. 727, 141 S.E.2d 460 (1965); Clairmont Dev. Co. v. Morgan, 222 Ga. 255, 149 S.E.2d 489 (1966); Hyman v. Pruitt, 226 Ga. 625, 176 S.E.2d 707 (1970); Allen v. Carter, 226 Ga. 727, 177 S.E.2d 245 (1970); Bailey v. Dobbs, 227 Ga. 838, 183 S.E.2d 461 (1971); McClure v. Hightower, 237 Ga. 157, 227 S.E.2d 47 (1976).
Trial court did not err in denying an employee's request for mandamus relief, as a grievance decision entered by the employer's Bureau of Labor Relations did not create a legal requirement that the employee be reinstated to a previous position, along with the back pay sought, but instead, stated that the Bureau had no objection to any accommodation made to rectify the employee's situation; moreover, the employee's federal conspiracy conviction rendered the request for mandamus relief moot. Williams v. City of Atlanta, 281 Ga. 478, 640 S.E.2d 35 (2007).
No legal remedy for enforcement of rights.
- Mandamus lies at the instance of a citizen who has a clear specific legal right and no legal remedy for its enforcement. Napier v. Poe, 12 Ga. 170 (1852).
Mandamus against public officers is available to individual where there is no other specific legal remedy and a legal injustice will result from failure to perform a clear official duty. Evans v. White, 178 Ga. 262, 172 S.E. 913 (1934); Ex parte Ross, 197 Ga. 257, 28 S.E.2d 925 (1944).
The right to extraordinary aid of mandamus exists only where the applicant has a clear legal right to the relief sought and there is no other adequate remedy. Wright v. Forrester, 192 Ga. 864, 16 S.E.2d 873 (1941); State Hwy. Dep't v. Reed, 211 Ga. 197, 84 S.E.2d 561 (1954); Westberry v. Taylor, 215 Ga. 464, 111 S.E.2d 77 (1959); O'Callahan v. Aikens, 218 Ga. 46, 126 S.E.2d 212 (1962); Bedingfield v. Adams, 221 Ga. 69, 142 S.E.2d 915 (1965); Henderson v. Carter, 229 Ga. 876, 195 S.E.2d 4 (1972), overruled on other grounds, City of Atlanta v. Barnes, 276 Ga. 449 (2003); Nesbitt v. Lewis, 235 Ga. 477, 220 S.E.2d 7 (1975); Hernandez v. Board of Comm'rs, 242 Ga. 76, 247 S.E.2d 870 (1978).
Civil rights action.- Federal district court did not err in concluding that university professor's procedural due process claim was actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the district court reached the plausible conclusion that the state courts may have summarily dismissed the professor's mandamus request without considering the merits thereof; while a writ of certiorari was not available to the professor upon the state court's determination that the termination proceedings were purely administrative, the professor was still entitled to seek a writ of mandamus. Laskar v. Peterson, 771 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2014).
Right must be complete and not inchoate.
- To warrant relief by mandamus, right whose enforcement is sought must be a complete and not merely an inchoate right. Mattox v. Board of Educ., 148 Ga. 577, 97 S.E. 532, 5 A.L.R. 568 (1918).
Superior court judge has duty to issue mandamus in any cause where there is no other specific legal remedy and legal justice would be impaired if mandamus were not issued. Gay v. City of Lyons, 209 Ga. 599, 74 S.E.2d 839 (1953).
Mandamus is not available where another remedy exists. Carroll v. American Agric. Chem. Co., 175 Ga. 855, 167 S.E. 597 (1932); McGarvey v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 243 Ga. 714, 256 S.E.2d 781 (1979).
Mandamus will not lie when there is adequate and specific remedy at law; it is available only when it is exclusive. Adams v. Town of Weston, 181 Ga. 503, 183 S.E. 69 (1935); Patten v. Miller, 190 Ga. 123, 8 S.E.2d 757 (1940); Ungar v. Mayor of Savannah, 224 Ga. 613, 163 S.E.2d 814 (1968).
Mandamus is never an available remedy when there is a plain specific legal remedy. Wofford v. Porte, 212 Ga. 533, 93 S.E.2d 690 (1956); Wofford v. City of Gainesville, 212 Ga. 818, 96 S.E.2d 490 (1957); Harper v. Burgess, 225 Ga. 420, 169 S.E.2d 297 (1969).
Other legal remedy must be complete.
- The rule that mandamus will not be granted where there is specific legal remedy is restricted to cases where the legal remedy is equally convenient, complete, and beneficial. Adams v. Town of Weston, 181 Ga. 503, 183 S.E. 69 (1935).
Where another remedy is not well adapted to case, it will not prevent resort to mandamus. Adams v. Town of Weston, 181 Ga. 503, 183 S.E. 69 (1935).
Mandamus not proper where plaintiff has cause of action arising from contract.
- Where the plaintiff has a right of action against the defendants to recover the amount due the plaintiff under contract, and can maintain an action at law for that purpose, the plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law, and the writ of mandamus will not lie. Burke v. Board of Educ., 182 Ga. 458, 185 S.E. 813 (1936).
One must exhaust available administrative remedies before applying for mandamus. O'Callahan v. Aikens, 218 Ga. 46, 126 S.E.2d 212 (1962).
If there is specific remedy by certiorari, remedy of mandamus does not exist. Hayes v. Brown, 205 Ga. 234, 52 S.E.2d 862 (1949); City of Dalton v. Smith, 158 Ga. App. 356, 280 S.E.2d 138 (1981).
When certiorari is available, it will generally provide easier and speedier remedy than mandamus, and it is always available to review decisions of inferior judicatories. Wofford Oil Co. v. City of Calhoun, 183 Ga. 511, 189 S.E. 5 (1936).
In suit for mandamus, duty complainant seeks to have enforced must be duty arising by law either expressly or by necessary implication, and the law must not only authorize the act to be done, but must require its performance. Williamson v. Wilson, 189 Ga. 652, 7 S.E.2d 241 (1940); Tucker v. Wilson, 198 Ga. 474, 31 S.E.2d 657 (1944); Armistead v. MacNeill, 203 Ga. 204, 45 S.E.2d 652 (1947); Veal v. Washington County Bd. of Educ., 211 Ga. 204, 84 S.E.2d 565 (1954); McCallum v. Almand, 213 Ga. 701, 100 S.E.2d 924 (1957); City of College Park v. Hamilton, 220 Ga. 629, 140 S.E.2d 878 (1965).
Mandamus may issue against officials to compel due performance of official duties. McCallum v. Bryan, 213 Ga. 669, 100 S.E.2d 916 (1957); Undercofler v. Scott, 220 Ga. 406, 139 S.E.2d 299 (1964).
The writ of mandamus is issued to compel public officials to perform their official duties where there is no other adequate legal remedy. Clifton v. Berry, 244 Ga. 78, 259 S.E.2d 35 (1979).
Because the amount of credit the defendant was entitled to receive was to be computed by a pre-sentence custodian, and the duty to award the credit for time served prior to trial fell upon the Department of Corrections, an appeal from an order denying the defendant clarification of an imposed sentence was not properly before the appeals court; moreover, any dissatisfaction with that relief would not be part of the defendant's direct appeal from the original conviction, but would be in a mandamus or injunction action against the Commissioner of the Department of Corrections. Smashey v. State, 282 Ga. App. 293, 638 S.E.2d 431 (2006).
Mandamus is available only to require officers to perform duties clearly required by law. Wrightsville Consol. Sch. Dist. v. Selig Co., 195 Ga. 408, 24 S.E.2d 306 (1943); Tucker v. Wilson, 198 Ga. 474, 31 S.E.2d 657 (1944).
Mandamus is the remedy to compel a public officer or a county board to perform a duty imposed by law. City of Dalton v. Smith, 158 Ga. App. 356, 280 S.E.2d 138 (1981).
Mandamus lies against officer to require performance of clear legal right. McCallum v. Bryan, 213 Ga. 669, 100 S.E.2d 916 (1957); Duncan v. Poythress, 515 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ga.), aff'd, 657 F.2d 691 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 459 U.S. 1012, 103 S. Ct. 368, 74 L. Ed. 2d 504 (1982).
Mandamus will compel performance in instances where duty is clear and well defined, and when no element of discretion is involved in the performance. Atlanta Title & Trust Co. v. Tidwell, 173 Ga. 499, 160 S.E. 620 (1931).
Mandamus issues if officer's discretion not involved.
- Where the duties alleged to be incumbent upon the officer involve the discretion of the officer referred to, the compulsory processes of the court will not be employed to compel the officer to perform an act concerning the performance of which the officer is vested with a discretion. Stevenson v. Bond, 177 Ga. 71, 169 S.E. 368 (1933).
Mandamus, being a process to require a public official to act, is not available to control or change the official's action taken in the exercise of discretion vested in the official by the law. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 203 Ga. 832, 49 S.E.2d 38 (1948).
Mandamus is not an available remedy to control the official action taken in the exercise of discretion vested by law in a public officer. Persons v. Mashburn, 211 Ga. 477, 86 S.E.2d 319 (1955).
Where the duty of public officers to perform specific acts is clear and well defined and is imposed by law, and when no element of discretion is involved in performance thereof, the writ of mandamus will issue to compel their performance. Mere authorization to act is insufficient unless the law requires performance of the duty. Hartsfield v. Salem, 213 Ga. 760, 101 S.E.2d 701 (1958).
Where it is sought to compel an official act which is discretionary, the writ of mandamus generally will not issue because there is no clear legal right. Clear Vision CATV Servs., Inc. v. Mayor of Jesup, 225 Ga. 757, 171 S.E.2d 505 (1969).
Mandamus proper where officer grossly abuses discretion.
- While the writ of mandamus cannot ordinarily be employed to control the discretion vested in such an officer by directing what the officer's action shall be, the exception to this general rule exists where there has been such an arbitrary and capricious use or gross abuse of discretion as will in effect amount to a failure on the part of the officer to exercise the officer's discretion at all. South View Cem. Ass'n v. Hailey, 199 Ga. 478, 34 S.E.2d 863 (1945).
Where an officer is vested with discretion, the exercise of which has been so capricious or arbitrary as to amount to its gross abuse, mandamus will lie. Wade v. Combined Mut. Cas. Co., 201 Ga. 318, 39 S.E.2d 681 (1946).
Mandamus does not lie to control the action of an officer vested with a discretion, in the absence of a gross abuse of such discretion. Touchton v. Echols County, 211 Ga. 85, 84 S.E.2d 81 (1954).
Mandamus generally does not lie except to compel performance of a public duty. Martin v. Hatfield, 251 Ga. 638, 308 S.E.2d 833 (1983).
Law must compel action.
- Where no duty is imposed by law, an officer may not be compelled by writ of mandamus. Sapp v. DeLacy, 127 Ga. 659, 56 S.E. 754 (1907); Allen v. Pool, 131 Ga. 116, 62 S.E. 31 (1908); Jones v. Bank of Cumming, 131 Ga. 191, 62 S.E. 68 (1908).
Mandamus will not lie to compel public officer to do act not clearly commanded by law. Cureton v. Wheeler, 172 Ga. 879, 159 S.E. 283 (1931); Bowles v. Etheridge, 176 Ga. 660, 168 S.E. 769 (1933); Horrigan v. Rivers, 183 Ga. 141, 187 S.E. 836 (1936); Tucker v. Wilson, 198 Ga. 474, 31 S.E.2d 657 (1944).
Mandamus will not require illegal act to be done by a public official, or to compel the performance of an act where no duty is imposed by law. Trussell v. Martin, 207 Ga. 553, 63 S.E.2d 361 (1951).
Duty must exist at time mandamus sought.
- Mandamus is available as a remedy where the duty to be enforced is one which exists at the time when the application for mandamus is made or the writ is granted. Duncan v. Poythress, 515 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ga.), aff'd, 657 F.2d 691 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 459 U.S. 1012, 103 S. Ct. 368, 74 L. Ed. 2d 504 (1982).
Mandamus is not proper remedy to compel undoing of acts already done or the correction of wrongs already perpetrated, and this is so, even though the action taken was clearly illegal. Hilton Constr. Co. v. Rockdale County Bd. of Educ., 245 Ga. 533, 266 S.E.2d 157 (1980).
Mandamus will not lie to compel general course of conduct and the performance of continuous duties. Richter v. Jordan, 185 Ga. 39, 193 S.E. 871 (1937); Solomon v. Brown, 218 Ga. 508, 128 S.E.2d 735 (1962).
Mandamus is not an appropriate remedy to compel a general course of official conduct for a long series of continuous acts to be performed under varying conditions. Jackson v. Cochran, 134 Ga. 396, 67 S.E. 825, 20 Ann. Cas. 219 (1910).
Persons holding public office may be required to perform continuing duty which their predecessors in office refused or failed to do. Undercofler v. Scott, 220 Ga. 406, 139 S.E.2d 299 (1964).
Proceeding brought under this section, is essentially personal one against respondent, and not one in rem against the office, and must necessarily be accounted as involving one's personal and pecuniary rights. Bryant v. Mitchell, 195 Ga. 135, 23 S.E.2d 410 (1942) (see O.C.G.A. § 9-6-20).
Writ of mandamus does not reach office nor can it be directed to office. It acts directly on the person of the officer or other respondent, coercing the officer in the performance of a plain duty. It is a personal action against the officer and not one in rem against the office. McCallum v. Bryan, 213 Ga. 669, 100 S.E.2d 916 (1957).
The writ of mandamus is personal and issues to the individual to compel performance, and it does not reach the office but is directed against the officer to compel the officer to perform the required legal duty. Bulloch County v. Ritzert, 213 Ga. 818, 102 S.E.2d 40 (1958).
The writ of mandamus seeks to enforce the personal obligation of the individual to whom it is addressed; it is a personal action against the officer and not one in rem against the office. Crow v. McCallum, 215 Ga. 692, 113 S.E.2d 203 (1960).
Writ of mandamus cannot properly be issued where body sits in quasi-judicial capacity. In such a case its decisions are subject to review only by the writ of certiorari. Anderson v. McMurry, 217 Ga. 145, 121 S.E.2d 22 (1961).
Writ of mandamus should not be granted unless it would afford to applicant some material advantage. Harper v. Burgess, 225 Ga. 420, 169 S.E.2d 297 (1969).
Mandamus will not issue where the remedy is ineffectual, or where the granting of the writ would decide questions of importance to persons not parties to the proceedings and entail hardships thereon. Smith v. Hodgson, 129 Ga. 494, 59 S.E. 272 (1907).
It is improper to grant mandamus where court would aid effectuation of injustice, or where the relator does not come into court with clean hands. Ward v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 181 Ga. 228, 181 S.E. 664 (1935).
Generally, demand and refusal is a prerequisite to granting mandamus. Leonard v. House, 15 Ga. 473 (1854).
Mandamus action is commenced by original petition or application to compel due performance of an official duty, if there is no other specific legal remedy for the legal rights. Richardson v. Rector, 134 Ga. App. 116, 213 S.E.2d 488 (1975).
One who assails official acts by employing remedy of mandamus must prefer specific charges. The allegations of the petition must be positive, and not made on information and belief and the facts must be pleaded with certainty. The ultimate facts upon which the right to the writ of mandamus is based should be alleged. Cox v. Little, 178 Ga. 750, 174 S.E. 332 (1934).
In order to authorize grant of mandamus absolute, plaintiff must show clear legal right and that the mandamus will be effective. Troutman v. Aiken, 213 Ga. 55, 96 S.E.2d 585 (1957).
Before a writ of mandamus will issue, applicant must show, first, that the applicant has a clear legal right to the relief sought, and second, that there is no other adequate remedy. Solomon v. Brown, 218 Ga. 508, 128 S.E.2d 735 (1962); City of College Park v. Hamilton, 220 Ga. 629, 140 S.E.2d 878 (1965).
Mandamus not issued where petition fails to allege clear legal right.
- Where the laws of Georgia do not place upon a public officer the duty of performing acts sought to be required of the officer by petitioners, and the petition fails to allege a clear legal right on the part of the petitioners to require the act done which it sought to have performed, a writ of mandamus will not lie. Tucker v. Wilson, 198 Ga. 474, 31 S.E.2d 657 (1944).
Availability of mandamus relief satisfied pre-deprivation procedural due process.
- Terminated firefighter's pre-deprivation procedural due process claim was barred, as a matter of law, where the firefighter had access to a remedy in state court, a writ of mandamus under O.C.G.A. § 9-6-20, and had not shown that this state law remedy would have been insufficient to satisfy due process. Cochran v. Collins, 253 F. Supp. 2d 1295 (N.D. Ga. 2003).
Petition must allege demand for performance and refusal by official.
- One of the essentials to a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to compel a public official to perform a duty is that it be alleged that a demand has been made upon the defendant officer and that the officer has refused the demand. McDonald v. Schofield, 216 Ga. 589, 118 S.E.2d 479 (1961).
Plea of laches is equitable plea and does not apply to legal remedy of mandamus. Addis v. Smith, 226 Ga. 894, 178 S.E.2d 191 (1970).
Effect of mandamus petition on limitations periods.
- Inmate's federal habeas corpus petition, which was filed more than 365 days after the parole revocation the inmate was challenging, was time barred, and the inmate's earlier filing of a mandamus action under O.C.G.A. § 9-6-20 did not toll the federal limitations period because the mandamus petition, in which the inmate sought certain documents, was not a petition for collateral review that tolled the federal limitations period. Hawes v. Howerton, F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. July 6, 2006).
Petition for mandamus not moot.
- After a trial court in defendant's criminal matter entered an order of nolle prosequi regarding criminal charges against defendant, a motion for discharge and acquittal, based on the claim that the trial court had failed to comply with a demand for a speedy trial under O.C.G.A. § 17-7-170, should have still been ruled on; accordingly, it was error to find that defendant's petition for a writ of mandamus, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-6-20, seeking to have the trial court judge rule on the motion for discharge and acquittal, was rendered moot. Davis v. Wilson, 280 Ga. 29, 622 S.E.2d 325 (2005).
Mandamus claim dismissed prematurely.
- Dismissal of an employee's complaint for mandamus was reversed as asserted against the mayor because the ordinances allegedly violated in the process of disciplining the employee were not properly before the trial court; thus, the dismissal of the mandamus claim was premature. Hildebrand v. City of Warner Robins, 354 Ga. App. 164, 840 S.E.2d 503 (2020).
Elements of prima facie case.
- A petitioner for mandamus does not make out a prima facie case until the petitioner proves a legal duty imposed on the defendant to do the thing the petitioner is asked to do and shows a pecuniary loss to the petitioner for which the petitioner cannot be compensated in damages. Carroll v. American Agric. Chem. Co., 175 Ga. 855, 167 S.E. 597 (1932); Poole v. Duncan, 202 Ga. 255, 42 S.E.2d 731 (1947).
In a taxpayer suit against a county and officials (the county), the court upheld the grant of summary judgment to the county because the taxpayer's mandamus claims failed for the simple reason that the taxpayer adduced no evidence that any actual assessment of any particular property was other than at fair market value or that the county had failed to comply with the county's legal duty to see that all taxable property within the county is assessed and returned for taxes at the property's fair market value. SJN Props., LLC v. Fulton County Bd. of Assessors, 296 Ga. 793, 770 S.E.2d 832 (2015).
There is always prima facie presumption in favor of good faith of officer. Cox v. Little, 178 Ga. 750, 174 S.E. 332 (1934).
Summary judgment applicable to mandamus cases.
- The fact that this chapter provides rules under which mandamus actions shall be tried would not make Ga. L. 1967, p. 226, § 25 (see O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56) inapplicable in mandamus actions, because there was no express conflict between the sections providing for mandamus actions and the section relating to summary judgment. Harrison v. Weiner, 226 Ga. 93, 172 S.E.2d 840 (1970).
Dismissal of inmate's mandamus action was error.
- Trial court erred in dismissing an inmate's mandamus action pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-6-20, in which the defendant sought additional jail time credit, upon the inmate's failure to appear at a hearing in the matter, as the trial court failed to rule on the inmate's motion for habeas corpus ad testificandum under former O.C.G.A. § 24-10-62 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-13-62) and, accordingly, the inmate had no ability to appear in court on the hearing date. Rozar v. Donald, 280 Ga. 111, 622 S.E.2d 850 (2005).
Petition for mandamus erroneously denied.
- The trial court erroneously dismissed a litigant's petition for a writ of mandamus, and erroneously relied on dicta, in finding that orders setting a pre-trial conference in the underlying medical malpractice action were merely "housekeeping or administrative orders" that did not suspend the running of the five-year period under O.C.G.A. §§ 9-2-60(b) and9-11-41(e). Instead, such orders tolled the running of the five-year rule if the orders were in writing, signed by the trial judge, and properly entered in the records of the trial court. Zepp v. Brannen, 283 Ga. 395, 658 S.E.2d 567 (2008).
Relief fashioned by court did not constitute mandamus.
- Trial court simply granted summary judgment in favor of sign companies based on the court's finding that there were no valid ordinances regulating the construction of billboards at the time the applications by sign companies were filed and the sign companies were entitled to construct, maintain, and operate all signs for which the companies submitted applications and brought an action. The remedy fashioned by the trial court did not constitute mandamus relief because despite the cities' contrary arguments, the order did not compel the county or the cities to issue a permit as no permit was required at the time the applications were filed. Fulton County v. Action Outdoor Adver., JV, LLC, 289 Ga. 347, 711 S.E.2d 682 (2011).
Mandatory injunction was not mandamus.
- Mere fact that a court order is mandatory, rather than prohibitive, does not transform injunctive relief into a writ of mandamus and an injunction is not void merely because the injunction is mandatory in nature. Moreover, a trial court may issue a mandatory injunction when mandamus relief is not available. Rigby v. Boatright, 330 Ga. App. 181, 767 S.E.2d 783 (2014).
Costs allocated to parties failing in action.
- A proceeding under former Code 1933, § 64-101 (see O.C.G.A. § 9-6-20) fell within the statutory rule controlling civil actions at law, former Code 1933, § 24-3401 (see O.C.G.A. § 9-15-1), which stated that parties failing in such actions were liable for costs. Board of Educ. v. Fowler, 192 Ga. 35, 14 S.E.2d 478 (1941).
Trial court's entry of judgment on a jury's verdict is a judicial act and to reverse it, appeal, and not mandamus, is the proper remedy. Barber Fertilizer Co. v. Chason, 265 Ga. 497, 458 S.E.2d 631 (1995).
Cited in Bonner v. State ex. rel Pitts, 7 Ga. 473 (1849); Gresham v. Pyron, 17 Ga. 263 (1855); Lane v. Robinson, 40 Ga. 467 (1869); Bank of Ga. v. Harrison, 66 Ga. 696 (1881); Central R.R. v. Miller, 91 Ga. 83, 16 S.E. 256 (1892); Gamble v. Clark, 92 Ga. 695, 19 S.E. 54 (1893); Pulaski County v. DeLacy, 114 Ga. 583, 40 S.E. 741 (1902); Akerman v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 118 Ga. 334, 45 S.E. 312 (1903); Kingsbery v. People's Furn. Co., 130 Ga. 365, 60 S.E. 865 (1908); Hall v. Martin, 136 Ga. 549, 71 S.E. 803 (1911); Adkins v. Bennett, 138 Ga. 118, 74 S.E. 838 (1912); Bowles v. Malone, 139 Ga. 115, 76 S.E. 854 (1912); Hill v. Hixon, 151 Ga. 333, 106 S.E. 551 (1921); Bashlor v. Bacon, 168 Ga. 370, 147 S.E. 762 (1929); Talmadge v. Cordell, 170 Ga. 13, 152 S.E. 91 (1930); Dodge County Bd. of Educ. v. Dykes, 171 Ga. 317, 155 S.E. 489 (1930); Board of Educ. v. Board of Educ., 173 Ga. 203, 159 S.E. 712 (1931); Federal Life Ins. Co. v. Hurst, 43 Ga. App. 840, 160 S.E. 533 (1931); Chapman v. Dobbs, 175 Ga. 724, 166 S.E. 22 (1932); Hancock v. Rush, 181 Ga. 587, 183 S.E. 554 (1936); Perry v. Bank of Ellijay, 182 Ga. 768, 187 S.E. 18 (1936); Wofford Oil Co. v. City of Calhoun, 183 Ga. 511, 189 S.E. 5 (1936); Thompson v. MacNeill, 184 Ga. 311, 191 S.E. 249 (1937); Claxton State Bank v. R.S. Armstrong & Bro. Co., 185 Ga. 487, 195 S.E. 418 (1938); State Bd. of Educ. v. Board of Pub. Educ., 186 Ga. 783, 199 S.E. 641 (1938); DeBerry v. Spikes, 188 Ga. 222, 3 S.E.2d 719 (1939); Nesbit v. Gormley, 189 Ga. 275, 5 S.E.2d 747 (1939); City of Waycross v. Cullens, 190 Ga. 823, 10 S.E.2d 920 (1940); Speed Oil Co. v. Aldredge, 192 Ga. 285, 15 S.E.2d 214 (1941); Allman v. Aldredge, 65 Ga. App. 761, 16 S.E.2d 525 (1941); Manning v. Wills, 193 Ga. 82, 17 S.E.2d 261 (1941); Head v. Waldrup, 193 Ga. 165, 17 S.E.2d 585 (1941); City of Macon v. Herrington, 198 Ga. 576, 32 S.E.2d 517 (1944); Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 203 Ga. 832, 49 S.E.2d 38 (1948); Short v. City of Cornelia, 204 Ga. 217, 49 S.E.2d 483 (1948); Gray v. Gunby, 206 Ga. 63, 55 S.E.2d 588 (1949); Bentley v. Crow, 212 Ga. 35, 89 S.E.2d 887 (1955); Sabino v. United States, 220 Ga. 391, 139 S.E.2d 295 (1964); City Council v. Mulcay, 112 Ga. App. 817, 146 S.E.2d 354 (1965); City of Atlanta v. East Point Amusement Co., 222 Ga. 774, 152 S.E.2d 374 (1966); Manning v. A.A.B. Corp., 223 Ga. 111, 153 S.E.2d 561 (1967); Martin v. Martin, 118 Ga. App. 192, 163 S.E.2d 254 (1968); Fountain v. Suber, 225 Ga. 361, 169 S.E.2d 162 (1969); Hill v. Board of Tax Equalizers, 227 Ga. 145, 179 S.E.2d 243 (1971); New Era Publishing Co. v. Guess, 231 Ga. 250, 201 S.E.2d 142 (1973); Justice v. State Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 234 Ga. 749, 218 S.E.2d 45 (1975); Guhl v. Crow, 237 Ga. 699, 229 S.E.2d 475 (1976); State v. Fleming, 245 Ga. 700, 267 S.E.2d 207 (1980); Campbell v. Fulton County Bd. of Registration & Elections, 249 Ga. 845, 295 S.E.2d 80 (1982); Bledsoe v. Banke, 258 Ga. 815, 376 S.E.2d 686 (1989); Tilley Properties, Inc. v. Bartow County, 261 Ga. 153, 401 S.E.2d 527 (1991); Fisch v. Randall Mill Corp., 262 Ga. 861, 426 S.E.2d 883 (1993); ENRE Corp. v. Wheeler County Bd. of Comm'rs, 274 Ga. 17, 549 S.E.2d 67 (2001); Gaddy v. Ga. Dep't of Revenue, 301 Ga. 552, 802 S.E.2d 225 (2017); Bd. of Comm'rs v. Mayor & Council of Valdosta, 352 Ga. App. 391, 834 S.E.2d 890 (2019); Williams v. DeKalb County, 308 Ga. 265, 840 S.E.2d 423 (2020).
Applicability to Specific Cases
1. Cases Where Mandamus Proper
Mandamus is available remedy against public officials charged with duty of building schoolhouse, to compel action in the discharge of such duty. Plainfield Consol. Sch. Dist. v. Cook, 173 Ga. 447, 160 S.E. 617 (1931).
Mandamus is available remedy where refusal to authorize sale of malt beverages is arbitrary and illegal. Tate v. Seymour, 181 Ga. 801, 184 S.E. 598 (1936).
Mandamus was available as a remedy to compel school board to call election where under former law elected terms of school district trustees had expired. Edmondson v. Holt, 176 Ga. 907, 169 S.E. 299 (1933).
City school board was properly compelled by mandamus to recognize rights of member. Akerman v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 118 Ga. 334, 45 S.E. 312 (1903).
Mandamus only available remedy for enforcement of contracts made by county board of education.
- Since a county board of education is not a natural person, a partnership, or a body corporate which can be sued, mandamus is not only an appropriate remedy, but it is the only remedy available to the plaintiffs by which they can obtain performance of the contracts. Smith v. Maynard, 214 Ga. 764, 107 S.E.2d 815 (1959).
Recordation of county contracts in accordance with former Civil Code 1895, § 343 (see O.C.G.A. § 36-10-1) could be compelled by mandamus. Jones v. Bank of Cumming, 131 Ga. 614, 63 S.E. 36 (1908).
Mandamus to require governmental body to hold hearing.
- Because the firefighter did not have a hearing, the firefighter was correct that the firefighter did not have a right to a writ of certiorari, O.C.G.A. § 5-4-1(a); however, pursuant to Georgia law, when no other specific legal remedy was available and a party had a clear right to have a certain act performed, a party could seek mandamus, O.C.G.A. § 9-6-20. Under Georgia law, this procedure could be used to compel a governmental body to act in compliance with the law, for instance to require a governmental board to hold a hearing as provided by law. East v. Clayton County, 436 Fed. Appx. 904 (11th Cir. 2011)(Unpublished).
Mandamus proper remedy for pretrial confinement credit.
- Trial court's order denying the defendant's motion for credit for time served in pretrial confinement was vacated, as the defendant's remedy lied solely with the Department of Corrections and not the courts, and then if the defendant remained aggrieved thereafter, a mandamus or injunction action could be pursued. Edwards v. State, 283 Ga. App. 305, 641 S.E.2d 193 (2007).
Mandamus is proper remedy for reviewing denial of conditional and special use permits, in the absence of provision in a zoning ordinance prescribing the means of judicial review. City of Atlanta v. Wansley Moving & Storage Co., 245 Ga. 794, 267 S.E.2d 234 (1980), but see City of Cumming v. Flowers, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 171 (Ga. 2017).
Mandamus was proper remedy to compel issuance of permits to do electrical work, which permits had been refused to plaintiff based on unreasonable and void provisions of a licensing ordinance. Sullivan v. Johnson, 189 Ga. 778, 7 S.E.2d 900 (1940).
Mandamus was proper remedy to compel acceptance of subdivision roads.
- Developer was entitled to mandamus relief on its claim that a county improperly failed to accept subdivision roads because the county had sovereign immunity from the developer's claim for damages and no other legal remedy remained. Rabun County v. Mt. Creek Estates, LLC, 280 Ga. 855, 632 S.E.2d 140 (2006).
Mandamus action challenging county board's decision abandoning road.
- In a mandamus action, a trial court erred by reversing a decision of a county board of commissioners to abandon a road as the trial court failed to give proper deference to the board's decision to abandon the road and substituted the court's own judgment for that of the board. Scarborough v. Hunter, 293 Ga. 431, 746 S.E.2d 119 (2013).
Mandamus authorized against county treasurer.
- Mandamus would lie to compel county treasurer to pay order for services of court reporter. Lamb v. Toomer, 91 Ga. 621, 17 S.E. 966 (1893).
Mandamus is proper remedy to require payment by county treasurer. Daniel v. Yow, 226 Ga. 544, 176 S.E.2d 67 (1970).
Payment of part-time clerical help.
- Mandamus was proper remedy to compel payment of part-time clerical help in office of clerk of superior court during term of court. Grimsley v. Twiggs County, 249 Ga. 632, 292 S.E.2d 675 (1982).
Board of commissioners may be properly compelled by mandamus to pay funds to treasurer. Aaron v. German, 114 Ga. 587, 40 S.E. 713 (1901); Board of Rds. & Revenue v. Clark, 117 Ga. 288, 43 S.E. 722 (1903).
Mandamus to compel a judge to conduct civil trials was authorized because the judge's refusal to schedule civil cases for trial for more than two years was a gross abuse of discretion and no other specific legal remedy was available. Stubbs v. Carpenter, 271 Ga. 327, 519 S.E.2d 451 (1999).
Mandamus proper to compel reinstatement of fireman following improper suspension.
- Where following oral suspension by fire department, violative of the civil service act then in force, the fireman instituted a mandamus proceeding against the chief of the fire department to compel reinstatement to position as a fireman, the remedy sought was appropriate. McAfee v. Board of Firemasters, 186 Ga. 262, 197 S.E. 802 (1938).
Mandamus to enforce findings of recount committee in primary election.
- When the executive committee or other authority conducting and holding a primary election for the nomination of its candidates fails or refuses to adopt, promulgate, publish, and certify to the proper authorities the findings and report of a recount committee, then the candidate for such office whose rights may be affected by such failure or refusal has a right to proceed by mandamus to enforce the findings and report of such committee, and there is jurisdiction in the superior courts of this state to hear and determine the cause, notwithstanding the political nature of the controversy. Middleton v. Moody, 216 Ga. 237, 115 S.E.2d 567 (1960).
Registered voter may compel registrars to place the voter's name on list of registered voters by mandamus. Bearden v. Daves, 139 Ga. 635, 77 S.E. 871 (1913).
Mandamus held proper to compel board of canvassers to reconvene and consolidate election returns by sole candidate. Morris v. Glover, 121 Ga. 751, 49 S.E. 786 (1905). See also Brown v. Watterson, 96 Ga. 598, 24 S.E. 141 (1895).
Mandamus appropriate to order payment of insolvent orders where county improperly commingled funds.
- Where the fund designed for the payment of insolvent costs was mingled with the general funds of a county, and money arising from fines and forfeitures which was subject to orders for insolvent costs was diverted into the general fund, the judge of the superior court did not err in granting a mandamus absolute, requiring that all moneys coming into the treasury of the county should be applied to the payment of the insolvent orders of the petitioner until the same were paid in full. Citizens Bank v. Newton, 180 Ga. 860, 181 S.E. 171 (1935).
Mandamus to seek payment of judgment from city.
- Petition seeking the payment of judgment from present funds of the judgment debtor city, if available, and if not available, from a tax to be levied on property within the limits of the city, stated a cause of action for mandamus. Bradford v. Bolton, 215 Ga. 188, 109 S.E.2d 751 (1959).
Mandamus properly granted in favor of plaintiff, retired fireman, for payment of monthly pension to which the fireman was legally entitled. Pierce v. Rhodes, 208 Ga. 554, 67 S.E.2d 771 (1951).
Mandamus will lie to compel members of State Board of Pardons and Paroles to consider and pass upon application for parole of a prisoner who has served less than the minimum term of the prisoner's indeterminate sentence but more than the term required by the rules of the board in order to be eligible for consideration for parole. Riley v. Garrett, 219 Ga. 345, 133 S.E.2d 367 (1963).
Mandamus will lie where arbitrary denial of a liquor license constitutes violation of equal protection. Hernandez v. Board of Comm'rs, 242 Ga. 76, 247 S.E.2d 870 (1978).
Mandamus will lie to compel issuance of a liquor license by a county board. Brock v. State, 65 Ga. 437 (1880).
Mandamus lies to require municipality to pay balance due on salary of petitioner, its former clerk, where such sum has been approved for payment by its mayor and council and appropriate entry made on its minutes and sufficient funds are available. Adams v. Town of Weston, 181 Ga. 503, 183 S.E. 69 (1935).
Superintendent of schools could compel, by mandamus, payment of the superintendent's salary by the board of education, as a money judgment would not furnish an adequate remedy. Mattox v. Board of Educ., 148 Ga. 577, 97 S.E. 532, 5 A.L.R. 568 (1918).
Court improperly denied mandamus to compel issuance of commission to school district trustee.
- Where plaintiff, as the successful candidate in a school district election for the office of trustee, was entitled, as a matter of law, to be commissioned by the county board of education, court erred in refusing to grant a mandamus absolute to compel the issuance of a commission to the plaintiff. Ramsey v. Mingledorff, 181 Ga. 803, 184 S.E. 322 (1936).
Mayor and council failed to call special election.
- The calling of an election to approve an additional tax for school purposes, being a plain duty laid upon the mayor and council by law, and their failure to perform this duty being alleged, a case demanding the writ of mandamus is pleaded, and it was error to sustain the demurrer (now motion to dismiss) to the petition and dismiss the same. Board of Educ. v. Oliver, 216 Ga. 450, 117 S.E.2d 163 (1960).
Municipal authorities could be compelled by mandamus to call election for mayor and councilmen, when the duty so to do was enjoined upon them by the municipal charter. Comer v. Epps, 149 Ga. 57, 99 S.E. 120 (1919).
Court erred in dismissing application for mandamus to compel issuance of building permit, the case being one where, without mandamus, a defect of legal justice would ensue. Wofford Oil Co. v. City of Calhoun, 183 Ga. 511, 189 S.E. 5 (1936).
Abuse of discretion to deny zoning permit where no valid reason for denial.
- Where the only evidence offered in opposition to application for permit to build filling station was of property owners nearby upon grounds of danger, noise, and the depressing of the value of their property, none of which amount to a valid reason for declining the permit, it was an abuse of discretion to refuse the mandamus. Hadden v. Pierce, 212 Ga. 45, 90 S.E.2d 405 (1955).
Arbitrary denial of cemetery permit grounds for mandamus.
- Where county commissioners arbitrarily and capriciously refused grant of permit to establish cemetery, under statute giving them power to grant or refuse permission, so that their action in so doing amounted to a gross abuse of the discretion which the exercise of their administrative function called for, petitioner would be entitled to invoke the remedy of mandamus, that being the only method of relief available. South View Cem. Ass'n v. Hailey, 199 Ga. 478, 34 S.E.2d 863 (1945).
Permit to park mobile home.
- Where the petitioners had undergone the proper procedures necessary to acquire a permit for parking their mobile home on their lot, and the town had raised no valid reason for denial of the permit, the trial court should grant their petition for mandamus. Cain v. Town of Sparks, 256 Ga. 310, 348 S.E.2d 645 (1986).
No mandamus to review habitual offender status.
- Because an administrative law judge lacked jurisdiction to address the issue of a driver's habitual violator status, and thus, the ruling that the driver was wrongfully declared an habitual offender was not binding on the parties, the driver was not entitled to mandamus relief ordering the Commissioner of the Department of Vehicle Services to issue a driver's license. James v. Davis, 280 Ga. 497, 629 S.E.2d 820 (2006).
Elected county superintendent, unlawfully removed from office by county board of education, could maintain mandamus against the members of the board to compel them to recognize the elected county superintendent as the person entitled to hold the office and to discharge the duties thereof; separate suit for the writ of quo warranto against the person purportedly elected by the board as a successor did not afford a complete and adequate remedy as against the board, since in that case the complainant or relator could only recover the office from the respondent and could not obtain an order requiring the members of the board to recognize him. Jones v. Nelson, 202 Ga. 732, 45 S.E.2d 62 (1947).
Jury commissioners could be compelled by mandamus to make jury list. Davis v. Arthur, 139 Ga. 74, 76 S.E. 676 (1912).
Insurance Commissioner's refusal to renew company's license grounds for mandamus.
- Where the refusal of the Insurance Commissioner to renew an insurance company's license is without justification, the failure to perform this official duty will irreparably injure the company, and therefore its petition alleges a cause of action for mandamus. Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Cravey, 208 Ga. 682, 69 S.E.2d 87 (1952).
Mandamus held proper to compel probate court judge to enter building contract on minutes.
- Mandamus will lie at the instance of the assignee of a contractor's warrant issued for erection of a courthouse to compel judge of probate court to enter building contract on the judge's minutes. Jones v. Bank of Cumming, 131 Ga. 614, 63 S.E. 36 (1908).
Compel court to put oral suppression order into writing.
- Because the state failed to request that the trial court put an oral order of suppression in writing, and show that the trial court refused to do so, it did not have the right to appeal from that order; moreover, while the state could have filed a mandamus petition seeking to require the court to put the oral order in writing, it did not seek that relief. State v. Morrell, 281 Ga. 152, 635 S.E.2d 716 (2006).
Mandamus maintainable to compel publication of official statements.
- Mandamus was held to be the proper remedy to compel sheriff, judge of the probate court, and clerk to continue to publish official statements in the proper newspaper. Braddy v. Whiteley, 113 Ga. 746, 39 S.E. 317 (1901); Dollar v. Wind, 135 Ga. 760, 70 S.E. 335 (1911). But see Southern Crescent Newspapers v. Dorsey, 269 Ga. 41, 497 S.E.2d 360 (1998).
Enforcement of levy by municipality held proper by mandamus.
- Where town council was required by law to levy a certain tax as fixed by a board of school commissioners, and refused to do so, commissioners could force the levy by mandamus. Dennington v. Mayor of Roberta, 130 Ga. 494, 61 S.E. 20 (1908).
Acceptance by levying officer of good affidavit of illegality could be compelled by mandamus. Williams v. McArthur, 111 Ga. 28, 36 S.E. 301 (1900).
Tax receiver was properly compelled by mandamus to assess property of delinquent taxpayer. Richmond County v. Steed, 150 Ga. 229, 103 S.E. 253 (1920).
Restoration of property illegally taken on tax execution could be compelled by mandamus. Mitchell v. Hay, 37 Ga. 581 (1868).
Mandamus was proper to compel sheriff to execute deed to property sold under execution from probate court. Burckhalter v. O'Connor, 100 Ga. 366, 28 S.E. 154 (1897).
Mandamus proper to correct procedural deprivation.
- Applicants for a certificate to operate a bail bond company failed to establish a procedural due process violation because, even if the applicants had a constitutionally protected property interest in the application, the applicants had an adequate remedy at state law through mandamus under O.C.G.A. § 9-6-20 against the sheriff to remedy any alleged procedural deprivations. A.A.A. Always Open Bail Bonds, Inc. v. Dekalb County, 129 Fed. Appx. 522 (11th Cir. 2005).
Teacher's claim that the teacher was denied procedural due process when the Georgia Professional Standards Commission refused to consider the teacher's appeal of a disciplinary action that was taken against the teacher failed because the teacher had a remedy available under O.C.G.A. § 9-6-20 in the form of a writ of mandamus. Wilbourne v. Forsyth County Sch. Dist., F.3d (11th Cir. Jan. 5, 2009)(Unpublished).
Former tenured teacher failed to state a claim of a procedural due process violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the nonrenewal of a teaching contract because the teacher failed to utilize available state remedies under O.C.G.A. §§ 9-6-20,20-2-940,20-2-942(b), and20-2-1160(a) through petitioning the board of education for a hearing or seeking mandamus relief. Mason v. Clayton County Bd. of Educ., 334 Fed. Appx. 191 (11th Cir. 2009)(Unpublished).
Former college student failed to state a procedural due process claim based on denial of a post-deprivation hearing following the student's suspension as the student had an adequate post-deprivation remedy; mandamus under O.C.G.A. § 9-6-20 was an available state remedy. Wells v. Columbus Tech. College, 510 Fed. Appx. 893 (11th Cir. 2013)(Unpublished).
Mandamus is proper remedy for failure of public defender's office to appoint appellate counsel.
- A trial court properly held that the court did not have authority to appoint appellate counsel for a defendant because, under the Georgia Indigent Defense Act of 2003, a defendant was required to direct a request for indigent representation directly to the public defender's office. It appeared that the defendant, who had been sentenced to prison, would be eligible under O.C.G.A. § 17-12-23; although the defendant claimed that the public defender's office would not heed the defendant's requests, the defendant was not without a remedy as the defendant could apply for a writ of mandamus under O.C.G.A. § 9-6-20. Bynum v. State, 289 Ga. App. 636, 658 S.E.2d 196 (2008).
Commissioners failing to lay off town lots could be properly compelled by mandamus. Polk v. James, 68 Ga. 128 (1881).
Mandamus against city to compel furnishing of water.
- Where plaintiff brought mandamus to force city to furnish the plaintiff water after it had stopped doing so, the petition was not subject to dismissal upon the ground that plaintiff had legal remedy. City of Camilla v. Norris, 134 Ga. 351, 67 S.E. 940 (1910).
Mandamus to compel city to issue written verification for proposed solid waste handling facility.
- Applicant for a solid waste handling facility was entitled to mandamus relief seeking to compel a city to issue written verification that a proposed solid waste handling facility did not violate any zoning or land use ordinances and that it was consistent with all solid waste management plans, as: (1) the city did not comply with O.C.G.A. § 12-8-31.1(a) and (b); and (2) it could not rely on its solid waste management plan to deny the written verification under O.C.G.A. § 12-8-24(g) which was consistent with the city's plan approved in 1993. McKee v. City of Geneva, 280 Ga. 411, 627 S.E.2d 555 (2006).
2. Cases Where Mandamus Improper
Mandamus is not available remedy to compel justice of peace to set aside decision or judgment rendered by the justice of the peace in the trial of a case without a jury and to compel the justice of the peace to render a different judgment. Hayes v. Brown, 205 Ga. 234, 52 S.E.2d 862 (1949).
Mandamus not available if appellate review available.
- Superior court did not err when it denied mandamus relief to a car manufacturer that challenged a trial court order for the manufacturer to produce documents which the manufacturer claimed were privileged from discovery because reversal of the order had to be obtained pursuant to the available methods of obtaining appellate review. Ford Motor Co. v. Lawrence, 279 Ga. 284, 612 S.E.2d 301 (2005).
Mandamus relief properly denied since certification of appeals obtained.
- Trial court did not err by denying a group of property owners their request for mandamus relief in the nature of finding that the county board of tax assessors certified their property tax appeals because it was undisputed that the tax appeals were physically delivered to the trial court and that it had ruled that such appeals were certified to it; thus, the property owners received the relief sought regarding certification. Newton Timber Co., L.L.L.P. v. Monroe County Bd. of Tax Assessors, Ga. , 755 S.E.2d 770 (2014).
Mandamus not proper to seek to compel Governor to consent to suit.
- Trial court was correct in denying an appellant's request to bring a mandamus action against a Governor, seeking to compel the Governor to consent to a suit against the state, to-wit, filing suit against the state without the Governor's consent, a remedy the appellant had in fact employed. Garnett v. Hamrick, 280 Ga. 523, 630 S.E.2d 384 (2006).
Mandamus unavailable to access court records.
- Law firm that sought copies of a court reporter's recordings of hearings in two criminal cases was not entitled to mandamus relief from a trial court's order denying the request for copies because the law firm had an adequate remedy at law in the procedures provided in Ga. Unif. Super. Ct. R. 21, which applied to both civil and criminal cases. Merch. Law Firm, P.C. v. Emerson, 301 Ga. 609, 800 S.E.2d 557 (2017).
State court judge not entitled to mandamus ordering county to pay additional compensation.
- State court judge was not entitled to mandamus relief for additional compensation under a local law and a county ordinance because the judge received all compensation and allowances as provided by law, and the judge's salary did not decrease in any way during the judge's term of office in violation of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VII, Para. V. Cowen v. Clayton County, 306 Ga. 698, 832 S.E.2d 819 (2019).
Mandamus inappropriate to compel spending of referendum funds.
- Mandamus was not appropriate under O.C.G.A. § 9-6-20 as members of a county board of commissioners did not fail to perform their official duties by entering into a 2006 intergovernmental agreement to have $12 million raised by a 1999 Special Local Option Sales Tax (SPLOST) referendum used to upgrade and build two local waste water facilities as the SPLOST funds were insufficient to upgrade the county's existing centralized system of waste water treatment; the 2006 intergovernmental agreement utilized the funds for the purposes specified in the 1999 resolution under O.C.G.A. § 48-8- 121(a)(1), just by a different means. Hicks v. Khoury, 283 Ga. 407, 658 S.E.2d 616 (2008).
Mandamus not issued to compel revocation of liquor license where such act discretionary.
- Where under a city's charter it was discretionary whether a liquor license should be revoked, the defendants being authorized to revoke such license when they deem it necessary to the general welfare of the city, they could not be compelled by mandamus to do so. Hartsfield v. Salem, 213 Ga. 760, 101 S.E.2d 701 (1958).
No official duty to certify names of candidates.
- A petition seeking only to require the Secretary of State to certify the names of certain candidates for political office to the Governor, in the absence of any statutory law or decision of the courts of this state requiring the Secretary of State to do so, failed to show any cause for the issuance of a writ of mandamus. Tucker v. Wilson, 198 Ga. 474, 31 S.E.2d 657 (1944).
Mandamus properly denied where no allegation that abatement of nuisance inadequate to afford relief.
- Where there were no allegations that the abatement of an alleged nuisance in the manner authorized by law would not afford petitioners adequate relief, writ of mandamus would not lie. State Hwy. Dep't v. Reed, 211 Ga. 197, 84 S.E.2d 561 (1954).
Mandamus properly denied where county board of education had paid plaintiff.
- Where plaintiff, driver of a privately owned and personally maintained school bus, had received from county board of education more than it was required to pay the plaintiff under the act in question, and had disbursed pro rata among its school bus drivers all funds received by it for pupil transportation from all sources, the trial judge did not err in refusing to grant mandamus absolute. Veal v. Washington County Bd. of Educ., 211 Ga. 204, 84 S.E.2d 565 (1954).
Mandamus unavailable to require school board to place citizen on agenda.
- A citizen was not entitled to a writ of mandamus directing a school board to place the citizen on the board's agenda because setting the agenda was a discretionary act that was not subject to mandamus and none of the statutes cited by the citizen, O.C.G.A. §§ 20-2-1160(a),45-10-1, and50-6-6(b), imposed a duty on the board to place the citizen on the board's agenda. James v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 283 Ga. 517, 661 S.E.2d 535 (2008).
Trial court did not err in denying the plaintiff's request for a mandamus nisi because the plaintiff's request for mandamus was unsupportable as a matter of law as it was undisputed that the county board of tax assessors provided various documents in response to the plaintiff's information requests regarding property tax assessments, and the plaintiff's demands for supplementation of the responses and an explanation of those responses in a recorded meeting session strayed far beyond what was required by statute. Hansen v. DeKalb County Board of Tax Assessors, 295 Ga. 385, 761 S.E.2d 35 (2014).
Mandamus unavailable for nominee seeking to serve on electric membership corporations.
- Trial court erred by granting a nominee's writ of mandamus because under O.C.G.A. § 9-6-23, mandamus did not lie to enforce purely private contract rights and the nominee's efforts to be qualified as a person to sit on the board of an electric membership corporation was a private right as board members were not public officers within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 9-6-20. Rigby v. Boatright, 294 Ga. 253, 751 S.E.2d 851 (2013).
Mandamus properly dismissed where no legal duty imposed on official to issue salary vouchers.
- Where no duty was imposed by law upon the Secretary of State to issue vouchers for salary due to members of the State Board of Barber and Hair-Dresser Examiners, the trial judge did not err in dismissing on general demurrer (now motion to dismiss), the petition of a former member of that board for a writ of mandamus to require the Secretary of State to issue a check or voucher for a balance of the salary claimed by the plaintiff. Williamson v. Wilson, 189 Ga. 652, 7 S.E.2d 241 (1940).
Mandamus improper where city's grant of conditional use permit excluded authorization to build stadium.
- Trial court erred in granting mandamus relief to a school based on the city's act of granting a conditional use permit, but disallowing the school to build a football stadium as part of the permit, as the increased traffic conditions that would result if the stadium were allowed supported the action. City of Roswell v. Fellowship Christian Sch., Inc., 281 Ga. 767, 642 S.E.2d 824 (2007).
Mandamus not appropriate if state revenue commissioner could be made party to county tax appeal.
- In a gas company's suit against the state revenue commissioner for mandamus compelling the commissioner to accept its property tax returns under O.C.G.A. §§ 48-1-2(21) and48-5-511(a), remand was proper to determine if the company had an acceptable alternative remedy in its pending county tax appeals under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-311, as required by O.C.G.A. § 9-6-20, if the commissioner could be made a party to those appeals by joinder or some other procedure. Southern LNG, Inc. v. MacGinnitie, 294 Ga. 657, 755 S.E.2d 683 (2014).
State treasurer had no duty to pay out funds.
- Petition seeking a writ of mandamus directing the state treasurer to honor and pay a warrant for state funds which the petition failed to show had been executed as required by law, so that there was no failure of the treasurer to perform the treasurer's official duty in paying a warrant properly executed and presented to the treasurer, alleged no cause of action, and was properly dismissed on demurrer (now motion to dismiss). Barwick v. Roberts, 188 Ga. 655, 4 S.E.2d 664 (1939).
Mandamus not available to compel county to pay personal injury judgment.
- Writ of mandamus to compel a county to pay the entire judgment entered against a former employee was properly denied as the underlying accident claim was covered by the county's self-insurance plan; Fulton County, Ga., Code of Resolutions § 102-81(e) excluded the claim from those the county was required to pay in full, and the county was responsible only for the amount of the self-insurance limits. Thomason v. Fulton County, 284 Ga. 49, 663 S.E.2d 216 (2008).
Remedy of mandamus cannot avail where the Constitution prohibits payment of tort claims from school taxation. Sheley v. Board of Pub. Educ., 132 Ga. App. 314, 208 S.E.2d 126 (1974), cert. dismissed, 233 Ga. 487, 212 S.E.2d 627 (1975).
Taxpayers have adequate remedy at law under refund statute and mandamus will not lie. Henderson v. Carter, 229 Ga. 876, 195 S.E.2d 4 (1972), overruled on other grounds, City of Atlanta v. Barnes, 276 Ga. 449 (2003).
Writ of mandamus against taxpayer is not a remedy provided by statute for collection of taxes. Richmond County v. Steed, 150 Ga. 229, 103 S.E. 253 (1920).
Where petitioners seek to compel officials to enforce liquor laws, mandamus is improper remedy since the law provides for a citizen's arrest of the offenders or for the issuance of a warrant upon complaint by the citizen for the arrest of the violators. Mandamus will not lie where there is an adequate legal remedy. Solomon v. Brown, 218 Ga. 508, 128 S.E.2d 735 (1962).
Issuance of a retail off-premises beer and wine license by a county commission could not be compelled by a writ of mandamus. Dickerson v. Augusta-Richmond County Comm'n, 271 Ga. 612, 523 S.E.2d 310 (1999).
Inapplicable to private citizens.
- Where a road was abandoned after an owner filed a petition for mandamus, the constitutionality of O.C.G.A. § 9-6-21(b) was moot; pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-6-20, mandamus was not applicable to a neighbor or to claims for injunctive or monetary relief. Gaw v. Telfair County Bd. of Comm'rs, 277 Ga. 157, 587 S.E.2d 50 (2003).
Mandamus unavailable to terminated teacher prior to use of administrative process.
- Mandamus will not lie where it appears that the complainant has not availed oneself of the administrative remedies available under O.C.G.A. § 20-2-1160, which provides for an appeal to the State Board of Education from decisions concerning the termination of teachers pursuant to the Fair Dismissal Act. Lansford v. Cook, 252 Ga. 414, 314 S.E.2d 103 (1984).
Mandamus against sheriff to compel rearrest improper where bench warrant was adequate.
- Where issuance of a bench warrant was adequate to enforce sentence, by having sheriff arrest defendant and turn the defendant over to chain-gang authorities, mandamus proceedings against the sheriff to compel the sheriff to rearrest defendant would not lie. Porter v. Garmony, 148 Ga. 261, 96 S.E. 426 (1918).
Mandamus not available to compel county to re-hire former employee to unspecified job.
- Trial court erred by granting a former employee a writ of mandamus requiring a county to give an unspecified job because there was nothing in the record establishing that an available job was sufficiently similar to the former employee's prior job as to provide a clear legal right to that job, which the former employee was required to show for the grant of a writ of mandamus. Clayton County Bd. of Comm'rs v. Murphy, 297 Ga. 763, 778 S.E.2d 193 (2015).
Mandamus not available to compel completion of illegal sale.
- Where sheriff, by mistake, sold property on the first Tuesday in May, but discovered the mistake before the money was paid by the holder, the sheriff could not be compelled by mandamus to make a deed and deliver possession to the bidder on the bidder's tender of the amount of the bid. State ex. rel Collins v. Byrd, 42 Ga. 629 (1871).
County judge acting as agent of board of county commissioners cannot be compelled to perform their duties. Holtzclaw v. Riley, 113 Ga. 1023, 39 S.E. 425 (1901).
No power to compel fellow judge to perform duties.
- When duties are imposed on a judge of the superior court as an officer, another judge of the superior court has no power to issue a mandamus to compel performance of such duties. Justices of Inferior Court v. Orr, 12 Ga. 137 (1852).
Motion to recuse judge.
- Because an affidavit in support of a judge's recusal was insufficient on its face, and the proper remedy for challenging the denial of a motion for recusal was an appeal, not an action for a writ of mandamus, the presiding judge properly denied a pro se litigant's motion to recuse and declined the litigant relief. Gray v. Manis, 282 Ga. 336, 647 S.E.2d 588 (2007).
Appointment of permanent process servers.
- Mandamus did not lie to require a state court judge to appoint permanent process servers pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4(c) since, even if the petitioners had no other specific legal remedy, the statute provided a trial court with the authority as well as the discretion to appoint disinterested persons, who are citizens of the United States and at least 18 years of age, as permanent process servers, but did not mandate that the trial court make such an appointment when the statutory requirements have been satisfied. Tamaroff v. Cowen, 270 Ga. 415, 511 S.E.2d 159 (1999).
Dismissal of assistant principal.
- Where the school board had not admitted that it let an assistant principal go for unlawful reasons and the petitioner had not presented any evidence to substantiate their claim that the assistant principal was not rehired as a result of the assistant principal's exercise of constitutionally protected activities, the petitioner had not shown any facts which would remove the decision not to renew the contract from the realm of policy into the realm of law; hence, since the assistant principal had not established any right to a school board hearing under O.C.G.A. § 20-2-1160, the trial court should not have granted the petition for a writ of mandamus. Dalton City Bd. of Educ. v. Smith, 256 Ga. 394, 349 S.E.2d 458 (1986).
School district with no right to relief from State Board of Education decision.
- Local school district was not entitled to mandamus relief compelling the State Board of Education (Board) to determine the amount of transportation funding it provided to the district based on the schools students actually attended because the Board's interpretation of the phrase "school to which they are assigned," in O.C.G.A. § 20-2-188(d), to mean a school in the student's attendance zone, regardless of the school attended, was reasonable and the district had no clear legal right to the relief it sought, nor did it show a gross abuse of discretion by state officials. Schrenko v. DeKalb County Sch. Dist., 276 Ga. 786, 582 S.E.2d 109 (2003).
Discovery, continuance in criminal proceedings unauthorized.
- The defendant filed a suit for mandamus and prohibition against the solicitor and the judge to whom the defendant's case was assigned, seeking the solicitor's compliance with the defendant's requests for discovery, as well as a continuance of the criminal proceedings against the defendant until the solicitor complied with the defendant's discovery requests. Since the court was under no duty to grant a continuance and the solicitor was under no duty to provide discovery, such extraordinary relief was not authorized and the court correctly dismissed the petition for failure to state a claim. Scott v. McLaughlin, 258 Ga. 407, 369 S.E.2d 257 (1988).
To compel coverage of defense and indemnification.
- Trial court's denial of a county employee's request to amend the employee's complaint to add a claim for mandamus, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-6-20, was proper because the employee did not have a clear legal right to coverage of the employee's defense and indemnification in an action brought against the employee, as the county could terminate such coverage where it was found that the employee's responses to interrogatories and answers to deposition questions were inaccurate or false; accordingly, the county attorney had a reasoned and articulable basis to terminate the employee's coverage and mandamus would not have provided any relief. Baker v. Gwinnett County, 267 Ga. App. 839, 600 S.E.2d 819 (2004).
Mandamus to vacate convictions not available.
- Mandamus seeking damages and ruling compelling officials to vacate convictions for simple battery and obstruction of an officer was not available to defendant. Lewis v. Schreeder, Wheeler & Flint, 265 Ga. 349, 455 S.E.2d 588 (1995).
Mandamus to control manner of city's entry into contracts denied.
- Based on the Georgia legislature's explicitly stated intention in the Georgia Local Government Public Works Construction Law, O.C.G.A. § 36-91-1 et seq., that local laws and ordinances controlled the manner of the city's execution of and entry into contracts, a contractor was not entitled to a writ of mandamus requiring the city to execute a contract in its favor, as neither the mayor nor the city council exercised their discretionary authority to approve any award which might or might not have resulted from the competitive sealed proposals process. Duty Free Air & Ship Supply Co./Franklin Wilson Airport Concession, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 282 Ga. 173, 646 S.E.2d 48 (2007).
Recomputation of criminal sentence.
- The court correctly dismissed a petition for mandamus against the State Board of Pardons and Paroles and its chairman, seeking an order requiring them to recompute the petitioner's sentences resulting from the petitioner's convictions as a habitual violator. The duty to award credit for time served lies with the Department of Corrections, not the board. Further, mandamus lies against an official to require the performance of a clear legal duty, but does not reach the office. Harper v. State Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 260 Ga. 132, 390 S.E.2d 592 (1990).
Mandamus to compel criminal charges.
- Petition seeking mandamus to compel a prosecutor to bring a criminal perjury charge was properly denied since the claim of alleged perjury, and the effect it may have had upon the criminal trial of one of the appellants who brought the mandamus petition, were claims that should have been raised either in the context of a habeas corpus proceeding or, in the case of newly discovered evidence, through an extraordinary motion for a new trial. Mayo v. Head, 280 Ga. 793, 631 S.E.2d 108 (2006).
Discretionary nature of judge's decision.
- Grant of writ of mandamus to the defendant was reversed because mandamus was not an allowable remedy since the opportunity for review via a writ of certiorari existed as to the municipal judge's decision as the municipal court's duty under O.C.G.A. § 36-32-6(c) as to the defendant's marijuana possession was a discretionary act allowing the opportunity for review via a writ. Schaeffer v. Kearney, 355 Ga. App. 449, 844 S.E.2d 515 (2020).
Unauthorized appeals.
- Where defendant had no clear legal right to compel the judge to allow the defendant to pursue the defendant's unauthorized appeal, the trial court correctly refused to grant mandamus. Grant v. Gaines, 265 Ga. 159, 454 S.E.2d 481 (1995).
Retailer incorrectly sought mandamus relief from a board of zoning appeals' denial of its application for a variance from the county's sign ordinance because the applicable ordinance specified that a writ of certiorari was the sole means of obtaining judicial review of such a decision, and the fact that the ordinance was amended while litigation was pending did not allow the retailer to pursue mandamus, nor was certiorari an inadequate remedy because the board could not rule on the retailer's challenge to the constitutionality of the ordinance, as that argument could be raised when seeking a writ of certiorari. DeKalb County v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 278 Ga. 501, 604 S.E.2d 162 (2004).
Verification letter for proposed landfill.
- Trial court properly entered a declaratory judgment against a limited liability limited partnership (LLLP) and properly denied the LLLP's request for a writ of mandamus as the LLLP was not entitled to a verification letter since the county's zoning ordinance was properly enacted, and the LLLP's land was not zoned for a landfill. Mid-Georgia Envtl. Mgmt. Group, L.L.L.P. v. Meriwether County, 277 Ga. 670, 594 S.E.2d 344 (2004).
Mandamus to require in-state tuition for noncitizen students.
- Noncitizen students failed to show that the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) policy had the force and effect of a federal law that would support a mandamus order requiring state universities to grant the students in-state tuition, and even if DACA had the force of law, DACA did not create a clear legal duty to grant the students in-state tuition. Alford v. Hernandez, 343 Ga. App. 332, 807 S.E.2d 84 (2017), cert. denied, No. S18C0459, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 327 (Ga. 2018).
Mandamus cannot dictate where boundary line to be located.
- Trial court erred by granting a county mandamus relief in a county boundary line dispute action pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 36-3-20 et seq. because while mandamus was authorized to compel the Georgia Secretary of State to do certain tasks, it was not authorized to dictate where the boundary line was to be located. Bibb County v. Monroe County, 294 Ga. 730, 755 S.E.2d 760 (2014).
Petition for mandamus properly dismissed.
- The trial court properly dismissed a landowners' petition for mandamus filed against a judge as premature and for failing to state a claim, because the landowner opted to file the petition, but could have requested a hearing to allow the judge an opportunity to rule on the previously filed motions; the 90-day ruling period applicable to the motions pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-6-21(b) had not yet expired at the time the petition had been filed. Voyles v. McKinney, 283 Ga. 169, 657 S.E.2d 193 (2008).
Discretionary standard required application.
- Trial court erred by granting mandamus relief under O.C.G.A. § 9-6-20 with regard to a property owner seeking to compel a county to maintain roads in a subdivision because while the county had accepted dedication of the streets, the county still was vested with the discretion to decide whether to open all the roads or close any of the roads, and the trial court was required to determine whether the county's decisions were arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable or a gross abuse of discretion as nowhere in the judgment was that standard articulated. Burke County v. Askin, 291 Ga. 697, 732 S.E.2d 416 (2012).
Out of state attorney lacked standing.
- Florida attorney who had been admitted pro hac vice to represent a defendant in a tire case, but whose duties were limited by the trial court due to the attorney's misleading statements, and whose client was later dismissed from the case, did not have standing to seek mandamus compelling the trial court to rule on motions under O.C.G.A. § 15-6-21(b) so the attorney could appeal the ruling as to the attorney's conduct. Fein v. Bessen, 300 Ga. 25, 793 S.E.2d 76 (2016).
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
This section authorizes remedy of mandamus where official's discretion has been arbitrarily and capriciously exercised so as to constitute gross abuse of discretion. 1971 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 71-168.(see O.C.G.A. § 9-6-20).
Officers must keep their offices open at sufficient times to discharge their duties whether or not there is a statute which requires a particular office to be open at specific times. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-497.
Inadequacy of appropriated funds does not excuse duty of public official to exercise due diligence to perform the official's responsibilities. 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 75-59.
Public official excused from official duty only where performance clearly impossible.- A public official of this state will be excused from carrying out an official duty upon failure of the General Assembly to appropriate funds for performance, if, but only if, the official is able to show that the resulting lack of funds, together with an inability to obtain the same, make performance impossible; failure of the General Assembly to appropriate moneys for a specific official duty might not justify a failure to perform where the official has received a general appropriation and could divert a portion thereof to carry out the official's statutory or official duty. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-174.
Same rule applies to interdepartmental council.- An interdepartmental council created by an Act of the General Assembly is excused from carrying out its official duties upon failure of the General Assembly to appropriate funds for performance of said duties, if, but only if, this resulting lack of funds rendered performance impossible; the court would have the power to determine whether the mandatory duties of the council could be performed or not. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-184.
Mandamus proper remedy to enforce marking of official vehicles.- A petition for writ of mandamus brought by a taxpayer or member of the motoring public is the proper method to enforce compliance with the statute requiring the marking of official vehicles. 1965-66 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 65-49.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d.
- 52 Am. Jur. 2d, Mandamus, § 1 et seq.
17 Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Mandamus, §§ 2, 136.
C.J.S.- 55 C.J.S., Mandamus, § 51 et seq.
ALR.
- Election of remedies as between mandamus and an action for damages, 1 A.L.R. 1698.
Mandamus to compel court to assume or exercise jurisdiction where it has erroneously dismissed the cause or refused to proceed on the ground of supposed lack of jurisdiction, 4 A.L.R. 582; 82 A.L.R. 1163.
Mandamus to compel a court to take jurisdiction of a cause that it has erroneously dismissed for supposed insufficiency or lack of service, 4 A.L.R. 610.
Inadequacy of remedy by appeal or writ of error as affecting right to mandamus to inferior court, 4 A.L.R. 632.
Mandamus to compel a court to reinstate or proceed with the hearing of an appeal that it has erroneously dismissed, 4 A.L.R. 655.
Mandamus to compel payment of salary of public officer or employee, 5 A.L.R. 572.
Mandamus to enforce performance of public duty by officer who is subject to penalty, fine, or imprisonment, 19 A.L.R. 1382.
Contempt for disobedience of mandamus, 30 A.L.R. 148.
Unconstitutionality of statute as defense to mandamus proceeding, 30 A.L.R. 378; 129 A.L.R. 941.
Unfitness as affecting right to restoration by mandamus to office from which one has been illegally removed, 36 A.L.R. 508.
Action or suit as abating mandamus proceeding or vice versa, 37 A.L.R. 1432.
Mandamus to compel institution of proceedings to oust public officer, 51 A.L.R. 561.
Remedy by mandamus of creditor against officer who fails to levy under execution, 57 A.L.R. 836.
Mandamus to compel collection of taxes, 58 A.L.R. 117.
Enforceability by mandamus of right to inspect public records, 60 A.L.R. 1356; 169 A.L.R. 653.
Mandamus to compel general course of conduct or performance of continuing duty or series of acts, 64 A.L.R. 975.
Power, right, or duty of a court of equity to supervise or direct performance of duties of tax assessors, 78 A.L.R. 693.
Mandamus to compel consideration, acceptance, or rejection of bids for public contract, 80 A.L.R. 1382.
Mandamus to compel appropriation for payment of salary of public officer or employee, 81 A.L.R. 1253.
Mandamus as proper remedy to compel service by public utility, 83 A.L.R. 947.
Mandamus to put one in possession of office title to which is in dispute, 84 A.L.R. 1114; 136 A.L.R. 1340.
Sufficiency of allegations as regards omitted or underassessed property in petition for mandamus to compel assessment, 85 A.L.R. 1315.
Right of several having similar interests to join as relators in mandamus proceeding, 87 A.L.R. 528.
Mandamus to compel court or official to approve bond proffered in legal proceedings, 92 A.L.R. 1211.
Mandamus as a proper remedy for return of a tax illegally or erroneously exacted, 93 A.L.R. 585.
Mandamus to compel delivery of papers and records to private corporation, 93 A.L.R. 1061.
Mandamus to restore license as proper remedy where professional license has been wrongfully revoked, 95 A.L.R. 1424.
Mandamus to compel payment of state, county, municipal, or quasi municipal corporation warrant, 98 A.L.R. 442.
Right to and necessity of amendment of alternative writ of mandamus to conform to peremptory writ, 100 A.L.R. 404.
Change of incumbent of office or of personnel of board or other official body as affecting mandamus proceeding previously commenced, 102 A.L.R. 943.
Mandamus to governor, 105 A.L.R. 1124.
Determination of canvassing boards or election officials as regards counting or exclusion of ballots as subject of review by mandamus, 107 A.L.R. 618.
Court's control over mandamus as means of avoiding the enforcement of strict legal right to the detriment of the public, 113 A.L.R. 209.
Public officer or board as proper relator in mandamus proceeding to enforce duty owed primarily to individual or to other political unit or public authority, 113 A.L.R. 589.
Right to an alias writ of mandamus where a peremptory writ previously granted has been disobeyed wholly or in part, 114 A.L.R. 1286.
Mandamus as taxpayer's remedy in respect of valuation of property for taxation, 131 A.L.R. 360.
Mandamus to members or officer of Legislature, 136 A.L.R. 677.
Judicial review of decision upon application for license to practice within state by physician or surgeon from another state or country, 136 A.L.R. 742.
Mandamus to put one in possession of office title to which is in dispute, 136 A.L.R. 1340.
Mandamus to compel reinstatement of suspended or expelled members of labor union, 141 A.L.R. 617.
Right to mandamus as affected by loss of other remedy, 145 A.L.R. 1044.
Right of writ of mandamus as affected by a pending action or proceeding, or existence of injunction, to which relator is not a party, 148 A.L.R. 210.
Right to go behind money judgment against public body in a mandamus proceeding to enforce it, 155 A.L.R. 464.
Mandamus as subject to statute of limitations, 155 A.L.R. 1144.
Discretion of appellate court to refuse exercise of its original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, 165 A.L.R. 1431.
Legislature's express denial of right of appeal as affecting right to review on the merits by certiorari or mandamus, 174 A.L.R. 194.
Suspension or expulsion from social club or similar society and the remedies therefor, 20 A.L.R.2d 344.
Suspension or expulsion from professional association and the remedies therefor, 20 A.L.R.2d 531.
Mandamus to compel judge or other officer to grant accused bail or to accept proffered sureties, 23 A.L.R.2d 803.
Remedies to compel municipal officials to enforce zoning regulations, 35 A.L.R.2d 1135.
Mandamus or prohibition as remedy to enforce right to jury trial, 41 A.L.R.2d 780.
Mandamus as remedy to compel assertedly disqualified judge to recuse self or to certify his disqualification, 45 A.L.R.2d 937; 56 A.L.R. Fed. 494.
Allowance of damages to successful plaintiff or relator in mandamus, 73 A.L.R.2d 903, 34 A.L.R.4th 457.
Availability of mandamus or prohibition to review order of reference to master or auditor, 76 A.L.R.2d 1120.
Stay or supersedeas on appellate review in mandamus proceeding, 88 A.L.R.2d 420.
Compelling admission to membership in professional association or society, 89 A.L.R.2d 964.
Mandamus to compel ascertainment of compensation for property taken or for injuries inflicted under the power of eminent domain, 91 A.L.R.2d 991.
Prohibition or mandamus as appropriate remedy to review ruling on change of venue in civil case, 93 A.L.R.2d 802.
Availability of mandamus or prohibition to compel or to prevent discovery proceedings, 95 A.L.R.2d 1229.
Judgment granting or denying writ of mandamus or prohibition as res judicata, 21 A.L.R.3d 206.
Mandamus to compel disciplinary investigation or action against physician or attorney, 33 A.L.R.3d 1429.
Mandamus to compel zoning officials to cancel permit granted in violation of zoning regulation, 68 A.L.R.3d 166.
Mandamus as remedy to compel disqualification of federal judge, 56 A.L.R. Fed. 494.