Ordinarily, when one renders service or transfers property which is valuable to another, which the latter accepts, a promise is implied to pay the reasonable value thereof. However, this presumption does not usually arise in cases between very near relatives.
(Civil Code 1895, § 4936; Civil Code 1910, § 5513; Code 1933, § 3-107.)
Law reviews.- For article discussing quantum meruit actions by attorneys against clients, see 16 Ga. St. B.J. 150 (1980). For note, the voluntary-payment doctrine in Georgia, see 16 Ga. L. Rev. 893 (1982). For comment on Cooper v. Cooper, 59 Ga. App. 832, 2 S.E.2d 145 (1939), see 2 Ga. B.J. 41 (1939). For comment advocating liberal construction of indefinite employment contract, in light of Gray v. Aiken, 205 Ga. 649, 54 S.E.2d 587 (1949), see 1 Mercer L. Rev. 304 (1950).
JUDICIAL DECISIONSANALYSIS
To recover in quantum meruit, the plaintiff must show that compensation has not already been received by plaintiff for the reasonable value of the goods or services conferred on the defendant. Nelson & Hill, P.A. v. Wood, 245 Ga. App. 60, 537 S.E.2d 670 (2000).
Requirement of value.
- Obligation under quantum meruit arose when work had value to the recipient; the estate beneficiary agreed to reimburse the tenant for improvements done to a house by the tenant, but the estate and not the beneficiary owned the house; the beneficiary did not receive a benefit worth the total value of the improvements, and judgment against the beneficiary for that total was improper. Langford v. Robinson, 272 Ga. App. 376, 612 S.E.2d 552 (2005).
Quantum meruit may be sought for breach of written contract.
- If there exists a written contract which is broken, one of the remedies for the breach is quantum meruit, that is, in treating the contract as rescinded. Gilbert v. Powell, 165 Ga. App. 504, 301 S.E.2d 683 (1983).
Recovery under a quantum meruit theory.
- Peanut company was entitled to payment from a cooperative bank under a quantum meruit theory because the bank directed the company to receive, process, and shell peanuts, and the company's efforts were valuable to the bank. Farm Credit of Northwest Fla., ACA v. Easom Peanut Co., 312 Ga. App. 374, 718 S.E.2d 590 (2011), cert. denied, No. S12C0444, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 315 (Ga. 2012).
No benefit conferred.- Debtor failed to allege facts to show a valuable benefit conferred on a property owner through the debtor's settlement agreement with other entities and, thus, the debtor's claim for quantum meruit and unjust enrichment failed. Rohrig Invs., LP v. Knuckle P'ship, LLLP (In re Rohrig Invs., LP), 584 Bankr. 382 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2018).
No error in instructions.
- Trial court did not err in giving a charge based on O.C.G.A. § 9-2-7 since the issue of implied contract was before the jury. Kent v. Brown, 238 Ga. App. 607, 518 S.E.2d 737 (1999).
Cited in Rustin v. Norman, 25 Ga. App. 342, 103 S.E. 194 (1920); Deas v. Jeffcoat, 29 Ga. App. 791, 116 S.E. 546 (1923); Upchurch v. Maynard, 39 Ga. App. 332, 147 S.E. 139 (1929); Strahley v. Hendricks, 40 Ga. App. 571, 150 S.E. 561 (1929); Henry Darling, Inc. v. Harvey-Given Co., 40 Ga. App. 771, 151 S.E. 518 (1930); Georgia, F. & A.R.R. v. Purviance, 42 Ga. App. 519, 156 S.E. 731 (1931); Watts v. Rich, 49 Ga. App. 334, 175 S.E. 417 (1934); Brooks v. Sims, 54 Ga. App. 71, 187 S.E. 254 (1936); Deutsch v. Haas, 55 Ga. App. 467, 190 S.E. 637 (1937); Evans v. Hartley, 57 Ga. App. 598, 196 S.E. 273 (1938); McIntire v. McQuade, 63 Ga. App. 116, 10 S.E.2d 233 (1940); Walden v. Walden, 191 Ga. 182, 12 S.E.2d 345 (1940); Hendrix v. Crosby, 76 Ga. App. 191, 45 S.E.2d 448 (1947); Neal v. Stapleton, 203 Ga. 236, 46 S.E.2d 130 (1948); Larkins v. Boyd, 205 Ga. 69, 52 S.E.2d 307 (1949); Lawson v. O'Kelley, 81 Ga. App. 883, 60 S.E.2d 380 (1950); Thomas v. Lomax, 82 Ga. App. 592, 61 S.E.2d 790 (1950); Rhyne v. Price, 82 Ga. App. 691, 62 S.E.2d 420 (1950); Guyton v. Young, 84 Ga. App. 155, 65 S.E.2d 858 (1951); Sykes v. Collins, 208 Ga. 333, 66 S.E.2d 717 (1951); Abernathy v. Putnam, 85 Ga. App. 644, 69 S.E.2d 896 (1952); Iteld v. Karp, 85 Ga. App. 835, 70 S.E.2d 378 (1952); Sheriff v. Weimer, 88 Ga. App. 80, 76 S.E.2d 33 (1953); Wyatt v. Murray, 90 Ga. App. 138, 82 S.E.2d 159 (1954); Parker & Co. v. Glenn, 90 Ga. App. 500, 83 S.E.2d 263 (1954); Thomas McDonald & Co. v. Elliott, 92 Ga. App. 409, 88 S.E.2d 440 (1955); Stokes & Co. v. McCoy, 212 Ga. 78, 90 S.E.2d 404 (1955); City of Summerville v. Sellers, 94 Ga. App. 152, 94 S.E.2d 69 (1956); Peachtree Rd. Realty Assoc. v. Woolard, 97 Ga. App. 455, 103 S.E.2d 442 (1958); Johnson v. Higgins-McArthur Co., 99 Ga. App. 260, 108 S.E.2d 299 (1959); Tyson v. Nimick, 99 Ga. App. 722, 109 S.E.2d 627 (1959); R.P. Farnsworth & Co. v. Tri-State Constr. Co., 271 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1959); Planters Rural Tel. Coop. v. Chance, 105 Ga. App. 270, 124 S.E.2d 300 (1962); Farmers Whse. of Pelham, Inc. v. Collins, 220 Ga. 141, 137 S.E.2d 619 (1964); Winn v. National Bank, 110 Ga. App. 133, 138 S.E.2d 89 (1964); McLaughlin v. Farmers Gin Co., 111 Ga. App. 89, 140 S.E.2d 492 (1965); Georgia Realty & Ins. Co. v. Oakland Consol. of Ga., Inc., 113 Ga. App. 231, 148 S.E.2d 53 (1966); Parks v. Brissey, 114 Ga. App. 563, 151 S.E.2d 896 (1966); MacLeod v. Belvedale, Inc., 115 Ga. App. 444, 154 S.E.2d 756 (1967); Goodman v. Friedman, 117 Ga. App. 475, 161 S.E.2d 71 (1968); Smallwood v. Conner, 118 Ga. App. 59, 162 S.E.2d 747 (1968); Perlis v. Horne, 118 Ga. App. 511, 164 S.E.2d 281 (1968); Apollo Homes, Inc. v. Knowles, 119 Ga. App. 239, 166 S.E.2d 644 (1969); Gardner v. Tarpley, 120 Ga. App. 192, 169 S.E.2d 690 (1969); Cochran v. Cheney, 121 Ga. App. 449, 174 S.E.2d 234 (1970); Zappa v. Ewing, 122 Ga. App. 664, 178 S.E.2d 338 (1970); Security Dev. & Inv. Co. v. Ben O'Callaghan Co., 125 Ga. App. 526, 188 S.E.2d 238 (1972); Creative Serv., Inc. v. Spears Constr. Co., 130 Ga. App. 145, 202 S.E.2d 581 (1973); Ronfra Dev. Corp. v. Pennington, 131 Ga. App. 195, 205 S.E.2d 448 (1974); Redman Dev. Corp. v. Pollard, 131 Ga. App. 708, 206 S.E.2d 605 (1974); Walker v. Joanna M. Knox & Assocs., 132 Ga. App. 12, 207 S.E.2d 570 (1974); Bank Bldg. & Equip. Corp. v. Georgia State Bank, 132 Ga. App. 762, 209 S.E.2d 82 (1974); Hampton v. Taylor, 233 Ga. 63, 209 S.E.2d 634 (1974); Howard Sheppard, Inc. v. McGowan, 137 Ga. App. 408, 224 S.E.2d 65 (1976); McRae v. Britton, 144 Ga. App. 340, 240 S.E.2d 904 (1977); McDonald v. Welding Specialty, Inc., 144 Ga. App. 303, 241 S.E.2d 18 (1977); Sharp-Boylston Co. v. Lundeen, 145 Ga. App. 672, 244 S.E.2d 622 (1978); Gayle v. Greco, 150 Ga. App. 651, 258 S.E.2d 301 (1979); Booth v. Watson, 153 Ga. App. 672, 266 S.E.2d 326 (1980); Gage v. Tiffin Motor Homes, Inc., 153 Ga. App. 704, 266 S.E.2d 345 (1980); Rothstein v. Mirvis & Fox, Inc., 155 Ga. App. 79, 270 S.E.2d 301 (1980); Krofft Dev. Corp. v. Quo Modo, Inc., 158 Ga. App. 403, 280 S.E.2d 368 (1981); Redman Indus., Inc. v. Tower Properties, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 144 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Brookhaven Landscape & Grading Co. v. J.F. Barton Contracting Co., 676 F.2d 516 (11th Cir. 1982); Maher v. Associated Video, Inc., 167 Ga. App. 763, 307 S.E.2d 545 (1983); Boddy Enters., Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 171 Ga. App. 551, 320 S.E.2d 374 (1984); Dauer v. Flight Int'l, Inc., 174 Ga. App. 879, 332 S.E.2d 28 (1985); Allen v. T.A. Communications, Inc., 181 Ga. App. 726, 353 S.E.2d 569 (1987); Staggs v. Wang, 185 Ga. App. 310, 363 S.E.2d 808 (1987); Pharr v. Olin Corp., 715 F. Supp. 1569 (N.D. Ga. 1989); Georgia Tile Distrib., Inc. v. Zumpano Enter., Inc., 205 Ga. App. 487, 422 S.E.2d 906 (1992); Akin v. PAFEC Ltd., 991 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1993); Owens v. Landscape Perfections, Inc., 215 Ga. App. 642, 451 S.E.2d 495 (1994); Atlanta Apt. Inv., Inc. v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 220 Ga. App. 595, 469 S.E.2d 831 (1996); Watson v. Sierra Contracting Corp., 226 Ga. App. 21, 485 S.E.2d 563 (1997); Yoh v. Daniel, 230 Ga. App. 640, 497 S.E.2d 392 (1998); O'Neal v. Home Town Bank, 237 Ga. App. 325, 514 S.E.2d 669 (1999); Scott v. Mamari Corp., 242 Ga. App. 455, 530 S.E.2d 208 (2000); B&R Realty, Inc. v. Carroll, 245 Ga. App. 44, 537 S.E.2d 183 (2000); Hobby v. Smith, 250 Ga. App. 669, 550 S.E.2d 718 (2001); Iraola & CIA., S.A. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 325 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 2003); Imex Int'l v. Wires Eng'g, 261 Ga. App. 329, 583 S.E.2d 117 (2003); McCondichie v. Groover, 261 Ga. App. 784, 584 S.E.2d 57 (2003); Ekokotu v. Fed. Express Corp., 408 Fed. Appx. 331 (11th Cir. 2011)(Unpublished).
Implied Promises, Generally
Substance of this section is a fundamental principle in determining liability under implied contract. Delta Corp. v. Knight, 109 Ga. App. 3, 135 S.E.2d 56 (1964).
Express agreement denounced by law cannot be made legal and binding as implied contract, by merely praying for recovery on quantum meruit of portion of amount expressly agreed upon. Sapp v. Davids, 176 Ga. 265, 168 S.E. 62 (1933).
No recovery was permitted for a subcontractor in quantum meruit under O.C.G.A. § 9-2-7 as the express subcontract violated public policy and a subcontractor's lien under O.C.G.A. §§ 44-14-361.1 and44-14-367 could not be filed. Although a subcontractor claimed to have been regularly connected to a Georgia-licensed electrician in order to comply with O.C.G.A. § 43-14-8(f), evidence indicated that the Georgia-licensed electrician simply applied for necessary project permits and did not inspect the electrical work performed or that the work complied with the applicable codes. If an express contract is found to be void as a violation of public policy, an implied contract will not be found to have existed for the same reason. JR Construction/Electric, LLC v. Ordner Constr. Co., 294 Ga. App. 453, 669 S.E.2d 224 (2008).
Absent express contract for payment of services, implied contract may arise by which person to whom services are rendered shall pay for them, when from all the facts and circumstances it can reasonably be inferred that it is in the contemplation of the parties that the services are to be paid for. Fortner v. McCorkle, 78 Ga. App. 76, 50 S.E.2d 250 (1948).
Service performed with knowledge.
- When one performs for another, with the other's knowledge, a useful service of a character that is usually charged for, and the latter expresses no dissent or avails oneself of the service, a promise to pay the reasonable value of the service is implied. Mitcham v. Singleton, 50 Ga. App. 457, 178 S.E. 465 (1935).
Presumption of promise to pay.
- When one renders beneficial services for another the law ordinarily presumes a request and promise to pay what such services are reasonably worth, unless they services were rendered under circumstances which repel this presumption. Brightwell v. Oglethorpe Tel. Co., 47 Ga. App. 521, 171 S.E. 162 (1933).
When one renders services valuable to another which the latter accepts, a promise is implied to pay the reasonable value thereof, and an action of this type is one upon quantum meruit. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. McNatt, 141 Ga. App. 6, 232 S.E.2d 356 (1977).
When duty to pay where person is without knowledge of services.
- When one without knowledge neither authorizes, consents to, nor ratifies another's labor or permanent improvements to property, there is no duty imposed upon the one so benefited to make restitution. The reason is that in the absence of knowledge or authorization it would be unduly harsh to require the recipient's return of the value of goods and services when the goods or services cannot themselves be returned. Beavers v. Weatherly, 250 Ga. 546, 299 S.E.2d 730 (1983); Ginsberg v. Termotto, 175 Ga. App. 265, 333 S.E.2d 120 (1985); Grady Tractor Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 213 Ga. App. 663, 446 S.E.2d 228 (1994).
Presumption to pay is rebuttable.
- Presumption of law that the person enjoying the benefit of services is bound to pay for the servicesis subject to rebuttal by proof either that the services were intended to be gratuitous or by particular circumstances from which the law would raise the counterpresumption that the services were not intended to be a charge against the party benefited thereby. Smith Dev., Inc. v. Flood, 198 Ga. App. 817, 403 S.E.2d 249 (1991).
Quantum meruit lies ordinarily when one renders services valuable to another which the latter accepts, raising the implication of a promise to pay the reasonable value thereof. Griner v. Foskey, 158 Ga. App. 769, 282 S.E.2d 150 (1981).
There can be no recovery on quantum meruit when action based on express contract. Stowers v. Hall, 159 Ga. App. 501, 283 S.E.2d 714 (1981).
In a dispute between a concert booking agent and concert venue owners, the parties' contract covered services rendered by the agent in a given year regardless of when the concerts took place; therefore, the agent's work on the 2013 season until the agreement was terminated in August 2012 was covered by the agreement and could not support a claim for quantum meruit under O.C.G.A. § 9-2-7. Lucas Entm't Grp., LLC v. Robert W. Woodruff Arts Ctr., Inc., F.3d (11th Cir. Dec. 1, 2017)(Unpublished).
Express promise subsequent to rendition of services is evidence of an implied promise. Neal & Son v. Stanley, 17 Ga. App. 502, 87 S.E. 718 (1916).
No recovery can be had for services rendered voluntarily and with no expectation at the time of the rendition that they will be compensated. Brightwell v. Oglethorpe Tel. Co., 47 Ga. App. 621, 171 S.E. 162 (1933).
Recovery on quantum meruit may not be obtained when services are rendered with no anticipation that compensation is to be received. Pembroke Steel Co. v. Technical Sales Assocs., 138 Ga. App. 744, 227 S.E.2d 491 (1976).
Services rendered for love and affection.
- When a person renders valuable services to another, which the latter accepts, a contract to pay therefor is implied in law, unless from the facts and circumstances, including the nature of the services and relationship between the parties, it appears that the services were rendered out of consideration of love and affection or otherwise rendered gratuitously. Cooper v. Cooper, 59 Ga. App. 832, 2 S.E.2d 145 (1939).
In an action by decedent's estate to recover costs and other damages associated with building a house for the defendant in which the estate claimed that the decedent acted as general contractor and that the defendant wrongfully refused to pay for decedent's services, the defendant should have had the right to present evidence of a relationship with the decedent in order to support defendant's contention that the decedent provided the services gratuitously. Broughton v. Johnson, 247 Ga. App. 819, 545 S.E.2d 370 (2001).
Law will not imply promise to pay for services contrary to intention of parties. Brightwell v. Oglethorpe Tel. Co., 47 Ga. App. 621, 171 S.E. 162 (1933).
Criteria for determining if services were meant to be paid for.
- In determining that in the contemplation of the parties personal services are to be paid for, the degree of relationship between the parties, the nature of the services, statements made by the person to whom the services are rendered of appreciation of the services and an intention to pay therefor (although not necessarily communicated to the person rendering the services), the fact that the person to whom the services are rendered is financially able to pay therefor, and other facts and circumstances concerning the performance of the services, may be considered as authorizing the inference that it is in the contemplation of the parties that the services are to be paid for. Humphries v. Miller, 66 Ga. App. 871, 19 S.E.2d 321 (1942).
In determining that in the contemplation of the parties, services are to be paid for, the degree of relationship between the parties, the nature of the services, including the fact that their performance is very disagreeable and obnoxious to the person performing them, that they are such as to indicate the relation of master and servant or employer and employee between the parties, and such that the person performing them would not naturally do so without compensation and would not perform them solely for love and affection, and statements made by the person to whom the services are rendered of appreciation of the services and an intention to pay therefor, although not necessarily communicated to the person rendering the services, and the fact that the person to whom the services are rendered is financially able to pay therefor, and other facts and circumstances concerning the performance of the services, may be considered as authorizing the inference that it is in the contemplation of the parties that the services are to be paid for. Fortner v. McCorkle, 78 Ga. App. 76, 50 S.E.2d 250 (1948); McRae v. Britton, 144 Ga. App. 340, 240 S.E.2d 904 (1977).
Absent express agreement, key to determination of whether one rendering services valuable to another is to be compensated therefor is whether or not the services were gratuitously rendered, either by virtue of the presumption arising from the family relationship or as a matter of fact. Guyton v. Young, 84 Ga. App. 155, 65 S.E.2d 858 (1951).
Word "value" means value to the owner rather than the cost of producing the work to the workmen. Pembroke Steel Co. v. Technical Sales Assocs., 138 Ga. App. 744, 227 S.E.2d 491 (1976).
When quantum meruit is an available remedy, the plaintiff seeks to recover the value of the work and materials furnished, but value must be defined as value to the owner, not the cost to the contractor of producing the result. Stowers v. Hall, 159 Ga. App. 501, 283 S.E.2d 714 (1981).
"Reasonable value" defined.
- "Reasonable value" which plaintiff is entitled to recover is not the value of plaintiff's labor but the value of the benefit resulting from such labor. City of Gainesville v. Edwards, 112 Ga. App. 672, 145 S.E.2d 715 (1965).
Value of services rendered in essence is exclusively matter for jury determination. Pembroke Steel Co. v. Technical Sales Assocs., 138 Ga. App. 744, 227 S.E.2d 491 (1976); Bailey v. Fox, 144 Ga. App. 195, 240 S.E.2d 737 (1977).
Jury determines value.
- In action upon quantum meruit for value of professional services, question of what is reasonable is peculiarly within the province of the jury. Marshall v. Bahnsen, 1 Ga. App. 485, 57 S.E. 1006 (1907); Griner v. Foskey, 158 Ga. App. 769, 282 S.E.2d 150 (1981).
Plaintiff must carry burden of proof of reasonable value of services rendered to and accepted by defendant to recover on a quantum meruit basis. Development Corp. v. Berndt, 131 Ga. App. 277, 205 S.E.2d 868 (1974).
Insufficient evidence of value of services.
- Trial court's post trial ruling which held that it applied an incorrect measure of damages in determining the amount of quantum meruit damages in a claim brought by a home builder and that there was insufficient evidence to determine the value of the improvements to buyers of a home was internally inconsistent, and a remand was necessary; proof of the reasonable value of services rendered to and accepted by a defendant was an element essential to recovery on a quantum meruit basis, and when there was no benefit to the recipient there was no recovery, so if the evidence was insufficient, the trial court should have ruled in favor of the buyers on the claim and not have allowed the claim to be relitigated. Diegert v. Cedarbrook Homes, Inc., 267 Ga. App. 264, 599 S.E.2d 211 (2004).
Performance of services in addition to those contracted for.
- When one contracts to render services to another and performs additional services which are not contemplated in the original agreement and which are accepted by the latter, a promise is implied to pay the reasonable value of the additional services and a recovery in quantum meruit is authorized. Smith v. Sharpe, 113 Ga. App. 838, 149 S.E.2d 830 (1966).
Even if there is an express contract, if services not contemplated by original agreement become necessary to achieve contractual objective and are rendered and accepted, the law implies and enforces performance of promise to pay for such extra services. Puritan Mills, Inc. v. Pickering Constr. Co., 152 Ga. App. 309, 262 S.E.2d 586 (1979); Fruin-Colnon Corp. v. Air Door, Inc., 157 Ga. App. 804, 278 S.E.2d 708 (1981).
When certain work was necessary for proper performance of original contract but was not provided for in original plans and specifications, and defendant as well as general contractor not only authorized the additional work directly by named officers and agents, but knowingly received the benefits thereof, an implied promise to pay the reasonable value of this work is raised by operation of law. Conway v. Housing Auth., 102 Ga. App. 333, 116 S.E.2d 331 (1960).
When owner of property procures contractor engaged in improving the property to perform work in addition to that already agreed upon, the law will imply a promise on the part of the owner to pay the reasonable cost of such additional work. Kapplin v. Seiden, 109 Ga. App. 586, 137 S.E.2d 55 (1964).
Where plaintiff was not negligent in originally performing under construction contract, subsequent corrective work would not fall within original contract and plaintiff would be entitled to compensation for reasonable value of the work. City of Macon v. Blythe Bros., 125 Ga. App. 469, 188 S.E.2d 233 (1972).
Trial court did not err by charging the jury on quantum meruit because the allegations in the contractor's complaint were sufficient to raise a claim of quantum meruit where the contractor alleged that the contractor entered into a contract to supervise the construction of improvements to the homeowners' residence but that the homeowners ordered several additional improvements and further extensive renovations to be made to the residence; that the homeowners were fully aware of any and all changes to the estimates previously provided and that the homeowners approved the changes and agreed to any and all ensuing changes to the originally agreed-upon price; and that the contractor remained uncompensated for the reasonable value of the contractor's work. One Bluff Drive, LLC v. K. A. P., Inc., 330 Ga. App. 45, 766 S.E.2d 508 (2014).
Obligation of property owners to pay for municipal improvements.
- Although special benefits may flow to property owners from municipal improvements, no special obligation arises on their part to pay therefor, except when the owners sue the city for consequential damages caused by construction of the improvement, in which case the city may set-off the enhanced value of the property against such claim. City of Hogansville v. Daniel, 52 Ga. App. 12, 182 S.E. 78 (1935).
Since there is no legal liability resting on abutting property owner to pay for public improvements or paving of street, the law will not raise an implied obligation or quasi-contract to pay the municipality for the increased value of the property, even though the municipality when making the improvements mistakenly believed it had authority to levy assessments against the property owner. City of Hogansville v. Daniel, 52 Ga. App. 12, 182 S.E. 78 (1935).
Consequential benefits arising because of public improvements will not give rise to cause of action per se in favor of the municipality or county making the improvements against an abutting property owner. City of Hogansville v. Daniel, 52 Ga. App. 12, 182 S.E. 78 (1935).
Promise insufficient to act as basis of action.- Legal theory of quantum meruit was inapplicable when no promise was made by the city to reconvey the property once the debtor had sufficient funds to pay cash in lieu of dedicating the recreation property, but rather at most, the city director of development promised that the director would recommend to the city council that it reconvey the property when the debtor offered the money. SMS Inv. Assocs. v. Peachtree City, 180 Bankr. 694 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1995).
Jury trial proper when plaintiff expected compensation.
- When, although plaintiff claimed plaintiff expected that the compensation was to be in the form of an ownership interest in the business, it is abundantly clear from the plaintiff's affidavits and deposition that plaintiff expected compensation for the service the plaintiff performed and there is no evidence that plaintiff did not expect anything for the services, the issue of the plaintiff's entitlement to compensation under the theory of quantum meruit was properly retained for jury resolution by denying the defendant's motion for summary judgment. Ghee v. Kimsey, 179 Ga. App. 446, 346 S.E.2d 888 (1986).
Broker's commission.
- O.C.G.A. §§ 9-2-7 and10-6-31 permit an action by a real estate broker who has located desired property and arranged for purchase thereof. Williamson v. Martin-Ozburn Realty Co., 19 Ga. App. 425, 91 S.E. 510 (1917); Washington v. Jordan, 28 Ga. App. 18, 109 S.E. 923 (1921).
When property placed in the hands of a broker for sale is subsequently sold by the owner, the broker is entitled to a commission if the broker was the procuring cause of the sale, even if the sale was actually consummated by the owner. Johnson v. Lipscomb-Weyman-Chapman Co., 46 Ga. App. 798, 169 S.E. 266 (1933); Erwin v. Wender, 78 Ga. App. 94, 50 S.E.2d 244 (1948).
When broker with whom property has been listed procures a prospective purchaser, and owner, with knowledge of this fact, intervenes or sells the property to customer or prospective purchaser procured by broker, inference is authorized that broker has earned a commission and can recover it from the owner. Mendenhall v. Adair Realty & Loan Co., 67 Ga. App. 154, 19 S.E.2d 740 (1942).
Petition alleging character and extent of services performed by plaintiff brokers, reasonable or ordinary charges for like services in same community, acceptance by defendant, and fact that such services were procuring cause of sale and culminated in defendant's purchase, though for a slightly larger sum than that which the defendant had authorized plaintiff to give for it, stated a cause of action for reasonable value of such services. Hendrix v. Crosby, 76 Ga. App. 191, 45 S.E.2d 448 (1947).
In order for a broker to earn a commission on account of the sale of property, the broker must either have sold it or been the procuring cause of the sale. Erwin v. Wender, 78 Ga. App. 94, 50 S.E.2d 244 (1948); Martin v. Hendrix, Waddell, Martin & Co., 140 Ga. App. 557, 231 S.E.2d 526 (1976).
Action predicated upon an implied promise to pay the reasonable value of services would arise only if plaintiff-broker had rendered valuable services to defendant-corporation which the latter accepts. Williams v. Coca-Cola Co., 158 Ga. App. 139, 279 S.E.2d 261 (1981).
O.C.G.A. § 9-2-7 did not require, in the context of a broker suing for services performed, the existence of an agency relationship. Coldwell Banker Com. Group, Inc. v. Nodvin, 598 F. Supp. 853 (N.D. Ga. 1984), aff'd, 774 F.2d 1177 (11th Cir. 1985).
Although in a suit for a broker's commission a realtor must show that the realtor either effected the sale of property or was the procuring cause of the sale, a realtor may recover in quantum meruit without showing the value of the services received by and of the benefit to the sued party. Futch v. Guthrie, 176 Ga. App. 672, 337 S.E.2d 384 (1985).
Mortgage broker who arranged for loans to a purchaser of property could not recover from the purchaser under a quantum meruit theory because a mortgage broker has no expectation of being compensated by the borrower. There was no implied promise on the part of the purchaser to pay a fee for the services of a mortgage broker since the standard practice is for a mortgage broker to look to the lender for payment. Vaswani v. Southern Mtg. & Fin. Servs. Corp., 196 Ga. App. 223, 395 S.E.2d 647 (1990).
Broker's quantum meruit claim for damages based on an amount equal to the commission calculated according to the standard agreement it sent to defendant presented prima facie proof of the value of its services, even though the jury rejected its contract claim. Ctr. Pointe Invs. v. Frank M. Darby Co., 249 Ga. App. 782, 549 S.E.2d 435 (2001).
Under Georgia law, procuring cause is a necessary element of a quantum meruit claim brought by a real estate broker; to the extent that Sharp-Boylston Co. v. Lundeen, 145 Ga. App. 672 (1978) and its progeny hold otherwise, they are overruled. Amend v. 485 Props., 280 Ga. 327, 627 S.E.2d 565 (2006).
Award of quantum meruit recovery in favor of a broker in the broker's suit against a buyer was affirmed on appeal after: (1) the broker performed as an agent and rendered valuable services to the buyer in the form of locating certain goods and components and providing contacts; (2) the services were performed at the request of the buyer; (3) it would have been unjust for the buyer to accept the services without compensating the broker; (4) the broker had an expectation of compensation at the time the broker rendered the services; and (5) no contract of employment existed as the broker and the buyer did not have a meeting of the minds as to the essential terms of employment. Litsky v. G.I. Apparel, Inc., F.3d (11th Cir. Oct. 12, 2005)(Unpublished).
Action on quantum meruit.
- Suits on quantum meruit must proceed, if at all, under this section; suit on quantum meruit is therefore suit on an implied promise to pay for the value of services rendered. Sapp v. Davids, 176 Ga. 265, 168 S.E. 62 (1933).
Action brought to recover for reasonable value of services rendered another, which the latter accepts, is an action upon quantum meruit. Johnson v. Lipscomb-Weyman-Chapman Co., 46 Ga. App. 798, 169 S.E. 266 (1933).
When either there is no specific contract or the contract agreed to is repudiated by both parties, an action sounding in quantum meruit will lie for whatever work was done and accepted. Stowers v. Hall, 159 Ga. App. 501, 283 S.E.2d 714 (1981).
Holding corporation was liable under theory of quantum meruit for its share of financial burden under an agreement entered into by its affiliate to pay a commission for arranging financing for a development project. Northwest Preferred, Ltd. v. Williams, 184 Ga. App. 145, 360 S.E.2d 910 (1987).
In a contractor's quantum meruit action, a former high school baseball coach was erroneously denied a directed verdict, as the evidence showed that although the contractor rendered a valuable service to a school by building an indoor baseball hitting facility, when the school board, and not the coach, accepted those services to create an implied promise of payment, quantum meruit payment for construction of the facility could not lie against the coach; moreover, because there was no implied agreement requiring the coach to pay for the hitting facility, the contractor's argument that the coach was liable for having received a personal benefit from the construction of the hitting facility went to the question of unjust enrichment, and not quantum meruit. Brown v. Penland Constr. Co., 281 Ga. 625, 641 S.E.2d 522 (2007).
Implied obligation under this section may be pleaded in setoff to action brought by person who was benefited. Schofield's Sons Co. v. Duggan & Jones, 33 Ga. App. 238, 125 S.E. 789 (1924).
No expectation of payment from successor corporation.
- When advertising services were performed by plaintiff for one corporation, but not for its successor corporation, plaintiff's quantum meruit claim could not survive against the successors since the plaintiff could not possibly have held an expectation of compensation from them. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment for the successor corporation on the quantum meruit claim. Artrac Corp. v. Austin Kelley Adv., Inc., 197 Ga. App. 772, 399 S.E.2d 529 (1990), cert. denied, 198 Ga. App. 897, 399 S.E.2d 529 (1991).
Implied Promises Between Relatives
How presumption of gratuitous services between relatives rebutted.
- Recovery for services between relatives might be had if express contract is shown or if surrounding circumstances indicate that it was the intention of both parties that compensation should be made and negative idea that services were performed merely because of natural sense of duty, love, and affection arising out of a relationship. Westbrook v. Saylors, 56 Ga. App. 587, 193 S.E. 371 (1937).
When one renders personal services to a very near relative who is sick and helpless, such as nursing and personal care, a presumption that the services are to be paid for does not necessarily arise in the absence of an express contract between the parties for the payment of such services, there may arise an implied contract by which the person to whom the services are rendered shall pay the other for the services, when from all the facts and circumstances it can reasonably be inferred that it is in the contemplation of the parties that the services are to be paid for. Humphries v. Miller, 66 Ga. App. 871, 19 S.E.2d 321 (1942).
Among members of family, services of one in caring for another are presumed to have been gratuitously rendered, but this presumption may be rebutted by proof of an express promise by recipient of services to pay or, at least where adults are concerned, by proof of an implied promise to pay, taking into consideration the nature of the services and the facts and circumstances under which the services were rendered. Guyton v. Young, 84 Ga. App. 155, 65 S.E.2d 858 (1951); Henry v. Hemstreet, 86 Ga. App. 863, 72 S.E.2d 801 (1952).
It is not necessary for near relative to prove an express contract in order to recover for services that ordinarily would be deemed gratuitous. Freeman v. Phillips, 135 Ga. App. 466, 218 S.E.2d 144 (1975).
Intention of near relatives that services shall be compensated will govern. Phinazee v. Bunn, 123 Ga. 230, 51 S.E. 300 (1905).
In order to recover for services rendered to a near relative, the surrounding circumstances must plainly indicate that it was the intention of both parties that compensation should be made. Freeman v. Phillips, 135 Ga. App. 466, 218 S.E.2d 144 (1975).
Question for jury.
- When facts do not plainly demand inference that services between relatives were gratuitous, the particular facts of each case should be submitted to the jury under proper instructions as to the law. Freeman v. Phillips, 135 Ga. App. 466, 218 S.E.2d 144 (1975).
Mere fact that services performed by near relative were necessary to the person for whom the services were performed and that performance of the services saved the sick relative and enhanced the value of the relative's estate were insufficient, without more, to authorize finding that it was in the contemplation of the parties that the services were to be paid for. Humphries v. Miller, 66 Ga. App. 871, 19 S.E.2d 321 (1942).
As between parents and adult child, when compensation is claimed by either against the other for services rendered, it must be determined from the particular circumstances, in absence of express contract, whether it can be reasonably inferred that pecuniary compensation was in view of parties when services were rendered. Cooper v. Van Horn, 61 Ga. App. 214, 6 S.E.2d 408 (1939).
Services rendered on behalf of parent by child, even after majority, are not a sufficient consideration to support a contract, unless the parent made an express promise to pay for such services or the surrounding circumstances plainly indicated that it was the intention of both parties that compensation should be made. Meads v. Williams, 55 Ga. App. 224, 189 S.E. 718 (1937).
When child renders services in the nature of nursing, waiting upon, and ministering to the wants and necessities of an infirm, diseased, and aged parent, there is a presumption that such services are rendered in filial duty and affection and not because of expected compensation in money or property, in the absence of any express agreement between the parties for compensation or any facts or circumstances indicating that it was intended and contemplated by both parent and child that payment should be made. Cooper v. Cooper, 59 Ga. App. 832, 2 S.E.2d 145 (1939), for comment, see 2 Ga. B.J. 41 (1939).
In order to sustain recovery by child for services in the nature of care and attention to old and infirm parent, it must affirmatively appear either that they were rendered under express contract that the child was to be paid for them, or surrounding circumstances plainly indicate that it was the intention of both parties that compensation should be made, and negative idea that the services were performed merely because of natural sense of duty, love, and affection arising out of relation. Fortner v. McCorkle, 78 Ga. App. 76, 50 S.E.2d 250 (1948).
In order to sustain a recovery by a child against a parent for services in the nature of care and attention such as are usually bestowed because of a natural sense of duty and affection arising out of the relationship, it must affirmatively appear that the services were performed under an express contract that the parent would pay for them, or the surrounding circumstances must plainly indicate that it was the intention of the parties that compensation should be paid. Freeman v. Collier, 204 Ga. 329, 50 S.E.2d 61 (1948); Fuller v. Weekes, 105 Ga. App. 790, 125 S.E.2d 662, rev'd on other grounds, 218 Ga. 515, 128 S.E.2d 715 (1962).
When services are rendered by an adult child in attending to the business of the parent in the conduct of a hotel owned by the latter due to the parent's infirmity, and when the services have a value materially in excess of the support received from the parent and thereby tend to enhance the parent's estate, the jury could find from the evidence that, considering all the circumstances, both the parent and the child contemplated that the child should receive compensation for the services rendered. Freeman v. Collier, 204 Ga. 329, 50 S.E.2d 61 (1948).
Support of parent.
- When child broke up child's home and lived with the child's parent upon express promise by the latter to will the child the parent's home place if the child would care for the parent during the parent's life, and the child fulfilled the child's agreement but the parent did not, action upon an implied promise will lie in the child's favor. Hudson v. Hudson, 87 Ga. 678, 13 S.E. 583, 27 Am. St. R. 270 (1891).
Claim for offset against amount due on note on grounds that maker had cared for and supported payee, the maker's parent, for 35 months, was invalid, in that it failed to allege any express contract by the parent to pay for such services or any facts tending to show that the parent came under any legal obligation to pay for such services. Greenwood v. Greenwood, 44 Ga. App. 847, 163 S.E. 317 (1932).
In order for recovery by parent to be authorized against child for services and necessities, it must affirmatively appear by express contract that the child was to be paid for them or circumstances plainly indicate that it was intention of both the child and the parent that compensation should be made, and negative idea that services were performed and necessities furnished merely because of the natural sense of duty, love, and affection which arises out of relationship existing between the child and parent. Morris v. Bruce, 98 Ga. App. 821, 107 S.E.2d 262 (1959).
Care and burial of sister.
- When there is no express contract or agreement and no facts or circumstances which would authorize an inference that the parties contemplated that services would be paid for, no reimbursement would be allowed for expenses incurred for care, supervision, and burial of the sister because presumption of implied promise to pay usually does not arise between very near relatives. Lovin v. Poss, 240 Ga. 848, 242 S.E.2d 609 (1978).
Services rendered to uncle.
- In claim for services rendered, on a quantum meruit basis, when plaintiff and the plaintiff's family kept and cared for the intestate, plaintiff's uncle, for a period of approximately eight years with the understanding that they would be compensated for their services after the uncle's death in view of the age and physical infirmities of the intestate during the last four years of the uncle's life (claim for services prior thereto being barred by the statute of limitations), the evidence amply authorized the finding that the uncle's lodging, board, washing of the uncle's wearing apparel and bedclothing, and nursing and caring for the uncle were worth $50.00 a month without interest. Westbrook v. Saylors, 56 Ga. App. 587, 193 S.E. 371 (1937).
It is for jury to say what circumstances are sufficient to support usual implication of promise to pay for the services, or to repel counterinference that their performance was prompted by affection and that they were rendered without expectation of payment therefor. Freeman v. Phillips, 135 Ga. App. 466, 218 S.E.2d 144 (1975).
Advancement made to individual by brother of his dead wife, voluntarily and without a request from the husband, is inferably a gift, and as a matter of law no implied promise arose to repay the money advanced. But when the advancement is made at the request of the husband, either express or implied, an implied promise by the husband to repay is inferable. Lovett v. Allen, 34 Ga. App. 385, 129 S.E. 897 (1925).
Services rendered to spouse.
- There was no evidence to support an award of damages in quantum meruit against a husband in a wife's action alleging that the husband's father breached an oral agreement to deed a parcel of property to the wife and the husband because there was no present benefit to the husband since the husband did not own the property or any interest in the property; there was no evidence that there was ever any expectation by either party that the wife would be compensated by the husband for the wife's contributions to their businesses while they were a married couple. Wallin v. Wallin, 316 Ga. App. 455, 729 S.E.2d 567 (2012).
Money Had and Received
For brief history of action for money had and received, see Jasper School Dist. v. Gormley, 184 Ga. 756, 193 S.E. 248 (1937).
Origin of action in common-law courts.
- Action in assumpsit for money had and received is an action at law because of its origin as a mode of action in the common-law courts. Sheehan v. City Council, 71 Ga. App. 233, 30 S.E.2d 502 (1944).
Action for money had and received is founded upon equitable principle that no one ought unjustly to enrich oneself at the expense of another, and is maintainable in all cases where one has received money under such circumstances that in equity and good conscience one ought not to retain, and ex aequo et bono it belongs to another. King v. Forman, 71 Ga. App. 75, 30 S.E.2d 214 (1944); Sheehan v. City Council, 71 Ga. App. 233, 30 S.E.2d 502 (1944); Brackett v. Fulton Nat'l Bank, 80 Ga. App. 467, 56 S.E.2d 486 (1949).
Gist of action for money had and received lies in retention by defendant of money of plaintiff which, in equity and good conscience, the defendant has no right to retain. Manry v. Williams Mfg. Co., 45 Ga. App. 833, 166 S.E. 222 (1932).
Action of assumpsit for money had and received will not lie unless it is shown that the money or its equivalent was actually received by defendant or the defendant's agent. King v. Forman, 71 Ga. App. 75, 30 S.E.2d 214 (1944).
Fact that mistake in making excess payments occurs through some negligence of the complaining party does not avoid the duty of the party receiving the money or goods to return them unless the negligence amounts to a breach of some legal duty. Department of Pub. Health v. Perry, 123 Ga. App. 816, 182 S.E.2d 493 (1971).
State has right to recover money paid out through mistake under the time-honored and well recognized principle that one may not retain money or goods which have come into one's hands through mistake and which one is not, in good conscience, entitled to retain. Department of Pub. Health v. Perry, 123 Ga. App. 816, 182 S.E.2d 493 (1971).
Since a purported written contract was void for vagueness, plaintiff was entitled to recover the money deposited under the invalid agreement, that never ripened into a valid contract, on the basis of money had and received or unjust enrichment. Cochran v. Ogletree, 244 Ga. App. 537, 536 S.E.2d 194 (2000).
This section cannot operate as a partial assignment of contract in favor of a third person who has supplied part of the material contracted for. Meager v. Linder Lumber Co., 1 Ga. App. 426, 57 S.E. 1004 (1907).
No benefit of bargain from illegal contracts.
- Although an agreement which an investor concluded with a person who was employed by a company that offered to sell stock to its employees during an initial public offering, wherein the employee offered to purchase stock in the employee's own name for the investor, was illegal, and the investor was not entitled to profits the investor lost because the employee did not buy the stock, the investor was only entitled to a return of money the investor gave the employee to buy the stock. McCondichie v. Groover, 261 Ga. App. 784, 584 S.E.2d 57 (2003).
Application
Right to equipment.
- When there was proof that a city equipped a hotel's kitchen at a cost of $400,000, this evidence, and the absence of proof that the equipment was removed from the kitchen before a purchaser took possession of the premises, raised genuine issues of material fact as to the city's right to recover in quantum meruit for whatever equipment remained, and the trial court erred in granting the purchaser's motion for summary judgment. City of College Park v. Sheraton Savannah Corp., 235 Ga. App. 561, 509 S.E.2d 371 (1998).
Limited liability companies.
- When a limited liability company member owned the property where a construction project was started, signed a personal guaranty for the work done under the contract that all parties anticipated was to have been signed, and attended meetings at which progress on the project was discussed, the member's claim that the member did not know that the builder was working on the member's property, despite the member having promised to pay, did not create a fact issue; thus, summary judgment against the member on the builder's quantum meruit claim was proper. Marett v. Brice Bldg. Co., 268 Ga. App. 778, 603 S.E.2d 40 (2004).
Marine salvage.
- Plaintiff may bring in an personam claim for quantum meruit in Georgia's state courts based on events that could also support a claim in federal admiralty court for marine salvage; while a salvage bounty cannot be awarded, the jury may consider the peril involved and the value of the property saved in determining the value of the service the boat owner received. Phillips v. Sea Tow/Sea Spill, 276 Ga. 352, 578 S.E.2d 846 (2003).
Real estate agents.
- Real estate agent failed to establish the reasonable value of the agent's services in referring clients to the agent's former paramour, who was also a real estate agent, the agent could not recover referral fees under the theory of unjust enrichment once the parties romantic relationship ended. Folds v. Barber, 278 Ga. 37, 597 S.E.2d 409 (2004).
Plaintiff debtor-in-possession properly stated a claim for unjust enrichment because the plaintiff alleged that a debtor transferred a benefit to defendant (or that defendant took a benefit from the debtor) without a contract, compensation, or consideration, and that defendant, under equitable principles, ought to return that benefit to the debtor. MC Asset Recovery, LLC v. Southern Co., F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Dec. 11, 2006).
Failed investments in sporting event parties.
- Professional basketball player was not liable to inexperienced businessmen who invested and lost money by hosting sports event-related parties based on an oral agreement with two men claiming to act as the player's agents. The businessmen's claim for unjust enrichment under O.C.G.A. § 9-2-7 was unsuccessful because there was no evidence that money was transferred into the player's accounts, and a failed investment was not a cognizable basis for relief in quantum meruit. J'Carpc, LLC v. Wilkins, 545 F. Supp. 2d 1330 (N.D. Ga. 2008).
Attorney's fees.
- Allegations that defendant hired plaintiff as attorney at law, that plaintiff performed certain enumerated services as such attorney, which services were accepted by defendant, that such services were of a stated reasonable value and defendant refused to pay therefor, and that, as a result of plaintiff's efforts and services which were accepted by defendant, it had become enriched in a stated sum, were sufficient to state a cause of action for quantum meruit and unjust enrichment. Sellers v. City of Summerville, 88 Ga. App. 109, 76 S.E.2d 99 (1953), later appeal, 91 Ga. App. 105, 85 S.E.2d 56 (1954), 94 Ga. App. 152, 94 S.E.2d 69 (1956).
Recovery of attorney's fees on quantum meruit basis was permitted only when no fee had been agreed upon, or when the attorney cannot render the balance of the agreed service due to any of the contingencies provided in former Code 1933, § 9-611 (see now O.C.G.A. § 15-19-11). Dickey v. Mingledorff, 110 Ga. App. 454, 138 S.E.2d 735 (1964).
When there is no special contract between the parties, the attorney may recover on quantum meruit for the reasonable value of the services rendered. Griner v. Foskey, 158 Ga. App. 769, 282 S.E.2d 150 (1981).
In an action for attorney fees it does not follow, if there were more parties than one on a side, and the attorney was employed by only one, and the others had knowledge that the attorney was representing the whole case, and the services were for their benefit, and accepted by them, that to avoid liability it was their duty to have notified the attorney that they would not be liable. Griner v. Foskey, 158 Ga. App. 769, 282 S.E.2d 150 (1981).
Even though an attorney was entitled to recover the reasonable value of the attorney's services under quantum meruit, it was error to grant the attorney summary judgment as to a sum certain because issues of material fact remained as to whether all of the services were of benefit and value to the client. Sosebee v. McCrimmon, 228 Ga. App. 705, 492 S.E.2d 584 (1997).
Insufficient evidence of representation to pay more for medical services.
- Insurance company and the corporation were entitled to summary judgment on the burn center's quantum meruit claim because the burn center failed to substantiate how or why the medical services the center provided to the corporation's employee were beneficial or valuable to the corporation or the insurance company and the center never specifically identified what it was alleging the insurance company and the corporation received when the center provided medical services to the corporation's employee. Further, there was nothing in the language of Mississippi's Workers' Compensation Medical Fee Schedule, Miss. Code Ann. § 71-3-15, to indicate that the rate of reimbursement for out-of-state services was contingent upon whether a foreign state's medical fee schedule would apply in that foreign state, and so, to the extent the insurance company benefited from the discharge of a statutory obligation under Mississippi law, the undisputed evidence showed that it already paid the reasonable value for the burn center's services; therefore, there was no evidence in the record demonstrating that the insurance company or the corporation ever made any representation that they would be willing to pay anything more than what was required of them by Georgia or Mississippi workers' compensation law. Joseph M. Still Burn Ctrs., Inc. v. AmFed Nat'l Ins. Co., 702 F. Supp. 2d 1371 (S.D. Ga. 2010).
Claim against state agency barred by sovereign immunity.
- Computer contractor that had an unsigned copy of an agreement and an invoice for services rendered failed to show that the contractor had a signed agreement with a state agency for purposes of the state's waiver of immunity under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX(c). The contractor's claims for unjust enrichment were also barred by sovereign immunity. Ga. Dep't of Cmty. Health v. Data Inquiry, LLC, 313 Ga. App. 683, 722 S.E.2d 403 (2012).
Ultra vires contract not enforceable under quantum meruit theory of recovery against city.
- Appellate court erred by holding that an environmental engineering company could recover against a city on the company's quantum meruit claim because quantum meruit was not an available remedy against the city since the claim was based on a municipal contract that was ultra vires as the contract was never approved by city council. City of Baldwin v. Woodard & Curran, Inc., 293 Ga. 19, 743 S.E.2d 381 (2013).
Clear that services were requested or knowingly accepted.
- Trial court erred by granting summary judgment to the defendants on the part owner's claim for quantum meruit and unjust enrichment because it was clear that the part owner provided services that benefitted the defendants and were either requested or knowingly accepted. Bedsole v. Action Outdoor Adver. JV, LLC, 325 Ga. App. 194, 750 S.E.2d 445 (2013).
Dismissal of the claim for quantum meruit was reversed because even if the stylists's wig designs lacked legal novelty, quantum meruit provided an avenue of recovery for the provision of the services rendered in designing and producing the wigs regardless of the novelty of the designs themselves. Davidson v. Maraj, F.3d (11th Cir. Apr. 24, 2015)(Unpublished).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d.
- 17A Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts, § 368 et seq. 66 Am. Jur. 2d, Restitution and Implied Contracts, §§ 2 et seq., 37 et seq., 48.
21B Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Restitution and Implied Contracts, § 2.
C.J.S.- 17 C.J.S., Contracts, §§ 6, 688.
ALR.
- Action on implied contract arising out of fraud as within statutes of limitation applicable to fraud, 3 A.L.R. 1603.
Right of real estate broker to commissions where he was unable to procure an offer of the owner's price from one whom he interested, and who subsequently, without his intervention, purchased at that price, 9 A.L.R. 1194.
Liability of husband for services rendered by wife in carrying on his business, 23 A.L.R. 18.
Presumption as to gratuitous character of services of relative in caring for children of one not of same household, 24 A.L.R. 962.
Implied contract to reimburse one for expense of trip taken at request of relative, 24 A.L.R. 973.
Liability for or on account of services rendered under erroneous impression as to parentage induced by fraud or mistake, 33 A.L.R. 681.
Right to compensation for board furnished to relatives of wife, 36 A.L.R. 677.
Recovery by one who has breached contract for services providing for share in proceeds or profits as compensation, 40 A.L.R. 34; 57 A.L.R. 1037.
Liability of municipal corporation upon implied contract for use of property which it received under an invalid contract, 42 A.L.R. 632.
Implied contract or employment of real estate broker to procure customer, 43 A.L.R. 842; 49 A.L.R. 933.
Recovery on quantum meruit by one who breaches contract to serve or support another for life, 47 A.L.R. 1162.
Judgment in action for services of physician or surgeon as bar to action against him for malpractice, 49 A.L.R. 551.
Circumstances other than relationship of parties which repel interference of an agreement to pay for work performed at one's request, or with his acquiescence, 54 A.L.R. 548.
Right of purchaser of mortgaged chattels to allowance as against mortgagee on account of value added by former's services or expenditures, 55 A.L.R. 652.
Vendee's right to recover amount paid under executory contract for sale of land, 59 A.L.R. 189; 102 A.L.R. 852; 134 A.L.R. 1064.
Right of one who pays taxes for which another is bound, to subrogation to the right of the taxing power, 61 A.L.R. 587; 106 A.L.R. 1212.
Recovery back of public money paid by mistake, 63 A.L.R. 1346.
Right of subrogation of owner of undivided interest in real property who pays sole debt of the owner of another undivided interest therein, 64 A.L.R. 1299.
Absence from, or inability to attend, school or college as affecting liability for, or right to recover back payments on account of, tuition or board, 69 A.L.R. 714.
Payments made under unenforceable contract as applicable in reduction of amount recoverable on quantum meriut, 76 A.L.R. 1412.
Right of attorney to recover upon quantum meruit or implied contract for services rendered under champterous contract, 85 A.L.R. 1365.
Right of one who by mistake pays taxes to recover against person benefited by payment, 91 A.L.R. 389.
Nontort liability of third person who receives money or property in supposed performance of contract, to party to contract who was entitled thereto, 106 A.L.R. 322.
Decedent's agreement to devise, bequeath, or leave property as compensation for services, 106 A.L.R. 742.
What amounts to acceptance by owner of work done under contract for construction or repair of building which will support a recovery on quantum meruit, 107 A.L.R. 1411.
Liability of municipality or other governmental body on implied or quasi contracts for value of property or work, 110 A.L.R. 153; 154 A.L.R. 356.
Right of true owner to recover proceeds of sale or lease of real property made by another in the belief that he was the owner of the property, 133 A.L.R. 1443.
Principal's right to recover commissions paid by him or by third person to unfaithful agent or broker, 134 A.L.R. 1346.
Past services by relative or member of family as consideration for note or other executory obligation, 140 A.L.R. 491.
What amounts to waiver of termination of real estate broker's contract, 140 A.L.R. 1019.
Necessity and sufficiency of pleading defense of family relationship in action on implied contract for services rendered, 144 A.L.R. 864.
Real estate broker's right to compensation as affected by death of person employing him, 146 A.L.R. 828.
Seller's, bailor's, lessor's, or lender's knowledge of the other party's intention to put the property or money to an illegal use as defense to action for purchase price, rent, or loan, 166 A.L.R. 1353.
Recovery for services rendered by member of household or family other than spouse without express agreement for compensation, 7 A.L.R.2d 8; 92 A.L.R.3d 726; 94 A.L.R.3d 552.
Remedies during promisor's lifetime on contract to convey or will property at death in consideration of support or services, 7 A.L.R.2d 1166.
Performance of work previously contracted for as consideration for promise to pay greater or additional amount, 12 A.L.R.2d 78.
Measure of damages for fraudulently procuring services at lower rate or gratuitously, 24 A.L.R.2d 742.
Right of infant who repudiates contract for services to recover thereon or in quantum meruit, 35 A.L.R.2d 1302.
Compensation for improvements made or placed on premises of another by mistake, 57 A.L.R.2d 263.
Admissibility of evidence of value or extent of decedent's estate in action against estate for reasonable value of services furnished decedent, 65 A.L.R.2d 945.
What constitutes acceptance or ratification of, or acquiescence in, services rendered by attorney so as to raise implied promise to pay reasonable value thereof, 78 A.L.R.2d 318.
Recovery on quantum meruit where only express contract is pleaded, under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 54 and similar state statutes or rules, 84 A.L.R.2d 1077.
Attorney's recovery in quantum meruit for legal services rendered under a contract which is illegal or void as against public policy, 100 A.L.R.2d 1378.
Person performing services as competent to testify as to their value, 5 A.L.R.3d 947.
Implied obligation not to use trade secrets or similar confidential information disclosed during unsuccessful negotiations for sale, license, or the like, 9 A.L.R.3d 665.
Price fixed in contract violating statute of frauds as evidence of value in action on quantum meruit, 21 A.L.R.3d 9.
Failure of artisan or construction contractor to comply with statute or regulation requiring a work permit or submission of plans as affecting his right to recover compensation from contractee, 26 A.L.R.3d 1395.
Liability of one requesting medical practitioner or hospital to furnish services to third party for cost of services, absent express undertaking to pay, 34 A.L.R.3d 176.
Judgment in action on express contract for labor or services as precluding, as a matter of res judicata, subsequent action on implied contract (quantum meruit) or vice versa, 35 A.L.R.3d 874.
Invasion of privacy by radio or television, 56 A.L.R.3d 386.
Amount of attorney's compensation in absence of contract or statute fixing amount, 57 A.L.R.3d 475; 59 A.L.R.3d 152, 17 A.L.R.5th 366.
Building and construction contracts: right of subcontractor who has dealt only with primary contractor to recover against property owner in quasi contract, 62 A.L.R.3d 288.
Enforceability of contract to make will in return for services, by one who continues performance after death of person originally undertaking to serve, 84 A.L.R.3d 930.
Enforceability of voluntary promise of additional corporation because of unforeseen difficulties in performance of existing contract, 85 A.L.R.3d 259.
Limitation to quantum meruit recovery, where attorney employed under contingent fee contract is discharged without cause, 92 A.L.R.3d 690.
Establishment of "family" relationship to raise presumption that services were rendered gratuitously, as between persons living in same household but not related by blood or affinity, 92 A.L.R.3d 726.
Recovery for services rendered by persons living in apparent relation of husband and wife without express agreement for compensation, 94 A.L.R.3d 552.
Unexplained gratuitous transfer of property from one relative to another as raising presumption of gift, 94 A.L.R.3d 608.
Absence from or inability to attend school or college as affecting liability for or right to recover payments for tuition or board, 20 A.L.R.4th 303.
Excessiveness or adequacy of attorneys' fees in matters involving real estate - modern cases, 10 A.L.R.5th 448.
Excessiveness or adequacy of attorney's fees in domestic relations, 17 A.L.R.5th 366.
Limitation to quantum meruit recovery, where attorney employed under contingent-fee contract is discharged without cause, 56 A.L.R.5th 1.