(Ga. L. 1966, p. 609, § 56; Ga. L. 1967, p. 226, § 25; Ga. L. 1975, p. 757, § 3.)
Cross references.- Motions in civil actions, Uniform Superior Court Rules, Rule 6.
Reply, Uniform State Court Rules, Rule 6.2.
Motions for summary judgment in probate court proceedings, Uniform Rules for the Probate Courts, Rules 6.5 and 6.6.
U.S. Code.- For provisions of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56, see 28 U.S.C.
Law reviews.- For article discussing effective use of motions for summary judgment prior to adoption of this section, see 23 Ga. B.J. 439 (1961). For article summarizing summary judgment in this state, see 27 Mercer L. Rev. 285 (1975). For article discussing interplay of the Appellate Practice Act (Art. 2, Ch. 6, T. 5), § 9-11-54(b), and subsection (h) of this section, see 31 Mercer L. Rev. 1 (1979). For survey of Georgia trial practice and procedure from June 1979 through May 1980, see 32 Mercer L. Rev. 225 (1980). For survey of Georgia trial practice and procedure from mid-1980 through mid-1981, see 33 Mercer L. Rev. 275 (1981). For article discussing expert testimony and summary judgment motions in medical malpractice actions, see 18 Ga. St. B.J. 44 (1981). For survey of Georgia trial practice and procedure from mid-1981 through mid-1982, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 299 (1982). For annual survey of law of torts, see 38 Mercer L. Rev. 351 (1986). For annual survey of trial practice and procedure, see 58 Mercer L. Rev. 405 (2006). For survey article on appellate practice and procedure, see 59 Mercer L. Rev. 21 (2007). For survey article on appellate practice and procedure, see 60 Mercer L. Rev. 21 (2008). For annual survey of law on real property, see 62 Mercer L. Rev. 283 (2010). For note, "Summary Judgment in Medical Malpractice Actions," see 7 Ga. St. B.J. 470 (1971). For case note, "Lynch v. Waters: Tolling Georgia's Statute of Limitations for Medical Malpractice," see 38 Mercer L. Rev. 1493 (1987). For note, "Employer Beware: Changing the Landscape of Employment Discrimination Claims at the Summary Judgment Stage," see 68 Mercer L. Rev. 1145 (2017). For case comment, "Yost v. Torok and Abusive Litigation: A New Tort to Solve an Old Problem," see 21 Ga. L. Rev. 429 (1986). For comment, "Overruling Tradition: Summary Judgment in the Eleventh Circuit After 1986," see 41 Mercer L. Rev. 737 (1990).
JUDICIAL DECISIONSANALYSIS
General Consideration
Editor's notes.
- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under Ga. L 1959, p. 234, § 1 et seq., are included in the annotations for this Code section.
Constitutionality.
- Summary judgment does not unconstitutionally deprive litigants of their right to a jury trial since summary judgment may be entered only when there is no issue of fact for consideration. Harry v. Glynn County, 269 Ga. 503, 501 S.E.2d 196 (1998).
Due process requirements.
- Although a motion for summary judgment is a vehicle for disposing of a controversy without the necessity of a trial and a summary disposition of the issues in order to efficiently resolve litigation, nevertheless, due process requires that the respondent not be surprised; rather, that the respondent be given reasonable opportunity to refute the movant's showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact. Porter Coatings v. Stein Steel & Supply Co., 247 Ga. 631, 278 S.E.2d 377 (1981).
Crux of summary judgment procedure.
- Crux of summary judgment procedure is that if there is no substantial issue as to any material fact, then the court can apply the appropriate legal principles and define the legal rights of the parties without lengthy trials to establish already undisputed facts. Caldwell v. Mayor of Savannah, 101 Ga. App. 683, 115 S.E.2d 403 (1960);(decided under Ga. L. 1959, p. 234, § 1 et seq.)
Essence of a motion for summary judgment is that there is no genuine issue of material fact to be resolved by the trier of facts, and that the movant is entitled to judgment on the law applicable to the established fact. McCarty v. National Life & Accident Ins. Co., 107 Ga. App. 178, 129 S.E.2d 408 (1962);(decided under Ga. L. 1959, p. 234, § 1 et seq.)
Similarity to federal rule.
- O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56 is similar to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, and on review it is proper for the appellate court to consider federal rulings. Federal Ins. Co. v. Oakwood Steel Co., 126 Ga. App. 479, 191 S.E.2d 298 (1972).
Summary Judgment Act of 1959, Ga. L. 1959, p. 234, § 1 et seq., was substantially identical to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Practice and Procedure, 28 U.S.C. Holland v. Sanfax Corp., 106 Ga. App. 1, 126 S.E.2d 442 (1962).
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56 must be strictly followed in consideration of a motion for summary judgment. Southeastern Metal Prods., Inc. v. Horger, 166 Ga. App. 205, 303 S.E.2d 536 (1983).
Unawareness of rules not excusable.
- Florida attorney's unawareness of Georgia rule permitting motion for summary judgment to be decided by the court without oral hearing was not excusable neglect that warranted reconsideration of the grant of summary judgment. Dominiak v. Camden Tel. & Tel. Co., 205 Ga. App. 620, 422 S.E.2d 887, cert. denied, 205 Ga. App. 899, 422 S.E.2d 887 (1992).
Ga. L. 1966, p. 609, § 56 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56) must be construed with Ga. L. 1967, p. 226, § 25 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-11-1). Taylor v. Donaldson, 227 Ga. 496, 181 S.E.2d 340, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 805, 92 S. Ct. 163, 30 L. Ed. 2d 38 (1971).
O.C.G.A.
§ 9-11-56 controls over local court rules. - Local court rules that are not in substantial compliance with the requirements of the Civil Practice Act (see now O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 9) with regard to summary judgment proceedings are of no effect. Smith v. Conley, 152 Ga. App. 589, 263 S.E.2d 453 (1979).
No conflict with superior court rules.
- O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56 and Rule 6.3 of the Uniform Rules of Superior Courts work together consistently. Furthermore, Rule 6.3 does not thwart the obvious purpose of a hearing in summary judgment, which is to provide counsel with an opportunity to persuade the court and to provide the court with an opportunity to interrogate counsel. Kelley v. First Franklin Fin. Corp., 256 Ga. 622, 351 S.E.2d 443 (1987).
There is no conflict between the requirements of Uniform Superior Court Rules 6.2 and 6.5 and O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56; rather, the requirements are in addition to those set out in the Civil Practice Act, O.C.G.A. Ch. 11, T. 9. West v. Nodvin, 183 Ga. App. 645, 359 S.E.2d 729 (1987).
Rule 6.3 of the Uniform Superior Court Rules is not inconsistent with subsection (c) of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56, and it is not error for the trial court to grant summary judgment in accordance with Rule 6.3 without an oral-argument hearing, if neither party requested such a hearing. Dallas Blue Haven Pools, Inc. v. Taslimi, 256 Ga. 739, 354 S.E.2d 160 (1987).
Subsection (c) of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56 refers only to filing of opposing affidavits prior to the day of hearing and provides no authority for other responsive materials to be filed outside the 30-day period prescribed in Superior Court Rule 6.2. Winchester v. Sun Valley-Atlanta Assocs., 206 Ga. App. 140, 424 S.E.2d 85 (1992); Coastal Plains Trucking Co. v. Thomas County Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 224 Ga. App. 885, 482 S.E.2d 493 (1997).
Section 9-11-55 controlling as to default.
- Motion for summary judgment is not an appropriate means by which a plaintiff can secure a judgment based upon the defendant's alleged default. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-55 is the controlling statute on the issue of default. Watson v. Georgia State Dep't of Educ. Credit Union, 201 Ga. App. 761, 412 S.E.2d 286 (1991).
Summary judgment is analogous to directed verdict; operation of the motions is essentially the same in reference to those issues upon which a movant for summary judgment would have, at trial, the burden of proof, but somewhat different if the motion is made by the opponent of the party with the trial burden. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Beaver, 120 Ga. App. 420, 170 S.E.2d 737 (1969).
"Claim" defined.
- General Assembly did not intend to give a restrictive meaning to the term "claim" in Ga. L. 1967, p. 226, § 25 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56), and this term is not confined to such actions as contracts, torts, or the like. Taylor v. Donaldson, 227 Ga. 496, 181 S.E.2d 340, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 805, 92 S. Ct. 163, 30 L. Ed. 2d 38 (1971).
Appeal to superior court by propounder of will as "claim".
- Term "claim," as used in O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56, applies if the propounder of a purported will, upon appeal to the superior court, seeks to establish it as the last will and testament of the decedent. Taylor v. Donaldson, 227 Ga. 496, 181 S.E.2d 340, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 805, 92 S. Ct. 163, 30 L. Ed. 2d 38 (1971).
Statute of limitations may be raised in brief in opposition to a motion for summary judgment. Brown v. Quarles, 154 Ga. App. 350, 268 S.E.2d 403 (1980).
Law of the case doctrine.
- Because the law of the case doctrine did not apply to issues not previously ruled upon below, enumerated as error on appeal, or discussed in a prior appellate decision, the trial court erred in denying summary judgment to a boat's charterer, and partial summary judgment to both the charterer and the boat's owner, in an action arising out of injuries sustained by a longshoreman while on board a cargo ship as the law of the case rule did not preclude consideration of the charterer's status and the issue of whether both were liable under the International Safety Management Code as such were not previously addressed by the trial court. Eastern Car Liner, Ltd. v. Kyles, 280 Ga. App. 362, 634 S.E.2d 129 (2006).
Respondent to a motion to dismiss is entitled to notice of conversion of the motion into one for summary judgment and to 30 days to respond to the motion for summary judgment unless such notice and opportunity are waived. Bonner v. Fox, 204 Ga. App. 666, 420 S.E.2d 312 (1992).
Adjudication on summary judgment is an adjudication on the merits. Summer-Minter & Assocs. v. Giordano, 231 Ga. 601, 203 S.E.2d 173 (1974); Dickson v. Dickson, 238 Ga. 672, 235 S.E.2d 479 (1977); Fierer v. Ashe, 147 Ga. App. 446, 249 S.E.2d 270 (1978); National Heritage Corp. v. Mount Olive Mem. Gardens, Inc., 148 Ga. App. 398, 251 S.E.2d 311 (1978), rev'd on other grounds, 244 Ga. 240, 260 S.E.2d 1 (1979); Walter E. Heller & Co. v. Aetna Bus. Credit, Inc., 158 Ga. App. 249, 280 S.E.2d 144 (1981).
Summary judgment is an abbreviated trial of no less importance than any other trial on the merits. Summer-Minter & Assocs. v. Giordano, 231 Ga. 601, 203 S.E.2d 173 (1974); Davidson Mineral Properties, Inc. v. Gifford-Hill & Co., 235 Ga. 176, 219 S.E.2d 133 (1975).
Grant of summary judgment is a ruling on merits. Usher v. Johnson, 157 Ga. App. 420, 278 S.E.2d 70 (1981).
Granting summary judgment is a decision on the merits and ends the case; amendments and subsequent motions for summary judgment made after this decision on the merits are too late. Ellington v. Tolar Constr. Co., 142 Ga. App. 218, 235 S.E.2d 729, cert. dismissed, 239 Ga. 849, 240 S.E.2d 551 (1977).
Party against whom summary judgment is granted is in the same position as if having lost a verdict. Summer-Minter & Assocs. v. Giordano, 231 Ga. 601, 203 S.E.2d 173 (1974); Dickson v. Dickson, 238 Ga. 672, 235 S.E.2d 479 (1977); National Heritage Corp. v. Mount Olive Mem. Gardens, Inc., 148 Ga. App. 398, 251 S.E.2d 311 (1978), rev'd on other grounds, 244 Ga. 240, 260 S.E.2d 1 (1979); Walter E. Heller & Co. v. Aetna Bus. Credit, Inc., 158 Ga. App. 249, 280 S.E.2d 144 (1981).
There is no such thing as a "default summary judgment." By failing to respond to a motion for summary judgment, a party merely waives the right to present evidence in opposition to the motion. It does not automatically follow that the motion should be granted. McGivern v. First Capital Income Properties, Ltd., 188 Ga. App. 716, 373 S.E.2d 817 (1988); Hughes v. Montgomery Contracting Co., 189 Ga. App. 814, 377 S.E.2d 723 (1989).
Effect of summary judgment on abusive litigation counterclaim.
- Because trial courts are not "infallible" when determining whether questions of fact exist on motions for summary judgment, a trial court's grant of summary judgment on a complaint does not control the merits of a subsequent motion for summary judgment on the defendant's abusive litigation counterclaim arising out of the filing of that complaint. Seckinger v. Holtzendorf, 200 Ga. App. 604, 409 S.E.2d 76, cert. denied, 200 Ga. App. 897, 409 S.E.2d 76 (1991).
Denial of motion for summary judgment decides nothing except that under the evidence before the court at that time there can be rendered no judgment as a matter of law. Ellington v. Tolar Constr. Co., 142 Ga. App. 218, 235 S.E.2d 729, cert. dismissed, 239 Ga. 849, 240 S.E.2d 551 (1977); Graham Bros. Constr. Co. v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 150 Ga. App. 193, 257 S.E.2d 321 (1979); T.L. Rogers Oil Co. v. South Carolina Nat'l Bank, 203 Ga. App. 605, 417 S.E.2d 336, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 908, 417 S.E.2d 336 (1992).
When the plaintiffs contended that because the trial court originally denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment based on the running of the statute of limitations, it was barred from later entering an order granting such a motion, based on the doctrine of res judicata, it was held that the denial of a motion for summary judgment decides nothing, and thus the plaintiffs' argument based on the doctrine of res judicata was inapposite. Gaskins v. A.B.C. Drug Co., 183 Ga. App. 518, 359 S.E.2d 364 (1987).
Costs, fees, awards despite summary judgment denial.
- Denial of summary judgment does not preclude as a matter of law the exercise of the trial court's discretion under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 to award litigation costs and attorney's fees for frivolous actions upon the trial of the case. Porter v. Felker, 261 Ga. 421, 405 S.E.2d 31 (1991).
Denial of summary judgment in a prior case resulted in collateral estoppel of a later claim of abusive litigation. The previous denial of summary judgment to the plaintiff in the abusive litigation case, who was the defendant in the prior case, constituted a binding determination that the claim in the prior case did not lack substantial justification. Walker v. McLarty, 199 Ga. App. 460, 405 S.E.2d 294 (1991), cert. denied, 199 Ga. App. 907, 405 S.E.2d 294 (1991) But see. Graves v. State, 269 Ga. 772, 504 S.E.2d 679 (1998), overruled on other grounds, Jones v. State, 272 Ga. 900, 537 S.E.2d 80 (2000), reversing Graves v. State, 227 Ga. App. 628, 490 S.E.2d 111 (1997).
Subsection (d) of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56 provides specifically for partial summary judgment. There is no requirement that all claims pled be included in a motion for partial summary judgment. Clark v. West, 196 Ga. App. 456, 395 S.E.2d 884 (1990).
Judgment on the pleadings held not partial summary judgment.
- If the record shows that no matter outside the pleadings is presented or considered by the court when making an order on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, entry of judgment is not a partial summary judgment, but a judgment on the pleadings only. Goolsby v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 Ga. App. 881, 204 S.E.2d 789 (1974).
Disposition of motion to dismiss under summary judgment procedure when matter outside pleadings considered.
- Although a petition may amply meet liberalized requirements of notice pleading so as to preclude dismissal from consideration of the petition alone, the court has authority to consider the matter outside the pleadings, if presented, and if the court does so, the court must dispose of the matter under summary judgment procedures. Kiker v. Hefner, 119 Ga. App. 629, 168 S.E.2d 637 (1969).
Defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, insufficiency of process, and insufficiency of service of process was not converted to a summary judgment motion upon consideration of matters outside the pleadings and, thus, dismissal was not directly appealable under the summary judgment statute. Church v. Bell, 213 Ga. App. 44, 443 S.E.2d 677 (1994).
Motion to dismiss by the state transportation department was treated as a motion for summary judgment because the department, the surviving relatives of the decedents who died in an auto accident, and the trial court relied on numerous documents outside the pleadings. DOT v. Carr, 254 Ga. App. 781, 564 S.E.2d 14 (2002).
Motion for summary judgment on basis of complaint equivalent to motion to dismiss.
- If a motion for summary judgment is made by the defendant solely on the basis of the complaint, such motion is functionally equivalent to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim; such complaint should be liberally construed in favor of the complainant, with the facts alleged in the complaint taken as true, and the motion for summary judgment must be denied if a claim has been pled. Guthrie v. Monumental Properties, Inc., 141 Ga. App. 21, 232 S.E.2d 369 (1977).
Trial judge has inherent power, during the same term of court in which judgment is rendered, to revise, correct, revoke, modify, or vacate such judgment, even upon the court's own motion, for purpose of promoting justice and in the exercise of sound legal discretion. LeCraw v. Atlanta Arts Alliance, Inc., 126 Ga. App. 656, 191 S.E.2d 572 (1972).
Number of motions for summary judgment.
- There is nothing limiting the number of times a party may make a motion for summary judgment. Graham Bros. Constr. Co. v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 150 Ga. App. 193, 257 S.E.2d 321 (1979); T.L. Rogers Oil Co. v. South Carolina Nat'l Bank, 203 Ga. App. 605, 417 S.E.2d 336, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 908, 417 S.E.2d 336 (1992).
Renewed or second motion for summary judgment may be considered within the discretion of a trial court, even though there has been no expansion of the record since the denial of the first motion for summary judgment. Southeastern Metal Prods., Inc. v. Horger, 166 Ga. App. 205, 303 S.E.2d 536 (1983); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Thomas, 172 Ga. App. 816, 324 S.E.2d 735 (1984).
Nothing in O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56 limits the number of times a party may make a motion for summary judgment, even without proffering additional evidence, leaving it within the trial judge's discretion to consider such motions. Eastern Car Liner, Ltd. v. Kyles, 280 Ga. App. 362, 634 S.E.2d 129 (2006).
Although the court found that summary judgment was improperly granted, nothing in O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56 limited the number of times a party could make a motion for summary judgment; thus, upon remand, either party could file a motion for summary judgment and seek a determination based upon the evidence and standard for summary adjudication. Gold Creek SL, LLC v. City of Dawsonville, 290 Ga. App. 807, 660 S.E.2d 858 (2008).
Grant after previous denial.
- Previous denial of summary judgment does not preclude the subsequent grant thereof on the basis of an expanded record. Ellington v. Tolar Constr. Co., 142 Ga. App. 218, 235 S.E.2d 729, cert. dismissed, 239 Ga. 849, 240 S.E.2d 551 (1977); Graham Bros. Constr. Co. v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 150 Ga. App. 193, 257 S.E.2d 321 (1979); Christian v. Allstate Ins. Co., 152 Ga. App. 358, 262 S.E.2d 621 (1979); T.L. Rogers Oil Co. v. South Carolina Nat'l Bank, 203 Ga. App. 605, 417 S.E.2d 336, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 908, 417 S.E.2d 336 (1992).
Prior denial of summary judgment does not foreclose the subsequent grant thereof, as an order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before entry of judgment adjudicating all claims, rights, and liabilities of all parties. Fierer v. Ashe, 147 Ga. App. 446, 249 S.E.2d 270 (1978).
Although the plaintiffs filed the plaintiffs' negligence lawsuit in the superior court of one county and that court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the circuit court in the county to which the lawsuit was transferred did not err in reconsidering the defendants' motion for summary judgment and granting the motion because nothing limits the number of times a party may make a motion for summary judgment and res judicata does not apply to a denial of a motion for summary judgment. Hubbard v. DOT, 256 Ga. App. 342, 568 S.E.2d 559 (2002).
Striking of a counterclaim after consideration of the proposed pretrial orders of the plaintiff and the defendant, pleadings, evidence, and arguments of counsel is tantamount to a grant of summary judgment motion and appealable without certificate of immediate review, even though interlocutory. Aiken v. Citizens & S. Bank, 249 Ga. 481, 291 S.E.2d 717, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 973, 103 S. Ct. 307, 74 L. Ed. 2d 287 (1982).
Third-party defendant is entitled to move for summary judgment against the original plaintiff on any ground for which the original defendant would be entitled to summary judgment against the plaintiff. Empire Shoe Co. v. Nico Indus., Inc., 197 Ga. App. 411, 398 S.E.2d 440 (1990).
When motion to dismiss is treated as motion for summary judgment.
- If a motion to dismiss is supplemented by argument of counsel and matters outside of the pleadings, it is treated as a motion for summary judgment. Blasingame v. Blasingame, 249 Ga. 791, 294 S.E.2d 519 (1982).
An exhibit offered at a hearing on an interlocutory injunction that was the basis of the trial court's decision to grant the appellee's motion to dismiss converted the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment, and the appellants were entitled to have the notice required in the summary judgment provisions. Wallis v. Trustees, Sugar Hill United Methodist Church, 252 Ga. 51, 310 S.E.2d 915 (1984).
In an action filed by children to recover damages for injuries sustained by their parent in a fall in a nursing home facility, a motion to dismiss the action for failure to state a claim filed by the center that operated the facility was converted to a motion for summary judgment and, on appeal, was to be reviewed as such; the children, as nonmovants, submitted documentary evidence in response to the motion, and, by doing so, in effect requested that the motion be converted into one for summary judgment and acquiesced in the trial court's decision not to give notice of the actual nature of the pending motion. Gaddis v. Chatsworth Health Care Ctr., Inc., 282 Ga. App. 615, 639 S.E.2d 399 (2006).
Treatment of O.C.G.A.
§ 9-11-12(b)(6) motion as one for summary judgment. - So long as the parties are afforded sufficient time within which to file affidavits and other evidentiary materials, a trial court sua sponte can treat an O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(b)(6) motion as one for summary judgment, even though neither party has introduced matter outside of the pleadings. Zepp v. Mayor of Athens, 180 Ga. App. 72, 348 S.E.2d 673 (1986).
Although the trial court converted the defendant limited liability company's (LLC's) motion to dismiss the plaintiff sanitation company's action into a motion for summary judgment when the court considered matters outside the pleadings, the appellate court refused to reverse the trial court's judgment finding that an agreement which allowed the sanitation company to purchase the LLC for $500,000 less than any amount offered by a third party was an unreasonable restraint on alienation because the trial court allowed the sanitation company to introduce evidence in support of the company's claims. RTS Landfill, Inc. v. Appalachian Waste Sys., LLC, 267 Ga. App. 56, 598 S.E.2d 798 (2004).
Notice of conversion of motion to motion for summary judgment.
- In a case alleging unfair employment termination, the trial court's failure to notify the employee of the trial court's conversion of the employer's motion to dismiss to a summary judgment motion, and the court's failure to give the employee at least 30 days to respond, although error, was not reversible because the employee failed to show that the employee was harmed by this deficiency in the notice; because the employee failed to provide the appellate court with a transcript of the summary judgment hearing, the trial court's summary judgment was presumed to have been correct on appeal and was affirmed. Bynum v. Horizon Staffing, 266 Ga. App. 337, 596 S.E.2d 648 (2004).
Motion in limine held not to be, in effect, a motion for summary judgment.
- Motion in limine in a dispossessory action that the issuance of the writ of possession had rendered the issue of possession moot was not in effect a motion for summary judgment and, in granting the motion and dismissing the case, the court did not violate the defendant's right, pursuant to subsection (c) of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56 and Rule 6.2 of the Uniform Rules for Superior and State Courts, to have at least 30 days to respond to the motion, when none of the parties wished to pursue their damage claims and, therefore, nothing remained to be tried. Diplomat Restaurant, Inc. v. Anthony, 180 Ga. App. 431, 349 S.E.2d 284 (1986).
Standing to oppose motion made by codefendant.
- Codefendant in a tort action has no standing to oppose a motion for summary judgment made by the other codefendant, if the codefendant has no existing rights that will be adversely affected by the grant thereof. Southeastern Erection Co. v. Flagler Co., 108 Ga. App. 831, 134 S.E.2d 822 (1964);(decided under Ga. L. 1959, p. 234, § 1 et seq.)
Effect of ruling at earlier hearing on admissibility.
- Grant of judgment for the plaintiffs on the pleadings after a ruling that no issuable defense had been alleged was not error on the ground that the court had, some months earlier, denied a motion for summary judgment made on behalf of the plaintiffs, when the court was considering the effect of evidence, whereas at the preliminary hearing the court was considering the admissibility of the evidence. Phillips v. Marcin, 162 Ga. App. 202, 290 S.E.2d 546 (1982).
Seventh Amendment right to jury trial not infringed.
- Because the Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution did not apply in state courts, and an insured's right to a jury trial thereunder was not infringed when genuine issues of material fact were lacking and disposition of the matter was best handled by way of summary judgment, the insured's Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial was not infringed; as a result, the insured failed to demonstrate any constitutional deprivation warranting a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. Cuyler v. Allstate Ins. Co., 284 Ga. App. 409, 643 S.E.2d 783, cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 510 (Ga. 2007).
Cited in Algernon Blair, Inc. v. National Sur. Corp., 222 Ga. 672, 151 S.E.2d 724 (1966); Atlanta Funtown, Inc. v. Crouch, 114 Ga. App. 702, 152 S.E.2d 583 (1966); Harrington v. Frye, 116 Ga. App. 755, 159 S.E.2d 84 (1967); Grizzard v. Grizzard, 224 Ga. 42, 159 S.E.2d 400 (1968); O'Kelley v. Evans, 224 Ga. 49, 159 S.E.2d 418 (1968); Jackson v. Kight, 117 Ga. App. 385, 160 S.E.2d 668 (1968); Norton Realty & Loan Co. v. City of Gainesville, 224 Ga. 166, 160 S.E.2d 819 (1968); Kerry v. Brown, 224 Ga. 200, 160 S.E.2d 832 (1968); Passmore v. Truman & Smith Inst., Inc., 117 Ga. App. 620, 161 S.E.2d 323 (1968); McLeod v. Westmoreland, 117 Ga. App. 659, 161 S.E.2d 335 (1968); Levy v. G.E.C. Corp., 117 Ga. App. 673, 161 S.E.2d 339 (1968); Boatright v. Padgett Motor Sales, Inc., 117 Ga. App. 578, 161 S.E.2d 402 (1968); Brooks v. Holman, 117 Ga. App. 615, 161 S.E.2d 512 (1968); Futch v. Futch, 224 Ga. 350, 161 S.E.2d 868 (1968); McCurry v. Bailey, 224 Ga. 318, 162 S.E.2d 9 (1968); Dyer v. Lanier, 224 Ga. 371, 162 S.E.2d 340 (1968); Trammell v. West, 224 Ga. 365, 162 S.E.2d 353 (1968); Ryder v. Schreeder, 224 Ga. 382, 162 S.E.2d 375 (1968); Kiker v. Hefner, 224 Ga. 511, 162 S.E.2d 731 (1968); Moulder v. Steele, 118 Ga. App. 87, 162 S.E.2d 785 (1968); Atlanta Biltmore Hotel Corp. v. Martell, 118 Ga. App. 172, 162 S.E.2d 815 (1968); Flowers v. Flowers, 118 Ga. App. 85, 162 S.E.2d 818 (1968); Zappa v. Allstate Ins. Co., 118 Ga. App. 235, 162 S.E.2d 911 (1968); Sanfrantello v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 Ga. App. 205, 163 S.E.2d 256 (1968); Rubel Baking Co. v. Levitt, 118 Ga. App. 306, 163 S.E.2d 437 (1968); Wade v. Howell, 224 Ga. 626, 163 S.E.2d 717 (1968); National Factor & Inv. Corp. v. State Bank, 224 Ga. 535, 163 S.E.2d 817 (1968); Fidelity-Phenix Ins. Co. v. Mauldin, 118 Ga. App. 401, 163 S.E.2d 834 (1968); Seaview Dev. Co. v. Galanti, 118 Ga. App. 378, 163 S.E.2d 845 (1968); Savannah Elec. & Power Co. v. Edenfield, 118 Ga. App. 531, 164 S.E.2d 366 (1968); Zeesman v. Cordele Credit Jewelry, Inc., 224 Ga. 732, 164 S.E.2d 729 (1968); Farmers Union Whse. v. Bird, 224 Ga. 842, 165 S.E.2d 148 (1968); Todd v. Windsor, 118 Ga. App. 805, 165 S.E.2d 438 (1968); Malone v. Ottinger, 118 Ga. App. 778, 165 S.E.2d 660 (1968); Colonial Stores, Inc. v. Holt, 118 Ga. App. 826, 166 S.E.2d 30 (1969); Duncan Cleaners, Inc. v. Shuman Co., 119 Ga. App. 128, 166 S.E.2d 387 (1969); Davis v. American Acceptance Corp., 119 Ga. App. 265, 167 S.E.2d 222 (1969); Herrington v. LaCount, 225 Ga. 232, 167 S.E.2d 631 (1969); Hood v. General Shoe Corp., 119 Ga. App. 649, 168 S.E.2d 326 (1969); Carden v. LaGrone, 225 Ga. 365, 169 S.E.2d 168 (1969); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Pullin, 120 Ga. App. 69, 169 S.E.2d 688 (1969); City of Atlanta v. Royal Peacock Social Club, Inc., 225 Ga. 474, 169 S.E.2d 807 (1969); Summerlin v. Beacon Inv. Co., 120 Ga. App. 296, 170 S.E.2d 307 (1969); Morris v. Morris, 121 Ga. App. 100, 172 S.E.2d 872 (1970); Worley v. Travelers Indem. Co., 121 Ga. App. 179, 173 S.E.2d 248 (1970); Reynolds v. Wilson, 121 Ga. App. 153, 173 S.E.2d 256 (1970); Johnson v. Frazier, 121 Ga. App. 212, 173 S.E.2d 434 (1970); Askew v. Carroll, 121 Ga. App. 305, 173 S.E.2d 463 (1970); Ward v. Ward, 226 Ga. 212, 173 S.E.2d 703 (1970); Herring v. R.L. Mathis Cert. Dairy Co., 121 Ga. App. 373, 173 S.E.2d 716 (1970); Phillips v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 121 Ga. App. 342, 173 S.E.2d 723 (1970); Elberton-Elbert County Hosp. Auth. v. Watson, 121 Ga. App. 550, 174 S.E.2d 470 (1970); Brooks v. Holman, 121 Ga. App. 720, 175 S.E.2d 131 (1970); Kirkland v. Jones, 122 Ga. App. 131, 176 S.E.2d 510 (1970); American Bank v. Gray, 122 Ga. App. 443, 177 S.E.2d 208 (1970); Adamson v. Adamson, 226 Ga. 719, 177 S.E.2d 241 (1970); Williams v. Williams, 226 Ga. 734, 177 S.E.2d 481 (1970); Bulloch County Bank v. Dodd, 226 Ga. 773, 177 S.E.2d 673 (1970); Citizens Bank v. Alexander-Smith Academy, Inc., 226 Ga. 871, 178 S.E.2d 178 (1970); Georgia Power Co. v. Jones, 122 Ga. App. 614, 178 S.E.2d 265 (1970); Dodson v. Phagan, 122 Ga. App. 752, 178 S.E.2d 748 (1970); Shepard v. Wilson, 123 Ga. App. 74, 179 S.E.2d 550 (1970); Abco Bldrs., Inc. v. Peavy Concrete Prod., Inc., 123 Ga. App. 167, 179 S.E.2d 695 (1971); Sorrells v. Smith, 227 Ga. 262, 180 S.E.2d 238 (1971); Smith v. Standard Oil Co., 227 Ga. 268, 180 S.E.2d 691 (1971); Rader v. Rayette Faberge, Inc., 123 Ga. App. 328, 181 S.E.2d 83 (1971); Citizens Bank v. Barber, 123 Ga. App. 507, 181 S.E.2d 545 (1971); Bekins Van Lines Co. v. Barlow, 123 Ga. App. 601, 181 S.E.2d 908 (1971); Goodwin v. First Baptist Church, 227 Ga. 603, 182 S.E.2d 105 (1971); Leathers v. Klebold, 227 Ga. 683, 182 S.E.2d 423 (1971); Salters v. Pugmire Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 124 Ga. App. 414, 184 S.E.2d 56 (1971); Rushing v. Ellis, 124 Ga. App. 621, 184 S.E.2d 667 (1971); Whittle v. Johnston, 124 Ga. App. 785, 186 S.E.2d 129 (1971); Burdell v. Georgia R.R. Bank & Trust Co., 124 Ga. App. 828, 186 S.E.2d 291 (1971); J.H. Ewing & Sons v. Montgomery, 124 Ga. App. 836, 186 S.E.2d 335 (1971); Sumter County v. Pritchett, 125 Ga. App. 222, 186 S.E.2d 798 (1971); Crowder v. Electro-Kinetics Corp., 228 Ga. 610, 187 S.E.2d 249 (1972); Corbin v. Gulf Ins. Co., 125 Ga. App. 281, 187 S.E.2d 312 (1972); Johnson v. Wormsloe Found., Inc., 228 Ga. 722, 187 S.E.2d 682 (1972); Cheek v. J. Allen Couch & Son Funeral Home, 125 Ga. App. 438, 187 S.E.2d 907 (1972); Stewart v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 229 Ga. 244, 190 S.E.2d 520 (1972); Leachman v. Cobb Dev. Co., 229 Ga. 207, 190 S.E.2d 537 (1972); Beaubien v. Bogle, 126 Ga. App. 406, 190 S.E.2d 830 (1972); Frost v. Gasaway, 229 Ga. 354, 190 S.E.2d 902 (1972); Byers v. Lieberman, 126 Ga. App. 582, 191 S.E.2d 470 (1972); General Fin. Corp. v. Davis, 126 Ga. App. 821, 191 S.E.2d 865 (1972); Roy D. Warren Co. v. Wagnon, 126 Ga. App. 776, 191 S.E.2d 894 (1972); Haber v. Georgia Power Co., 127 Ga. App. 19, 192 S.E.2d 436 (1972); Payne v. Payne, 229 Ga. 822, 194 S.E.2d 458 (1972); Bloodworth v. Smith, 128 Ga. App. 378, 196 S.E.2d 691 (1973); Equity Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Shelnutt, 128 Ga. App. 849, 198 S.E.2d 350 (1973); Howell v. Harden, 129 Ga. App. 200, 198 S.E.2d 890 (1973); Trammell v. Elliott, 230 Ga. 841, 199 S.E.2d 194 (1973); Tingle v. Arnold, Cate & Allen, 129 Ga. App. 134, 199 S.E.2d 260 (1973); Henry v. Allstate Ins. Co., 129 Ga. App. 223, 199 S.E.2d 338 (1973); Mattison v. Jackson-Atlantic, Inc., 129 Ga. App. 279, 199 S.E.2d 387 (1973); Brown v. Harwell, 129 Ga. App. 313, 199 S.E.2d 637 (1973); Food Fair, Inc. v. Mock, 129 Ga. App. 421, 199 S.E.2d 820 (1973); Frey v. Friendly Motors, Inc., 129 Ga. App. 636, 200 S.E.2d 467 (1973); Ernst v. Little, 129 Ga. App. 756, 201 S.E.2d 185 (1973); Continental Carriers, Inc. v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 129 Ga. App. 889, 201 S.E.2d 826 (1973); National Bank v. Merritt, 130 Ga. App. 85, 202 S.E.2d 193 (1973); Cooper v. Plott, 121 Ga. App. 488, 174 S.E.2d 446 (1974); Register v. Kandlbinder, 231 Ga. 786, 204 S.E.2d 145 (1974); Ryle v. Ryle, 130 Ga. App. 680, 204 S.E.2d 339 (1974); Georgia Auto Sales, Inc. v. Hinrichsen, 131 Ga. App. 43, 205 S.E.2d 65 (1974); Bernath Barrel & Drum Co. v. Ostrum Boiler Serv., Inc., 131 Ga. App. 140, 205 S.E.2d 459 (1974); Whitehurst v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 131 Ga. App. 202, 205 S.E.2d 489 (1974); Smith v. Rothstein, 131 Ga. App. 632, 206 S.E.2d 592 (1974); Thibadeau v. Crane, 131 Ga. App. 591, 206 S.E.2d 609 (1974); Pritchett v. Rainey, 131 Ga. App. 521, 206 S.E.2d 726 (1974); Townsend v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 131 Ga. App. 824, 207 S.E.2d 230 (1974); Hannah v. Shauck, 131 Ga. App. 834, 207 S.E.2d 239 (1974); Holbrook Waterproofing Co. v. Cleaver, 132 Ga. App. 24, 207 S.E.2d 562 (1974); O'Pry v. Goodman, 132 Ga. App. 191, 207 S.E.2d 674 (1974); Lowe v. American Mach. & Foundry Co., 132 Ga. App. 572, 208 S.E.2d 585 (1974); Adams v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 132 Ga. App. 622, 208 S.E.2d 628 (1974); Jaciewicki v. Gordarl Assocs., 132 Ga. App. 888, 209 S.E.2d 693 (1974); Avis Rent A Car Sys. v. Rice, 132 Ga. App. 857, 209 S.E.2d 270 (1974)
Aiken Asphalt Paving Co. v. Winn, 133 Ga. App. 3, 209 S.E.2d 700 (1974); Sasser & Co. v. Griffin, 133 Ga. App. 83, 210 S.E.2d 34 (1974); Thomas v. Allstate Ins. Co., 133 Ga. App. 193, 210 S.E.2d 361 (1974); Wielgorecki v. White, 133 Ga. App. 834, 212 S.E.2d 480 (1975); First Nat'l Bank v. Osborne, 233 Ga. 602, 212 S.E.2d 785 (1975); Harrell v. Wilson, 233 Ga. 899, 213 S.E.2d 871 (1975); Duval & Co. v. Malcom, 233 Ga. 784, 214 S.E.2d 356 (1975); R.L. Kimsey Cotton Co. v. Ferguson, 233 Ga. 962, 214 S.E.2d 360 (1975); Stein v. Maddox, 234 Ga. 164, 215 S.E.2d 231 (1975); Dutch Inns of Am., Inc. v. United Va. Leasing Corp., 134 Ga. App. 525, 215 S.E.2d 290 (1975); Taylor v. B. & W. Elec. Supply Co., 134 Ga. App. 634, 215 S.E.2d 530 (1975); Jackson v. Jackson, 234 Ga. 587, 216 S.E.2d 808 (1975); Langley v. Pacific Indem. Co., 135 Ga. App. 29, 217 S.E.2d 369 (1975); Bob's Dairy Barn & Restaurant, Inc. v. I.D.S. Leasing Corp., 135 Ga. App. 227, 217 S.E.2d 462 (1975); Freeman v. Phillips, 135 Ga. App. 466, 218 S.E.2d 144 (1975); John Deere Indus. Equip. Co. v. Ponder, 135 Ga. App. 688, 218 S.E.2d 686 (1975); Tax Assessors v. Chitwood, 235 Ga. 147, 218 S.E.2d 759 (1975); Capes v. Morgan, 235 Ga. 1, 218 S.E.2d 764 (1975); Jones v. Young, 136 Ga. App. 21, 220 S.E.2d 24 (1975); McKinnon v. Trivett, 136 Ga. App. 59, 220 S.E.2d 63 (1975); Barone v. Adcox, 235 Ga. 588, 221 S.E.2d 6 (1975); Clements v. Warner Robins Supply Co., 235 Ga. 612, 221 S.E.2d 35 (1975); United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Day, 136 Ga. 359, 221 S.E.2d 467 (1975); Central Soya Co. v. Bundrick, 137 Ga. App. 63, 222 S.E.2d 852 (1975); Southland Inv. Corp. v. McIntosh, 137 Ga. App. 216, 223 S.E.2d 257 (1976); Allan v. Allan, 236 Ga. 199, 223 S.E.2d 445 (1976); Lindgren v. Dowis, 236 Ga. 278, 223 S.E.2d 682 (1976); Graves Refrigeration, Inc. v. Haswell, 137 Ga. App. 515, 224 S.E.2d 494 (1976); Georgia Motor Club, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 137 Ga. App. 521, 224 S.E.2d 498 (1976); Strickland v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 137 Ga. App. 538, 224 S.E.2d 504 (1976); Kleiner v. Silver, 137 Ga. App. 560, 224 S.E.2d 508 (1976); Rowland v. Kellos, 236 Ga. 799, 225 S.E.2d 302 (1976); Waters v. Groover, 138 Ga. App. 276, 226 S.E.2d 74 (1976); Shepherd Constr. Co. v. State Hwy. Dep't, 138 Ga. App. 252, 226 S.E.2d 79 (1976); Phillips v. Hertz Com. Leasing Corp., 138 Ga. App. 441, 226 S.E.2d 287 (1976); Wilson v. Coite Somers Co., 138 Ga. App. 455, 226 S.E.2d 277 (1976); LaCount v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 138 Ga. App. 476, 226 S.E.2d 307 (1976); Massey v. Henderson, 138 Ga. App. 565, 226 S.E.2d 750 (1976); National Bank & Trust Co. v. Grant, 237 Ga. 337, 227 S.E.2d 372 (1976); Bingham v. Advance Indus. Sec., Inc., 138 Ga. App. 875, 228 S.E.2d 1 (1976); Cornwell v. Williams Bros. Lumber Co., 139 Ga. App. 773, 229 S.E.2d 551 (1976); Henderson Mill, Ltd. v. McConnell, 237 Ga. 807, 229 S.E.2d 660 (1976); Foster Wheeler Corp. v. Georgia Power Co., 140 Ga. App. 261, 230 S.E.2d 494 (1976); Thomas v. Jackson, 238 Ga. 90, 231 S.E.2d 50 (1976); First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. AMF Skamper Corp., 140 Ga. App. 422, 231 S.E.2d 456 (1976); Stern v. Wyatt, 140 Ga. App. 704, 231 S.E.2d 519 (1976); Raven v. S.S. Kresge Co., 140 Ga. App. 799, 232 S.E.2d 122 (1976); Crisp v. First Nat'l Bank, 141 Ga. App. 30, 232 S.E.2d 376 (1977); Hoffman v. PMC Dev. Co., 238 Ga. 258, 232 S.E.2d 541 (1977); Hampton v. McCord, 141 Ga. App. 97, 232 S.E.2d 582 (1977); Burgess v. Clermont Properties, Inc., 141 Ga. App. 112, 232 S.E.2d 627 (1977); Young v. Climatrol S.E. Distrib. Corp., 141 Ga. App. 235, 233 S.E.2d 54 (1977); Nipper v. Crisp County, 141 Ga. App. 312, 233 S.E.2d 270 (1977); Johnson v. Heifler, 141 Ga. App. 460, 233 S.E.2d 853 (1977); Wood v. Metropolitan Atlanta Girls' Club, Inc., 141 Ga. App. 473, 233 S.E.2d 862 (1977); Parker v. Centrum Int'l Film Corp., 141 Ga. App. 521, 233 S.E.2d 877 (1977); Ideal Paint Contractors, Inc. v. Home Mart Bldg. Ctrs., Inc., 141 Ga. App. 830, 234 S.E.2d 670 (1977); Little v. Home Transp. Co., 142 Ga. App. 30, 234 S.E.2d 833 (1977); Mayer v. Turner, 142 Ga. App. 63, 234 S.E.2d 853 (1977); Harbin Lumber Co. v. Fowler, 142 Ga. App. 167, 235 S.E.2d 638 (1977); Stallings v. Chance, 142 Ga. App. 491, 236 S.E.2d 110 (1977); Farnan v. National Bank, 142 Ga. App. 777, 236 S.E.2d 923 (1977); Price v. Winn, 142 Ga. App. 790, 237 S.E.2d 409 (1977); Newton Bros. v. Shank, 143 Ga. App. 21, 237 S.E.2d 412 (1977); Moore v. Trust Co. Bank, 142 Ga. App. 877, 237 S.E.2d 471 (1977); Sims v. Sims, 239 Ga. 451, 238 S.E.2d 32 (1977); Stallings v. Chance, 239 Ga. 567, 238 S.E.2d 327 (1977); Jones v. Doe, 143 Ga. App. 451, 238 S.E.2d 555 (1977); Shaw v. First Nat'l Bank, 143 Ga. App. 416, 238 S.E.2d 719 (1977); Wilson v. Citizens Bank, 143 Ga. App. 402, 238 S.E.2d 754 (1977); Mahler v. Paquin, 143 Ga. App. 773, 240 S.E.2d 185 (1977); Davis v. South Carolina Ins. Co., 143 Ga. App. 782, 240 S.E.2d 191 (1977); McAllister v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 240 Ga. 246, 240 S.E.2d 247 (1977); Shipp v. World Automotive, Inc., 144 Ga. App. 38, 240 S.E.2d 590 (1977); Freeman v. Saxton, 240 Ga. 309, 240 S.E.2d 708 (1977); Security Branding, Inc. v. Corbitt, 144 Ga. App. 164, 240 S.E.2d 728 (1977); Peek v. Southern Guar. Ins. Co., 240 Ga. 498, 241 S.E.2d 210 (1978); Fairington, Inc. v. Yeargin Constr. Co., 144 Ga. App. 491, 241 S.E.2d 608 (1978); Mercury Rising, Inc. v. Gwinnett Bank & Trust Co., 144 Ga. App. 502, 241 S.E.2d 620 (1978); Johnson v. Citizens & S. Bank, 144 Ga. App. 515, 241 S.E.2d 625 (1978); Goolsby v. Oakes, 240 Ga. 493, 241 S.E.2d 836 (1978); Canal Ins. Co. v. Cambron, 240 Ga. 708, 242 S.E.2d 32 (1978); Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Martin Co., 240 Ga. 662, 242 S.E.2d 135 (1978); Goodwin v. Trust Co., 144 Ga. App. 787, 242 S.E.2d 302 (1978); Columbus, Ga., By Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Outreach For Christ, Inc., 241 Ga. 2, 243 S.E.2d 42 (1978); Floyd v. DeVille, 145 Ga. App. 161, 243 S.E.2d 115 (1978); Wall v. Citizens & S. Bank, 145 Ga. App. 76, 243 S.E.2d 271 (1978); LDH Properties, Inc. v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 145 Ga. App. 132, 243 S.E.2d 278 (1978); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Christian Brokerage Co., 145 Ga. App. 126, 243 S.E.2d 281 (1978); National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Rouse, 145 Ga. App. 40, 243 S.E.2d 300 (1978); Currington v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 145 Ga. App. 350, 243 S.E.2d 713 (1978); Barber v. Adams, 145 Ga. App. 627, 244 S.E.2d 149 (1978); Smith v. Gibbs, 145 Ga. App. 647, 244 S.E.2d 615 (1978); Whiteside v. Douglas County Bank, 145 Ga. App. 775, 245 S.E.2d 2 (1978); Hollingsworth v. Georgia Osteopathic Hosp., 145 Ga. App. 870, 245 S.E.2d 60 (1978); Parker v. Fidelity Bank, 146 Ga. App. 52, 245 S.E.2d 364 (1978); Fagala v. Morrison, 146 Ga. App. 377, 246 S.E.2d 408 (1978); Applebaum v. David, Inc., 146 Ga. App. 406, 246 S.E.2d 424 (1978); Owens v. Griggs, 146 Ga. App. 478, 246 S.E.2d 480 (1978); Cooper v. Public Fin. Corp., 146 Ga. App. 250, 246 S.E.2d 684 (1978); Tally v. Atlanta Nat'l Real Estate Trust, 146 Ga. App. 585, 246 S.E.2d 700 (1978); Whiteside v. Douglas County Bank, 146 Ga. App. 888, 247 S.E.2d 558 (1978); Bozard v. J.A. Jones Constr. Co., 146 Ga. App. 877, 247 S.E.2d 605 (1978); Boling v. Golden Arch Realty Corp., 242 Ga. 3, 247 S.E.2d 744 (1978); Nationwide Fin. Corp. v. Banks, 147 Ga. App. 73, 248 S.E.2d 54 (1978); Shepherd v. Epps, 242 Ga. 322, 249 S.E.2d 33 (1978); Chambers v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 242 Ga. 498, 249 S.E.2d 214 (1978); Robinson v. Carswell, 147 Ga. App. 521, 249 S.E.2d 331 (1978); Oliver v. City of Atlanta, 147 Ga. App. 790, 250 S.E.2d 519 (1978); Stubbs v. Olshan, 147 Ga. App. 793, 250 S.E.2d 535 (1978); Concept-National, Inc. v. DiMattina Supply Co., 147 Ga. App. 865, 250 S.E.2d 552 (1978); Skyway Cycle Sales, Inc. v. Gordon, 148 Ga. App. 150, 251 S.E.2d 118 (1978); McFarland v. Beardsly, 148 Ga. App. 645, 252 S.E.2d 72 (1979); Century Bldrs., Inc. v. Carter, 243 Ga. 14, 252 S.E.2d 507 (1979); Thomasson v. Trust Co. Bank, 149 Ga. App. 556, 254 S.E.2d 881 (1979); Carl E. Jones Dev., Inc. v. Wilson, 149 Ga. App. 679, 255 S.E.2d 135 (1979)
Gobbi v. Hurt, 150 Ga. App. 60, 256 S.E.2d 664 (1979); Dunaway v. North Ga. Co., 150 Ga. App. 66, 256 S.E.2d 669 (1979); Luedtke v. National Stor-All, Inc., 150 Ga. App. 93, 256 S.E.2d 672 (1979); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Sloan, 150 Ga. App. 464, 258 S.E.2d 146 (1979); Gorlin v. First Nat'l Bank, 150 Ga. App. 637, 258 S.E.2d 290 (1979); Albert v. Bryan, 150 Ga. App. 649, 258 S.E.2d 300 (1979); Tanner v. Ayers, 150 Ga. App. 709, 258 S.E.2d 545 (1979); Corbin v. Pilgrim Realty Co., 151 Ga. App. 102, 258 S.E.2d 758 (1979); Sumner v. Adel Banking Co., 244 Ga. 73, 259 S.E.2d 32 (1979); Ivey Contracting Co. v. Elliott, 151 Ga. App. 361, 259 S.E.2d 658 (1979); Knight v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 151 Ga. App. 447, 260 S.E.2d 511 (1979); Great N. Nekoosa Corp. v. Board of Tax Assessors, 244 Ga. 624, 261 S.E.2d 346 (1979); A.R. Hudson Realty, Inc. v. Hood, 151 Ga. App. 778, 262 S.E.2d 189 (1979); Johnson v. Lastinger, 152 Ga. App. 328, 262 S.E.2d 601 (1979); Walter E. Heller & Co. v. Color-Set. Inc., 152 Ga. App. 347, 262 S.E.2d 614 (1979); Peppers v. Siefferman, 153 Ga. App. 206, 265 S.E.2d 26 (1980); Tahoe Carpet Indus., Inc. v. Aetna Bus. Credit, Inc., 153 Ga. App. 317, 265 S.E.2d 116 (1980); Ogletree v. Upson County Hosp. Auth., 153 Ga. App. 429, 265 S.E.2d 347 (1980); Ramsey Winch Co. v. Trust Co. Bank, 153 Ga. App. 500, 265 S.E.2d 848 (1980); Reese v. Sanders, 153 Ga. App. 654, 266 S.E.2d 313 (1980); Bennett v. Shipman, 153 Ga. App. 876, 267 S.E.2d 271 (1980); Commercial Credit Equip. Corp. v. Bates, 154 Ga. App. 71, 267 S.E.2d 469 (1980); Bailey v. Johnson, 245 Ga. 823, 268 S.E.2d 147 (1980); Hart v. Trust Co., 154 Ga. App. 329, 268 S.E.2d 384 (1980); Ford v. Whitmire, 154 Ga. App. 382, 268 S.E.2d 430 (1980); Jankowski v. Taylor, 154 Ga. App. 752, 269 S.E.2d 871 (1980); Jordan v. Jordan, 246 Ga. 395, 271 S.E.2d 450 (1980); McCray v. Hunter, 157 Ga. App. 509, 277 S.E.2d 795 (1981); Benton Bros. Ford Co. v. Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co., 157 Ga. App. 448, 278 S.E.2d 40 (1981); Huckabee Buick, Inc. v. Miller, 157 Ga. App. 429, 278 S.E.2d 79 (1981); Premium Distrib. Co. v. National Distrib. Co., 157 Ga. App. 666, 278 S.E.2d 468 (1981); King's Appliance & Elecs., Inc. v. Citizens & S. Bank, 157 Ga. App. 857, 278 S.E.2d 733 (1981); Hill Aircraft & Leasing Corp. v. Planes, Inc., 158 Ga. App. 151, 279 S.E.2d 250 (1981); Sigmon v. Womack, 158 Ga. App. 47, 279 S.E.2d 254 (1981); Miller Grading Contractors v. Georgia Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 247 Ga. 730, 279 S.E.2d 442 (1981); Cole v. Jordan, 158 Ga. App. 200, 279 S.E.2d 497 (1981); Sheppard v. Yara Eng'g Corp., 248 Ga. 147, 281 S.E.2d 586 (1981); Richards v. Mayor of Americus, 158 Ga. App. 693, 282 S.E.2d 122 (1981); Holt v. Bray, 159 Ga. App. 43, 282 S.E.2d 693 (1981); Goss v. Thornton, 159 Ga. App. 166, 283 S.E.2d 63 (1981); Hawkins v. Greenberg, 159 Ga. App. 302, 283 S.E.2d 301 (1981); Sanders v. Colwell, 248 Ga. 376, 283 S.E.2d 461 (1981); Thompson v. Hurt, 159 Ga. App. 656, 284 S.E.2d 671 (1981); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Mells, 159 Ga. App. 796, 285 S.E.2d 197 (1981); Floyd v. Lamar Ferrell Chevrolet, Inc., 159 Ga. App. 756, 285 S.E.2d 218 (1981); Northcutt v. Mills, 159 Ga. App. 768, 285 S.E.2d 228 (1981); Stender v. Fulton County, 160 Ga. App. 852, 287 S.E.2d 696 (1982); Lang v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 161 Ga. App. 760, 287 S.E.2d 729 (1982); Mintz v. Frazier, 160 Ga. App. 668, 288 S.E.2d 24 (1981); Ridge v. Espinoza, 160 Ga. App. 678, 288 S.E.2d 56 (1981); International Sys. v. City of Jackson, 161 Ga. App. 423, 288 S.E.2d 344 (1982); Utz v. Powell, 160 Ga. App. 888, 288 S.E.2d 601 (1982); Telligman v. Monumental Properties, Inc., 161 Ga. App. 13, 288 S.E.2d 846 (1982); Voliton v. Piggly Wiggly, 161 Ga. App. 813, 288 S.E.2d 924 (1982); Neely v. Richmond County, 161 Ga. App. 71, 289 S.E.2d 258 (1982); Sharpe's Appliance Store, Inc. v. Anderson, 161 Ga. App. 112, 289 S.E.2d 312 (1982); Property Pickup, Inc. v. Morgan, 249 Ga. 239, 290 S.E.2d 52 (1982); First Nat'l Bank v. National Bank, 249 Ga. 216, 290 S.E.2d 55 (1982); Moya Enters., Inc. v. Harry Anderson Trucking, Inc., 162 Ga. App. 39, 290 S.E.2d 145 (1982); Keasler v. Cedar Bluff Bank, 162 Ga. App. 57, 290 S.E.2d 150 (1982); Robinson v. Stevens Indus., Inc., 162 Ga. App. 132, 290 S.E.2d 336 (1982); Hawkins v. Travelers Ins. Co., 162 Ga. App. 231, 290 S.E.2d 348 (1982); Miles v. Edgewood Chenille, Inc., 162 Ga. App. 168, 290 S.E.2d 494 (1982); Holland v. Tri-City Hosp. Auth., 162 Ga. App. 256, 291 S.E.2d 107 (1982); J.L. Lester & Sons v. Smith, 162 Ga. App. 506, 291 S.E.2d 251 (1982); Cohran v. Carlin, 249 Ga. 510, 291 S.E.2d 538 (1982); Baker v. Baker, 249 Ga. 429, 292 S.E.2d 75 (1982); Donehoo v. Phillips, 162 Ga. App. 671, 292 S.E.2d 542 (1982); Williams v. Physicians & Surgeons Community Hosp., 249 Ga. 588, 292 S.E.2d 705 (1982); Stroup v. Castellucis, 163 Ga. App. 113, 293 S.E.2d 523 (1982); McCullough v. Molyneaux, 163 Ga. App. 352, 294 S.E.2d 560 (1982); Atlanta Professional Ass'n for Thoracic & Cardiovascular Surgery v. Allen, 163 Ga. App. 400, 294 S.E.2d 647 (1982); Young v. Hinton, 163 Ga. App. 692, 295 S.E.2d 150 (1982); Cato Oil & Grease Co. v. Lewis, 250 Ga. 24, 295 S.E.2d 527 (1982); Maddox v. Allstate Ins. Co., 164 Ga. App. 21, 296 S.E.2d 84 (1982); Sawyer v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 164 Ga. App. 177, 296 S.E.2d 134 (1982); Northside Cleaners, Inc. v. Paleologou, 163 Ga. App. 827, 296 S.E.2d 361 (1982); Ashburn Motor Inn, Inc. v. White Adv. Int'l, 164 Ga. App. 438, 296 S.E.2d 220 (1982); Slaughter v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 164 Ga. App. 428, 296 S.E.2d 428 (1982); Davis v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 164 Ga. App. 137, 296 S.E.2d 431 (1982); Georgia Hwy. Express, Inc. v. UPS, Inc., 164 Ga. App. 674, 297 S.E.2d 497 (1982); National Carloading Corp. v. Security Van Lines, 164 Ga. App. 850, 297 S.E.2d 740 (1982); Frazier v. Petecraft Aviation Servs., Inc., 164 Ga. App. 568, 298 S.E.2d 532 (1982); Peluso v. Central of Ga. R.R., 165 Ga. App. 215, 299 S.E.2d 51 (1983); Gilbert v. Decker, 165 Ga. App. 11, 299 S.E.2d 65 (1983); Fields Realty & Ins. Co. v. Teper, 165 Ga. App. 28, 299 S.E.2d 74 (1983); Brown v. City of Atlanta, 165 Ga. App. 310, 299 S.E.2d 101 (1983); Dobbs v. Cobb E.N.T. Assocs., 165 Ga. App. 238, 299 S.E.2d 141 (1983); Willingham v. Bridges, 165 Ga. App. 35, 299 S.E.2d 392 (1983); Regional Pacesetters, Inc. v. Halpern Enters., Inc., 165 Ga. App. 777, 300 S.E.2d 180 (1983); Burgett v. Thamer Constr., Inc., 165 Ga. App. 404, 300 S.E.2d 211 (1983); A-Larms, Inc. v. Alarms Device Mfg. Co., 165 Ga. App. 382, 300 S.E.2d 311 (1983); Johnson v. G.A.B. Bus. Servs. Inc., 165 Ga. App. 284, 300 S.E.2d 325 (1983); Browning v. Powell, 165 Ga. App. 315, 301 S.E.2d 52 (1983); City of Acworth v. John J. Harte Assocs., 165 Ga. App. 438, 301 S.E.2d 499 (1983); Smith v. Smith, 165 Ga. App. 532, 301 S.E.2d 696 (1983); Marconi Avionics, Inc. v. DeKalb County, 165 Ga. App. 628, 302 S.E.2d 384 (1983); Jones v. Rodzewicz, 165 Ga. App. 635, 302 S.E.2d 402 (1983); Vizzini v. Blonder, 165 Ga. App. 840, 303 S.E.2d 38 (1983); Bartley v. Augusta Country Club, Inc., 166 Ga. App. 1, 303 S.E.2d 129 (1983); Spell v. Bible Baptist Church, Inc., 166 Ga. App. 22, 303 S.E.2d 156 (1983); Wiard v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 166 Ga. App. 47, 303 S.E.2d 161 (1983); Whirlpool Corp. v. Hurlbut, 166 Ga. App. 95, 303 S.E.2d 284 (1983); Morrison Dental Assocs. v. Wilcher, 166 Ga. App. 236, 303 S.E.2d 775 (1983); Higginbottom v. Thiele Kaolin Co., 251 Ga. 148, 304 S.E.2d 365 (1983); Klorer-Willhardt, Inc. v. Martz, 166 Ga. App. 446, 304 S.E.2d 442 (1983); Murch v. Brown, 166 Ga. App. 538, 304 S.E.2d 750 (1983); Purcell v. C. Goldstein & Sons, 166 Ga. App. 547, 305 S.E.2d 10 (1983); Marchman Oil & Chem. Co. v. Southern Petro. Trading Co., 167 Ga. App. 691, 307 S.E.2d 509 (1983); Christian v. M & R Collection Adjustment, Inc., 167 Ga. App. 712, 307 S.E.2d 523 (1983); Partridge v. Partridge, 167 Ga. App. 716, 307 S.E.2d 524 (1983); Parks v. Atlanta Pub. Sch. Sys. Bd. of Educ., 168 Ga. App. 572, 309 S.E.2d 645 (1983)
Bennett v. Bank of S., 168 Ga. App. 536, 309 S.E.2d 682 (1983); Logan v. American Bankers Life Assurance Co., 168 Ga. App. 647, 310 S.E.2d 263 (1983); Hayes v. Murray, 169 Ga. App. 78, 311 S.E.2d 477 (1983); Wright v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 169 Ga. App. 454, 313 S.E.2d 150 (1984); Groover Eng'g Co. v. Capital Assocs., 169 Ga. App. 480, 313 S.E.2d 498 (1984); Hayes v. Murray, 252 Ga. 529, 314 S.E.2d 885 (1984); Perry v. International Indem. Co., 169 Ga. App. 818, 315 S.E.2d 13 (1984); Avera v. Avera, 253 Ga. 16, 315 S.E.2d 883 (1984); Evans v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 170 Ga. App. 145, 316 S.E.2d 517 (1984); Lawrence v. Timber Prods. Inspection, Inc., 170 Ga. App. 156, 316 S.E.2d 525 (1984); Continental Ins. Co. v. Hawkins, 170 Ga. App. 274, 316 S.E.2d 596 (1984); Pritchard v. Wilson, 170 Ga. App. 313, 316 S.E.2d 604 (1984); El-Amin v. Trust Co. Bank, 171 Ga. App. 35, 318 S.E.2d 655 (1984); Bradley v. Tattnall Bank, 170 Ga. App. 821, 318 S.E.2d 657 (1984); Georgia Am. Ins. Co. v. Varnum, 171 Ga. App. 190, 318 S.E.2d 814 (1984); Richards v. Southern Fin. Corp., 171 Ga. App. 268, 319 S.E.2d 103 (1984); Smith v. Maner, 171 Ga. App. 363, 319 S.E.2d 532 (1984); Coast Catamaran Corp. v. Mann, 171 Ga. App. 844, 321 S.E.2d 353 (1984); Suttle v. Northside Realty Assocs., 171 Ga. App. 928, 321 S.E.2d 424 (1984); Williams v. Heykow, Inc., 171 Ga. App. 936, 321 S.E.2d 431 (1984); Jahncke Serv., Inc. v. DOT, 172 Ga. App. 215, 322 S.E.2d 505 (1984); Poss v. Moreland, 253 Ga. 730, 324 S.E.2d 456 (1985); Sparks v. Parks, 172 Ga. App. 823, 324 S.E.2d 784 (1984); Wisseh v. Bank of Credit & Commerce Int'l, 173 Ga. App. 286, 325 S.E.2d 897 (1985); Wood v. Chatham Eng'g & Constr. Co., 173 Ga. App. 289, 326 S.E.2d 8 (1985); Baker v. Wulf, 173 Ga. App. 674, 327 S.E.2d 796 (1985); Mingledolph v. University Emergency Physicians, 174 Ga. App. 75, 329 S.E.2d 222 (1985); Duenas v. Bence, 174 Ga. App. 80, 329 S.E.2d 260 (1985); Blackburn v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 174 Ga. App. 157, 329 S.E.2d 284 (1985); Lewis v. Rickenbaker, 174 Ga. App. 371, 330 S.E.2d 140 (1985); Guillebeau v. Yeargin, 254 Ga. 490, 330 S.E.2d 585 (1985); Payne v. Dixie Elec. Co., 174 Ga. App. 610, 330 S.E.2d 749 (1985); Bradbury v. Mead Corp., 174 Ga. App. 601, 330 S.E.2d 801 (1985); Bandy v. Hospital Auth., 174 Ga. App. 556, 332 S.E.2d 46 (1985); Anderberg v. Georgia Elec. Membership Corp., 175 Ga. App. 14, 332 S.E.2d 326 (1985); Franklin v. Piggly Wiggly Food S., Inc., 175 Ga. App. 20, 332 S.E.2d 329 (1985); Alexander v. Heritage Corp., 175 Ga. App. 55, 332 S.E.2d 667 (1985); Collie v. Hutson, 175 Ga. App. 672, 334 S.E.2d 13 (1985); Drohan v. Carriage Carpet Mills, 175 Ga. App. 717, 334 S.E.2d 219 (1985); Anderson v. Hendrix, 175 Ga. App. 720, 334 S.E.2d 697 (1985); Bentley v. National Bank, 175 Ga. App. 732, 334 S.E.2d 331 (1985); Hayes v. Fernandez, 176 Ga. App. 332, 335 S.E.2d 735 (1985); Messex v. Lynch, 255 Ga. 208, 336 S.E.2d 755 (1985); J.M. Clayton Co. v. Martin, 177 Ga. App. 228, 339 S.E.2d 280 (1985); Edelschick v. Blanchard, 177 Ga. App. 410, 339 S.E.2d 628 (1985); Bekele v. Ryals, 177 Ga. App. 445, 339 S.E.2d 655 (1986); Skinner v. Perkins, 255 Ga. 366, 339 S.E.2d 717 (1986); Fulghum v. Kelly, 255 Ga. 652, 340 S.E.2d 589 (1986); Edmonds v. Bates, 178 Ga. App. 69, 342 S.E.2d 476 (1986); Evans v. Bibb Co., 178 Ga. App. 139, 342 S.E.2d 484 (1986); Reynolds v. Transport Ins. Co., 178 Ga. App. 462, 343 S.E.2d 502 (1986); Watkins v. Watkins, 256 Ga. 58, 344 S.E.2d 220 (1986); Brown v. Rowe, 178 Ga. App. 575, 344 S.E.2d 245 (1986); Nicholson v. Harris, 179 Ga. App. 35, 345 S.E.2d 63 (1986); Advanced Contouring, Inc. v. McMillan Div. of States Eng'g Corp., 179 Ga. App. 128, 345 S.E.2d 666 (1986); Douglas County v. Anneewakee, Inc., 179 Ga. App. 270, 346 S.E.2d 368 (1986); Buffington v. Gold Kist, Inc., 179 Ga. App. 393, 346 S.E.2d 577 (1986); Hodges Plumbing & Elec. Co. v. ITT Grinnell Co., 179 Ga. App. 521, 347 S.E.2d 257 (1986); Clark v. McBride, 256 Ga. 308, 348 S.E.2d 634 (1986); Capital Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 180 Ga. App. 413, 349 S.E.2d 201 (1986); Cline v. McLeod, 180 Ga. App. 286, 349 S.E.2d 232 (1986); Davis v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 180 Ga. App. 567, 349 S.E.2d 525 (1986); Helmich v. Kennedy, 796 F.2d 1441 (11th Cir. 1986); Hunnicutt v. Hunnicutt, 180 Ga. App. 798, 350 S.E.2d 770 (1986); Kirk v. Lithonia Mobile Homes, Inc., 181 Ga. App. 533, 352 S.E.2d 788 (1987); Yates Paving & Grading Co. v. Waters, 181 Ga. App. 537, 352 S.E.2d 791 (1987); Seymour v. Vaughn, 181 Ga. App. 604, 353 S.E.2d 91 (1987); Arre Indus., Inc. v. Aralmex, 181 Ga. App. 607, 353 S.E.2d 94 (1987); Dein v. Lesack, 181 Ga. App. 671, 353 S.E.2d 602 (1987); Hively v. Davis, 181 Ga. App. 733, 353 S.E.2d 622 (1987); Brown v. Coastal Emergency Servs., Inc., 181 Ga. App. 893, 354 S.E.2d 632 (1987); Jones v. Gordon, 182 Ga. App. 29, 354 S.E.2d 658 (1987); Alliance Auto Acceptance Lease, Inc. v. Chuck Clancy Ford, Inc., 182 Ga. App. 182, 355 S.E.2d 112 (1987); Goldkist, Inc. v. Brownlee, 182 Ga. App. 287, 355 S.E.2d 773 (1987); Patterson v. Lanham, 182 Ga. App. 343, 355 S.E.2d 738 (1987); Goodman v. Kahn, 182 Ga. App. 724, 356 S.E.2d 757 (1987); Baker v. Baker, 257 Ga. 187, 356 S.E.2d 873 (1987); Showalter v. Villa Prado Assocs., 182 Ga. App. 705, 356 S.E.2d 895 (1987); Jones v. Clark, 182 Ga. App. 871, 357 S.E.2d 285 (1987); Coca-Cola Co. v. Denmark, 182 Ga. App. 883, 357 S.E.2d 286 (1987); Dixie Constr. Prods., Inc. v. Southeastern Council on Comp. Ins., 183 Ga. App. 101, 357 S.E.2d 831 (1987); Williams v. Thomas, 183 Ga. App. 51, 357 S.E.2d 872 (1987); Watkins v. Laser/Print-Atlanta, Inc., 183 Ga. App. 172, 358 S.E.2d 477 (1987); Burns v. Gleason, 183 Ga. App. 245, 358 S.E.2d 646 (1987); Cook v. Arrington, 183 Ga. App. 384, 358 S.E.2d 869 (1987); ARA Transp. v. Barnes, 183 Ga. App. 424, 359 S.E.2d 157 (1987); Smoky Mt. Enters., Inc. v. Bennett, 183 Ga. App. 514, 359 S.E.2d 366 (1987); Falcone Int'l, Inc. v. Clowes, 184 Ga. App. 442, 361 S.E.2d 708 (1987); Lynch v. Georgia Power Co., 185 Ga. App. 256, 363 S.E.2d 777 (1987); Sofet v. Roberts, 185 Ga. App. 451, 364 S.E.2d 595 (1987); My Fair Lady of Ga., Inc. v. Harris, 185 Ga. App. 459, 364 S.E.2d 580 (1988); Sutton v. Sullivan & Carden, 185 Ga. App. 577, 364 S.E.2d 887 (1988); Smith v. Southeastern Fid. Ins. Co., 258 Ga. 15, 365 S.E.2d 105 (1988); Schwartz v. Rennie, 185 Ga. App. 638, 365 S.E.2d 159 (1988); Moffie v. Oglethorpe Univ., Inc., 186 Ga. App. 328, 367 S.E.2d 112 (1988); Jernigan Auto Parts, Inc. v. Commercial State Bank, 186 Ga. App. 267, 367 S.E.2d 250 (1988); Southerland v. Dalton Paving & Constr., Inc., 186 Ga. App. 743, 368 S.E.2d 193 (1988); Brice v. Northwest Ga. Bank, 186 Ga. App. 871, 368 S.E.2d 816 (1988); Menningmann v. Independent Fire Ins. Co., 187 Ga. App. 118, 369 S.E.2d 295 (1988); Young v. Wooldridge, 187 Ga. App. 661, 371 S.E.2d 100 (1988); Reahard v. Ivester, 188 Ga. App. 17, 371 S.E.2d 905 (1988); Willis v. Allen, 188 Ga. App. 390, 373 S.E.2d 79 (1988); Peck v. Rollins Protective Servs., Inc., 189 Ga. App. 381, 375 S.E.2d 494 (1988); Calhoun v. Bone, 189 Ga. App. 396, 375 S.E.2d 871 (1988); Hunt v. Lee, 190 Ga. App. 403, 379 S.E.2d 215 (1989); Ledbetter v. Delight Whsle. Co., 191 Ga. App. 64, 380 S.E.2d 736 (1989); Reese v. Georgia Power Co., 191 Ga. App. 125, 381 S.E.2d 110 (1989); Barnes v. GMAC, 191 Ga. App. 201, 381 S.E.2d 146 (1989); Adams v. Atlanta Faith Mem. Church, Inc., 191 Ga. App. 215, 381 S.E.2d 397 (1989); Wilson v. Wickes-Homecrafters, Inc., 191 Ga. App. 474, 382 S.E.2d 194 (1989); Doug Howles' Paces Ferry Dodge, Inc. v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 191 Ga. App. 556, 382 S.E.2d 364 (1989); Lynburn Enters., Inc. v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 191 Ga. App. 710, 382 S.E.2d 599 (1989); Whelchel v. Laing Properties, Inc., 190 Ga. App. 182, 378 S.E.2d 478 (1989); Brygider v. Atkinson, 192 Ga. App. 424, 385 S.E.2d 95 (1989); Deal v. Builders Transp., Inc., 192 Ga. App. 511, 385 S.E.2d 293 (1989); Edmunds v. Cowan, 192 Ga. App. 616, 386 S.E.2d 39 (1989)
International Bus. Consulting, Ltd. v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 192 Ga. App. 742, 386 S.E.2d 400 (1989); Hill v. Federal Employees Credit Union, 193 Ga. App. 44, 386 S.E.2d 874 (1989); Baughcum v. Cecil Key Paving, Inc., 190 Ga. App. 21, 378 S.E.2d 151 (1989); Clemons v. Piggly Wiggly Food S., Inc., 193 Ga. App. 309, 387 S.E.2d 600 (1989); Jacobs v. Spano, 193 Ga. App. 447, 387 S.E.2d 924 (1989); Harris v. Boyd, 193 Ga. App. 467, 388 S.E.2d 60 (1989); Campbell v. Hyatt Regency, 193 Ga. App. 542, 388 S.E.2d 341 (1989); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Weathers, 193 Ga. App. 557, 388 S.E.2d 393 (1989); Houston v. Georgia N.E.R.R., 193 Ga. App. 687, 388 S.E.2d 762 (1989); Simmons v. Holsey Temple Christian Methodist Church, 193 Ga. App. 770, 389 S.E.2d 1 (1989); Lewis v. McDowell, 194 Ga. App. 429, 390 S.E.2d 605 (1990); Steerman v. American States Ins. Co., 194 Ga. App. 461, 390 S.E.2d 669 (1990); Barnes v. Johnson, 194 Ga. App. 568, 390 S.E.2d 921 (1990); Miller v. Smith & Smith Land Surveyors, 194 Ga. App. 474, 391 S.E.2d 20 (1990); Mark Singleton Buick, Inc. v. Taylor, 194 Ga. App. 630, 391 S.E.2d 435 (1990); King v. Sheraton Savannah Corp., 194 Ga. App. 618, 391 S.E.2d 457 (1990); Webb v. Rushing, 194 Ga. App. 732, 391 S.E.2d 709 (1990); Hyzer v. Hickman, 195 Ga. App. 213, 393 S.E.2d 79 (1990); Stuckey Diamonds, Inc. v. Jones, 195 Ga. App. 351, 393 S.E.2d 706 (1990); Electrical Distrib., Inc. v. Turner Constr. Co., 196 Ga. App. 359, 395 S.E.2d 879 (1990); Hudgins v. Bawtinhimer, 196 Ga. App. 386, 395 S.E.2d 909 (1990); Collier v. Powell, 196 Ga. App. 522, 396 S.E.2d 264 (1990); Wall v. Southern Ry., 196 Ga. App. 483, 396 S.E.2d 266 (1990). But see CSX Transp., Inc. v. Trism Specialized Carriers, Inc., 9 F. Supp. 2d 1374 (N.D. Ga. 1998); Lee v. North Am. Life & Cas. Co., 196 Ga. App. 792, 397 S.E.2d 64 (1990); Miller v. Jeff Davis Apts., Ltd. II, 196 Ga. App. 600, 396 S.E.2d 494 (1990); Primo's, Inc. v. Clayton Common Assocs., 197 Ga. App. 286, 398 S.E.2d 231 (1990); Bell v. Coronet Ins. Co., 197 Ga. App. 211, 398 S.E.2d 242 (1990); Cheeley v. Henderson, 197 Ga. App. 543, 398 S.E.2d 787 (1990); Taquechel v. Chattahoochee Bank, 260 Ga. 755, 400 S.E.2d 8 (1991); Hill-Everett v. Jones, 197 Ga. App. 872, 399 S.E.2d 739 (1990); Hall v. Scott USA, Ltd., 198 Ga. App. 197, 400 S.E.2d 700 (1990); Kievman v. Kievman, 260 Ga. 853, 400 S.E.2d 317 (1991); Jones v. Campbell, 198 Ga. App. 83, 400 S.E.2d 364 (1990); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ainsworth, 198 Ga. App. 740, 402 S.E.2d 759 (1991); Battle v. Sandy Springs Assocs., 198 Ga. App. 584, 402 S.E.2d 336 (1991); Kelley v. Baker Protective Servs., Inc., 198 Ga. App. 378, 401 S.E.2d 585 (1991); Owen v. M & M Metro Supply, Inc., 198 Ga. App. 420, 401 S.E.2d 612 (1991); Joiner v. Lee, 197 Ga. App. 754, 399 S.E.2d 516 (1990); Arnall, Golden & Gregory v. Health Serv. Ctrs., Inc., 197 Ga. App. 791, 399 S.E.2d 565 (1990); Precise v. City of Rossville, 261 Ga. 210, 403 S.E.2d 47 (1991); Judge v. Wellman, 198 Ga. App. 782, 403 S.E.2d 76 (1991); 944, Inc. v. Georgia State Bank, 198 Ga. App. 893, 403 S.E.2d 466 (1991); Brown v. Apollo Indus., Inc., 199 Ga. App. 260, 404 S.E.2d 447 (1991); Kelly v. Vargo, 261 Ga. 422, 405 S.E.2d 36 (1991); Artis v. Gaither, 199 Ga. App. 114, 404 S.E.2d 322 (1991); Doctors Bldg. Partners v. Grimes Bridge Assocs., 199 Ga. App. 216, 404 S.E.2d 582 (1991); S & W Masonry Contractor, Inc. v. Jamison Co., 199 Ga. App. 628, 405 S.E.2d 519 (1991); Collier v. Evans, 199 Ga. App. 763, 406 S.E.2d 90 (1991); Bailey v. Butler, 199 Ga. App. 753, 406 S.E.2d 97 (1991); Daniel v. Safeway Ins. Co., 199 Ga. App. 833, 406 S.E.2d 266 (1991); Wilson v. Tara Ford, Inc., 200 Ga. App. 98, 406 S.E.2d 807 (1991); Fulton v. Pilon, 199 Ga. App. 861, 406 S.E.2d 517 (1991); Evans v. City of Atlanta, 199 Ga. App. 878, 406 S.E.2d 530 (1991); Dent v. Memorial Hosp., 200 Ga. App. 499, 408 S.E.2d 473 (1991); Moore v. Service Merchandise Co., 200 Ga. App. 463, 408 S.E.2d 480 (1991); E.H. Crump Co. v. Millar, 200 Ga. App. 598, 409 S.E.2d 235 (1991); Costanzo v. Jones, 200 Ga. App. 806, 409 S.E.2d 686 (1991); Sullenberger v. Grand Union Co., 201 Ga. App. 194, 410 S.E.2d 381 (1991); Sims v. Foss, 201 Ga. App. 345, 411 S.E.2d 59 (1991); Culberson v. Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth., 201 Ga. App. 347, 411 S.E.2d 75 (1991); Northside Bldg. Supply Co. v. Foures, 201 Ga. App. 259, 411 S.E.2d 87 (1991); Mauldin v. Weinstock, 201 Ga. App. 514, 411 S.E.2d 370 (1991); Johnson v. Lomas Mtg. USA, Inc., 201 Ga. App. 562, 411 S.E.2d 731 (1991); Sarantis v. Kroger Co., 201 Ga. App. 552, 411 S.E.2d 758 (1991); Jones v. Ward, 201 Ga. App. 757, 412 S.E.2d 576 (1991); Jackson v. DOT, 201 Ga. App. 863, 412 S.E.2d 847 (1991); First Community Bank v. Bryan Starr & Assocs., 203 Ga. App. 696, 417 S.E.2d 330 (1992); Bethco, Inc. v. Cinema 'N' Drafthouse Int'l, Inc., 204 Ga. App. 143, 418 S.E.2d 467 (1992); Famble v. State Farm Ins. Co., 204 Ga. App. 332, 419 S.E.2d 143 (1992); T.L. Rogers Oil Co. v. Sommers Co., 203 Ga. App. 404, 417 S.E.2d 44 (1992); Lend Lease Trucks, Inc. v. TRW, Inc., 206 Ga. App. 410, 425 S.E.2d 293 (1992); Scott v. Hamilton Dorsey Alston Co., 206 Ga. App. 504, 426 S.E.2d 55 (1992); Tri-City Constr. Co. v. Sandy Plains Partnership, 206 Ga. App. 506, 426 S.E.2d 57 (1992); Alco Std. Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 206 Ga. App. 794, 426 S.E.2d 648 (1992); Corry v. Robinson, 207 Ga. App. 167, 427 S.E.2d 507 (1993); Georgia Canoeing Ass'n v. Henry, 263 Ga. 77, 428 S.E.2d 336 (1993); Thurmond v. Richmond County Bd. of Educ., 207 Ga. App. 437, 428 S.E.2d 392 (1993); Hasty v. Spruill, 207 Ga. App. 485, 428 S.E.2d 420 (1993); King v. Crain-Daly Volkswagen, Inc., 207 Ga. App. 583, 428 S.E.2d 586 (1993); First Nat'l Bank v. Loggins, 207 Ga. App. 814, 429 S.E.2d 278 (1993); Sagnibene v. Budget Rent-A-Car Sys., 209 Ga. App. 44, 432 S.E.2d 639 (1993); Hailey v. Blalock, 209 Ga. App. 345, 433 S.E.2d 337 (1993); Lawal v. Stanley Bostitch Co., 209 Ga. App. 439, 433 S.E.2d 706 (1993); Smith v. Tommy Roberts Trucking Co., 209 Ga. App. 826, 435 S.E.2d 54 (1993); Riverdale Pools & Constr., Inc. v. Evans, 210 Ga. App. 127, 435 S.E.2d 501 (1993); Pope v. Department of Human Resources, 209 Ga. App. 835, 434 S.E.2d 731 (1993); Dixieland Truck Brokers, Inc. v. International Indem. Co., 210 Ga. App. 160, 435 S.E.2d 520 (1993); Spartan Food Sys. v. Williams, 212 Ga. App. 674, 442 S.E.2d 489 (1994); Schulman v. MIS Resources Int'l, 212 Ga. App. 588, 443 S.E.2d 2 (1994); Brown v. Southeastern Sec. Ins. Co., 216 Ga. App. 234, 454 S.E.2d 158 (1995); Conklin v. Zant, 216 Ga. App. 357, 454 S.E.2d 159 (1995); Southern Medical Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 216 Ga. App. 289, 454 S.E.2d 180 (1995); Cooper v. Corporate Property Investors, 220 Ga. App. 889, 470 S.E.2d 689 (1996); Washington v. Jefferson County, 221 Ga. App. 81, 470 S.E.2d 714 (1996); Sullivan v. Horn, 221 Ga. App. 289, 470 S.E.2d 765 (1996); Young v. John Deere Co., 221 Ga. App. 157, 471 S.E.2d 19 (1996); Brown v. Super Disc. Mkts., Inc., 223 Ga. App. 174, 477 S.E.2d 839 (1996); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sapp, 223 Ga. App. 443, 477 S.E.2d 869 (1996); Saxton v. Coastal Dialysis & Medical Clinic, Inc., 220 Ga. App. 805, 470 S.E.2d 252 (1996); Hansen v. Mt. Yonah Scenic Estates Club, Inc., 227 Ga. App. 258, 488 S.E.2d 732 (1997); Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ga., Inc. v. Kell, 227 Ga. App. 266, 488 S.E.2d 735 (1997); Nicholl v. NationsBank, 227 Ga. App. 287, 488 S.E.2d 751 (1997); Jenkins v. Brice, 231 Ga. App. 843, 499 S.E.2d 734 (1998); Stephens v. Clairmont Ctr., Inc., 230 Ga. App. 793, 498 S.E.2d 307 (1998); Kitfield v. Henderson, Black & Greene, 231 Ga. App. 130, 498 S.E.2d 537 (1998); Jones v. Krystal Co., 231 Ga. App. 102, 498 S.E.2d 565 (1998); Patriot Gen. Ins. Co. v. Millis, 233 Ga. App. 867, 506 S.E.2d 145 (1998); La Petite Academy, Inc. v. Prescott, 234 Ga. App. 32, 506 S.E.2d 183 (1998); Taylor v. Gelfand, 233 Ga. App. 835, 505 S.E.2d 222 (1998); Kelson v. Central of Ga. R.R., 234 Ga. App. 200, 505 S.E.2d 803 (1998)
Mullis v. Speight Seed Farms, Inc., 234 Ga. App. 27, 505 S.E.2d 818 (1998); Roberts v. City of Macon, 234 Ga. App. 287, 506 S.E.2d 650 (1998); Hannah v. Hampton Auto Parts, Inc., 234 Ga. App. 392, 506 S.E.2d 910 (1998); Re/Max Executives, Inc. v. Vacalis, 234 Ga. App. 659, 507 S.E.2d 235 (1998); Davis v. First Healthcare Corp., 234 Ga. App. 744, 507 S.E.2d 563 (1998); Fulton County Tax Comm'r v. GMC, 234 Ga. App. 459, 507 S.E.2d 772 (1998); Lewis v. Lease Atlanta, Inc., 234 Ga. App. 812, 508 S.E.2d 188 (1998); Zampatti v. Tradebank Int'l Franchising Corp., 235 Ga. App. 333, 508 S.E.2d 750 (1998); Woods v. State, 243 Ga. App. 195, 532 S.E.2d 747 (2000); Bakhtiarnejad v. Cox Enters., 247 Ga. App. 205, 541 S.E.2d 33 (2000); Georgialina Enters. v. Frakes, 250 Ga. App. 250, 551 S.E.2d 95 (2001); Wallace v. Stringer, 250 Ga. App. 850, 553 S.E.2d 166 (2001); Bob Davidson & Assocs. v. Norm Webster & Assocs., 251 Ga. App. 56, 553 S.E.2d 365 (2001); Little Tallapoosa Dev., Inc. v. Baldwin Paving Co., 251 Ga. App. 238, 553 S.E.2d 860 (2001); Span v. Phar-Mor, Inc., 251 Ga. App. 320, 554 S.E.2d 309 (2001); Milestone v. David, 251 Ga. App. 832, 555 S.E.2d 163 (2001); Sherrill v. Stockel, 252 Ga. App. 276, 557 S.E.2d 8 (2001).
Benedict v. Snead, 253 Ga. App. 749, 560 S.E.2d 278 (2002); Conley v. Dawson, 257 Ga. App. 665, 572 S.E.2d 34 (2002); Sheridan v. DataNational, Inc., 258 Ga. App. 28, 572 S.E.2d 718 (2002); Estate of Jennings v. Psychiatric Health Servs., 258 Ga. App. 111, 573 S.E.2d 115 (2002); Durham v. Mathis, 258 Ga. App. 749, 575 S.E.2d 6 (2002); Mustaqeem-Graydon v. SunTrust Bank, 258 Ga. App. 200, 573 S.E.2d 455 (2002); Smith v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 258 Ga. App. 570, 574 S.E.2d 627 (2002); Hall v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 258 Ga. App. 712, 574 S.E.2d 902 (2002); Charles v. Glover, 258 Ga. App. 710, 574 S.E.2d 910 (2002); Ponder v. Brooks, 256 Ga. App. 596, 569 S.E.2d 267 (2002); West Coast Cambridge, Inc. v. Rice, 262 Ga. App. 106, 584 S.E.2d 696 (2003); Ga. DOD v. Johnson, 262 Ga. App. 475, 585 S.E.2d 907 (2003); Holt & Holt, Inc. v. Choate Constr. Co., 271 Ga. App. 292, 609 S.E.2d 103 (2004); Gay v. Ga. Dep't of Corr., 270 Ga. App. 17, 606 S.E.2d 53 (2004); Carswell v. Oconee Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc., 270 Ga. App. 155, 605 S.E.2d 879 (2004); Condon v. Vickery, 270 Ga. App. 322, 606 S.E.2d 336 (2004); Park Regency Ptnrs., L.P. v. Gruber, 271 Ga. App. 66, 608 S.E.2d 667 (2004); Harrison v. Williams, 270 Ga. App. 308, 605 S.E.2d 923 (2004); Palma v. Ga. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 270 Ga. App. 333, 606 S.E.2d 341 (2004); Mathews v. Marietta Toyota, Inc., 270 Ga. App. 337, 606 S.E.2d 862 (2004); Albany Bone & Joint Clinic, P.C. v. Hajek, 272 Ga. App. 464, 612 S.E.2d 509 (2005); Dierkes v. Crawford Orthodontic Care, P.C., 284 Ga. App. 96, 643 S.E.2d 364 (2007); Harris v. Inn of Lake City, 285 Ga. App. 521, 647 S.E.2d 277 (2007); Kennedy v. Ga. Dep't of Human Res. Child Support Enforcement, 286 Ga. App. 222, 648 S.E.2d 727 (2007); Hamburger v. PFM Capital Mgmt., 286 Ga. App. 382, 649 S.E.2d 779 (2007); Kay-Lex Co. v. Essex Ins. Co., 286 Ga. App. 484, 649 S.E.2d 602 (2007); Mooneyham v. Provident Auto Leasing Co., 288 Ga. App. 837, 655 S.E.2d 640 (2007); Exel Transp. Servs. v. Sigma Vita, Inc., 288 Ga. App. 527, 654 S.E.2d 665 (2007); Hous. Auth. v. Ellis, 288 Ga. App. 834, 655 S.E.2d 621 (2007); CDP Event Servs. v. Atcheson, 289 Ga. App. 183, 656 S.E.2d 537 (2008); Edwards v. Sewell, 289 Ga. App. 128, 656 S.E.2d 246 (2008); Pazur v. Belcher, 290 Ga. App. 703, 659 S.E.2d 804 (2008); Alcatraz Media, LLC v. Yahoo! Inc., 290 Ga. App. 882, 660 S.E.2d 797 (2008); Roylston v. Bank of Am., N.A., 290 Ga. App. 556, 660 S.E.2d 412 (2008); Smith v. Stewart, 291 Ga. App. 86, 660 S.E.2d 822 (2008); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sutton, 290 Ga. App. 154, 658 S.E.2d 909 (2008); Beasley v. Northside Hosp., Inc., 289 Ga. App. 685, 658 S.E.2d 233 (2008); Somers v. M.A.U., Inc., 289 Ga. App. 731, 658 S.E.2d 242 (2008); Brookview Holdings, LLC v. Suarez, 285 Ga. App. 90, 645 S.E.2d 559 (2007); Drew v. Istar Fin., Inc., 291 Ga. App. 323, 661 S.E.2d 686 (2008); McLaine v. McLeod, 291 Ga. App. 335, 661 S.E.2d 695 (2008); Davis v. Harpagon Co., LLC, 283 Ga. 539, 661 S.E.2d 545 (2008); Rosado v. Rosado, 291 Ga. App. 670, 662 S.E.2d 761 (2008); Miller v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 292 Ga. App. 189, 663 S.E.2d 756 (2008); Johnson v. GAPVT Motors, Inc., 292 Ga. App. 79, 663 S.E.2d 779 (2008); Scott v. Bank of Am., 292 Ga. App. 34, 663 S.E.2d 386 (2008); Secured Equity Fin., LLC v. Washington Mut. Bank, F. A., 293 Ga. App. 50, 666 S.E.2d 554 (2008); Coote v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 292 Ga. App. 164, 664 S.E.2d 554 (2008); Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Beasley, 293 Ga. App. 8, 666 S.E.2d 83 (2008); Rooks v. Tenet Health Sys. GB, Inc., 292 Ga. App. 477, 664 S.E.2d 861 (2008); Bickerstaff Real Estate Mgmt., LLC v. Hanners, 292 Ga. App. 554, 665 S.E.2d 705 (2008); Rheem Mfg. v. Butts, 292 Ga. App. 523, 664 S.E.2d 878 (2008); Greater Ga. Life Ins. Co. v. Eason, 292 Ga. App. 682, 665 S.E.2d 725 (2008); Weatherly v. Weatherly, 292 Ga. App. 879, 665 S.E.2d 922 (2008); Morrill v. Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co., 293 Ga. App. 259, 666 S.E.2d 582 (2008); Avion Sys. v. Thompson, 293 Ga. App. 60, 666 S.E.2d 464 (2008); McCall v. Couture, 293 Ga. App. 305, 666 S.E.2d 637 (2008); Partain v. Oconee County, 293 Ga. App. 320, 667 S.E.2d 132 (2008); Triple Net Props., LLC v. Burruss Dev. & Constr., Inc., 293 Ga. App. 323, 667 S.E.2d 127 (2008); Custer v. Coward, 293 Ga. App. 316, 667 S.E.2d 135 (2008); AMLI Residential Props. v. Ga. Power Co., 293 Ga. App. 358, 667 S.E.2d 150 (2008); Harris Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Tarene Farms, LLC, 293 Ga. App. 430, 667 S.E.2d 200 (2008); Kinzy v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 293 Ga. App. 509, 667 S.E.2d 673 (2008); Am. Teleconferencing Servs. v. Network Billing Sys., LLC, 293 Ga. App. 772, 668 S.E.2d 259 (2008); Clay v. Oxendine, 285 Ga. App. 50, 645 S.E.2d 553 (2007); Dowse v. Southern Guar. Ins. Co., 263 Ga. App. 435, 588 S.E.2d 234 (2003); Dalton Paving & Constr., Inc. v. South Green Constr. of Ga., Inc., 284 Ga. App. 506, 643 S.E.2d 754 (2007); MCG Health, Inc. v. Barton, 285 Ga. App. 577, 647 S.E.2d 81 (2007); Bullington v. Blakely Crop Hail, Inc., 294 Ga. App. 147, 668 S.E.2d 732 (2008); DaimlerChrysler Motors Co. v. Clemente, 294 Ga. App. 38, 668 S.E.2d 737 (2008); Schofield Interior Contrs., Inc. v. Std. Bldg. Co., 293 Ga. App. 812, 668 S.E.2d 316 (2008); City of Decatur v. DeKalb County, 284 Ga. 434, 668 S.E.2d 247 (2008); Dennis v. First Nat'l Bank of the S., 293 Ga. App. 890, 668 S.E.2d 479 (2008); Coleman v. Arrington Auto Sales & Rentals, 294 Ga. App. 247, 669 S.E.2d 414 (2008); Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Stribling, 294 Ga. App. 382, 670 S.E.2d 154 (2008); Savage v. E. R. Snell Contr., Inc., 295 Ga. App. 319, 672 S.E.2d 1 (2008); Dyess v. Brewton, 284 Ga. 583, 669 S.E.2d 145 (2008); De Castro v. Durrell, 295 Ga. App. 194, 671 S.E.2d 244 (2008); Mullis v. Bibb County, 294 Ga. App. 721, 669 S.E.2d 716 (2008); C & H Dev., LLC v. Franklin County, 294 Ga. App. 792, 670 S.E.2d 491 (2008); DeSarno v. Jam Golf Mgmt., LLC, 295 Ga. App. 70, 670 S.E.2d 889 (2008); McCullough v. Reyes, 287 Ga. App. 483, 651 S.E.2d 810 (2007); Monfort v. Colquitt County Hosp. Auth., 288 Ga. App. 202, 653 S.E.2d 535 (2007); Pruette v. Phoebe Putney Mem. Hosp., 295 Ga. App. 335, 671 S.E.2d 844 (2008); Creeden v. Fuentes, 296 Ga. App. 96, 673 S.E.2d 611 (2009); Lamb v. Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth., 297 Ga. App. 529, 677 S.E.2d 328 (2009); Kitchen v. Insuramerica Corp., 296 Ga. App. 739, 675 S.E.2d 598 (2009); Russell v. Barrett, 296 Ga. App. 114, 673 S.E.2d 623 (2009); Iwan Renovations, Inc. v. N. Atlanta Nat'l Bank, 296 Ga. App. 125, 673 S.E.2d 632 (2009); Calloway v. City of Fayetteville, 296 Ga. App. 200, 674 S.E.2d 66 (2009); Daniel v. Allstate Ins. Co., 290 Ga. App. 898, 660 S.E.2d 765 (2008); Davis v. MARTA, 296 Ga. App. 355, 674 S.E.2d 627 (2009); Haugabook v. Crisler, 297 Ga. App. 428, 677 S.E.2d 355 (2009); McCray v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 291 Ga. App. 317, 661 S.E.2d 691 (2008); Rachels v. Thompson, 290 Ga. App. 115, 658 S.E.2d 890 (2008); Safe Shield Workwear, LLC v. Shubee, Inc., 296 Ga. App. 498, 675 S.E.2d 249 (2009); Hanson Staple Co. v. Eckelberry, 297 Ga. App. 356, 677 S.E.2d 321 (2009); Am. Nat'l Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Amerieast, Inc., 297 Ga. App. 443, 677 S.E.2d 663 (2009); Gardner v. Marcum, 292 Ga. App. 369, 665 S.E.2d 336 (2008); Ins. Co. of Pa. v. APAC-Southeast, Inc., 297 Ga. App. 553, 677 S.E.2d 734 (2009); Hicks v. Heard, 297 Ga. App. 689, 678 S.E.2d 145 (2009); Riding v. Ellis, 297 Ga. App. 740, 678 S.E.2d 178 (2009); Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 297 Ga. App. 751, 678 S.E.2d 196 (2009); Tookes v. Murray, 297 Ga. App. 765, 678 S.E.2d 209 (2009); Lee v. Phoebe Putney Mem. Hosp., Inc., 297 Ga. App. 692, 678 S.E.2d 340 (2009); Abdul-Malik v. AirTran Airways, Inc., 297 Ga. App. 852, 678 S.E.2d 555 (2009); Greenhorne & O'Mara, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 298 Ga. App. 261, 679 S.E.2d 818 (2009); Mason v. Allstate Ins. Co., 298 Ga. App. 308, 680 S.E.2d 168 (2009); Lehman v. Keller, 297 Ga. App. 371, 677 S.E.2d 415 (2009); Gettner v. Fitzgerald, 297 Ga. App. 258, 677 S.E.2d 149 (2009); Keyingham Invs., LLC v. Fid. Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 298 Ga. App. 467, 680 S.E.2d 442 (2009)
Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Snipes, 298 Ga. App. 405, 680 S.E.2d 438 (2009); Yim v. J's Fashion Accessories, Inc., 298 Ga. App. 399, 680 S.E.2d 466 (2009); McGregor v. Columbia Nat'l Ins. Co., 298 Ga. App. 491, 680 S.E.2d 559 (2009); Rushin v. Ussery, 298 Ga. App. 830, 681 S.E.2d 263 (2009); Leo v. Waffle House, Inc., 298 Ga. App. 838, 681 S.E.2d 258 (2009); Summit Auto. Group, LLC v. Clark Kia Motors Ame., Inc., 298 Ga. App. 875, 681 S.E.2d 681 (2009); Irvin Int'l, Inc. v. Riverwood Int'l Corp., 299 Ga. App. 633, 683 S.E.2d 158 (2009); Jones v. City of Willacoochee, 299 Ga. App. 741, 683 S.E.2d 683 (2009); Reynolds Props. v. Bickelmann, 300 Ga. App. 484, 685 S.E.2d 450 (2009); OnBrand Media v. Codex Consulting, Inc., 301 Ga. App. 141, 687 S.E.2d 168 (2009); Quarles v. Quarles, 285 Ga. 762, 683 S.E.2d 583 (2009); Textile Rubber & Chem. Co. v. Thermo-Flex Techs., Inc., 301 Ga. App. 491, 687 S.E.2d 919 (2009); Solley v. Mullins Trucking Co., 301 Ga. App. 565, 687 S.E.2d 924 (2009); Northland Ins. Co. v. Am. Home Assur. Co., 301 Ga. App. 726, 689 S.E.2d 87 (2009); Hollis & Spann, Inc. v. Hopkins, 301 Ga. App. 29, 686 S.E.2d 817 (2009); Stefano Arts v. Sui, 301 Ga. App. 857, 690 S.E.2d 197 (2010); Drury v. Harris Ventures, Inc., 302 Ga. App. 545, 691 S.E.2d 356 (2010); Kaplan v. City of Sandy Springs, 286 Ga. 559, 690 S.E.2d 395 (2010); Henderson v. Sargent, 297 Ga. App. 504, 677 S.E.2d 709 (2009); Buckler v. DeKalb County Bd. of Comm'rs, 299 Ga. App. 465, 683 S.E.2d 22 (2009); Gallagher v. Buckhead Cmty. Bank, 299 Ga. App. 622, 683 S.E.2d 50 (2009); Weaver v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 298 Ga. App. 645, 680 S.E.2d 668 (2009); Jones v. O'Day, 303 Ga. App. 159, 692 S.E.2d 774 (2010); Baker v. Harcon, Inc., 303 Ga. App. 749, 694 S.E.2d 673 (2010); Powerhouse Custom Homes, Inc. v. 84 Lumber Co., L.P., 307 Ga. App. 605, 705 S.E.2d 704 (2011); AAF-McQuay, Inc. v. Willis, 308 Ga. App. 203, 707 S.E.2d 508 (2011); Lee v. McCord, 292 Ga. App. 707, 665 S.E.2d 414 (2008); Lewis v. Ritz Carlton Hotel Co., LLC, 310 Ga. App. 58, 712 S.E.2d 91 (2011); Karle v. Belle, 310 Ga. App. 115, 712 S.E.2d 96 (2011); Davis v. Foreman, 311 Ga. App. 775, 717 S.E.2d 295 (2011); Jones v. White, 311 Ga. App. 822, 717 S.E.2d 322 (2011); In re Estate of Tapley, 312 Ga. App. 234, 718 S.E.2d 92 (2011); Aleman v. Sugarloaf Dialysis, LLC, 312 Ga. App. 658, 719 S.E.2d 551 (2011); Griffin v. State Bank, 312 Ga. App. 87, 718 S.E.2d 35 (2011); Hays v. Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 314 Ga. App. 110, 722 S.E.2d 923 (2012); Sands v. Lindsey, 314 Ga. App. 160, 723 S.E.2d 471 (2012); Trendmark Homes, Inc. v. Bank of N. Ga., 314 Ga. App. 886, 726 S.E.2d 138 (2012); Boatright v. Glynn County Sch. Dist., 315 Ga. App. 468, 726 S.E.2d 591 (2012); Amtrust N. Am., Inc. v. Smith, 315 Ga. App. 133, 726 S.E.2d 628 (2012); McCrary v. Middle Ga. Mgmt. Servs., 315 Ga. App. 247, 726 S.E.2d 740 (2012); Tallahassee State Bank v. Macon, 317 Ga. App. 128, 730 S.E.2d 646 (2012); Sun Nurseries, Inc. v. Lake Erma, LLC, 316 Ga. App. 832, 730 S.E.2d 556 (2012); Greenway v. Northside Hosp., 317 Ga. App. 371, 730 S.E.2d 742 (2012); Brown v. Seaboard Constr. Co., 317 Ga. App. 667, 732 S.E.2d 325 (2012); McRae v. Hogan, 317 Ga. App. 813, 732 S.E.2d 853 (2012); Dixie Roadbuilders, Inc. v. Sallet, 318 Ga. App. 228, 733 S.E.2d 511 (2012); Ga. Cash Am. v. Greene, 318 Ga. App. 355, 734 S.E.2d 67 (2012); Meek v. Mallory & Evans, Inc., 318 Ga. App. 407, 734 S.E.2d 109 (2012); Parker v. All Am. Quality Foods, Inc., 318 Ga. App. 689, 734 S.E.2d 510 (2012); Maxum Indem. Co. v. Jimenez, 318 Ga. App. 669, 734 S.E.2d 499 (2012); Coweta County v. Cooper, 318 Ga. App. 41, 733 S.E.2d 348 (2012); Shell v. Tidewater Fin. Co., 318 Ga. App. 69, 733 S.E.2d 375 (2012); Kovacs v. Cornerstone Nat'l Ins. Co., 318 Ga. App. 99, 736 S.E.2d 105 (2012); Circle K Stores, Inc. v. T. O. H. Assocs., 318 Ga. App. 753, 734 S.E.2d 752 (2012); Cox v. Mayan Lagoon Estates Ltd., 319 Ga. App. 101, 734 S.E.2d 883 (2012); Samuels v. CBOCS, Inc., 319 Ga. App. 421, 742 S.E.2d 141 (2012); Kammerer Real Estate Holdings, LLC v. PLH Sandy Springs, LLC, 319 Ga. App. 393, 740 S.E.2d 635 (2012), overruled on other grounds, 322 Ga. App. 859, 747 S.E.2d 68 (2013); Oduok v. Wedean Props., 319 Ga. App. 785, 738 S.E.2d 626 (2013); Bogart v. Wis. Inst. for Torah Study, 321 Ga. App. 492, 739 S.E.2d 465 (2013); Garrett v. S. Health Corp. of Ellijay, Inc., 320 Ga. App. 176, 739 S.E.2d 661 (2013); Garner & Glover Co. v. Barrett, 321 Ga. App. 205, 738 S.E.2d 721 (2013); Nash v. Twp. Invs., LLC, 320 Ga. App. 494, 740 S.E.2d 236 (2013); Floyd County v. Scott, 320 Ga. App. 549, 740 S.E.2d 277 (2013); Henderson v. Sugarloaf Residential Prop. Owners Ass'n, 320 Ga. App. 544, 740 S.E.2d 273 (2013); Dixie Group, Inc. v. Shaw Indus. Group, 303 Ga. App. 459, 693 S.E.2d 888; Freund v. Warren, 320 Ga. App. 765, 740 S.E.2d 727 (2013); Clayton County v. Austin-Powell, 321 Ga. App. 12, 740 S.E.2d 831 (2013), overruled on other grounds, Phillips v. Harmon, 297 Ga. 386, 774 S.E.2d 596 (2015); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 321 Ga. App. 738, 742 S.E.2d 762 (2013); Woodcraft by MacDonald, Inc. v. Ga. Cas. & Sur. Co., 293 Ga. 9, 743 S.E.2d 373 (2013); Bobick v. Cmty. & S. Bank, 321 Ga. App. 855, 743 S.E.2d 518 (2013); Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga. v. Barnes, 322 Ga. App. 47, 743 S.E.2d 609 (2013), overruled on other grounds by Wolfe v. Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 300 Ga. 223, 794 S.E.2d 85 (Ga. 2016); Ansley v. Raczka-Long, 293 Ga. 138, 744 S.E.2d 55 (2013); Sherman v. City of Atlanta, 317 Ga. 345, 730 S.E.2d 113 (2013); McGraw v. IDS Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 323 Ga. App. 408, 744 S.E.2d 891 (2013); Hanna v. First Citizens Bank & Trust Co., Inc., 323 Ga. App. 321, 744 S.E.2d 894 (2013); UWork.com, Inc. v. Paragon Techs., Inc., 321 Ga. App. 584, 740 S.E.2d 887 (2013); Price v. Thapa, 323 Ga. App. 638, 745 S.E.2d 311 (2013); Aubain-Gray v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 323 Ga. App. 672, 747 S.E.2d 684 (2013); Carter v. Riggins, 323 Ga. App. 747, 748 S.E.2d 117 (2013); Cmty. Music Ctrs. of Atlanta, LLC v. JW Broad., Inc., 323 Ga. App. 757, 748 S.E.2d 127 (2013); Norfolk S. Ry. v. Zeagler, 293 Ga. 582, 748 S.E.2d 846 (2013); Benfield v. Wells, 324 Ga. App. 85, 749 S.E.2d 384 (2013); Houston v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 324 Ga. App. 105, 749 S.E.2d 400 (2013); Patel v. Ameris Bank, 324 Ga. App. 227, 749 S.E.2d 809 (2013); Freeman v. Smith, 324 Ga. App. 426, 750 S.E.2d 739 (2013), overruled on other grounds by Franklin v. Pitts, 349 Ga. App. 544, 826 S.E.2d 427 (2019); Danes v. Rogers, 324 Ga. App. 504, 751 S.E.2d 135 (2013); Stillwater Enters. v. Hanson Pipe & Precast, LLC, 324 Ga. App. 582, 751 S.E.2d 193 (2013); O'Dell v. Mahoney, 324 Ga. App. 360, 750 S.E.2d 689 (2013); STC Two, LLC v. Shulman-Weiner, 325 Ga. App. 245, 750 S.E.2d 730 (2013); Herren v. Sucher, 325 Ga. App. 219, 750 S.E.2d 430 (2013); Aquanaut Diving & Eng'g, Inc. v. Guitar Ctr. Stores, Inc., 324 Ga. App. 570, 751 S.E.2d 175 (2013); Bedsole v. Action Outdoor Adver. JV, LLC, 325 Ga. App. 194, 750 S.E.2d 445 (2013); The Kroger Co. v. Schoenhoff, 324 Ga. App. 619, 751 S.E.2d 438 (2013); Johnson v. Burrell, 294 Ga. 301, 751 S.E.2d 301 (2013); Crabapple Lake Parc Cmty. Ass'n v. Circeo, 325 Ga. App. 101, 751 S.E.2d 866 (2013); Quinney v. Phoebe Putney Mem. Hosp., 325 Ga. App. 112, 751 S.E.2d 874 (2013); DJ Mortg., LLC v. Synovus Bank, 325 Ga. App. 382, 750 S.E.2d 797 (2013); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Twenty Six Properties, LLC, 325 Ga. App. 662, 754 S.E.2d 630 (2014); Richards v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 325 Ga. App. 722, 754 S.E.2d 770 (2014); Burke v. Prime Rate Premium Fin. Corp., 325 Ga. App. 760, 754 S.E.2d 802 (2014); First Chatham Bank v. Liberty Capital, LLC, 325 Ga. App. 821, 755 S.E.2d 219 (2014); Wooden v. Synovus Bank, 325 Ga. App. 876, 756 S.E.2d 19 (2014); Southern LNG, Inc. v. MacGinnitie, 294 Ga. 657, 755 S.E.2d 683 (2014); Askew v. Rogers, 326 Ga. App. 24, 755 S.E.2d 836 (2014); Scrocca v. Ashwood Condominium Ass'n, 326 Ga. App. 226, 756 S.E.2d 308 (2014)
Taylor v. McGraw, 327 Ga. App. 654, 760 S.E.2d 657 (2014); Reed v. Carolina Cas. Ins. Co., 327 Ga. App. 130, 755 S.E.2d 356 (2014); Thompson-El v. Bank of Am., N.A., 327 Ga. App. 309, 759 S.E.2d 49 (2014); Cartersville Ranch, LLC v. Dellinger, 295 Ga. 195, 758 S.E.2d 781 (2014); Fabian v. Pontikakis, 327 Ga. App. 392, 759 S.E.2d 295 (2014); Adams v. DeWitt, 327 Ga. App. 576, 760 S.E.2d 191 (2014); Roca Properties, LLC v. Dance Hotlanta, Inc., 327 Ga. App. 700, 761 S.E.2d 105 (2014); Internet Brands, Inc. v. Jape, 328 Ga. App. 272, 760 S.E.2d 1 (2014); 915 Indian Trail, LLC v. State Bank & Trust Co., 328 Ga. App. 524, 759 S.E.2d 654 (2014); Barzey v. City of Cuthbert, 295 Ga. 641, 763 S.E.2d 447 (2014); Hayek v. Chastain Park Condo. Ass'n, 329 Ga. App. 164, 764 S.E.2d 183 (2014); Sanchez v. Atlanta Union Mission Corp., 329 Ga. App. 158, 764 S.E.2d 178 (2014); Courtland Hotel, LLC v. Salzer, 330 Ga. App. 264, 767 S.E.2d 750 (2014); Boston v. Athearn, 329 Ga. App. 890, 764 S.E.2d 582 (2014); Cope v. Evans, 329 Ga. App. 354, 765 S.E.2d 40 (2014); DeKalb County v. Kirkland, 329 Ga. App. 262, 764 S.E.2d 867 (2014); Hill v. VNS Corp., 329 Ga. App. 274, 764 S.E.2d 876 (2014); Maree v. ROMAR Joint Venture, 329 Ga. App. 282, 763 S.E.2d 899 (2014), overruled on other grounds by SRM Group, Inc. v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am., 308 Ga. 404, 841 S.E.2d 729 (2020). Rumsey v. Gillis, 329 Ga. App. 488, 765 S.E.2d 665 (2014); Holcomb v. Long, 329 Ga. App. 515, 765 S.E.2d 687 (2014); Davidson v. Meticulously Clean Sweepers, LLC, 329 Ga. App. 640, 765 S.E.2d 783 (2014); Justice v. SCI Ga. Funeral Servs., 329 Ga. App. 635, 765 S.E.2d 778 (2014); Rollins v. Rollins, 329 Ga. App. 768, 766 S.E.2d 162 (2014), vacated, remanded, 298 Ga. 161, 780 S.E.2d 328 (2015); First Citizens Bank & Trust, Inc. v. Ruddell, 330 Ga. App. 82, 766 S.E.2d 538 (2014); Godwin v. Mizpah Farms, LLLP, 330 Ga. App. 31, 766 S.E.2d 497 (2014); Sentinel Offender Services, LLC v. Glover, 296 Ga. 315, 766 S.E.2d 456 (2014); Wright v. Waterberg Big Game Hunting Lodge Otjahewita (Pty), Ltd., 330 Ga. App. 508, 767 S.E.2d 513 (2014).
Lowry v. Fenzel, 331 Ga. App. 603, 769 S.E.2d 522 (2015); Brazeal v. NewPoint Media Group, LLC, 331 Ga. App. 49, 769 S.E.2d 763 (2015); Buttacavoli v. Owen, Gleaton, Egan, Jones & Sweeney LLP, 331 Ga. App. 88, 769 S.E.2d 794 (2015), cert. denied, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 416 (Ga. 2015); Gaslowitz v. Stabilis Fund I, LP, 331 Ga. App. 152, 770 S.E.2d 245 (2015); Sanders v. Riley, 296 Ga. 693, 770 S.E.2d 570 (2015); Ashton Atlanta Residential, LLC v. Ajibola, 331 Ga. App. 231, 770 S.E.2d 311 (2015); Roberts v. Cmty. & S. Bank, 331 Ga. App. 364, 771 S.E.2d 68 (2015); 9766, LLC v. Dwarf House, Inc., 331 Ga. App. 287, 771 S.E.2d 1 (2015); Southern States-Bartow County, Inc. v. Riverwood Farm Prop. Owners Ass'n, Inc., 331 Ga. App. 878, 769 S.E.2d 823 (2015); In re Estate of Wade, 331 Ga. App. 535, 771 S.E.2d 214 (2015); SJN Props., LLC v. Fulton County Bd. of Assessors, 296 Ga. 793, 770 S.E.2d 832 (2015).
Tuohy v. City of Atlanta, 331 Ga. App. 846, 771 S.E.2d 501 (2015); Cheeley Invs., L.P. v. Zambetti, 332 Ga. App. 115, 770 S.E.2d 350 (2015), cert. denied, No. S15C1298, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 615 (Ga. 2015); Barking Hound Vill., LLC v. Monyak, 331 Ga. App. 811, 771 S.E.2d 469 (2015); Brown v. GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc., 331 Ga. App. 890, 770 S.E.2d 56 (2015), cert. denied, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 732 (Ga. 2015); Barbour-Amir v. Comcast of Georgia/Virginia, Inc., 332 Ga. App. 279, 772 S.E.2d 231 (2015); Padilla v. Medrano, 332 Ga. App. 393, 772 S.E.2d 836 (2015); Doctors Hosp. of Augusta, LLC v. Alicea, 332 Ga. App. 529, 774 S.E.2d 114 (2015), aff'd, 299 Ga. 315, 788 S.E.2d 392 (2016); Caraway v. Spillers, 332 Ga. App. 588, 774 S.E.2d 162 (2015); Dolan v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 333 Ga. App. 601, 773 S.E.2d 789 (2015); Allan v. Jefferson Lakeside, L.P., 333 Ga. App. 222, 775 S.E.2d 763 (2015); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Cook, 332 Ga. App. 834, 775 S.E.2d 199 (2015), cert. denied, No. S15C1753, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 720 (Ga. 2015); Ellis v. Hartford Run Apartments, LLC, 335 Ga. App. 118, 779 S.E.2d 103 (2015), cert. denied, No. S16C0607, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 289 (Ga. 2016); Gaskins v. Berry's Boat Dock, 334 Ga. App. 642, 780 S.E.2d 83 (2015); Coon v. Medical Ctr., Inc., 335 Ga. App. 278, 780 S.E.2d 118 (2015), aff'd, 300 G. 722, 797 S.E.2d 828 (2017); Hughes v. Cornerstone Inspection Grp., Inc., 336 Ga. App. 283, 784 S.E.2d 116 (2016); Bo Phillips Company, Inc. v. R. L. King Properties, LLC, 336 Ga. App. 705, 783 S.E.2d 445 (2016); Hill v. Jackson, 336 Ga. App. 679, 783 S.E.2d 719 (2016); Rivera v. Washington, 298 Ga. 770, 784 S.E.2d 775 (2016); Zook v. Arch Specialty Ins. Co., 336 Ga. App. 669, 784 S.E.2d 119 (2016); PLIVA, Inc. v. Dement, 335 Ga. App. 398, 780 S.E.2d 735 (2015); Houghton v. Sacor Financial, Inc., 337 Ga. App. 254, 786 S.E.2d 903 (2016); Adewumi v. Amelia Grove/Ashland Park Homeowners Ass'n, 337 Ga. App. 275, 787 S.E.2d 761 (2016); Campbell v. Ailion, 338 Ga. App. 382, 790 S.E.2d 68 (2016); Humphrey v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 337 Ga. App. 331, 787 S.E.2d 303 (2016); Barclay v. Stephenson, 337 Ga. App. 365, 787 S.E.2d 322 (2016); R&G Invs. & Holdings, LLC v. Am. Family Ins. Co., 337 Ga. App. 588, 787 S.E.2d 765 (2016), cert. denied, No. S16C1830, 2017 Ga. LEXIS 144 (Ga. 2017); State of Ga. v. International Keystone Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc., 299 Ga. 392, 788 S.E.2d 455 (2016); Edel v. Southtowne Motors of Newnan II, Inc., 338 Ga. App. 376, 789 S.E.2d 224 (2016); Pass v. Forestar GA Real Estate Group, Inc., 337 Ga. App. 244, 787 S.E.2d 250 (2016), cert. denied, No. S16C1689, 2016 Ga. LEXIS 830 (Ga. 2016); SunTrust Bank v. Venable, 299 Ga. 655, 791 S.E.2d 5 (2016); Harris v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co., 338 Ga. App. 838, 792 S.E.2d 111 (2016); Greenberg Farrow Architecture, Inc. v. JMLS 1422, LLC, 339 Ga. App. 325, 791 S.E.2d 635 (2016); Stroud v. Hall County, 339 Ga. App. 37, 793 S.E.2d 104 (2016); Rigby v. Flue-Cured Tobacco Coop. Stabilization Corp., 339 Ga. App. 558, 794 S.E.2d 413 (2016); Liberty Capital, LLC v. First Chatham Bank, 338 Ga. App. 48, 789 S.E.2d 303 (2016); Trustgard Ins. Co. v. Herndon, 338 Ga. App. 347, 3790 S.E.2d 115 (2016); Northside Bank v. Mountainbrook of Bartow County Homeowners Ass'n, 338 Ga. App. 126, 789 S.E.2d 378 (2016); Progressive Mt. Ins. Co. v. Bishop, 338 Ga. App. 115, 790 S.E.2d 91 (2016); Bryant v. Optima Int'l, 339 Ga. App. 696, 792 S.E.2d 489 (2016); George v. Hercules Real Estate Services, Inc., 339 Ga. App. 843, 795 S.E.2d 81 (2016); Burrowes v. Bank of Am., N.A., 340 Ga. App. 248, 797 S.E.2d 493 (2017); Atl. Geoscience, Inc. v. Phoenix Dev. & Land Inv., LLC, 341 Ga. App. 81, 799 S.E.2d 242 (2017); Mashburn Constr., L.P. v. CharterBank, 340 Ga. App. 580, 798 S.E.2d 251 (2017); Popham v. Landmark Am. Ins. Co., 340 Ga. App. 603, 798 S.E.2d 257 (2017); Ga. Dep't of Admin. Servs. v. McCoy, 340 Ga. App. 877, 798 S.E.2d 687 (2017); City of Atlanta v. Hogan Constr. Group, LLC, 341 Ga. App. 620, 801 S.E.2d 606 (2017); Rintoul v. Tolbert, 341 Ga. App. 688, 802 S.E.2d 56 (2017); Hosp. Auth. v. Fender, 342 Ga. App. 13, 802 S.E.2d 346 (2017); Fox v. Norfolk S. Corp., 342 Ga. App. 38, 802 S.E.2d 319 (2017); Souza v. Berberian, 342 Ga. App. 165, 802 S.E.2d 401 (2017); Martin v. Ledbetter, 342 Ga. App. 208, 802 S.E.2d 432 (2017); Kolb v. Northside Hospital, 342 Ga. App. 192, 802 S.E.2d 413 (2017); Downes v. Oglethorpe University, Inc., 342 Ga. App. 250, 802 S.E.2d 437 (2017); American Safety Indemnity Co. v. Sto Corp., 342 Ga. App. 263, 802 S.E.2d 448 (2017); Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rockefeller, 343 Ga. App. 36, 805 S.E.2d 660 (2017), cert. denied, No. S18C0338, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 258 (Ga. 2018); Demere Marsh Assocs., LLC v. Boatright Roofing & Gen. Contr., Inc., 343 Ga. App. 235, 808 S.E.2d 1 (2017); Sure, Inc. v. Premier Petroleum, Inc., 343 Ga. App. 219, 807 S.E.2d 19 (2017); Alford v. Hernandez, 343 Ga. App. 332, 807 S.E.2d 84 (2017), cert. denied, No. S18C0459, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 327 (Ga. 2018); Viad Corp v. United States Steel Corp., 343 Ga. App. 609, 808 S.E.2d 58 (2017); Avery v. Paulding County Airport Auth., 343 Ga. App. 832, 808 S.E.2d 15 (2017); Coleman v. Glynn County, 344 Ga. App. 545, 809 S.E.2d 383 (2018), cert. denied, No. S18C0869, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 566; cert. denied, No. S18C0881, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 572 (Ga. 2018); Davis v. Ganas, 344 Ga. App. 697, 812 S.E.2d 36 (2018); MacDowell v. Gallant, 344 Ga. App. 856, 811 S.E.2d 513 (2018), cert. denied, No. S18C0963, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 626 (Ga. 2018); Peterson v. Peterson, 303 Ga. 211, 811 S.E.2d 309 (2018); Ga.-Pac. Consumer Prods., LP v. Ratner, 345 Ga. App. 434, 812 S.E.2d 120 (2018), cert. denied, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 736, cert. denied, No. S18C1130, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 725 (Ga. 2018); Crop Production Services, Inc. v. Moye, 345 Ga. App. 228, 812 S.E.2d 565 (2018); Cancel v. Medical Center of Central Ga., Inc., 345 Ga. App. 215, 812 S.E.2d 592 (2018), cert. denied, No. S18C1054, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 769 (Ga. 2018); Southern Trust Insurance Company v. Cravey, 345 Ga. App. 697, 814 S.E.2d 802 (2018), cert. denied, No. S18C1319, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 820 (Ga. 2018); Gold v. DeKalb County Sch. Dist., 346 Ga. App. 108, 815 S.E.2d 259 (2018), aff'd, 307 Ga. 330, 834 S.E.2d 808 (2019); Amberfield Homeowners Ass'n v. Young, 346 Ga. App. 29, 813 S.E.2d 618 (2018); HA&W Capital Partners, LLC v. Bhandari, 346 Ga. App. 598, 816 S.E.2d 804 (2018); Williams v. Durden, 347 Ga. App. 363, 819 S.E.2d 524 (2018); Mercer v. Mercer, 347 Ga. App. 563, 820 S.E.2d 189 (2018); Sheffield v. Conair Corporation, 348 Ga. App. 6, 821 S.E.2d 93 (2018), cert. denied, No. S19C0437, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 467 (Ga. 2019); Weickert v. Home Depot U.S. A., Inc., 347 Ga. App. 889, 821 S.E.2d 110 (2018), cert. denied, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 551 (Ga. 2019); Division Six Sports, Inc. v. Hire Dynamics, LLC, 348 Ga. App. 347, 822 S.E.2d 841 (2019); Sage Atlanta Props., Ltd. v. Hawxhurst, 349 Ga. App. 758, 824 S.E.2d 387 (2019); Hayman v. Paulding County, 349 Ga. App. 77, 825 S.E.2d 482 (2019); The Plantation at Bay Creek Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Glasier, 349 Ga. App. 203, 825 S.E.2d 542 (2019); Gutierrez v. Hilti, Inc., 349 Ga. App. 752, 824 S.E.2d 391 (2019); First Acceptance Ins. Co. of Ga. v. Hughes, 305 Ga. 489, 826 S.E.2d 71 (2019); Laymac v. Kushner, 349 Ga. App. 727, 824 S.E.2d 768 (2019), cert. denied, No. S19C1091, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 871 (Ga. 2019); Cars v. W. Funding II, 349 Ga. App. 517, 826 S.E.2d 370 (2019); Yim v. Carr, 349 Ga. App. 892, 827 S.E.2d 685 (2019), cert. denied, No. S19C1220, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 853 (Ga. 2019); Golden Isles Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Lowie, 350 Ga. App. 1, 827 S.E.2d 703 (2019); Williams v. Murrell, 348 Ga. App. 754, 824 S.E.2d 638 (2019); Phillips v. Adams, Jordan & Herrington, P.C., 350 Ga. App. 184, 828 S.E.2d 414 (2019); Pasha v. Battle Creek Homeowners Ass'n, 350 Ga. App. 433, 829 S.E.2d 618 (2019); Nugent v. Myles, 350 Ga. App. 442, 829 S.E.2d 623 (2019); Jones Lang LaSalle Operations LLC v. Johnson, 350 Ga. App. 439, 829 S.E.2d 629 (2019)
Houston Hospitals, Inc. v. Felder, 351 Ga. App. 394, 829 S.E.2d 182 (2019), cert. denied, No. S19C1628, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 210 (Ga. 2020); Howell v. Bates, 350 Ga. App. 708, 830 S.E.2d 250 (2019); Oconee Fed. S&L Ass'n v. Brown, 351 Ga. App. 561, 831 S.E.2d 222 (2019), cert. dismissed, No. S20C0074, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 201 (Ga. 2020); Dixon v. Dixon, 352 Ga. App. 169, 834 S.E.2d 309 (2019); 6428 Church St. v. SM Corrigan, LLC, 352 Ga. App. 437, 834 S.E.2d 603 (2019), cert. denied, No. S20C0468, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 386 (Ga. 2020); cert. denied, No. S20C0473, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 399 (Ga. 2020); Fayette Cty. Bd. of Tax Assess. v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 354 Ga. App. 584, 841 S.E.2d 104 (2020); Williams Inv. Co. v. Girardot, 354 Ga. App. 762, 841 S.E.2d 436 (2020); Curry v. Conopco, Inc., 354 Ga. App. 692, 840 S.E.2d 151 (2020); Campbell v. Cirrus Education, 355 Ga. App. 628, 845 S.E.2d 393 (2020); Spann v. Davis, 355 Ga. App. 673, 845 S.E.2d 415 (2020); Zahler v. Nat'l Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2006-1, 355 Ga. App. 458, 844 S.E.2d 530 (2020); Joseph v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London, Ga. App. , 844 S.E.2d 852 (2020); Five Star Athlete Mgmt., Inc. v. Davis, 355 Ga. App. 774, 845 S.E.2d 754 (2020); Saik v. Brown, Ga. App. , S.E.2d (June 25, 2020); Zulke v. AC&DC Power Technologies, LLC, Ga. App. , S.E.2d (July 22, 2020); Walia v. Walia, Ga. App. , S.E.2d (July 30, 2020); JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Cronan, 355 Ga. App. 556, 845 S.E.2d 298 (2020); Campbell v. Cirrus Education, Inc., 355 Ga. App. 637, 845 S.E.2d 384 (2020); Premier Eye Care Assocs. v. Mag Mut. Ins. Co., 355 Ga. App. 620, 844 S.E.2d 282 (2020); City of Norcross v. Gwinnett County, 355 Ga. App. 662, 843 S.E.2d 31 (2020); McCalla Raymer, LLC v. Foxfire Acres, Inc., Ga. App. , 846 S.E.2d 404 (2020).
Cited in Saks Mgmt. & Assocs. v. Sung, Ga. App. , S.E.2d (Aug. 21, 2020).
Premier Eye Care Assocs. v. Mag Mut. Ins. Co., 355 Ga. App. 620, 844 S.E.2d 282 (2020).
Mullinax v. Pilgrim's Pride Corp., 354 Ga. App. 186, 840 S.E.2d 666 (2020); Helton v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 354 Ga. App. 208, 840 S.E.2d 692 (2020).
Sheffield v. Futch, 354 Ga. App. 661, 839 S.E.2d 294 (2020); GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Atlanta Botanical Garden, Inc., 306 Ga. 829, 834 S.E.2d 27 (2019); Chatham Area Transit Auth. v. Brantley, 353 Ga. App. 197, 834 S.E.2d 593 (2019); Head v. de Souse, 353 Ga. App. 309, 836 S.E.2d 227 (2019); First Communities Mgmt., Inc. v. Holmes, 353 Ga. App. 409, 837 S.E.2d 717 (2020); 280 Partners, LLC v. Bank of North Georgia, 352 Ga. App. 605, 835 S.E.2d 377 (2019); Sweet City Landfill, LLC v. Lyon, 352 Ga. App. 824, 835 S.E.2d 764 (2019); DeKalb County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. CWS SGARR Brookhaven, LLC, 352 Ga. App. 848, 836 S.E.2d 729 (2019); Bates v. Howell, 352 Ga. App. 733, 835 S.E.2d 814 (2019); Cannon v. Oconee County, 353 Ga. App. 296, 835 S.E.2d 753 (2019); Mitchell v. Capehart, 353 Ga. App. 461, 838 S.E.2d 125 (2020); Parham v. Stewart, 308 Ga. 170, 839 S.E.2d 605 (2020).
Purpose of Summary Judgment
Prompt and inexpensive method of disposing of cases.
- Motion for summary judgment is designed to provide a prompt and inexpensive method of disposing of any cause if the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits clearly show there is no issue of material fact, although allegations of the pleadings standing alone may raise such an issue. Maxey-Bosshardt Lumber Co. v. Maxwell, 127 Ga. App. 429, 193 S.E.2d 885 (1972).
Purpose of former Ga. L. 1959, p. 234, § 1 et seq. was to afford to either party litigant, upon motion, a judgment forthwith if the record shows there was not a genuine issue existing between the parties. Southern v. Adams, 111 Ga. App. 217, 141 S.E.2d 320 (1965);(decided under former Ga. L. 1959, p. 234, § 1 et seq.)
Very purpose of former Ga. L. 1959, p. 234, § 1 et seq. was to afford either party litigant a judgment forthwith if the record showed there was not a genuine issue existing between the parties, but only after each party had an opportunity to make out a case or establish a defense, as the case may be. Scales v. Peevy, 103 Ga. App. 42, 118 S.E.2d 193 (1961); Sparks v. Rinker, 111 Ga. App. 191, 141 S.E.2d 185 (1965);(decided under former Ga. L. 1959, p. 234, § 1 et seq.)
Summary resolution has its place; efficient and orderly dispensation of justice is enhanced when unnecessary and protracted litigation is avoided. Shmunes v. GMC, 146 Ga. App. 486, 246 S.E.2d 486 (1978).
Unnecessary jury trials eliminated.
- Summary judgment was clearly intended to dispose of litigation expeditiously and avoid the useless time and expense of going through a jury trial even though the petition fairly bristles with serious allegations, if, when given notice and an opportunity to produce affidavits by persons competent to testify on their own knowledge to the truth of such allegations, the pleader does nothing to contradict affidavits of the movant that show the opposite party has no right to prevail. Crutcher v. Crawford Land Co., 220 Ga. 298, 138 S.E.2d 580 (1964); Brown v. J.C. Penney Co., 123 Ga. App. 233, 180 S.E.2d 364 (1971); Summer-Minter & Assocs. v. Giordano, 231 Ga. 601, 203 S.E.2d 173 (1974); Motel Mgt. Sys. v. Billing, 143 Ga. App. 702, 240 S.E.2d 173 (1977);(decided under former Ga. L. 1959, p. 234, § 1 et seq.)
Function of motion for summary judgment is to avoid a useless trial if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. General Gas Corp. v. Carn, 103 Ga. App. 542, 120 S.E.2d 156 (1961);(decided under former Ga. L. 1959, p. 234, § 1 et seq.)
Former Ga. L. 1959, p. 234, § 1 et seq. obviously had as one of its purposes, if there was no genuine issue as to any material fact, to allow the trial court to apply appropriate legal principles and define the legal rights of the parties without lengthy trials to establish already undisputed facts. Scales v. Peevy, 103 Ga. App. 42, 118 S.E.2d 193 (1961);(decided under Ga. L. 1959, p. 234, § 1 et seq.)
Purpose of the Summary Judgment Act of 1959 (former Ga. L. 1959, p. 234, § 1 et seq.) was to eliminate the necessity for a jury trial if there was no genuine issue as to any material fact in the case. General Ins. Co. of Am. v. Camden Constr. Co., 115 Ga. App. 189, 154 S.E.2d 26 (1967);(decided under former Ga. L. 1959, p. 234, § 1 et seq.)
Purpose of former Ga. L. 1959, p. 234, § 1 et seq. was to eliminate the necessity for a jury trial if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Holland v. Sanfax Corp., 106 Ga. App. 1, 126 S.E.2d 442 (1962); King v. Fryer, 107 Ga. App. 715, 131 S.E.2d 203 (1963); Lampkin v. Edwards, 222 Ga. 288, 149 S.E.2d 708 (1966); Boston Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 120 Ga. App. 585, 171 S.E.2d 626 (1969); Elder v. Smith, 121 Ga. App. 461, 174 S.E.2d 239, rev'd on other grounds, 226 Ga. 688, 177 S.E.2d 77 (1970); Tony v. Pollard, 248 Ga. 86, 281 S.E.2d 557 (1981);(decided under former Ga. L. 1959, p. 234, § 1 et seq.)
Purpose of former Ga. L. 1959, p. 234, § 1 et seq. was to eliminate the necessity for a trial by jury if, giving the opposing party the benefit of all reasonable doubts and all favorable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence, there was no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Butterworth v. Pettitt, 223 Ga. 355, 155 S.E.2d 20 (1967); Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Beaver, 120 Ga. App. 420, 170 S.E.2d 737 (1969); Kroger Co. v. Cobb, 125 Ga. App. 310, 187 S.E.2d 316 (1972); Maxey-Bosshardt Lumber Co. v. Maxwell, 127 Ga. App. 429, 193 S.E.2d 885 (1972); Summer-Minter & Assocs. v. Giordano, 231 Ga. 601, 203 S.E.2d 173 (1974); Beach v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 140 Ga. App. 882, 232 S.E.2d 158 (1977); Jones v. First Nat'l Bank, 142 Ga. App. 18, 234 S.E.2d 794 (1977); Dickson v. Dickson, 238 Ga. 672, 235 S.E.2d 479 (1977); Hewatt v. Bonner, 142 Ga. App. 442, 236 S.E.2d 111 (1977); Motel Mgt. Sys. v. Billing, 143 Ga. App. 702, 240 S.E.2d 173 (1977); Skinner v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 145 Ga. App. 372, 243 S.E.2d 732 (1978); Culwell v. Lomas & Nettleton Co., 148 Ga. App. 478, 251 S.E.2d 579 (1978); Mock v. Canterbury Realty Co., 152 Ga. App. 872, 264 S.E.2d 489 (1980); Riddle v. Driebe, 153 Ga. App. 276, 265 S.E.2d 92 (1980); Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Davis, 153 Ga. App. 291, 265 S.E.2d 102 (1980); Lagerstrom v. Beers Constr. Co., 157 Ga. App. 396, 277 S.E.2d 765 (1981); Troutt v. Nash AMC/Jeep, Inc., 157 Ga. App. 399, 278 S.E.2d 54 (1981); Parlato v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 165 Ga. App. 758, 302 S.E.2d 613 (1983); Bowman v. United States Life Ins. Co., 167 Ga. App. 673, 307 S.E.2d 134 (1983);(decided under Ga. L. 1959, p. 234, § 1 et seq.)
Purpose of permitting summary judgments is to dispose of unnecessary trials and not to upset a verdict authorized by the evidence merely because at a previous stage of the case a finding may not have been authorized in accordance with such verdict. Hill v. Willis, 224 Ga. 263, 161 S.E.2d 281 (1968).
Ga. L. 1967, p. 234, § 1 et seq. (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56) serves a useful purpose, namely, to eliminate the necessity of trial by jury if there is no genuine issue of fact to be tried. Brown v. J.C. Penney Co., 123 Ga. App. 233, 180 S.E.2d 364 (1971).
Point of summary judgment is to remove from the jury what is so clear as not to need rumination. Siefferman v. Peppers, 159 Ga. App. 688, 285 S.E.2d 61 (1981).
No intent to change existing procedures afforded to parties.
- Purpose of former Ga. L. 1959, p. 234, § 1 et seq. was not to change or amend or do away with any of the existing procedures afforded parties to a lawsuit. Braselton Bros. v. Better Maid Dairy Prods., Inc., 110 Ga. App. 515, 139 S.E.2d 124 (1964);(decided under Ga. L. 1959, p. 234, § 1 et seq.)
Not intended to eliminate all trial by jury.
- It is not the purpose of summary judgment to change the general rules with reference to submitting questions to the jury, and summary judgment should be granted only if there is no genuine issue of fact as shown by the record before the court. Wasserman v. Southland Inv. Corp., 105 Ga. App. 420, 124 S.E.2d 674 (1962); Clayton v. Steve-Cathey, Inc., 105 Ga. App. 570, 125 S.E.2d 118 (1962);(decided under Ga. L. 1959, p. 234, § 1 et seq.)
Purpose of enacting Ga. L. 1959, p. 234, § 1 et seq. was not to change the general rule that questions of negligence, of contributory negligence, of cause and proximate cause, and of whose negligence or of what negligence constitutes the proximate cause of an injury are, except in plain, palpable, and indisputable cases, solely for the jury. Malcom v. Malcolm, 112 Ga. App. 151, 144 S.E.2d 188 (1965);(decided under Ga. L. 1959, p. 234, § 1 et seq.)
Trial of all the issues of fact by the jury was not intended to be abrogated by summary judgment. Ginn v. Morgan, 225 Ga. 192, 167 S.E.2d 393 (1969).
Material issues identified.
- Purpose of summary judgment procedure is to determine whether there is a material issue of fact to be tried, rather than to set up technical pitfalls for the unwary. Glenn v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 158 Ga. App. 98, 279 S.E.2d 481 (1981).
On summary judgment, a trial court determines only whether a material issue of fact exists, and such determination does not include "the discovery of the truth of such fact" or permit frustration of a plaintiff's constitutional right to a trial by jury "by inferring the existence of other facts" from predicate evidence. Bruno's Food Stores, Inc. v. Taylor, 228 Ga. App. 439, 491 S.E.2d 881 (1997).
Procedure pierces formal verbiage of pleadings.
- Primary purpose of summary judgment procedure was to allow a party to pierce the allegations of the pleadings, show the truth to the court, and receive judgment if there was no genuine issue of material fact, although an issue might be raised by the pleadings. Scales v. Peevy, 103 Ga. App. 42, 118 S.E.2d 193 (1961); Spratlin v. Manufacturers Acceptance Corp., 105 Ga. App. 463, 125 S.E.2d 110 (1962); Calhoun v. Eaves, 114 Ga. App. 756, 152 S.E.2d 805 (1966); Laite v. Baxter, 126 Ga. App. 743, 191 S.E.2d 531 (1972); Gregory v. Vance Publishing Corp., 130 Ga. App. 118, 202 S.E.2d 515 (1973); Flanders v. Columbia Nitrogen Corp., 135 Ga. App. 21, 217 S.E.2d 363 (1975); Maxwell v. Columbia Realty Venture, 155 Ga. App. 289, 270 S.E.2d 704 (1980);(decided under Ga. L. 1959, p. 234, § 1 et seq.)
Purpose of a motion for summary judgment is to pierce formal verbiage of the pleadings by showing that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Connors v. City Council, 120 Ga. App. 499, 171 S.E.2d 578 (1969); French v. Norman, 124 Ga. App. 567, 184 S.E.2d 663 (1971).
Summary judgment is designed to enable the judge, by piercing formal verbiage of the pleadings, to filter out sham issues that might otherwise cause needless and time-consuming litigation. Boston Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 120 Ga. App. 585, 171 S.E.2d 626 (1969); Porter v. Felker, 261 Ga. 421, 405 S.E.2d 31 (1991).
Very object of a motion for summary judgment is to separate what is formal or pretended in denial or averment from what is genuine and substantial so that only the latter may subject a suitor to the burden of a trial. Maxey-Bosshardt Lumber Co. v. Maxwell, 127 Ga. App. 429, 193 S.E.2d 885 (1972).
Applicability to Certain Actions, Proceedings, Issues, and Defenses
Attorney fees.
- When a company sought attorney fees, under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11, and punitive damages from its attorneys regarding their participation in a sale of the company's assets, summary judgment should have been granted in favor of the attorneys because no claims as to which such relief might have been awarded were found to be proper. R.W. Holdco, Inc. v. Johnson, 267 Ga. App. 859, 601 S.E.2d 177 (2004).
In an action to recover on a promissory note with past due interest, and upon entering summary judgment in favor of the lender, the trial court erred in awarding the lender $10,195.40 in attorney fees in a judgment in which the principal and interest amounted to only $6,259.12; under the formula delineated under O.C.G.A. § 13-1-11, such amount was limited to $650.91. Long v. Hogan, 289 Ga. App. 347, 656 S.E.2d 868 (2008), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 516 (Ga. 2008).
Evidence supported an award of attorney fees because the evidence presented by the client in a legal malpractice suit could authorize a jury to conclude that, despite owing the client a fiduciary duty, the attorney's persistent failure to adequately represent the client went beyond mere negligence and rose to the level of bad faith. Brito v. Gomez Law Group, LLC, 289 Ga. App. 625, 658 S.E.2d 178 (2008).
Breach of fiduciary duty.
- In a case in which a company sued the company's attorneys for breach of fiduciary duty for closing a sale of the company's assets, summary judgment was properly granted in favor of the attorneys because the attorneys made all proper disclosures to the employee and officer who had apparent authority to conduct the sale, and they justifiably relied on that authority, as well as on certain consent minutes from the corporation which was represented as being the company's parent. R.W. Holdco, Inc. v. Johnson, 267 Ga. App. 859, 601 S.E.2d 177 (2004).
Summary judgment was inappropriate in a breach of fiduciary duty action which centered around a verbal settlement agreement as material fact issues remained as to whether: (1) a company's offer to buy the minority shareholders' stock required a written purchase agreement; (2) the parties agreed to all material terms; and (3) a note signed by one of the minority shareholders had been cancelled. McKenna v. Capital Res. Partners, IV, L.P., 286 Ga. App. 828, 650 S.E.2d 580 (2007), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 752, 763 (Ga. 2007).
Because a claim filed by a minority shareholder against the officers and directors of a corporation alleging their depletion of corporate assets through excessive salaries related to the value or price the shareholder would receive in a stock appraisal action, the shareholder's exclusive remedy was within that action; thus, a separate breach of fiduciary duty claim filed in the shareholder's direct action against the officers and directors was properly disposed of via summary judgment. Levy v. Reiner, 290 Ga. App. 471, 659 S.E.2d 848 (2008).
Recoupment.
- In an action seeking a writ of possession for a mobile home, because the mobile home's tenants expressly waived any recourse against their bankrupt lender arising from a prior judgment, based on a voluntary settlement with the bankrupt lender accepting a general unsecured claim, the tenants could not later assert any right of recoupment; as a result, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment as to that claim against the tenants and in favor of a successor lender. Hill v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 280 Ga. App. 151, 633 S.E.2d 451 (2006).
Employee fraud.
- Trial court properly granted summary judgment pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(c) in an employee's fraud claim, wherein the employee contended that the employee was fraudulently induced to give up additional severance benefits in order to accept an at-will position with the successor to the employer, and that such position did not in fact exist, as the record clearly indicated that the employee worked and was paid for a period of almost two years prior to the employee's termination. Cramp v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 266 Ga. App. 38, 596 S.E.2d 212 (2004).
Acts of employees.
- Because an employer had not produced any evidence that established, as a matter of law, that a bartender's actions in breaking up a fight in their bowling center fell outside the class of activities its bartenders performed generally, a jury issue remained, and summary judgment should not have been granted. Brown v. AMF Bowling Ctrs., Inc., 236 Ga. App. 277, 511 S.E.2d 619 (1999).
Plaintiff who could not show that an employee was acting within the scope of employment at the time of a collision could not show a genuine issue of material fact in a wrongful death action against the employer, and summary judgment was therefore appropriate. Tyner v. Comfort Rest Sleep Prods., Inc., 236 Ga. App. 423, 512 S.E.2d 321 (1999).
Grant of summary judgment to an amusement park in an injured worker's personal injury suit was proper because the worker had violated OSHA regulations and National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) standards governing electrical safety in numerous respects, which were mandatory and had the force of law, and the worker's conduct fulfilled all of the requirements of negligence per se. Kull v. Six Flags over Ga. II, L.P., 264 Ga. App. 715, 592 S.E.2d 143 (2003).
Summary judgment in favor of a crane company was reversed because a question of fact remained regarding whether a crane operator, who was an employee of the company, was acting as the company's employee or as a borrowed servant of a general contractor on a construction site when the operator allegedly committed a negligent act that injured a worker. A contract between the company and the contractor labeling the operator a borrowed servant was not dispositive and a question remained regarding how much control the contractor actually had over the crane operator's actions. Gibson v. Tim's Crane & Rigging, Inc., 266 Ga. App. 42, 596 S.E.2d 215 (2004).
Employee on personal errand.
- Trial court properly granted summary judgment to the company on the injured person's lawsuit alleging that the company was liable to the injured party for the actions of its employee, who struck the injured party's vehicle while turning the truck the employee was driving into an intersection as the employee returned from a personal visit with relatives as the injured person could not show that the employee was acting within the scope of employment, that the company had actual knowledge of the employee's driving record, or that the employee's driving record showed a pattern of reckless driving. Upshaw v. Roberts Timber Co., 266 Ga. App. 135, 596 S.E.2d 679 (2004).
Trial court properly granted an employer's motion for summary judgment, in a personal injury action filed by a mother and daughter as the latter failed to show that the former was liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the accident caused by its employee, given that the employee was running personal errands at the time of the collision, despite the fact the errands seemed work-related, and was not on a special mission undertaken at the employer's direction; further, any reliance by the mother and daughter on the traveling sales person exception applied in workers' compensation cases was misplaced. Gassaway v. Precon Corp., 280 Ga. App. 351, 634 S.E.2d 153 (2006).
Trial court properly granted summary judgment to the health center on the patient's claim that the center was responsible for the negligent hiring/retention of the mental health assistant who allegedly raped the patient as the health center showed that the center exercised ordinary care not to hire a person who posed a reasonably foreseeable risk of inflicting harm on others by hiring a professional investigation service to do a background check on the mental health assistant; as a result of that background check, the service advised the health center that the mental health assistant had not been involved in criminal activity and the patient did not show that the health center otherwise knew that the mental health assistant posed a risk of harm to the center's patients. Munroe v. Universal Health Servs., Inc., 277 Ga. 861, 596 S.E.2d 604 (2004).
When a company sued the company's attorneys and accountants for fraud and aiding and abetting fraud regarding their participation in a sale of the company's assets because they did not notify the company's principal of the sale, summary judgment was properly granted in favor of the attorneys and accountants because the employee who conducted the sale had apparent authority to do so and actual fraud was insufficiently pled, under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9(b), as a response to the attorneys' and accountants' motion for summary judgment. R.W. Holdco, Inc. v. Johnson, 267 Ga. App. 859, 601 S.E.2d 177 (2004).
Because a corporation's president did not participate in the allegedly negligent work of employees of the corporation at a decedent's home or supervise or direct the employees in the work at the home, summary judgment in favor of the president in a wrongful death action brought by the decedent's children was affirmed; the president's alleged failure to provide proper training to the employees was not a sufficiently direct participation in a tort to expose the president to personal liability. Beasley v. A Better Gas Co., 269 Ga. App. 426, 604 S.E.2d 202 (2004).
In the employer's action to recover for theft of corporate funds, the employee was not entitled to summary judgment because the six-year statute of limitations applicable to constructive trust claims only barred the employer's action as to some, but not all, of the employee's thefts. Total Supply, Inc. v. Pridgen, 267 Ga. App. 125, 598 S.E.2d 805 (2004).
Employer was properly granted summary judgment in an employee's personal injury and loss of consortium suit filed against the employer because the employee's accidental injury, which occurred as the employee was walking to work from an employer-owned parking facility to the employee's work building and who was struck by an employer-operated vehicle, was compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq. Longuepee v. Ga. Inst. of Tech., 269 Ga. App. 884, 605 S.E.2d 455 (2004).
Because a contract between a crane owner and a general contractor stated that the owner's employee was a borrowed servant, a trial court correctly granted summary judgment in a negligence action arising from injuries resulting from the crane operation. Tim's Crane & Rigging, Inc. v. Gibson, 278 Ga. 796, 604 S.E.2d 763 (2004).
In a negligent hiring and supervision suit based on respondeat superior filed by a decedent's wife against an employer and its allegedly negligent employee, the trial court properly denied an employer's motion for summary judgment, given that the evidence was in dispute as to whether the employee was acting in the scope of employment at the time of the fatal injury to the decedent, and whether the employee might have foreseen that some injury would have resulted from an act or omission, or that consequences of a generally injurious nature might have been expected, based upon evidence that in the 22 years that the employee had driven for companies owned by the same people, the employee had received two speeding tickets and was involved in two minor car accidents. Remediation Res., Inc. v. Balding, 281 Ga. App. 31, 635 S.E.2d 332 (2006).
In a personal injury action, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to an employer on the issue of respondeat superior as the employer could not be found liable for its employee's personal actions undertaken at the time of the collision, which were not in furtherance of the employer's interests, and were not within the employee's scope of employment nor ratified by the employer. Hankerson v. Hammett, 285 Ga. App. 610, 647 S.E.2d 319 (2007).
In a personal injury action arising from an auto accident, summary judgment to an employer was reversed as an injured driver presented some evidence showing that at the time of the accident the employer's employee might have been on a work-related cell phone call or distracted by such a call that the employee chose not to answer, creating a jury question as to the employer's liability for the employee's actions. Hunter v. Modern Cont'l Constr. Co., 287 Ga. App. 689, 652 S.E.2d 583 (2007).
In a tort action filed by an executrix against a hospital, the hospital was properly granted summary judgment on a claim of medical battery as the undisputed facts supported an inference that the executrix's mother consented to the nursing staff determining what types of food the mother could tolerate, and as a result the nursing staff's conduct in exercising that discretion in deciding what types of food the mother could eat did not support a medical battery claim. Morton v. Wellstar Health Sys., 288 Ga. App. 301, 653 S.E.2d 756 (2007), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 292 (Ga. 2008).
County sheriff's authority over county-owned property.
- County sheriff had the independent authority to repaint and remark county-owned sheriff's vehicles assigned to the sheriff's exclusive use, but lacked the authority to modify portions of a county-owned building in which the sheriff's office and jail were housed as that facility was shared with the superior, state, and magistrate courts of Clayton County, as well as the clerks of those courts, the solicitor general, and the district attorney, and hence, not under the sheriff's exclusive use. As a result, subject to compliance with O.C.G.A. § 40-8-91, summary judgment in favor of the county as to the extent of the sheriff's authority was reversed as to the former, but affirmed as to the latter. Hill v. Clayton County Bd. of Comm'rs, 283 Ga. App. 15, 640 S.E.2d 638 (2006), overruled on other grounds, Mayor & Aldermen of Savannah v. Batson-Cook Co., 291 Ga. 114, 728 S.E.2d 189 (Ga. 2012).
Applying this rule in a Federal Employers' Liability Act case and permitting the claimant to reach a jury trial, rather than applying a different theory embodied in the comparable federal rule, did no violence to the principle that federal cases interpreting the substantive law control. Hepner v. Southern Ry., 182 Ga. App. 346, 356 S.E.2d 30 (1987).
Federal Employers' Liability Act.
- Trial court erroneously granted summary judgment to an employer, upon an employee's claim for benefits under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, for injuries to the right leg, right knee, and right ankle, given the evidence substantiating those injuries and that the employer was placed on some kind of notice regarding the injuries; but, summary judgment was upheld as to claims for benefits regarding the employee's injuries to both arms, wrists, hands, feet, left ankle, and left knee as no evidence substantiating those injuries, or as to medical causation, was presented. Phelps v. CSX Transp., Inc., 280 Ga. App. 330, 634 S.E.2d 112 (2006).
Quantum meruit for broker's fee.
- In a case in which a former employee alleged that the employee was entitled to quantum meruit against the former employer for having found a buyer for the employer's property, for which the employer had orally indicated that the employer would reward the employee, but the employee failed to raise in the trial court that the employee was a referral agent who was exempt from the real estate licensing statutes pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 43-40-29(a)(9), the issue was not reviewable on appeal; summary judgment under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(c) was granted to the employer as the employee was not licensed under O.C.G.A. §§ 43-40-1(2)(A) and43-40-30(a). The true nature of the exchange was a sale of real estate, an agreement was prohibited by the licensing statutes; accordingly, it could not be the basis of a quantum meruit claim. Everett v. Goodloe, 268 Ga. App. 536, 602 S.E.2d 284 (2004).
Equitable subrogation.
- In an action seeking a declaration that a bank held a first priority lien against certain real property that a trust purchased at a non-judicial foreclosure sale, because the trust failed in the trust's burden to show that, as a matter of law, the application of the principle of equitable subrogation would impair its superior or equal equity, or that it would be unduly prejudiced thereby; and similarly failed to show that the bank was culpably and inexcusably negligent, the trial court did not err in denying the trust's motion for summary judgment. Greer v. Provident Bank, Inc., 282 Ga. App. 566, 639 S.E.2d 377 (2006).
Malicious prosecution claim by former employee.
- Employer, an armored truck company, reasonably believed that its ex-employee, a messenger, had taken five bags from a bank holding room, signed for only four, and absconded with the missing bag; the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the employer on the messenger's malicious prosecution claim. Gibbs v. Loomis, Fargo & Co., 259 Ga. App. 170, 576 S.E.2d 589 (2003).
Adverse possession by state.
- Questions of fact as to whether the state acquired land by adverse possession arise if the state's claim of acquisition by adverse possession is disputed by parties producing evidence that the parties have record title to the land, that the state's possession of the land was permissible, and that the state did not purport to have a valid claim of right to the land or give notice that it did have a valid claim to the land. Tanner v. Brasher, 254 Ga. 41, 326 S.E.2d 218 (1985).
Adverse possession by private party.
- Trial court properly granted summary judgment to the grantor's grandchildren as the grandchildren held the disputed parcel of property under color of title, via a deed to the grantor's daughter, albeit the fact that such was not effective as a deed conveying a present interest, for the prescription period of seven years, and the grantor's heirs at law did not contest the deed until suit was filed. Matthews v. Crowder, 281 Ga. 842, 642 S.E.2d 852 (2007).
Easement.
- Trial court properly granted a corporation's summary judgment motion and awarded a corporation injunctive relief, barring an owner from interfering with the corporation's right of access to a highway, as the corporation's predecessor improved property on which it held a parol license, which created an easement that ran with the land under O.C.G.A. § 44-9-4, and which passed to the corporation. Blake v. RGL Assocs., Inc., 267 Ga. App. 709, 600 S.E.2d 765 (2004).
Trial court erred in granting a couple's motion for summary judgment, in an action against a landowner declaring that a warranty deed included an express easement across the landowner's land, as the language contained within the deed failed to contain any means of identifying the quantity, dimensions, or location of the easement intended to be conveyed, and a survey failed to show the easement; thus, the express easement sought to be conveyed was void for vagueness and unenforceable. Smith v. Tolar, 281 Ga. App. 406, 636 S.E.2d 112 (2006).
Because a buyer's proposed landfill would not be a public utility, but would be privately-owned, it was not entitled to a written verification of zoning compliance so it could pursue a state permit to build a landfill; hence, when combined with the fact that the county did not violate the provisions of the Open Meetings Act under O.C.G.A. § 50-14-1(d), the county was properly granted summary judgment as to these issues. EarthResources, LLC v. Morgan County, 281 Ga. 396, 638 S.E.2d 325 (2006).
In an action arising from the sale of property, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the sellers, contrary to both O.C.G.A. §§ 44-5-62 and44-5-63, as a floodwater detention easement burdened the property by permitting the impoundment of water on it to prevent flooding or increased water runoff on other property located downstream and, even though the lake was certainly open and obvious, the same could not necessarily be said of the easement; moreover, a factual issue remained as damages and although the buyers' constructive notice of the easement by reason of its recordation within the chains of title would provide a compelling reason for exempting the easement from operation of the warranty deed, O.C.G.A. § 44-5-63 provided otherwise. McMurray v. Housworth, 282 Ga. App. 280, 638 S.E.2d 421 (2006).
Because the record contained no evidence that a neighboring landowner's predecessor in interest, or its agents, used the road continuously for at least 20 years, the predecessor did not acquire a private way by prescription and hence, the neighbor lacked any private way by prescription over a landowner's property to clear timber and remove barbed wire from the roadway without committing a trespass; hence, the trial court did not err in granting the landowner summary judgment as to the issue of trespass. Norton v. Holcomb, 285 Ga. App. 78, 646 S.E.2d 94 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1221, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 654 (Ga. 2007).
Because genuine issues of material fact remained as to whether a lessee's failure to reserve an easement to the subject property at the time the lessee executed a corrective quitclaim deed was otherwise unreasonable, foreclosing the condemnation action, partial summary judgment to the lessee was unwarranted. Wright v. Brookshire, 286 Ga. App. 162, 648 S.E.2d 485 (2007).
Pursuant to an expressed dedication involving land owned by an adjacent landowner and a neighbor, the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the neighbor as the declaration authorized the neighbor to rearrange their own building and parking spaces as long as the easement was maintained. Wilcox Holdings, Ltd. v. Hull, 290 Ga. App. 179, 659 S.E.2d 406 (2008).
Because the language of an easement agreement between two adjacent commercial landowners was ambiguous, parol evidence was admissible to show the parties' intent. Thus, questions of fact remained regarding intent, making summary judgment inappropriate. McGuire Holdings, LLLP v. TSQ Partners, LLC, 290 Ga. App. 595, 660 S.E.2d 397 (2008).
Action between adjoining landowners.
- In a suit between two landowners to enforce the terms of an easement, while no error resulted from an order striking certain affidavits in support of a second landowner's claim for reimbursement for its grading work, genuine material fact issues precluded summary judgment on this claim. Further, summary judgment was unwarranted as to the issue of whether the second landowner was entitled to use a detention pond on the first landowner's property. McGuire Holdings, LLLP v. TSQ Partners, LLC, 290 Ga. App. 595, 660 S.E.2d 397 (2008).
Appeal from probate court.
- Appeal to the superior court from the probate court is subject to established procedures for civil actions, thus entitling a party to invoke the summary judgment procedure. Woodall v. First Nat'l Bank, 118 Ga. App. 440, 164 S.E.2d 361 (1968).
Arbitration.
- Motion for summary judgment is not a proper procedural vehicle by which to seek to enforce an arbitration provision in a limited warranty because the remedy of a defendant who is aggrieved by the refusal of a plaintiff to arbitrate is to apply to the court for a stay of proceedings pending arbitration. Tillman Group, Inc. v. Keith, 201 Ga. App. 680, 411 S.E.2d 794 (1991).
Case referred to auditor.
- Court of record has no jurisdiction to entertain and grant summary judgment in a case which has been referred to an auditor for the purpose of having the auditor determine the questions of law and fact involved, if the auditor has heard the case and filed a report of the auditor's findings of law and fact. Braselton Bros. v. Better Maid Dairy Prods., Inc., 110 Ga. App. 515, 139 S.E.2d 124 (1964);(decided under Ga. L. 1959, p. 234, § 1 et seq.)
Verbal contracts.
- When a party who leased certain land from its supposed owner, who could not read, and then attempted to enforce an option to purchase the land, which was included in documents the lessee gave the owner to sign, the owner was entitled to summary judgment canceling their agreement because the agreement did not adequately describe the land that was the subject of the transaction, and the lessee was not entitled to summary judgment and specific performance. Makowski v. Waldrop, 262 Ga. App. 130, 584 S.E.2d 714 (2003).
Sellers were properly granted summary judgment in an action filed by a buyer arising out of an oral land sales contract given that: (1) no evidence of the buyer's partial performance existed sufficient to remove that contract from the statute of frauds; (2) a wetlands study and interest rate negotiation were not a part of the contract; and (3) a later negotiated contract was an arm's length transaction, the price of which was negotiated at the time, and hence, did not relate to the original contract. Payne v. Warren, 282 Ga. App. 524, 639 S.E.2d 528 (2006).
In light of the unresolved facts as to whether a monetary transfer between the parties, evidenced by an oral agreement, was either a loan or an investment, and the borrowers failed to affirmatively disprove the lender's claim that the transfer was a loan as alleged in the complaint, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the borrowers. Marcum v. Gardner, 283 Ga. App. 453, 641 S.E.2d 678 (2007).
Because a buyer's direct and uncontroverted evidence sufficiently showed the existence of an enforceable oral agreement for a dealer to sell to the buyer a rare Mercedes-Benz, with the price term being the manufacturer's suggested retail price ultimately arrived at by the manufacturer, and the dealer's circumstantial evidence failed to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding the price, the buyer satisfied the burden required to support an order granting summary judgment in the buyer's favor. Jones v. Baran Co., LLC, 290 Ga. App. 578, 660 S.E.2d 420 (2008).
Contracts.
- Because issues of fact existed as to whether the parties entered a binding contract terminating a warehousing agreement, and whether that agreement constituted an accord and satisfaction, summary judgment should not have been granted. Nebraska Plastics, Inc. v. Harris, 236 Ga. App. 499, 512 S.E.2d 388 (1999).
Summary judgment was properly granted to a hospital pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56 in the hospital's action against a doctor, seeking recovery of monies loaned to the doctor that were not repaid, because it was found that the doctor breached the agreement within six years of the time that the action was commenced and, accordingly, the action was not time-barred under O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24; the court noted that because the parties had indicated in the contract that the parties "expected" that the amount would be completely repaid within one year of when the repayments were commenced, such was merely a hope and not a binding condition that, when the year expired, started the running of the six-year limitations period, based on contract interpretation laws and the inapplicability of parol evidence under O.C.G.A. § 13-2-1(1). Walker v. Gwinnett Hosp. Sys., 263 Ga. App. 554, 588 S.E.2d 441 (2003).
Summary judgment was properly granted in favor of the seller because the trial court properly exercised the court's judgment and discretion in granting the seller's motion to open the seller's default judgment; no ratification of the parties' contract occurred because it was clear that the seller did not authorize the seller's sibling to act in the seller's behalf when the sibling signed the seller's name to the contract. MacDonald v. Harris, 265 Ga. App. 131, 593 S.E.2d 32 (2003).
When items stolen from an electric company were sold to a supply company, the supply company was not entitled to summary judgment dismissing the electric company's breach of contract claim against it because there were issues of fact concerning the scope of the contract between the parties on which this claim was based, including whether the contract covered new and used goods and whether the parties mutually departed from the agreement's terms. Fed. Ins. Co. v. Westside Supply Co., 264 Ga. App. 240, 590 S.E.2d 224 (2003).
Trial court properly granted summary judgment pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56 to those in possession of a colt in a tortious interference with a contract claim by a horse trainer, in which the trainer alleged having a contract to keep the recently born colt in exchange for continued services to the mare's owner; the court found that there was no showing that the possessors of the colt were aware of a contract regarding the ownership of the colt, the possessors had followed the necessary procedures for filing a financing statement under O.C.G.A. § 11-9-501 et seq., the possessors had allegedly foreclosed on the possessors' lien on the mare by the time that the possessors became aware of the trainer's claim, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 44-14-490, and the trainer did not record a lien against the colt pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 44-14-511. Medlin v. Morganstern, 268 Ga. App. 116, 601 S.E.2d 359 (2004).
When a retired police officer to whom a city had paid more retirement benefits than the police officer was entitled sued the city for breach of contract when the city corrected the error, the city was entitled to summary judgment because the city's contract with the officer required the payment of the amount of retirement benefits that the city paid after correcting the error, and the city clerk who caused the error had no authority to change that contract, so the contract was not breached. Dodd v. City of Gainesville, 268 Ga. App. 43, 601 S.E.2d 352 (2004).
Summary judgment for the storage companies on an owner's breach of contract claim was proper because the owner failed to show that the storage companies breached any duty owed under the contract; the contract clearly provided that the contract created no duty on the part of the storage companies to protect the owner's personal property and that the owner assumed all risk of loss. Liberty v. Storage Trust Props., L.P., 267 Ga. App. 905, 600 S.E.2d 841 (2004).
Because the trial court was faced with an ambiguity in a covenants declaration regarding the construction of improvements on commercial property, the court erred in granting summary judgment to the property's owner and the lessee, and finding that the ambiguity had to be construed against the developer, instead of first attempting to resolve the ambiguity by applying the rules of contract construction provided in O.C.G.A. § 13-2-2(4). White v. Kaminsky, 271 Ga. App. 719, 610 S.E.2d 542 (2004).
Trial court did not err in dismissing a nine-count complaint filed by two uninsured patients, for failing to state a claim and treated as a motion for summary judgment, alleging that a health care provider overcharged the patients for medical care received at rates grossly in excess of the rates charged to private medical insurers, or to Medicare/Medicaid benefit programs, as the parties entered into a valid contract, which the provider did not breach, and the patients failed to support the patients' claims that the provider committed an unfair trade practice or breached a fiduciary duty owed to the patients. Morrell v. Wellstar Health Sys., Inc., 280 Ga. App. 1, 633 S.E.2d 68 (2006).
In a dealer's action for breach of contract and trespass to chattel against two buyers following the buyers' purchase of a vehicle, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the dealer as the buyers' breach of contract, trespass to chattel, and default on the purchase agreement essentially waived any right they had to arbitrate the dispute; moreover, an appeal as to the propriety of the supersedeas bond imposed was dismissed as moot. Almonte v. West Ashley Toyota, 281 Ga. App. 808, 637 S.E.2d 755 (2006), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 71 (2007).
In a buyer's suit arising out of a failed deal to sell the seller's business seeking damages for breach of contract and specific performance, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the sellers as construction of the plain language of an addendum to the parties' letter of intent to sell the business showed that the parties had reached a binding agreement on all material terms concerning the purchase and sale of that business. Goobich v. Waters, 283 Ga. App. 53, 640 S.E.2d 606 (2006).
Based on the application of a merger clause in an expressed and lawful property sales contact, and the clear and unambiguous intent not to hold the lenders liable for transactions concerning the conveyance of a beach house made as consideration supporting the sale, summary judgment was properly granted to the lenders on the sellers' claims of fraud, concealment, breach of contract and unjust enrichment filed against the sellers. Donchi, Inc. v. Robdol, LLC, 283 Ga. App. 161, 640 S.E.2d 719 (2007).
Trial court did not err in awarding summary judgment to the State Medical Education Board, making a student liable for both the amount of the scholarship received and attorney's fees, as: (1) estoppels were unfavored under Georgia law; (2) the student came forward with no more than hearsay to support a claim that oral misrepresentations of fact were made regarding the scholarship; (3) the contract was not rescinded by either party; (4) no mutual mistake of fact was found; and (5) any impossibility in performing the contract was personal to the student. Calabro v. State Med. Educ. Bd., 283 Ga. App. 113, 640 S.E.2d 581 (2006).
Because a buyer failed to comply with provisions of its contract with a seller requiring written notice of a breach, this failure barred the buyer from relying on the seller's alleged breach of the agreement as a basis for the buyer's refusal to close and demand for refund of the earnest money; but, because the seller complied with the notice provision by notifying the buyer that the buyer's refusal to close placed the buyer in breach or default of the agreement and that the buyer had 15 days to cure the breach or default, upon the buyer's failure to do so, the buyer was entitled to summary judgment and to retain the earnest money as liquidated damages. Pillar Dev., Inc. v. Fuqua Constr. Co., 284 Ga. App. 858, 645 S.E.2d 64 (2007), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 669 (Ga. 2007).
Under the same transaction test, because the claims raised by a buyer in a Georgia state court were judicially determined in litigation between the parties in both the federal district court and the federal circuit court of appeals, and also sought redress for the same wrongs, the state court did not err in denying the buyer's partial summary judgment motion regarding those wrongs. BKJB P'ship v. Moseman, 284 Ga. App. 862, 644 S.E.2d 874, cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 558 (Ga. 2007).
Upon construction of a contract between an independent contractor and a billboard owner under O.C.G.A. § 13-2-2 because: (1) it was clear that the contractor did not waive any right to recover against the owner under any possible scenario, but only waived a right to recover against the owner's predecessor for damages if the waiver did not invalidate the insurance coverage; and (2) the contract only waived the owner's liability if the waiver did not invalidate the contractor's insurance, summary judgment was erroneously entered to the owner on grounds that the contractor waived a right to recover from the owner and because the trial court failed to consider whether the waiver invalidated the contractor's insurance. Holmes v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., 284 Ga. App. 474, 644 S.E.2d 311 (2007).
While the trial court properly found that a separate and independent contract made the subject of the buyers' breach of contract counterclaim against the seller unenforceable, supporting summary judgment for the seller on the buyers' counterclaim, the court erred in finding that the buyers' denial of any liability to the seller on the seller's complaint was insufficient; thus, the seller was not entitled to summary judgment on the seller's complaint for payment under a consignment contract and for attorney fees. Jones v. Equip. King Int'l, 287 Ga. App. 867, 652 S.E.2d 811 (2007).
On appeal from an order granting a broker's customer summary judgment in the broker's breach of contract action, because the merger doctrine did not apply to the fee contract involving a broker and the customer and the loan contract between the lender and the customer, and material fact issues remained as to the compensation due to the broker, and as to what effect, if any, a modification of the amount of the broker's fee had on the broker's fee agreement with the broker's customer, summary judgment in the customer's favor was reversed. Atlanta Integrity Mortg., Inc. v. Ben Hill United Methodist Church, Inc., 286 Ga. App. 795, 650 S.E.2d 359 (2007).
While the trial court did not err in entering an order granting partial summary judgment to a city on the city's breach of contract claim against a county and the county's tax commissioner, ruling that the latter breached the county's contract to bill, collect, and remit ad valorem taxes on the city's behalf because the county was not given adequate notice that the trial court would address the amount of damages incurred by the city as a result of the county's breach, the grant of summary judgment as to the damages issue was reversed on due process grounds. Ferdinand v. City of East Point, 288 Ga. App. 152, 653 S.E.2d 529 (2007), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 213 (Ga. 2008).
In a breach of contract action filed by a school against an enrolled student's parents seeking payment of a full year's tuition, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the school as the parents failed in the parents' burden of showing that a liquidated damages clause in the contract amounted to an unenforceable penalty. Turner v. Atlanta Girls' Sch., Inc., 288 Ga. App. 115, 653 S.E.2d 380 (2007).
Because the third party failed to present sufficient evidence supporting that party's position that the third party had a right, as successor in interest, to sue on a creditor's account with the creditor's debtor in order to support the third party's right, summary judgment in the third party's favor in a suit against the debtor was erroneously entered. Ponder v. CACV of Colo., LLC, 289 Ga. App. 858, 658 S.E.2d 469 (2008).
Summary judgment for a bank was proper on a corporation's breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and fraud claims as the bank did not promise not to foreclose the bank's superior mortgage on a property under any circumstances; the bank simply promised to pay the corporation if lots were sold and the corporation removed the corporation's materialman's lien. Kesco, Inc. v. Brand Banking Co., 268 Ga. App. 874, 603 S.E.2d 49 (2004).
Trial court properly denied summary judgment to an independent medical utilization review provider for an employee benefit health plan on a plan participant's breach of contract claim as the participant asserted a third party beneficiary claim against the review provider under a side contract between the review provider and the plan sponsor. Monroe v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys., 268 Ga. App. 659, 602 S.E.2d 219 (2004).
Summary judgment was improperly granted in favor of a limited partner on that partner's claim that a corporation's breach of contract claim against the partner was barred by the four year statute of limitations applicable to contracts for the sale of goods under O.C.G.A. § 11-2-725 because the contract involved a conveyance of leasehold interests in real property for oil and gas exploration, not the sale of oil and gas. Summary judgment should have been awarded in favor of the corporation on the corporation's claim that the six year statute of limitations in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24, which was applicable to contracts in writing, applied and did not bar the action. ABF Capital Corp. v. Yancey, 264 Ga. App. 850, 592 S.E.2d 492 (2003).
Trial court improperly granted summary judgment to a claims administrator for an employee benefit health plan on a plan participant's breach of contract claim as the participant raised a jury question on the issue of whether the claims administrator performed the administrator's contractual obligations. Monroe v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys., 268 Ga. App. 659, 602 S.E.2d 219 (2004).
Contract for specific performance.
- Grant of summary judgment to the plaintiff on the plaintiff's action for specific performance of a contract provision that allegedly required the defendant to sell the defendant's stock to the plaintiff was affirmed; the trial court properly found that the contract required one partner to sell that partner's corporate stock to another partner at book value as determined by the corporation's CPA, and that the contract was valid, enforceable, and supported by valuable consideration. Auldridge v. Rivers, 263 Ga. App. 396, 587 S.E.2d 870 (2003).
Attorney fee contracts.
- Trial court properly granted summary judgment to an attorney in the attorney's action to collect fees due under a written fee agreement with a former client as the attorney provided the services outlined within the contract, and the former client failed to produce any competent evidence supporting an affirmative defense of failure of consideration after the attorney made a prima facie case for summary judgment. Browning v. Alan Mullinax & Assocs., P.C., 288 Ga. App. 43, 653 S.E.2d 786 (2007).
Real estate sales contract.
- In an action arising from the sale of a condominium unit, the trial court did not err in denying the owners' summary judgment motion on the owners' claim of a right of first refusal, as the owners had no such right, but the owners were properly granted summary judgment on the buyer's claims of tortious interference with contractual and business relations and for punitive damages as the owners had a legitimate right to protect when the owners voted on the sale of the subject unit. Quality Foods, Inc. v. Smithberg, 288 Ga. App. 47, 653 S.E.2d 486 (2007), cert. denied, No. S08C0437, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 316 (Ga. 2008).
Contract for marital settlement.
- Trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the executors on an action to enforce a marital settlement agreement entered into before one spouse died as the agreement, which was a contract, was not unenforceable for lack of consideration, but the surviving spouse was also not entitled to judgment as a matter of law because issues regarding the deceased spouse's capacity to enter into the agreement and the surviving spouse's possible rescission of the contract had to be considered by a jury. Guthrie v. Guthrie, 259 Ga. App. 751, 577 S.E.2d 832 (2003), aff'd, 277 Ga. 700, 594 S.E.2d 356 (2004).
Contract to make a will.
- In an action to enforce a contract to make a will, the trial court erred in denying both parties' motions for summary judgment since the contract recited adequate consideration and, thus, was not illusory but was binding, the contract was not in furtherance of an immoral relationship and thus unenforceable, and the contract had not been abandoned; thus, there were no issues for which a jury decision was required. Abrams v. Massell, 262 Ga. App. 761, 586 S.E.2d 435 (2003).
Contracts between contractors.
- When a subcontractor sought compensation from a contractor for increased labor costs caused by the contractor, the contractor was not entitled to summary judgment dismissing the subcontractor's claim as: (1) the subcontractor did not waive the subcontractor's claim by failing to respond to the contractor's denial thereof within 48 hours as the contractor only decided whether the subcontractor could legally assert the subcontractor's claim; (2) the subcontractor's agreement to perform the subcontractor's work according to the contract's timetable did not bar the subcontractor's claim, as this only barred claims for delays contemplated by the parties when the contract was signed, and this provision did not address whether the subcontractor was entitled to compensation for increased labor costs; (3) change orders the subcontractor signed did not bar the subcontractor's claim as it sought damages for disruption, and not merely damages for delay; and (4) a "no damages for delay" provision in the contractor's contract with the owner did not bar the subcontractor's claim because it conflicted with a superseding provision of the contractor's contract with the subcontractor allowing the subcontractor to seek compensation for interferences and delays. Atl. Coast Mech. v. R. W. Allen Beers Constr., 264 Ga. App. 680, 592 S.E.2d 115 (2003).
Summary judgment on contract issues.
- Appellees failed to present any evidence establishing the appellees' status as the current holders of an interest in the contract at issue, despite the appellant's allegation that the contract between them has since been assigned by the appellees to a third party; therefore, since the appellant's objection that the appellees are not the real parties in interest had yet to be addressed, the trial court erred in granting the appellees' motion for summary judgment. Sawgrass Bldrs., Inc. v. Key, 212 Ga. App. 138, 441 S.E.2d 99 (1994).
Lease contracts.
- Because fact issues remained as to whether a lessee's conduct in attempting to exercise a credit amounted to a waiver of the credit, and whether the lessee made a good-faith, prompt, and diligent effort to resolve the amount due under a commercial lease so as to prevent the lessor from terminating the lease and gaining possession, both of which a jury was to decide, summary judgment was improperly entered on the lessor's claim for rent, and properly denied on the lessor's petition for a writ of possession. Eckerd Corp. v. Alterman Props., 264 Ga. App. 72, 589 S.E.2d 660 (2003).
Because a lessee failed to create an issue of fact regarding whether the lessor breached the parties' underlying commercial lease or whether the lessee waived the alleged breach, the trial court correctly granted the lessor's motion for summary judgment on the lessee's breach of contract claim. Nguyen v. Talisman Roswell, L.L.C., 262 Ga. App. 480, 585 S.E.2d 911 (2003).
Trial court properly granted summary judgment pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(c) to the defendants in an action for breach of a lease by the successor in interest to the lessor as the defendants admitted that the defendants had defaulted on the lease and that the successor was owed back rent. Gilco Invs., Inc. v. Stafford Cordele, LLC, 267 Ga. App. 167, 598 S.E.2d 889 (2004).
Because a sublease was ambiguous regarding a sublessee's obligation to pay operating expenses due under the master lease, fact questions remained as to the parties' intent, and a trial court erred in entering summary judgment for the sublessee. Holcim (US), Inc. v. AMDG, Inc., 265 Ga. App. 818, 596 S.E.2d 197 (2004).
Indemnity contracts.
- In an action to recover under an indemnity agreement, because the undisputed facts showed that a party was estopped from denying the validity of a bond, and that the party indemnified a surety for payments made thereunder, the surety was properly granted summary judgment as to the party's liability for monies paid under the bond. Samda Inv. Group, LLC v. Western Sur. Co., 287 Ga. App. 235, 651 S.E.2d 152 (2007).
Because the debtor read a plain, unambiguous guaranty contract and signed the contract as written, the court enforced the contract as written and granted summary judgment to the bank; summary judgment on damages was reversed because, although the remainder of the damages could be calculated on the record, no evidence in the record supported the post-closing interest rate. Charania v. Regions Bank, 264 Ga. App. 587, 591 S.E.2d 412 (2003).
Guaranty contract.
- As no matter of fact was involved, the construction of a guaranty was a matter of law for the court, which found that the guaranty executed by a guarantor contained a very broad waiver clause that plainly and unambiguously waived any claims the guarantor might have had against the debtor and extended to claims arising in equity, or under contract, statute, or common law; the waiver obviously included a claim under O.C.G.A. § 10-7-41, so the trial court erred by denying summary judgment to the debtor and other defendants, and erred as well in granting summary judgment in favor of the guarantor. Brookside Cmtys., LLC v. Lake Dow N. Corp., 268 Ga. App. 785, 603 S.E.2d 31 (2004).
Because an agent for a limited liability company and a builder's vice president testified that the parties negotiated and agreed on the terms of a construction contract including price, time, and the form of the contract, and the limited liability company authorized the builder to begin, the facts showed that the parties entered into an enforceable contract, and since a contract existed, the members' personal guaranties of the construction contract were valid; a trial court's summary judgment in favor of the builder on the members' personal guaranties was affirmed. Marett v. Brice Bldg. Co., 268 Ga. App. 778, 603 S.E.2d 40 (2004).
In an action to collect unpaid rent and fees owed by a lessee to a lessor under a lease agreement, the trial court properly granted partial summary judgment to the lessor, and against the lessee and the lessee's guarantor, as: (1) the language in the lease could not be construed to limit or modify the guarantor's pre-existing obligations under the guaranty through the time of the guarantor's revocation of the lease; and (2) the language of the guaranty, standing alone, was unambiguous and created an unconditional, continuing guaranty. The Cupboard, LLC v. Sunshine Travel Ctr., 283 Ga. App. 34, 640 S.E.2d 584 (2006).
In an action on a guaranty, because the plain and unambiguous terms of the guaranty and the guaranty's addendum only obligated the guarantor to the lease obligations of the original tenant, who was also the guarantor's subsidiary, and not the obligations of a new tenant, the guarantor was properly absolved of any liability to the landlord for the obligations of that new tenant, entitling the tenant to summary judgment on that issue. Highwoods Realty L.P. v. Cmty. Loans of Am., Inc., 288 Ga. App. 226, 653 S.E.2d 807 (2007).
Successor in interest tax liability.
- Order granting summary judgment on the issue of a successor in interest's liability for unpaid taxes in favor of that successor was reversed as the successor failed to protect itself from successor liability for the unpaid sales and use taxes owed by the successor's predecessor under O.C.G.A. § 48-8-46, and the successor failed to protect itself against unrecorded tax liens to the extent allowed by the statute. Graham v. JD Design Group, Inc., 281 Ga. App. 347, 636 S.E.2d 66 (2006).
Warranty contracts.
- Summary judgment should have been granted to a store, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(c), in an action by a dissatisfied customer who asserted causes of action for breach of an express warranty and a violation of the Fair Business Practices Act, O.C.G.A. § 10-1-390 et seq., as the customer failed to offer evidence of the terms of the warranty, which made both claims lack any foundation; the alleged warranty was based on a store employee's notation on the customer's receipt that the kitchen cabinets that the customer purchased had a "10-year warranty," but there was no indication of any further terms, so there was no enforceable warranty proven. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Miller, 268 Ga. App. 742, 603 S.E.2d 80 (2004).
Consent decree.
- Summary judgment was affirmed because no construction was required of a consent decree; therefore, the trial court was required to enforce the agreement as written. Since the terms of a settlement agreement were clear and unambiguous in requiring that a motorist pay $24,600 to settle a wrongful death claim, the settlement agreement was for new money and did not consider credit for $10,000 already paid by the motorist's insurer; if the parties had intended to give credit for the earlier payment, the settlement agreement would have stated this. Hicks v. Walker, 265 Ga. App. 495, 594 S.E.2d 710 (2004).
When a tenant who terminated the tenant's lease early and agreed to pay the landlord the difference between the tenant's rental obligation and rent the landlord was able to obtain from a third party said this agreement was a guaranty from which the tenant had been discharged, the landlord was entitled to partial summary judgment on the landlord's breach of contract claim in the landlord's suit to enforce the agreement because the agreement was not a guaranty subject to the discharge provisions of O.C.G.A. § 10-7-20 et seq., as the tenant did not agree to be answerable for the debt of another but, instead, agreed to continue the tenant's rental obligation to the landlord, subject to any credit the tenant might be entitled to for rent the landlord received from a third party. Equifax, Inc. v. 1600 Peachtree, L.L.C., 268 Ga. App. 186, 601 S.E.2d 519 (2004).
Breach of car dealership agreement.
- Summary judgment was properly entered for an automobile manufacturer on a dealership's claim that the manufacturer improperly terminated the parties' dealership agreement as the agreement was terminated after the dealership closed the dealership's business and the dealership's property was foreclosed; the termination was not procedurally defective as the termination notice was sent to the dealership's location of record, to the owner of the dealership at the owner's home address, and to the dealership's attorney. Greensboro Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 267 Ga. App. 773, 600 S.E.2d 631 (2004).
Summary judgment was properly entered for an automobile manufacturer on a dealership's claim that the manufacturer failed to pay for the repurchase of the dealership's parts, signage, tools, and equipment as: (1) the dealership failed to return the required release; (2) no vehicles were left at the dealership because the inventory had been seized, impounded, and sold; (3) the property on which the dealership was located had been foreclosed; (4) when the business relocated, the dealership was no longer receiving cars or parts from the manufacturer; and (5) the dealership presented no evidence of the value of the items that the dealership contended the dealership should have been paid for. Greensboro Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 267 Ga. App. 773, 600 S.E.2d 631 (2004).
Vehicle purchase agreements.
- Absent a confidential relationship between a lienholder and a prospective buyer of a vehicle subject to a lien, and absent any duty on the lienholder to disclose any problems with the vehicle's title to the buyer, the lienholder was properly granted summary judgment on the buyer's negligence, fraudulent concealment, and derivative claim for punitive damages. Lilliston v. Regions Bank, 288 Ga. App. 241, 653 S.E.2d 306 (2007), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 275 (Ga. 2008).
Foreclosure sales.
- In a wrongful foreclosure proceeding, summary judgment was properly granted in favor of the foreclosing seller because the seller showed that the buyer failed to maintain property insurance or to pay the taxes and assessments due, as required under a security deed; in addition, the propriety of the foreclosure sale was established through an attorney's affidavit and a newspaper publisher's affidavit. Ledford v. Darter, 260 Ga. App. 585, 580 S.E.2d 317 (2003).
Tax foreclosure sales.
- Trial court properly granted summary judgment to the property owner on the property owner's action that sought to set aside a deed executed pursuant to a judicial tax foreclosure sale. No genuine issue existed but that the tax sale was void because the sale was from a grantor who did not have title to the property to the property purchaser and that the sale could not pass title, which remained in the property owner. Canoeside Props. v. Livsey, 277 Ga. 425, 589 S.E.2d 116 (2003).
Request for disclosure of tax records.
- Trial court properly granted summary judgment to the corporation on the corporation's request for disclosure of the individual's tax records, which the corporation sought for the limited purpose of determining whether the individual's business properly qualified as a disadvantaged business regarding the awarding to it of a city contract for airport advertising, as Georgia's Open Records Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-18-70 et seq., favored the disclosure of public records, and neither the individual nor the city could find a specific exception that applied to bar disclosure under such circumstances. City of Atlanta v. Corey Entm't, Inc., 278 Ga. 474, 604 S.E.2d 140 (2004).
Foreclosure actions.
- Because the debtor failed to send written notice of the correct address of the subject property to the bank or the bank's agents, and could not assert an absent grantee's priority to escape the consequences of the debtor's own failure to provide a correct property address to all future holders of the note and deed, the foreclosure sale was not set aside; thus, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the bank and the assignees of the security interest on the ground that the bank provided sufficient notice of the foreclosure sale. Jackson v. Bank One, 287 Ga. App. 791, 652 S.E.2d 849 (2007), cert. denied, No. S08C0335, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 169 (Ga. 2008).
In a foreclosure action between a bank and the bank's debtors, given that the debtors failed to substantiate the claims of error asserted on appeal with sufficient evidence to create a jury question, and the bank committed no wrong in attempting to collect on a prior judgment against the debtors, summary judgment was properly entered to the bank, disposing of all the debtors' counterclaims filed against the bank. All Fleet Refinishing, Inc. v. W. Ga. Nat'l Bank, 280 Ga. App. 676, 634 S.E.2d 802 (2006).
Wrongful foreclosure.
- Lender was properly granted summary judgment on a borrower's claims for wrongful foreclosure and breach of contract because the borrower defaulted and the borrower's claims were barred by releases of liability in loan modification documents. Heritage Creek Dev. Corp. v. Colonial Bank, 268 Ga. App. 369, 601 S.E.2d 842 (2004).
Georgia Land Sales Act.
- Trial court properly granted summary judgment against a home buyer's claim that the sale of the property at issue failed to comply with the Georgia Land Sales Act (Act), O.C.G.A. § 44-3-1 et seq., as the property contained a house suitable for occupancy at the time of the sale; further, despite the buyer's argument that the statutory exemption under O.C.G.A. § 44-3-4(2) did not apply to residential property, giving the words of the exemption their plain and ordinary meaning, the exemption had to be read as excluding from the Act property upon which either a commercial building, an industrial building, a condominium, a shopping center, a house, or an apartment house was situated. Mancuso v. Steyaard, 280 Ga. App. 300, 640 S.E.2d 50 (2006).
Land sales contracts.
- In an action between a buyer and a seller arising out of a land sales contract, because a question of material fact remained as to whether the failure to close was the buyer's fault, and because both an oral waiver and waiver by conduct could be inferred, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the seller. Miller v. Coleman, 284 Ga. App. 300, 643 S.E.2d 797 (2007).
In an action arising out of an alleged breach of a land sales contract, given that the trial court relied on findings of fact that had been resolved only in the context of the ruling on an interlocutory injunction filed by the buyer, and that issues of material fact plainly remained as to whether the seller fulfilled the contractual obligations to designate land adjacent to the buyer's property for use as a city or county road, the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the seller had to be reversed. Taylor v. Thomas, 286 Ga. App. 27, 648 S.E.2d 426 (2007).
In an action filed by a trust and its trustee against a school board alleging breach of a real estate contract, or in the alternative, specific performance of the contract at a reduced purchase price, summary judgment in favor of the school board was reversed on the breach of contract claim; however, summary judgment on the specific performance claim was affirmed as the trust failed to tender the full purchase price, which was a prerequisite to a specific performance demand, the trust was not excused from doing so, and a tender would not have been futile. Peaches Land Trust v. Lumpkin County Sch. Bd., 286 Ga. App. 103, 648 S.E.2d 464 (2007).
In a dispute over an installment contract to purchase land, because evidence sufficiently showed that a buyer partially performed a subsequent oral agreement that was not barred by a merger clause contained in the contract, and the seller accepted the benefit of such performance, summary judgment to the seller was erroneous; moreover, given that jury questions as to part performance of the oral agreement remained, the order denying the buyer's partial summary judgment motion was upheld. Hernandez v. Carnes, 290 Ga. App. 730, 659 S.E.2d 925 (2008).
Suit against real estate agents.
- Trial court properly dismissed an action that a homebuyer filed against the buyer's real estate agent and a seller's real estate agent after the ignition of natural gas that had leaked from the fireplace in the buyer's house because there was no evidence that either agent knew about the leak, concealed the leak, or provided false information about the value of the house. Resnick v. Meybohm Realty, Inc., 269 Ga. App. 486, 604 S.E.2d 536 (2004).
Trial court erred in granting summary judgment to a home seller and against a realtor in construing the unambiguous language in the brokerage agreement at issue, which was for a definite term and was not terminable at will; moreover, although a sale was not consummated, the realtor remained entitled to the realtor's six percent commission, and the seller remained obligated to pay that amount, which was the proper measure of damages. Ben Farmer Realty, Inc. v. Owens, 286 Ga. App. 678, 649 S.E.2d 771 (2007), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 81 (Ga. 2008).
Third party beneficiary.
- Trial court properly granted summary judgment pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(c) to the Stone Mountain Memorial Association and to the Georgia Department of Corrections in a breach of contract action by an inmate who was injured while on a work detail that was required by the Department on the Association's property as the inmate was not an intended beneficiary of the contract pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-2-20(b); although the contract provided for the safety of the workplace, those contract provisions were not intended to benefit the inmates on work details but, instead, the inmates were just incidental beneficiaries. Gay v. Ga. Dep't of Corr., 270 Ga. App. 17, 606 S.E.2d 53 (2004).
In a breach of contract action filed by an employee, who was a third-party beneficiary to an employment contract with a contractor, the trial court erred in granting the employee summary judgment as: (1) under the plain language of the employment agreement at issue between the parties, as well as the county's personnel policy, the contractor was authorized to terminate the employee based on the employee's inability or unfitness to perform the assigned duties due to an injury; and (2) the employee could not perform all the job's requirements. Am. Water Serv. USA v. McRae, 286 Ga. App. 762, 650 S.E.2d 304 (2007), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 761 (Ga. 2007).
Because a valid general release entered into by a home buyer and home builder effectuated a binding accord and satisfaction barring any future claims between the parties, and absent evidence to void the release based on fraud, the buyer's filed claims in a subsequent suit filed against the home builder were properly summarily dismissed; thus, assessment of attorney fees was not an abuse of discretion and a penalty for filing a frivolous appeal was ordered. Pacheco v. Charles Crews Custom Homes, Inc., 289 Ga. App. 773, 658 S.E.2d 396 (2008).
Contract action involving road construction.
- Summary judgment pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56 was properly granted in the county's action to recover money had and received by the contractor because the contractor asserted that the contract, which was for road striping and which was not opened for public bidding, was for a specialized service under O.C.G.A. § 32-4-63(5), an exception to the public bidding requirements under O.C.G.A. § 32-4-64; however, O.C.G.A. § 32-1-3(6) expressly defined road striping as a form of road construction and not as a special service. Howard v. Brantley County, 260 Ga. App. 330, 579 S.E.2d 758 (2003).
Trial court erred in granting summary judgment on a homebuyer's breach of contract claim against the buyer's realtor as material fact issues remained as to whether the realtor violated the realtor's duties under the Brokerage Relationships in Real Estate Transaction Act, O.C.G.A. § 10-6A-1 et seq.; however, summary judgment was proper, based on the testimony presented on the motion, as to the homebuyer's fraudulent concealment claim. Ikola v. Schoene, 264 Ga. App. 338, 590 S.E.2d 750 (2003).
Employment contracts.
- Trial court did not err by granting summary judgment to a company on an employee's action to enforce an employment agreement and a promise to convey 20 percent of the company's stock to the employee because: (1) the indefinite statement in the employment contract of the employee's duties, the term of the employment, and the employee's salary made the employment contract unenforceable; and (2) the promise of 20 percent of the company's stock was for past consideration, and that was not sufficient consideration to make the promise enforceable. Key v. Naylor, Inc., 268 Ga. App. 419, 602 S.E.2d 192 (2004).
Because there was some evidence that an employment contract was valid and enforceable, the employer was not entitled to summary judgment; but, the employer was entitled to judgment because the time period for payment of future commissions was too indefinite to be enforced as those commissions were not otherwise billable during the period of employment. Hiers v. ChoicePoint Servs., 270 Ga. App. 128, 606 S.E.2d 29 (2004).
In an employee's suit arising out of the termination of an employment contract, the trial court properly granted the employer's motion for summary judgment as: (1) as an at-will employee, the employee could be terminated without cause at any time; (2) the employer was authorized to protect the employer's interest in the employer's curriculum and property; (3) no evidence supported a claim of slander; and (4) vague statements accusing the employee of a crime did not constitute slander per se. Taylor v. Calvary Baptist Temple, 279 Ga. App. 71, 630 S.E.2d 604 (2006).
Upon a de novo review of the plain terms outlined in an employment contract, a former employer was not entitled to receive commission payments from a former employee, a licensed sales agent, for deals closed with the employee's subsequent employer as any contrary reading would result in an unenforceable contract, under O.C.G.A. § 43-40-19(c); hence, summary judgment was properly granted to the employee on that issue, and the former employer's claim for money had and received also failed. Richard Bowers & Co. v. Creel, 280 Ga. App. 199, 633 S.E.2d 555 (2006).
In an action regarding an alleged breach of an employment contract seeking commissions on deals made by a real estate agent that a former real estate broker alleged it was entitled to, the trial court erred in entering summary judgment against the agent, finding that the agent owed the broker commissions as to one of two contested deals, because: (1) the agent closed the deal with that client after terminating employment with the broker; and (2) it was undisputed that the agent had not agreed to share commissions with the broker on deals struck after the agent left the broker's employ. Thus, since summary judgment was properly entered in the agent's favor regarding commissions paid to the agent as to the second of the two contested clients, the broker was not entitled to litigation costs under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11. Morgan v. Richard Bowers & Co., 280 Ga. App. 533, 634 S.E.2d 415 (2006).
Trial court did not err in denying an employer's summary judgment motion, determining that the employee had performed the services necessary to be entitled to the allegedly agreed-upon per diem compensation; hence, the employee's status as an at-will employee was not determinative, and did not bar the cause of action. Walker Elec. Co. v. Byrd, 281 Ga. App. 190, 635 S.E.2d 819 (2006).
Trial court did not err in granting an employer's motion for summary judgment: (1) denying the employee's request for mandamus relief, given that the employee had no clear legal right to a job reinstatement, and based on a federal conviction, that claim was moot; and (2) denying the employer's quantum meruit claim, as the existence of an employment contract, under which the employee sought the same compensation as a quantum meruit claim, precluded any quantum meruit recovery. Williams v. City of Atlanta, 281 Ga. 478, 640 S.E.2d 35 (2007).
In a renewal action resulting from the termination of a commission agreement in favor of a payee, because the payee's quantum meruit and reformation claims were barred by res judicata, and the fact that the state court potentially lacked jurisdiction over the reformation claim was immaterial, the trial court erred in denying the payor's motion for summary judgment. ChoicePoint Servs. v. Hiers, 284 Ga. App. 640, 644 S.E.2d 456 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1166, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 499 (Ga. 2007).
In an action arising from an alleged employment contract between the parties, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to an employer as genuine issues of material fact remained regarding whether a contract indeed existed between the parties, which the employee actually signed and acknowledged. Shilling v. Cornerstone Med. Assocs., LLC, 290 Ga. App. 169, 659 S.E.2d 416 (2008).
In a breach of contract action centering around a contract of employment with a county employer and the county's board of tax assessors, because the employment contract was never approved by the county commission, and the county's payment of a salary to the employee was not considered a ratification of the contract in the contract's entirety, the employee possessed only an at-will employment. Thus, summary judgment was properly entered against the employee. Powell v. Wheeler County, 290 Ga. App. 508, 659 S.E.2d 893 (2008).
Non-solicitation covenants in employment contracts.
- In an action arising from an alleged breach of a non-solicitation covenant within a consultant agreement, because the employee subject to the covenant understood the covenant to apply only to those clients the employee's employer acquired when it bought the employee's former company, or with whom the employee had material contact during the course of that employment, the trial court misconstrued the agreement by limiting the agreement's scope, and the employer was erroneously granted summary judgment based on the employee's alleged breach. Atl. Ins. Brokers, LLC v. Slade Hancock Agency, Inc., 287 Ga. App. 677, 652 S.E.2d 577 (2007).
Action under Fair Dismissal Act.
- In an action in which an employee, who was terminated for failing to obtain an educator's certificate, waived a rehearing, and was paid a full salary through the date of a hearing, the employee's due process rights under the Fair Dismissal Act, O.C.G.A. § 20-2-940, were not violated; consequently, the school board was properly granted summary judgment. Oliver v. Lee County Sch. Dist., 270 Ga. App. 61, 606 S.E.2d 88 (2004).
Summary judgment based on lack of foreseeability of crime.
- Trial court erred by granting summary judgment based on the lack of foreseeability of a third-party crime; specifically, the parking lot owners clearly knew of prior crimes on the premises prior to the plaintiff sustaining injuries. Rautenberg v. Pope, 351 Ga. App. 503, 831 S.E.2d 209 (2019), cert. denied, No. S20C0054, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 276 (Ga. 2020).
Solemn admission in judicio.
- Trial court properly granted a seller's motion for partial summary judgment and denied the escrow agent's motion to dismiss, in the seller's suit to recover the earnest money deposited by the buyers because the buyers admitted in the buyers' answer that the buyers knew the identity and location of the property, and although the buyers later amended the buyers' answer to raise a Georgia Statute of Frauds, O.C.G.A. § 13-5-30, defense, the buyers never withdrew the buyers' admission, and the buyers and the escrow agent were bound by the admission; the admission constituted a solemn admission in judicio under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-24(b)(7) (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-14-26), and created a conclusive presumption of law under former subsection (a) of that section. Nhan v. Wellington Square, LLC, 263 Ga. App. 717, 589 S.E.2d 285 (2003).
Res judicata.
- Appeals court agreed with the trial court that the doctrine of res judicata barred the negligence and breach of contract claims asserted by two property owners against a contractor as: (1) the claims were essentially identical to the allegations in a counterclaim filed in a prior Cherokee County action; (2) the parties in the two cases were identical for purposes of res judicata; and (3) the Cherokee County suit resulted in an adjudication on the merits. Perrett v. Sumner, 286 Ga. App. 379, 649 S.E.2d 545 (2007).
Stock agreement not illegal or immoral.
- Although the parties intended to circumvent Georgia Department of Revenue regulations by issuing corporate stock to an employee's spouse, the stock agreement was not illegal or immoral, a trial court erred in voiding the interest of the employee's spouse, and summary judgment in favor of the corporation in the spouse's action for an accounting, dissolution, and other relief was reversed; the corporation's failure to add a different shareholder's name to the corporate stock register did not demand a finding, for summary judgment purposes, that the person was not a shareholder, and the denial of the corporation's summary judgment motion as to that shareholder was affirmed. Edwards v. Grapefields, Inc., 267 Ga. App. 399, 599 S.E.2d 489 (2004).
Oral contract for transfer of real property.
- Summary judgment was properly entered against the deceased's child on a claim against the deceased's estate for specific performance in regard to an alleged oral contract for the conveyance of property since no evidence was presented regarding the value of the land or the home or the value of the services performed in exchange for the alleged promise. Miller v. Miller, 262 Ga. App. 546, 586 S.E.2d 36 (2003), overruled on other grounds, Mateen v. Dicus, 281 Ga. 455, 637 S.E.2d 377.
Landowners' trespass and negligence suit.
- Trial court properly denied a neighbor's motion for summary judgment and the appellate court reversed the denial of the cross-motion for summary judgment filed by the adjoining landowners in a trespass and negligence suit because the neighbor purchased property without first obtaining a survey and the adjoining landowners' home was already encroaching upon the neighbor's property by two feet at the time of the purchase; the adjoining landowners were not liable for their predecessor's conduct in building the house and a fence across the property line of the neighbor's predecessor in title, in the absence of evidence that their predecessor was acting as their agent, and were, therefore, entitled to summary judgment. Navajo Constr., Inc. v. Brigham, 271 Ga. App. 128, 608 S.E.2d 732 (2004).
Landowner's trespass and nuisance suit.
- In two cases involving a dispute for nuisance and trespass arising out of excessive water runoff which flowed onto a landowner's land, the trial court's grant of summary judgment to a construction contractor as to the issue of the contractor's liability was reversed, while the denial of summary judgment to a developer as to the issue of the contractor's liability was affirmed, as: (1) the combination of the lay and expert testimony as to the presence of the excess runoff and its cause presented questions of fact for a jury to decide; (2) merely because the county approved the development activities did not mean that either the contractor or the developer or both could not be held liable for nuisance; and (3) the landowner's action against the alleged creators of the water-runoff nuisance was authorized, regardless of their having sold the property. Green v. Eastland Homes, Inc., 284 Ga. App. 643, 644 S.E.2d 479 (2007), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 629 (Ga. 2007).
Premises liability to invitee.
- In a premise liability action, because questions of fact remained as to whether a student was a university's invitee at the time the student was shot on what was alleged to be the university's property at the time of the assault, and thus, whether the university owed the student a duty of ordinary care, and no evidence was presented that the student lost an "invitee" status, summary judgment in the university's favor was reversed. Clark Atlanta Univ., Inc. v. Williams, 288 Ga. App. 180, 654 S.E.2d 402 (2007), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 227 (Ga. 2008).
In a premises liability action filed by a guest of a property owner, because the guest failed to show that the owner had any actual or constructive knowledge of the alleged hazard that allegedly caused the guest's injuries, specifically, a hole in an otherwise flat, grassy area of the owner's yard, the court properly granted the owner summary judgment. Thomas v. Deason, 289 Ga. App. 753, 658 S.E.2d 165 (2008).
Restrictive covenants.
- On appeal from an order in a declaratory judgment action, the trial court did not err in finding, upon cross-motions for summary judgment, that restrictive covenants which had been made applicable to the subdivision over 20 years earlier remained in effect and prohibited a buyer from re-subdividing certain tracts into residential lots with less than five acres, but did err in ruling that interpretation of the covenants was a legal matter for the court, rather than a factual matter for the jury. Britt v. Albright, 282 Ga. App. 206, 638 S.E.2d 372 (2006), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 199 (Ga. 2007).
Credibility.
- If credibility is crucial, summary judgment becomes improper and a trial indispensable. Winkles v. Brown, 227 Ga. 33, 178 S.E.2d 865 (1970).
If a question of credibility arises as to a material issue, summary judgment should not be granted. Georgia Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Almon, 122 Ga. App. 42, 176 S.E.2d 205 (1970); Ash v. Spear, 137 Ga. App. 12, 223 S.E.2d 26 (1975).
Questions of credibility cannot be resolved on summary judgment. Jones v. Howard, 153 Ga. App. 137, 264 S.E.2d 587 (1980).
False light and invasion of privacy.
- Trial court properly granted summary judgment to an auto dealer, mortgage broker, and lender on an accused person's claim for invasion of privacy by placing a person in a false light as the accused person did not show that the false information - that the accused person allegedly participated in a fraudulent financing scheme - was distributed to the public at large. Additionally, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment on the issue of the accused person's claim that there was an invasion of privacy through appropriation as the accused person did not show any evidence that they took the accused person's name and likeness for their own advantage. Blakey v. Victory Equip. Sales, Inc., 259 Ga. App. 34, 576 S.E.2d 38 (2002).
Defamation actions.
- Summary judgment procedures are particularly appropriate in defamation actions when U.S. Const., amend. i is applicable. Williams v. Trust Co., 140 Ga. App. 49, 230 S.E.2d 45 (1976).
Because of the importance of free speech, summary judgment is the rule, not the exception, in defamation cases. Rosanova v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 411 F. Supp. 440 (S.D. Ga. 1976), aff'd, 580 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1978).
Debtor's defamation claim, under O.C.G.A. § 51-5-1(a), against a creditor for reporting its repossession of collateral from the debtor to credit reporting agencies was properly summarily dismissed, under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(c), because such a claim was preempted by the Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., absent the creditor's malice or willful intent to injure the debtor, which were not shown. Corbin v. Regions Bank, 258 Ga. App. 490, 574 S.E.2d 616 (2002).
Summary judgment for a city manager was appropriate in a community activist's defamation action because the activist was a limited-purpose public figure by reason of extensive participation in city affairs, and the activist failed to show actual malice by the manager. Sparks v. Peaster, 260 Ga. App. 232, 581 S.E.2d 579 (2003).
Summary judgment was improperly granted to an employer pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(c) in a terminated employee's suit alleging breach of contract, defamation, and tortious interference with contract because there were disputed questions of material fact and matters of credibility that a jury had to resolve regarding whether the corporation's president discharged the employee in good faith or did so for personal reasons unrelated to the employee's job performance. Salhab v. Tift Heart Ctr., P.C., 260 Ga. App. 799, 581 S.E.2d 363 (2003).
Statement that a sheriff provided to the Georgia Department of Labor (DOL) after the sheriff decided not to rehire an employee and the employee filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits was privileged, and the trial court ruled correctly that the sheriff was entitled to summary judgment on the employee's claim alleging slander, even though the sheriff's statement was published by a newspaper one week later and the newspaper published a follow-on article that stated that the sheriff stood by the statement the sheriff made to the DOL. Cooper-Bridges v. Ingle, 268 Ga. App. 73, 601 S.E.2d 445 (2004).
Trial court erroneously granted summary judgment against an election candidate, and in favor of the incumbent, on the former's defamation claims stemming from a printed newspaper advertisement as issues of fact remained as to the actual malice exhibited by the incumbent in publishing the advertisement, and the flagrant accusations stated therein went beyond the criticism, hostility, and unfairness a candidate might expect to encounter while running for political office. Howard v. Pope, 282 Ga. App. 137, 637 S.E.2d 854 (2006).
Libel actions.
- In an action by a contractor against a newspaper and the newspaper's editor, because: (1) the average reader would have interpreted a printed headline's use of the term "rape" as an attempt to convey the severity of the damage to the land that the contractor inflicted rather than to characterize the contractor's conduct that resulted in the damage as criminal; and (2) the article referred to by the headline did not constitute libel per se as the editor unquestionably did not intend, and readers did not interpret, the word "rape" as having any sexual connotation in the context used in the article, the editor and the newspaper were properly granted summary judgment as to the contractor's libel and libel per se claims. Lucas v. Cranshaw, 289 Ga. App. 510, 659 S.E.2d 612 (2008).
Defamation actions by public figures.
- If public figures bring defamation actions, summary judgment, rather than a trial on the merits, is a proper vehicle for affording constitutional protection if there is no substantive basis for a finding of knowing falsity or reckless disregard. Williams v. Trust Co., 140 Ga. App. 49, 230 S.E.2d 45 (1976).
In as much as the First Amendment mandates that a public figure plaintiff prove actual malice by clear and convincing evidence, a court ruling on a motion for summary judgment in a defamation case must be guided by the New York Times "clear and convincing" evidentiary standard in determining whether a genuine issue of actual malice exists - that is, whether the evidence presented is such that a reasonable jury might find that actual malice had been shown with convincing clarity. Barber v. Perdue, 194 Ga. App. 287, 390 S.E.2d 234 (1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 967, 111 S. Ct. 430, 112 L. Ed. 2d 414 (1990).
Application of public figure standard in libel case.
- Summary judgment as to liability was reversed because the intermediate appellate court and the trial court applied the wrong standard of fault to a limited-purpose public figure involved in a controversy over the operation of a county landfill; the New York Times v. Sullivan standard applied, requiring the public figure to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the Internet user published false and defamatory statements knowing that the statements were false or acting in reckless disregard of their truth or falsity. Mathis v. Cannon, 276 Ga. 16, 573 S.E.2d 376 (2002).
Application of voluntary payment doctrine.
- Voluntary payment doctrine did not bar a city's unjust enrichment and conversion claims filed against a construction contractor as the contractor failed to show that a genuine issue of material fact remained over whether the city was negligent in ascertaining the true facts and any prejudice if the duplicate payment were returned to the city. D & H Constr. Co. v. City of Woodstock, 284 Ga. App. 314, 643 S.E.2d 826 (2007).
Assertions that were merely opinions.
- Trial court properly granted the youth leader's motion for summary judgment on the troop leader's libel action since the youth leader's resignation letter, which, inter alia, alleged that the troop leader was "immoral" and did not live life according to the ideals of scouting did not support a libel action since its assertions were only opinions, incapable of being proved false. Gast v. Brittain, 277 Ga. 340, 589 S.E.2d 63 (2003).
Action against police officers.
- In an action for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution, the police officers were entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity after a school's principal failed to show the officers acted with actual malice or deliberate intent to injure the principal when the officers arrested the principal for hindering the arrest of two students for fighting and closing a door on an officer's foot and arm. Reed v. DeKalb County, 264 Ga. App. 83, 589 S.E.2d 584 (2003).
Background check agent was entitled to summary judgment on the employee's claims for negligence, defamation, libel, and slander since the employee's agreement with the employer, which contained an exculpatory clause releasing the employer and the employer's agents from any liabilities, claims, or lawsuits in regard to the information obtained in any background check was valid and the libel, slander, and defamation claims were barred by the one year statute of limitations as publication occurred when the agent sent the report to the employer not when the employer fired the employee. McCleskey v. Vericon Res., Inc., 264 Ga. App. 31, 589 S.E.2d 854 (2003).
Defenses of lack of jurisdiction and insufficient service.
- Defenses of lack of jurisdiction over the person and insufficiency of service of process are matters in abatement, not matters in bar, and are not within the scope of summary judgment procedure. Larwin Mtg. Investors v. Delta Equities, Inc., 129 Ga. App. 769, 201 S.E.2d 187 (1973).
Jurisdictional type motion is not within the scope of summary judgment procedure. Hemphill v. Con-Chem, Inc., 128 Ga. App. 590, 197 S.E.2d 457 (1973).
Waiver of most defenses.
- Trial court erred to the extent the court ruled that an insurer was prevented from introducing any evidence on liability following a default judgment entered against the insurer because the insurer could still assert policy defenses but, otherwise, by failing to answer timely the insurer was precluded from asserting any affirmative defense included within O.C.G.A. § 9-11-8(c). Willis v. Allstate Ins. Co., 321 Ga. App. 496, 740 S.E.2d 413 (2013).
Motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the person, when tried on affidavits pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-43(b), do not become motions for summary judgment. McPherson v. McPherson, 238 Ga. 271, 232 S.E.2d 552 (1977); Terrell v. Porter, 189 Ga. App. 778, 377 S.E.2d 540 (1989).
Although a defendant's motion for summary judgment raised the issue of insufficiency of service of process, that defense is a plea in abatement and, as such, it is not properly a basis of a motion for summary judgment, but if the defense is raised for resolution in the trial court and it has not otherwise been waived by the defendant, the nomenclature of the pleading that raises that issue should not be a material consideration. Under these circumstances, the proper disposition of the case is to vacate the order of the trial court on the cross-motions for summary judgment and to remand the case with the direction that the plaintiff's complaint be dismissed for insufficiency of service of process. Cheshire Bridge Enters., Inc. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 183 Ga. App. 672, 359 S.E.2d 702, cert. denied, 183 Ga. App. 905, 359 S.E.2d 702 (1987).
Dilatory pleas.
- Because summary judgment was improperly granted on a dilatory plea, and hence was not an adjudication on the merits, a plea of res judicata in a subsequent action would be denied. National Heritage Corp. v. Mount Olive Mem. Gardens, Inc., 244 Ga. 240, 260 S.E.2d 1 (1979).
Discrimination.
- Although there was evidence that a homeowner who listed a house with a real estate agency committed discrimination when the homeowner refused to show the house to African-American homebuyers, the evidence did not support the homebuyers' claims that the agency and a broker who worked for the agency participated in that discrimination, and the appellate court reversed the trial court's judgment denying summary judgment in favor of the agency, the broker, and a real estate company that sold a franchise to the agency on the homebuyers' claims alleging violation of Georgia's Fair Housing Act, O.C.G.A. § 8-3-200 et seq., and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Coldwell Banker Real Estate Corp. v. DeGraft-Hanson, 266 Ga. App. 23, 596 S.E.2d 408 (2004).
Dispute as to meaning of words.
- When it is clear from a writing and other evidence that the parties' intent as to meaning of certain words contained in the writing is in dispute, summary judgment should not be granted. Jones v. Howard, 153 Ga. App. 137, 264 S.E.2d 587 (1980).
Language of agreement controlled between exterminator and insurer.
- Exterminator was properly granted summary judgment in a home owner's action to recover additional damages after a settlement for termite damage because the literal language of the agreement made additional repairs the responsibility of an insurer, rather than the exterminator. Anderson v. Astro Exterminating Servs., 259 Ga. App. 370, 577 S.E.2d 67 (2003).
Domestication of child support judgments of foreign countries.
- In a case in which the plaintiff, a West German resident, sought to domesticate a West German judgment for child support, and because the facts established the defendant's minimum contacts with West Germany and that the defendant was afforded adequate notice and a reasonable opportunity to be heard in West Germany, the court abused the court's discretion in failing to rule that the West German judgment be domesticated and was enforceable according to the judgment's terms. Knothe v. Rose, 195 Ga. App. 7, 392 S.E.2d 570 (1990).
Failure to file Family Violence Report.
- Officers who investigated a claim of possible child abuse failed in the officers' obligation to file a Family Violence Report, as required by O.C.G.A. § 17-4-20.1(c), and the trial court properly denied a motion for summary judgment pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56 by the officers and others in a wrongful death claim on behalf of a deceased child as genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether their failure to investigate and file the necessary report proximately resulted in the child's injuries and death; the definition of "family violence" was broad under O.C.G.A. § 19-13-1, and although "reasonable discipline" was excepted thereunder, the officers had an obligation to investigate allegations that a child was being whipped. Meagher v. Quick, 264 Ga. App. 639, 594 S.E.2d 182 (2003).
Forfeiture of bond.
- Jury trial is not required when a bond is forfeited, unless the trial court agrees that there are genuine issues of material fact to be resolved. State v. Slaughter, 246 Ga. 174, 269 S.E.2d 446 (1980).
On forfeiture of bond, securities become quasiparties to the proceedings and subject themselves to the jurisdiction of the court so that summary judgment may be rendered on their bonds. State v. Slaughter, 246 Ga. 174, 269 S.E.2d 446 (1980).
Counterclaim for payments on bond by co-surety.
- Summary judgment was properly entered for a lessee bank on a lessor developer's counterclaim that alleged that the bank was obligated to pay the entire debt to the bondholder incurred to fund the project, rather than the debt service over the 15-year term of the lease, as the parties knew that the lease term was 15 years and that the term of the note was 20 years, yet failed to specifically provide that the bank pay the debt after the lease expired; parol evidence was inadmissible under O.C.G.A. § 13-2-2(1) to prove the parties' intentions as the lease was unambiguous. Porter Communs. Co. v. SouthTrust Bank, 268 Ga. App. 29, 601 S.E.2d 422 (2004).
Fraud.
- Although summary judgment may in a proper case be obtained in an action based on fraud and misrepresentation, summary judgment will be denied if the moving party is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Mitchell v. Calhoun, 229 Ga. 757, 194 S.E.2d 421 (1972).
If information as to a claimed fraudulent transaction rests exclusively within the knowledge of the participants, and the plaintiff has no means successfully to meet the facts alleged in the defendant's affidavit, summary judgment should not be granted on the defendant's affidavit. Mitchell v. Calhoun, 229 Ga. 757, 194 S.E.2d 421 (1972).
Because the plaintiff alleged fraud but failed to point to any evidence to prove an essential element of fraud, there remained no genuine issue of material fact, and therefore the trial court did not err in granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the issue of fraud. Brown v. Buffington, 203 Ga. App. 402, 416 S.E.2d 883 (1992).
Trial court erroneously granted summary judgment dismissing the home buyers' fraud claim against the sellers and the sellers' agent, given various misrepresentations made by the sellers' agent on the sellers' behalf, for the purpose of inducing the buyers to purchase the home. Smiley v. S & J Inves., Inc., 260 Ga. App. 493, 580 S.E.2d 283 (2003).
When items stolen from an electric company were sold to a supply company, the supply company was not entitled to summary judgment dismissing the electric company's fraud claim against the supply company because a jury could find that the supply company's principal knew the items were stolen. Fed. Ins. Co. v. Westside Supply Co., 264 Ga. App. 240, 590 S.E.2d 224 (2003).
Trial court erred in granting summary judgment pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(c) to a parent in an action against the parent's child, alleging fraud and coercion in the child's failure to transfer assets to the parent after the parent had transferred them to the parent's two children in order to protect them in the event that the parent was put into a nursing home; the evidence showed that the parent had control over all faculties and was under no duress, fraud, or coercion while engaging in the transfers to the children, and summary disposition of the issues as to liability and vesting of title back to the parent was inappropriate. Friar v. Friar, 265 Ga. App. 680, 595 S.E.2d 374 (2004).
Because it was shown that a decedent, before dying, substantially depleted his assets by making gifts to his wife and by purchasing land in the name of a corporate entity without consideration from the entity, a jury could infer that the decedent was intentionally depleting his assets to deprive his ex-wife of access to those assets in claims under the terms of a settlement agreement between the decedent and the ex-wife. Since such actions could be construed as an intent to defraud, it was error to grant the decedent's executor, the decedent's surviving wife, and the corporate entity summary judgment on claims of fraud. Miller v. Lomax, 266 Ga. App. 93, 596 S.E.2d 232 (2004).
Buyer presented enough evidence to raise issues of fact concerning the buyer's claim that the sellers knew about the condition of a septic system before the sellers sold the house and intentionally misled the buyer by telling the buyer that the system was in "perfect working order," and the trial court erred by granting the sellers' motion for summary judgment on the buyer's claim alleging fraud. Hudson v. Pollock, 267 Ga. App. 4, 598 S.E.2d 811 (2004).
Summary judgment for storage companies in an owner's fraud claim was proper because: (1) the parties' contract contained a merger clause; (2) the owner did not seek to rescind the contract until the owner filed a complaint; (3) by seeking damages for breach of contract in the owner's complaint, the owner took action inconsistent with a repudiation; (4) the owner delayed almost nine months in attempting to rescind the contract; and (5) since the owner failed to promptly rescind the contract, the merger clause barred the owner's fraud claim. Liberty v. Storage Trust Props., L.P., 267 Ga. App. 905, 600 S.E.2d 841 (2004).
In an action between a home builder and its buyers, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment on the buyers' fraud claim as: (1) the terms of the construction contract explicitly acknowledged that the construction price was based on allowances set in the budget and would change if actual costs exceeded the original allowance amount; (2) the buyers both acknowledged that the buyers understood that the original contract price was not a fixed price, and that the buyers would be responsible for actual costs that exceeded the allowances contained in the contract; (3) the buyers admitted that a portion of the additional costs resulted from changes that the buyers had requested; and (4) as a result, the mere existence of the change orders did not indicate that the builder fraudulently induced the buyers to enter into the contract. Davis v. Whitford Props., 282 Ga. App. 143, 637 S.E.2d 849 (2006).
Trial court did not err in granting a car dealer summary judgment against a customer's fraud claim as: (1) the customer's contention that the dealer knew of the alleged defects in a car sold to the customer at the time of the sale was specifically negated by affidavits submitted by the dealer's service and maintenance employees; and (2) even if the dealer knew of the car's defectiveness after the sale, this knowledge did not amount to either knowledge, or a reckless disregard of the car's defectiveness, at the time of the sale; hence, as a result, the trial court did not err in granting the dealer's motion for summary judgment on the customer's claims for attorney fees under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11, costs, and punitive damages pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1. Morris v. Pugmire Lincoln Mercury, Inc., 283 Ga. App. 238, 641 S.E.2d 222 (2007).
Dissolution of nonprofit corporation.
- Trial court erred in entering summary judgment for a college as to a Baptist convention's request to enjoin the college from dissolving as: (1) the convention was a member of the college under the Georgia Nonprofit Corporations Code, specifically under an earlier version of O.C.G.A. § 14-3-140; (2) the college's attempt at dissolving was a sham as the college intended to continue its functions under a new corporate entity; (3) the corporate reorganization was either a merger under O.C.G.A. § 14-3-1103(a)(3) or a disposition of assets under O.C.G.A. § 14-3-1202(b)(3), but it was not a true dissolution, and absent the convention's approval, it could not stand; and (4) O.C.G.A. § 14-3-1430(2)(A) did not justify the dissolution as the convention was the only member and it did not seek dissolution. Baptist Convention v. Shorter College, 266 Ga. App. 312, 596 S.E.2d 761 (2004), aff'd, 279 Ga. 466, 614 S.E.2d 37 (2005).
Stockholders' declaratory judgment action.
- Because no evidence was presented that the shares in the administratively dissolved company which the stockholders originally purchased, and which pre-dated the corporation's formation, were ever transformed into the corporation's stock, and the stockholders' fraud claims were vague at best, the corporation was properly granted summary judgment in the stockholders' declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that the stockholders owned stock in the corporation based on the stockholders' purchase of stock in the administratively dissolved company. Wright v. AFLAC, Inc., 283 Ga. App. 890, 643 S.E.2d 233 (2007).
Georgia Public Service Commission.
- Actions against the Georgia Public Service Commission are not exempt from the summary judgment procedures of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56. Statesboro Tel. Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 235 Ga. 179, 219 S.E.2d 127 (1975).
Application to Telephone Customer Protection Act.
- Because a telephone customer was enrolled in a radio station's discount program, calls containing unsolicited advertisements fell within the established business relationship exemption and were not automatically prohibited by the Telephone Customer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. § 227; the telephone customer was barred from recovering under the TCPA, and summary judgment in favor of the radio station was affirmed. Schneider v. Susquehanna Radio Corp., 260 Ga. App. 296, 581 S.E.2d 603 (2003).
Open Records Act.
- In denying a request under the Open Records Act (ORA), O.C.G.A. § 50-18-70 et seq., an agency was limited to the authority cited in denying an initial request; an insurance commissioner's refusal to disclose an investigation report and records was an abuse of discretion based on the reasons provided for denying the request, and an order granting summary judgment in favor of the commissioner and denying an individual's summary judgment motion in an ORA action was reversed. Hoffman v. Oxendine, 268 Ga. App. 316, 601 S.E.2d 813 (2004).
Insufficiency in the allegations of a complaint is not a matter that is proper for review on a motion for summary judgment if the allegations of the complaint are considered well-pled and the single issue before the court is whether on the merits the moving party in the position of a defendant has carried the party's burden of showing that as a matter of law the party in the position of a plaintiff is not entitled to relief because one essential element under any theory of recovery is lacking and incapable of proof. Robinson v. Starr, 197 Ga. App. 440, 398 S.E.2d 714 (1990).
Insurance fraud.
- Issues of fact concerning whether a former employee actually signed an insurance card and whether an insurer detrimentally relied upon alleged misrepresentations precluded the award of summary judgment in the insurer's fraud action against a former employee. Centennial Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 210 Ga. App. 194, 435 S.E.2d 498 (1993).
Summary judgment was properly granted for the insurer because the insured's complaint fell outside the four-year statute of limitation for fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims. Nash v. Ohio Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 266 Ga. App. 416, 597 S.E.2d 512 (2004).
Auto insurance contracts.
- Since there was no law or policy requiring insurance coverage for negligent service of alcohol, the home insurer's motor vehicle exclusion applied as the injured party's damages arose out of an automobile accident, and the alleged independent act of negligence did not negate the exclusion. Manning v. USF&G Ins. Co., 264 Ga. App. 102, 589 S.E.2d 687 (2003).
When an injured party sued the insurer of a motorist against whom the injured party obtained a judgment, both to collect on the judgment and to assert a claim, as assignee of the motorist, for bad faith failure to settle, the insurer was not entitled to summary judgment because, even though the motorist did not provide the insurer with notice of the claim, the injured party provided the insurer with sufficient notice, under O.C.G.A. § 33-7-15(c), when it provided the insurer a copy of the complaint, with a court clerk's notation of the case number and the date on which the complaint was filed, and the insurer did not show that the injured party's failure to provide the insurer with a copy of the summons deprived it of the ability to timely and adequately investigate the claim. Canal Indem. Co. v. Greene, 265 Ga. App. 67, 593 S.E.2d 41 (2003).
Trial court properly entered summary judgment against a corporation's insurer as the corporation was the named insured on a policy, notwithstanding the policy's identification of the named insured as an individual, doing business as a trade name, as the insurer filed a certificate of insurance with the Georgia Public Service Commission, pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 46-7-12(a), stating that it had insured the corporation, doing business as the trade name; as the insurer failed to rebut testimony that a truck owned by the individual was involved in an accident while it was engaged in the corporation's business, the injured parties' collision with the truck was covered by the policy. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 268 Ga. App. 224, 603 S.E.2d 298 (2004).
Summary judgment was properly entered for an insurer in the injured parties' declaratory judgment suit as the insurer clearly stated that the insurer was issuing one contract, albeit in two sections, and that the insurer's insured was entitled to only one payout; the insurer issued two policy numbers and two declarations pages to the insured as the insurer could only accommodate four vehicles under the insurer's policy declarations, and the insured had seven vehicles. Smith v. Allstate Ins. Co., 268 Ga. App. 229, 603 S.E.2d 302 (2004).
Since an injured person was neither named in the policy covering the vehicle in which the person was riding at the time of an accident, nor residing in the same household as the policy holder, and was not a beneficiary of the other four policies owned by the policyholder, the injured person was not entitled to stack the policies; thus, a trial court's summary judgment in favor of the insurance company was affirmed. Beard v. Nunes, 269 Ga. App. 214, 603 S.E.2d 735 (Aug. 23, 2004).
Trial court properly entered partial summary judgment for an insurer and refused to extend the full limits of the policy to the injured parties; the policy excluded "any loss arising out of" the use of an automobile by any person living with the insured, which covered the driver, and the injured parties were injured due to the driver's actions in driving an automobile. Carver v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 270 Ga. App. 100, 605 S.E.2d 842 (2004).
In an action concerning the limits of uninsured motorist (UM) coverage available under a claimant's policy, which was held with the claimant's husband who was the named insured thereunder, their insurer was properly granted summary judgment on that issue as the 2001 amendment to O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11 had no effect on the limits of UM coverage under the policy covering the claimant's vehicle, and as such, the insurer was not required to notify the claimant of the change in the law or to secure a separate UM election at the time this vehicle was added to the original insurance policy. Soufi v. Haygood, 282 Ga. App. 593, 639 S.E.2d 395 (2006).
Judgment dependent on auto insurance policy and policy not in evidence.
- In an insured's suit against an insurance agent alleging that the agent was aware of the need to provide coverage for vehicles sold in South Carolina, but the policy issued covered only vehicles at the insured's address in Georgia, summary judgment for the agent based on the insured's failure to read the policy was error because the policy was not in evidence and it was not clear that the policy readily demonstrated that the coverage requested had not been issued. Unique Auto Sales, LLC v. Dunwody Ins. Agency, 348 Ga. App. 656, 824 S.E.2d 578 (2019).
Insurance provision in murder-suicide case.
- Because substantial fact issues existed as to whether an insurance policy provision transferring ownership to the insured was activated in an apparent murder-suicide case, and whether the insured had murdered his wife, the owner of the policy, it was error of the court to grant summary judgment. Bland v. Ussery, 172 Ga. App. 131, 322 S.E.2d 335 (1984).
Insurance contracts.
- As the facts were not in dispute and a proper construction of the unambiguous language of the vacancy exclusion of an insurance policy showed that the vandalism that occurred in a certain insured building was not a covered loss because the building had been vacant for more than 60 days prior to the loss, the trial court should have granted the insurer summary judgment in an action by the buyer of the building, who was the assignee of the insured, to recover for the vandalism damage. Sorema N. Am. Reinsurance Co. v. Johnson, 258 Ga. App. 304, 574 S.E.2d 377 (2002).
Trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the casualty insurance company on the insured's claim for damages under the insured's insurance policy it had on the insured's property that was destroyed by fire as the purpose of summary judgment was to determine whether there was a triable issue of fact and whether the insured submitted to an examination as required under the policy could not be determined until that issue was tried. The error occurred because the insured submitted to an examination, but left the examination after three hours of questioning when the insured became angry at the way the insured was being questioned, although the insured did say as the insured left that the insured would continue the questioning with the assistance of the court. Evans v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 264 Ga. App. 485, 591 S.E.2d 378 (2003).
When an insurer sought a declaratory judgment defining the insurer's rights and responsibilities under an insurance policy issued to an insured cemetery that was sued for desecrating a grave, the construction of the policy was a matter for the court that could be resolved by summary judgment. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Somers, 264 Ga. App. 421, 591 S.E.2d 430 (2003).
When an insured sued an insurance agent for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty because the agent allegedly misrepresented the coverage afforded by a policy the insured purchased through the agent, the insured's failure to read the policy entitled the agent to summary judgment, as no confidential relationship between the insured and the agent existed. Canales v. Wilson Southland Ins. Agency, 261 Ga. App. 529, 583 S.E.2d 203 (2003).
Trial court properly declined to rule, as a matter of law, that when a child was with the noncustodial parent, the child was not a "resident" of the noncustodial parent's home for insurance coverage purposes; the questions of domicile and residence were typically fact questions left to the jury, and because the parents had joint custody of a child killed in a home accident while staying at the noncustodial father's home, a jury could find that the child was in fact a resident of the father's home at the time of the accident. Baldwin v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 264 Ga. App. 229, 590 S.E.2d 206 (2003).
Denial of an insurance company's summary judgment motion in a declaratory action brought against an injured person seeking a determination regarding coverage obligations in the injured person's underlying assault and battery claim was reversed because the injured person conceded that there was no coverage, but asserted estoppel based on delays in sending the reservation of rights notice and in filing the declaratory judgment action; since the injured person had no rights under the policy, the injured person was not allowed to sue the insurance company directly, and the injured person also lacked standing to assert the defense of waiver or estoppel against the insurance company for failing to provide a timely notice of reservation of rights. Capitol Indem. Corp. v. Fraley, 266 Ga. App. 561, 597 S.E.2d 601 (2004).
Trial court's grant of summary judgment pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56 to an insurer in an insured's declaratory judgment action seeking a coverage determination was erroneous because the insured, who worked as a roofing supervisor for a livelihood, had been engaged in manual roofing labor for the insured's pastor as a favor at the time of the incident and, accordingly, the insured's actions were not excluded under either the business pursuits exclusion nor under the professional services exclusion as roofing was a trade or occupation; the insured's notice to the insurer within a month of being sued was reasonably timely. Cunningham v. Middle Ga. Mut. Ins. Co., 268 Ga. App. 181, 601 S.E.2d 382 (2004).
Upon an insurer's interlocutory appeal, the appeals court found that the insurer was properly denied summary judgment on an insured's individual and class action claims for unearned insurance premiums owed under credit life and disability policies as the insured satisfied any contractual notice requirements to filing suit, the class was properly certified, and the insured adequately represented the interests of the class. J.M.I.C. Life Ins. Co. v. Toole, 280 Ga. App. 372, 634 S.E.2d 123 (2006).
In an action between an insurer and its insured regarding the insured's claim for additional coverage, because the provisions regarding blanket liability and additional limits of liability were ambiguous, and application of O.C.G.A. § 13-2-2 was insufficient to eliminate the ambiguity in that it was impossible to ascertain how much coverage was provided for the items at issue, particularly soft cost, a jury was to consider the circumstances surrounding the transaction to determine the scope and effect of the policy; hence, the insured was erroneously granted partial summary judgment on the issue. RLI Ins. Co. v. Highlands on Ponce, LLC, 280 Ga. App. 798, 635 S.E.2d 168 (2006).
Trial court's grant of summary judgment was upheld on appeal, in an insurance applicant's negligent misrepresentation action filed against an agency and its agent, as the applicant failed to include the insurance application, that was the focus of the suit, in the appellate record. Hattaway v. Conner, 281 Ga. App. 20, 635 S.E.2d 330 (2006).
In an action filed against an insurer seeking coverage under a homeowners policy, the insureds were properly denied coverage for damages to a home the insureds did not live in, and the insurer was properly granted summary judgment on the issue of coverage as the policy at issue clearly stated that the "insured premises" meant the residence the insureds used as their primary residence. Varsalona v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 281 Ga. App. 644, 637 S.E.2d 64 (2006).
Trial court erred in denying an insurer's motion for summary judgment as to the issue of coverage as an assault and battery exclusion contained in the insurer's commercial general liability policy barred coverage to the insured for damages claims arising from a shooting on the insured's premises in a wrongful death action filed against the insured; moreover, inclusion of the phrase "whether or not" in the exclusion was significant and made clear that the exclusion was intended to apply to all instances of assault and battery occurring on the premises. First Specialty Ins. Corp. v. Flowers, 284 Ga. App. 543, 644 S.E.2d 453 (2007).
Trial court did not err in granting an insurer summary judgment in the insurer's declaratory judgment action finding that the insurer owed no duty to the insured to defend or indemnify the insured in an action filed by the insured's client who was injured in an accident involving the covered vehicle as the policy at issue showed no liability coverage and, hence, did not obligate the insurer to that duty. Simalton v. AIU Ins. Co., 284 Ga. App. 152, 643 S.E.2d 553 (2007).
In a breach of contract action filed by an insured against an insurer, the trial court did not err in granting the insurer summary judgment as to the issue of coverage as questions answered untruthfully in the application for insurance by the insured amounted to misrepresentations warranting a cancellation of the policy at issue, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 33-24-7. T. J. Blake Trucking, Inc. v. Alea London, Ltd., 284 Ga. App. 384, 643 S.E.2d 762 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1101, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 505 (Ga. 2007).
Because Georgia contract law stated that the statute of limitation on a contract which contemplated an actual demand began to run 30 days after notice was sent of the amount due, as contemplated by the contract between an insured and the insured, the trial court erred in finding that the insurer's claim for reimbursement from the insured was time-barred; thus, summary judgment in favor of the insured was inappropriate. Canal Ins. Co. v. Pro Search, 286 Ga. App. 164, 648 S.E.2d 497 (2007), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 870 (Ga. 2007).
Trial court properly granted summary judgment to an insured in the insurer's declaratory judgment action, requiring the insurer to defend and indemnify the insured in the underlying suit filed by a resident of the insured's personal care home arising from an attack by a fellow resident as the incident occurred without the insured's foresight, expectation, or design, and was thus properly characterized as accidental under the terms of the insured's policy. Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Magnolia Estates, Inc., 286 Ga. App. 183, 648 S.E.2d 498 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1660, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 88 (Ga. 2008).
Due to the inadequacies of an insured's bad faith demand, as its attempt to equate the submission of a claim with the demand for payment required by O.C.G.A. § 33-4-6 was directly contravened by case law, and the fact that the insurer met all the insurer's obligations under the policy the insurer issued to the insured, the trial court did not err in denying summary judgment to the insured and granting summary judgment on the insurer's cross-motion, authorizing the insurer to quitclaim the refinanced property to the insurer in full satisfaction of the insurer's duties and obligations under the policy. BayRock Mortg. Corp. v. Chi. Title Ins. Co., 286 Ga. App. 18, 648 S.E.2d 433 (2007), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 108 (Ga. 2008).
Because the damages a tenant sought under a commercial general liability policy issued to the insured-landlord for carbon monoxide poisoning were clearly excluded by the unambiguous terms contained within an exclusion under the policy, the trial court erred in denying the insurer's motion for summary judgment as to the issue of coverage. Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Reed, 286 Ga. App. 603, 649 S.E.2d 843 (2007), aff'd, 284 Ga. 286, 667 S.E.2d 90 (2008).
Given that the language in an insurance contract providing for catastrophic coverage only extended to inpatient, and not outpatient, services, the trial court properly granted summary judgment as to the issue of the insurer's coverage as the hospital bill for which the insured sought payment was for outpatient services. Michna v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ga., Inc., 288 Ga. App. 112, 653 S.E.2d 377 (2007), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 214 (Ga. 2008).
Under the ordinary rules of contract construction, because: (1) no ambiguity in an insurance contact existed; and (2) the insurer was authorized to reduce the uninsured motorist policy limits therein per the directions of the insured, no error resulted from the trial court's order granting summary judgment to an insurer as to the issue of coverage. Moreover, separate signatures rejecting bodily injury coverage and property damage coverage were not required, and the court did not rely upon affidavits containing inadmissible evidence. Lambert v. Alfa Gen. Ins. Corp., 291 Ga. App. 57, 660 S.E.2d 889 (2008).
Summary judgment was properly granted to an insured pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(c) and denied to an insurer in the insured's action seeking to collect unpaid claims under the insured's policy wherein the insured was entitled to indemnification for losses arising from employee dishonesty; however, based on the construction rules of O.C.G.A. § 13-2-2, the ambiguous non-cumulative policy liability limit was construed in the insured's favor, but could not be interpreted to allow the limit for each of the years of coverage, but rather, the limit was applied to the entire three-year policy period. Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Sherman & Hemstreet, Inc., 260 Ga. App. 870, 581 S.E.2d 613 (2003), aff'd, 277 Ga. 734, 594 S.E.2d 648 (2004).
Insurance settlement.
- Trial court properly granted summary judgment to the vehicle owner in the insurer's suit against the vehicle owner after the insurer settled a claim with an injured victim after the company employee who rented a vehicle from the vehicle owner was involved in an accident that injured the victim; since no evidence showed the insurer and the vehicle owner contracted otherwise, Georgia statutory law dictated that the renter's liability insurance coverage, provided by the insurer, was the primary insurance and the vehicle owner's insurance provided secondary coverage. Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. General Car & Truck Leasing Sys., 258 Ga. App. 733, 574 S.E.2d 914 (2002).
In an action claiming beneficiary status to two annuities issued to a decedent, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to a foundation, and against an individual, on grounds that the decedent failed to do all that was necessary to change the beneficiary of the decedent's annuities to the individual, as such was specifically required for the change of beneficiary designation to go into effect, and substantial compliance with the requirements was insufficient; hence, no material fact issues remained. Lake v. Young Harris Alumni Found., Inc., 283 Ga. App. 409, 641 S.E.2d 628 (2007).
Uninsured motorist coverage.
- Conclusion that an insurer was only obligated to provide an insured with $40,000 of uninsured motorist (UM) coverage was supported by both the unambiguous policy language and by the fact that the insured admitted that the insured had not made a written request pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(a)(3) for an increase in UM coverage above the minimum coverage required at the time of the accident; thus, the trial court properly granted the insurer summary judgment on the insurer's request for a declaration that the insured only had $40,000 of UM coverage. Payne v. Middlesex Ins. Co., 259 Ga. App. 867, 578 S.E.2d 470 (2003).
Because Georgia public policy prohibited an exclusion within an insurer's uninsured coverage for the use of any motor vehicle by an insured to carry persons or property for a fee, as such denied the statutorily mandated coverage to an otherwise qualified insured, and the requirements under O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11 were plain and not illogical, summary judgment in favor of the insurer on this issue was reversed. Wagner v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 288 Ga. App. 132, 653 S.E.2d 526 (2007).
Trial court erred in denying motions for summary judgment pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56 by an insurer in a declaratory judgment action pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-4-2 seeking to determine whether the insurer had a duty to defend, and by the owners of an automobile on claims of negligent entrustment by the plaintiffs, a driver and passengers; the owners' son, who was driving the vehicle when the accident occurred, did not have permission to drive the vehicle, and therefore the son was not an insured under the owners' insurance policy. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. McCall, 261 Ga. App. 92, 581 S.E.2d 651 (2003).
Parent who filed a wrongful death action against an unidentified driver after a child's body was found by the side of a road presented no evidence that the unidentified driver was negligent or that the driver's actions caused the decedent's death, and the appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment granting a motion for summary judgment, which was filed by an insurance company that provided uninsured motorist coverage. Dawkins v. Doe, 263 Ga. App. 737, 589 S.E.2d 303 (2003).
Trial court erroneously granted summary judgment to an UM insurer because the injured claimant, who was also a federal employee, fell under the purview of federal compensation law; thus, under these federal provisions, the medical benefits insurer and the workers' compensation insurer had subrogation liens and were able to enforce the liens upon the injured party's receipt of a settlement from the liable third party, regardless of Georgia's requirement that such action be preceded by a determination that the injured person had been fully compensated. Thurman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 278 Ga. 162, 598 S.E.2d 448 (2004).
Insured who tried to recover damages for injuries the insured sustained in a motor vehicle accident in Florida, but who alleged that the insured's claim was denied because the insured's did not have the right to sue under Florida's no-fault statute, was entitled to collect uninsured motorist benefits from the insured's own insurance company, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11. However, the trial court, which heard the insured's action against, erred when the court denied the company's motion for summary judgment on the insured's claim seeking penalties and attorney fees, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 33-4-6, because the case presented a unique issue of law and there was no evidence that the company acted in bad faith when the company denied the insured's claim. Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Williams, 266 Ga. App. 540, 597 S.E.2d 430 (2004).
Insurance coverage on dealer "loaner" vehicle.
- Nothing required an insurer to provide excess insurance on a "loaner" car above the statutory minimum limits but the law required excess coverage in an amount not less than the limits; summary judgment reducing coverage below the limits was error. Hendrix v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 263 Ga. App. 589, 588 S.E.2d 761 (2003).
Death while pursued by emergency vehicles.
- Trial court erred in denying summary judgment to a city and the city's employees in a wrongful death action; a police officer's actions were not the proximate cause of the decedent's death during a crash with a vehicle that was fleeing from the police at high speed, and therefore O.C.G.A. § 40-6-6 did not apply. City of Pooler v. Edenfield, 263 Ga. App. 278, 587 S.E.2d 408 (2003).
Punitive damages may not be recovered if there is no entitlement to compensatory damages; because a homeowner had settled the property damage claim arising from an incident in which a truck struck the homeowner's house, and was not allowed to recover under the bodily injury provision of the policy since the homeowner was not injured in and did not witness the incident, summary judgment for an insurance company in the company's declaratory judgment action addressing the company's liability on the homeowner's punitive damage claim was affirmed. Flynn v. Allstate Ins. Co., 268 Ga. App. 222, 601 S.E.2d 739 (2004).
Insurer coverage.
- An insurer was entitled to summary judgment in the insurer's declaratory judgment action because the insurer's policy did not cover an injured bar patron's claims against an insured, an investigations and security firm that serviced the bar, because the subject policy's clear exclusions for assault, battery, and punitive damages did not conflict with a security guard endorsement. Capitol Indem., Inc. v. Brown, 260 Ga. App. 863, 581 S.E.2d 339 (2003).
State benefit health plan claims administrator was properly granted summary judgment in an action challenging the administrator's review of a physician's corporation's health plan claims because, in part, the administrator had no duty to produce the administrator's policies absent a confidential relationship, which was not established merely by the corporation's trust and confidence in the administrator. Brown v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Ga., Inc., 260 Ga. App. 796, 581 S.E.2d 636 (2003).
In a declaratory judgment action, the insurer was entitled to summary judgment on the parents' claim since the homeowners policy issued to the insured specifically excluded coverage for injury to the parents' son, who was shot and killed by the insured's son during an aggravated assault at a pizza restaurant; the exclusion authorized the trial court to find, as a matter of law, that a reasonable person in the insured's son's circumstances could expect bodily harm to result from the son's criminal actions. Tripp v. Allstate Ins. Co., 262 Ga. App. 93, 584 S.E.2d 692 (2003).
Absent an insurance clause showing mutual intent for a subcontractor's insurance to cover losses to the store and contractor, an indemnity clause was statutorily void and unenforceable; thus, summary judgment was properly denied. Federated Dep't Stores v. Superior Drywall & Acoustical, 264 Ga. App. 857, 592 S.E.2d 485 (2003).
Summary judgment in favor of cities and an insured in a declaratory judgment action brought by the insured's insurer was reversed; the underlying claim by the cities against the insured was for loss of grant monies arising from the alleged improper preparation of applications that did not fit into the policy definition of a property loss, and since the policy also excluded losses related to professional services, the insurer had no duty to defend. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. City of Rome, 268 Ga. App. 320, 601 S.E.2d 810 (2004).
Trial court properly granted summary judgment pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(c) to an insured in the insured's breach of insurance contract claim against an insurer for the insurer's failure to pay a claim, arising from water and sewage damage to the insured's offices; heavy rains had seeped into a large pit that was excavated by the city, which then flowed into a pipe that overflowed into the insured's office, and such water was not within the well-accepted definition of "surface water," such that the policy's surface water exclusion was inapplicable. Selective Way Ins. Co. v. Litig. Tech., Inc., 270 Ga. App. 38, 606 S.E.2d 68 (2004).
In a mother's suit claiming that an insurer breached an insurance contract with the son by failing to defend the son in the mother's suit brought against the son arising out of a car accident occurring when the son was driving the mother's car, summary judgment was properly granted on the issue of insurance coverage under the policy, which obligated the insurer to pay damages for which the insured was legally liable because of damages arising out of an accident involving the insured car or a car which was not owned by a resident of the insured's household because, while the mother and the son lived in the same house, this was not determinative of the question of whether the mother was a resident of the son's household. The mother's proof showed that she and her son maintained distinct households under different management, in that they each were responsible for separate parts of the house, did not cook or clean for each other, and came and went independently; and the insurer offered no evidence to counter the mother's proof. Southern Gen. Ins. Co. v. Foy, 279 Ga. App. 385, 631 S.E.2d 419 (2006).
Because the trial court erred in construing an insurer's policy to its insured, and a fact question remained as to an issue of slander, summary judgment was inappropriately entered; but, the insurer was not required to provide specific, unambiguous reasons for denying coverage in its reservation of rights letter to the insured. Southern Gen. Ins. Co. v. Foy, 279 Ga. App. 385, 631 S.E.2d 419 (2006).
Because: (1) resolution of the issues raised in a petition filed by the Georgia Insurers Insolvency Pool were dependent upon a determination by the State Board of Workers' Compensation of the amount, if any, an injured employee was entitled to recover in the pending, unresolved claim for workers' compensation; and (2) after a notice to controvert was filed, the Board never held a hearing or issued any findings with regard to liability for the claim, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to determine the applicability of earlier provisions of O.C.G.A. § 33-36-14(a) to the Pool's claim against an insurer, after another carrier became insolvent, and hence, grant the Pool summary judgment in its declaratory judgment action. Royal Indem. Co. v. Ga. Insurers Insolvency Pool, 284 Ga. App. 787, 644 S.E.2d 279 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1207, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 639 (Ga. 2007).
Intent.
- In a declaratory judgment action by an insurance company asking for an interpretation of an insurance policy that excludes coverage for injuries expected or intended by the insured, because the insured, while intoxicated, shot and killed his son and daughter-in-law, the question of intent or expectation uniquely fits the pattern of those issues of material fact that are not appropriate issues for summary judgment but are decided by the trier of fact. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Morgan, 258 Ga. 276, 368 S.E.2d 509 (1988).
Summary judgment in corporate actions.
- Trial court properly granted summary judgment to a president of a corporation in the president's petition to remove a lis pendens, which alleged that the president purchased property with embezzled funds as the shareholder's allegation was used to support the shareholder's tort claims of, inter alia, conversion and breach of fiduciary duty; thus, a lis pendens was unauthorized and the president could not be charged with notice of it. Hudson v. Dobson, 260 Ga. App. 473, 580 S.E.2d 268 (2003).
Summary judgment in estate matters.
- In an action for conversion of the estate's assets relating to a joint account created under O.C.G.A. § 7-1-813 between the executrix and a half-sister, given that some evidence existed that the decedent's purpose in establishing a joint account between the executrix of decedent's estate and the half-sister was for the decedent's convenience, and not to effect a gift, summary judgment was erroneously granted to the half-sister. Gray v. Benton, 280 Ga. App. 339, 634 S.E.2d 86 (2006).
Summary judgment in matters involving a trust.
- In a declaratory judgment action between a settlor's offspring regarding an agreement signed by the settlor to reform a trust, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to one sibling over the other, upholding the agreement as validly reforming the trust in order to fully effectuate the settlor's intent that the offspring divide the remainder of a trust's proceeds equally between them, per stirpes; moreover, the trial court correctly ruled that the prevailing sibling could not rely on the defenses of laches and unclean hands as such were equitable doctrines not applicable in a declaratory judgment action. Briden v. Clement, 283 Ga. App. 626, 642 S.E.2d 318 (2007).
Laches.
- If it cannot be said as a matter of law that a plaintiff was dilatory in asserting a claim, the defense of laches is a question for the jury, and summary judgment cannot be granted for the defendant on such issue. Davidson Mineral Properties, Inc. v. Gifford-Hill & Co., 235 Ga. 176, 219 S.E.2d 133 (1975).
Mandamus actions.
- Fact that O.C.G.A. § 9-6-20 et seq. provides rules under which mandamus actions shall be tried would not make O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56 inapplicable in mandamus actions because there is no express conflict between the sections. Harrison v. Weiner, 226 Ga. 93, 172 S.E.2d 840 (1970).
Matters in abatement and in bar.
- Motion for summary judgment applies to the merits of a claim or to matters in bar, but not to matters in abatement. Boyd Motors, Inc. v. Radcliff, 128 Ga. App. 15, 195 S.E.2d 291 (1973); Larwin Mtg. Investors v. Delta Equities, Inc., 129 Ga. App. 769, 201 S.E.2d 187 (1973).
Defenses enumerated in O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(b), except for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, are matters in abatement, which are not within the scope of summary judgment procedure. Boyd Motors, Inc. v. Radcliff, 128 Ga. App. 15, 195 S.E.2d 291 (1973); Ogden Equip. Co. v. Talmadge Farms, Inc., 232 Ga. 614, 208 S.E.2d 459 (1974); International Indem. Co. v. Blakey, 161 Ga. App. 99, 289 S.E.2d 303 (1982); Kirkpatrick v. Mackey, 162 Ga. App. 876, 293 S.E.2d 461 (1982).
Motion for summary judgment cannot be granted on matters in abatement. Ogden Equip. Co. v. Talmadge Farms, Inc., 232 Ga. 614, 208 S.E.2d 459 (1974); Carlson v. Hall County Planning Comm'n, 233 Ga. 286, 210 S.E.2d 815 (1974); Walsey v. Lockhart, 136 Ga. App. 624, 222 S.E.2d 141 (1975); C.W. Matthews Contracting Co. v. Capital Ford Truck Sales, Inc., 149 Ga. App. 354, 254 S.E.2d 426 (1979); Primas v. Saulsberry, 152 Ga. App. 88, 262 S.E.2d 251 (1979); Safwat v. United States Leasing Corp., 154 Ga. App. 341, 268 S.E.2d 395 (1980); Bennett v. Fine Jewelers Atl. Guild, Inc., 194 Ga. App. 377, 390 S.E.2d 625 (1990).
Summary judgment involves an adjudication on the merits, and should not be used in ruling on a dilatory plea or plea in abatement. National Heritage Corp. v. Mount Olive Mem. Gardens, Inc., 244 Ga. 240, 260 S.E.2d 1 (1979).
Matters in abatement are raised and resolved under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12, and are not proper subjects for a motion for summary judgment. Hight v. Blankenship, 199 Ga. App. 744, 406 S.E.2d 241 (1991).
As a determination whether compliance with the ante litem notice requirement of O.C.G.A. § 36-33-5 was met by property owners who asserted claims against a municipality was properly considered a matter in abatement, which should have been raised in a motion to dismiss under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12, flexibility by the court was required; accordingly, consideration of the matter within the summary judgment context, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56, was proper because matters outside of the pleadings, including the owners' depositions, were considered. Davis v. City of Forsyth, 275 Ga. App. 747, 621 S.E.2d 495 (2005).
Peer review.
- Under the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, specifically 42 U.S.C. § 11112(a)(4), a professional review action is presumed to have met the requisite conditions for immunity unless the presumption is rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence; thus, in ruling on a motion for summary judgment under the Act, the trial court is required to determine, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, whether a reasonable jury could conclude that the plaintiff has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the peer review activities did not meet the standards set forth in the Act. Patton v. St. Francis Hosp., 260 Ga. App. 202, 581 S.E.2d 551 (2003).
Trial court properly granted summary judgment for a hospital in an action arising out of the refusal to reinstate a doctor's staff privileges, finding that the hospital had immunity under the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 (HCQIA), 42 U.S.C. § 11101 et seq., because: (1) letters allowing the doctor to resume seeing patients only if the doctor complied with the doctor's psychiatrist's plan were not peer review action; (2) if the letters were peer review action, the doctor was afforded adequate notice and fair process; (3) the doctor failed to rebut the presumption that the peer review process was reasonable; (4) the doctor failed to rebut the presumption that the doctor was afforded adequate notice and a hearing; and (5) any violation of the hospital's bylaws did not necessarily mean that the doctor was denied adequate notice and a hearing under the HCQIA. Taylor v. Kennestone Hosp., Inc., 266 Ga. App. 14, 596 S.E.2d 179 (2004).
Medical malpractice.
- If a motion for summary judgment is supported by evidence that there is no genuine issue for trial, as the medical doctor performed the entire procedure in a medically accepted and recognized manner and in so doing exercised the degree of care and skill that is generally employed by physicians under similar circumstances, it would be necessary that the plaintiff offer evidence showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Swindell v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 161 Ga. App. 290, 291 S.E.2d 1 (1982); Bieling v. Battle, 209 Ga. App. 874, 434 S.E.2d 719 (1993).
Trial court erred in denying the appellants' motion for summary judgment on the patient's second action for medical malpractice, breach of contract, and failure to secure informed consent as the first action was against the same defendant, it was an adjudication on the merits, and the patient had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the first action. Simon v. Gunby, 260 Ga. App. 3, 578 S.E.2d 482 (2003).
Summary judgment pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56 was properly granted to physicians in a medical malpractice action against the physicians in which the plaintiff patient claimed radiation damage to an arm that the doctors did not reveal until the expiration of the limitations period of O.C.G.A. § 9-3-71(a); however, the record revealed that the physicians had repeatedly informed the patient that such damage was one of the possible causes of the arm pain and there was no fraud found on the physicians' part which would have extended the time period pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-3-96. Price v. Currie, 260 Ga. App. 526, 580 S.E.2d 299 (2003).
Summary judgment was granted pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(c) to a hospital in an action brought by parents who alleged that the mother had received negligent pre-natal care at the hospital, which resulted in permanent injuries to her son; the obstetricians and residents who rendered care to the mother were found to be in private practice and were independent contractors who were not subject to any control over their judgments or decisions by the hospital, rather than employees of the hospital and, accordingly, there was no liability on the part of the hospital for the contractor's actions. Anderson v. Medical Ctr., Inc., 260 Ga. App. 549, 580 S.E.2d 633 (2003).
In a medical malpractice suit decided in favor of a doctor on the doctor's motion for summary judgment, res ipsa loquitur did not apply in a malpractice suit as an unintended result did not raise an inference of negligence; it was presumed that medical or surgical services were performed in an ordinarily skillful manner. Oakes v. Magat, 263 Ga. App. 165, 587 S.E.2d 150 (2003).
O.C.G.A. § 31-9-6.1(c) squarely places the responsibility for obtaining consent to surgical procedures on the shoulders of the "responsible physician," who is defined in O.C.G.A. § 31-9-6.1(h) as the physician who performs the procedure or the physician under whose direct orders the procedure is performed by a nonphysician; an assisting physician was not responsible for obtaining a patient's consent for a leg-nerve surgery, and summary judgment for the doctor in a malpractice case brought by the patient was affirmed. Duke v. Bachner, 266 Ga. App. 109, 596 S.E.2d 414 (2004).
Statute of repose in a medical malpractice claim ran from the date the negligent or wrongful act or omission occurred without regard to when the injury arising from the negligent act or omission occurred or was discovered; thus, a malpractice claim filed more than five years after the date on which the last negligent or wrongful act or omission attributable to the doctor and the medical center could have occurred was time barred, and summary judgment in favor of a doctor and a medical center in a patient's malpractice claim was affirmed. Christian v. Atha, 267 Ga. App. 186, 598 S.E.2d 895 (2004).
Trial court properly granted a surgeon's summary judgment motion and held that a patient's medical malpractice suit was barred by the two-year statute of limitations set forth in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-71(a), which began to run at the time of the alleged misdiagnosis, when a surgeon advised the patient that the patient did not have breast cancer but recommended close follow-up care; the case did not fall within the limited exception for subsequent injury cases as the patient's symptoms worsened over time. Harrison v. Daly, 268 Ga. App. 280, 601 S.E.2d 771 (2004).
In a negligence action filed by a decedent's administrator, summary judgment was properly granted to a doctor and a clinic for the post-op treatment of the decedent as: (1) both the doctor and the clinic remained immune from suit under O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29.1; (2) the doctor's treatment of the decedent's complications immediately following the decedent's surgery did not change the voluntary nature of the treatment as a whole; (3) it was reasonable to expect that a physician would continue to treat a patient following surgery; and (4) the appeals court viewed the doctor's voluntary treatment of the decedent as a whole, not divided into categories of preoperative, operative, and post-operative; moreover, because no evidence was presented that either the doctor or the clinic was a "charitable institution," and O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29.1 provided no such exception, waiver of any common-law charitable immunity through the doctor's procurement of liability insurance did not apply. Wells v. Rogers, 281 Ga. App. 473, 636 S.E.2d 171 (2006), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 101 (Ga. 2007).
Because a catheter intentionally placed in a patient's body was not a "foreign object" as contemplated by O.C.G.A. § 9-3-72, and the fact that the catheter might have been negligently placed did not alter this finding, absent evidence of a doctor's fraud or concealment of the fraud, summary judgment in a patient's medical malpractice suit was properly granted to a doctor and a clinic as the applicable two-year statute of limitation had expired by the time the action was filed. Pogue v. Goodman, 282 Ga. App. 385, 638 S.E.2d 824 (2006).
Trial court erred in denying partial summary judgment on a patient's medical malpractice and ordinary negligence claims, when, given evidence that the patient suffered an injury arising out of the misdiagnosis in January of 1999, when the patient was first seen by the doctor manifesting continuous symptoms of a moderate B-12 deficiency and the doctor failed to make the diagnosis and provide treatment, and the patient failed to file an action within the two years; but, because the patient's ordinary negligence and breach of fiduciary duty claims were essentially malpractice claims, subject to the same limitations period, summary judgment as to these claims was upheld. Stafford-Fox v. Jenkins, 282 Ga. App. 667, 639 S.E.2d 610 (2006).
On appeal from the grant of summary judgment in favor of a dentist in a patient's medical malpractice action, such was upheld based on the expiration of the statute of limitation and rejection of the continuous treatment doctrine by the Supreme Court of Georgia and because the exception for a subsequent injury did not apply. Bousset v. Walker, 285 Ga. App. 102, 645 S.E.2d 593 (2007).
In a medical malpractice action, because the record on appeal contained evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact as to the proximate cause of a patient's injuries, the trial court erred in granting a hospital summary judgment; moreover, the appeals court declined to hear the hospital's claim that the patient failed to comply with O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1. Renz v. Northside Hosp., Inc., 285 Ga. App. 882, 648 S.E.2d 186 (2007).
Trial court erred in granting a medical clinic's motion for summary judgment in a patient's medical malpractice action and in finding that an affidavit provided by a patient's expert did not sufficiently establish causation as the expert specifically explained the precautions that should have been taken by the employee administering a shot to the patient, and stated that the failure to take these precautions proximately caused the patient's injury; moreover, given the expert's past relevant experience as a nurse, the expert was competent to provide an opinion in the case. Allen v. Family Med. Ctr., P.C., 287 Ga. App. 522, 652 S.E.2d 173 (2007).
Because a medical care provider failed to assert an available defense in the underlying action which would have absolved the provider from any liability and prevented a default judgment from entering against the provider, the trial court did not err in entering summary judgment against the provider on the provider's claims for contribution and indemnity. Emergency Professionals of Atlanta, P.C. v. Watson, 288 Ga. App. 473, 654 S.E.2d 434 (2007), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 407 (Ga. 2008).
In a medical malpractice action, because the undisputed evidence showed that both the personal injury claims and a later-added wrongful death claim were timely filed, both in terms of O.C.G.A. § 9-3-71 and the relevant statute of repose, the doctors sued were properly denied summary judgment as to those claims. Cleaveland v. Gannon, 288 Ga. App. 875, 655 S.E.2d 662 (2007), aff'd, 284 Ga. 376, 667 S.E.2d 366 (2008).
In a couple's medical malpractice action, because: (1) the couple failed to follow the court's case management orders, which the couple selected and consented to; (2) the couple's only expert was properly excluded as a rebuttal witness; and (3) the couple failed to present any evidence of causation, the trial court properly entered summary judgment against the couple. Thomas v. Peachtree Orthopaedic Clinic, P.C., 290 Ga. App. 869, 660 S.E.2d 758 (2008), cert. denied, No. S08C1373, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 915 (Ga. 2008).
In a medical malpractice action, because the suing couple's failure to faithfully engage in discovery could not be remedied by the exclusion of probative trial evidence, specifically, the testimony from the couple's expert witness, the trial court erred in entering summary judgment against the couple. Hart v. Northside Hosp., Inc., 291 Ga. App. 208, 661 S.E.2d 576 (2008).
Trial court properly granted summary judgment to an eye doctor and a corporation as even though the type of eye surgery performed on the patient made the patient more vulnerable to an eye infection and even though an eye infection caused the patient's loss of sight, the patient was unable to show the medical malpractice element of causation since the patient did not show that anything the doctor did, or failed to do, caused the eye infection. Berrell v. Hamilton, 260 Ga. App. 892, 581 S.E.2d 398 (2003).
Doctor's liability for certifying patient "safe" for activity.
- Trial court properly granted summary judgment to a doctor on the administrator's wrongful death suit alleging that the doctor negligently certified the truck driver to drive a truck even though the doctor knew or should have known that the truck driver had a pre-existing heart condition as the truck driver three months later died while driving the truck which then struck the decedent's vehicle and killed the decedent; even giving the administrator the benefit of all reasonable doubt, and construing the evidence and inferences in the administrator's favor, the doctor was entitled to summary judgment because the doctor did not have the legal authority to restrain the truck driver for the benefit of the motoring public and, thus, the doctor did not owe a duty to the decedent. Houston v. Bedgood, 263 Ga. App. 139, 588 S.E.2d 437 (2003).
Apparent authority of doctor working in emergency room.
- Trial court erred in granting the hospital's motion for summary judgment on the issue of whether an emergency room doctor was an apparent employee of the hospital since the evidence failed to show that the hospital had sufficiently notified the patient that the doctor was not the hospital's employee by allegedly posting a sign or including a paragraph in a two page document so indicating. Cooper v. Binion, 266 Ga. App. 709, 598 S.E.2d 6 (2004).
Hospital's liability for doctor's actions.
- Trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the hospital on the issue of whether the doctor was an actual employee of the hospital because evidence showed, inter alia, that the doctor was hired to perform a service rather than accomplish a task, the hospital supplied the equipment used by the doctor, the hospital retained the right to control the doctor's hours of work, the doctor was paid by the hour, the doctor spent all working hours at the hospital, the hospital handled all the billing of patients, and the hospital paid the doctor's malpractice insurance. Cooper v. Binion, 266 Ga. App. 709, 598 S.E.2d 6 (2004).
Negligent credentialing.
- Surviving spouse's negligent credentialing suit against a hospital was properly dismissed on summary judgment as the undisputed evidence showed that the surgeon did not perform the prostatic cryosurgery negligently. The surviving spouse's own expert witness affirmatively stated that the rectal injury, which caused the deceased spouse's death, was not the result of the surgeon's negligence during the cryosurgery but was a complication that could have occurred during any prostate cancer surgery and in the absence of any negligence, and that the surgeon's negligence did not occur until five weeks later, during the surgeon's treatment of the deceased spouse following an emergency hospitalization. Ladner v. Northside Hosp., Inc., 314 Ga. App. 136, 723 S.E.2d 450 (2012).
Intentional infliction of emotional distress by medical staff.
- Trial court's grant of summary judgment, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(c), to a hospital was proper in an action by a patient and her husband, alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress because there was no evidence to support a finding of intent or reckless disregard by an emergency room nurse, who had unsuccessfully attempted to search through the patient's clothing when she came in suffering a miscarriage; the fact that when the wife was home doing laundry, the intact fetus, still in the fetal sac, fell out of her pants could have been sufficient to support a finding that the nurse was negligent, but not more. Roddy v. Tanner Med. Ctr., Inc., 262 Ga. App. 202, 585 S.E.2d 175 (2003).
Legal malpractice.
- Trial court properly granted partial summary judgment to an attorney, the law firm partners, and the law firm on a client's breach of fiduciary duty and fraud claims as the claims were merely duplicative of the client's legal malpractice claim. Furthermore, even if the claims were not duplicative, the client's evidence that the attorney charged a grossly excessive fee, charged the client for estate planning software that the attorney retained for general use, failed to inform the client about the attorney's concerns, and misrepresented the attorney's ability would not have survived summary judgment. Griffin v. Fowler, 260 Ga. App. 443, 579 S.E.2d 848 (2003).
Trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the closing attorney on the alleged client's claims for legal malpractice and fraud as genuine issues about whether an attorney-client relationship existed and whether misrepresentations had been made precluded summary judgment, but the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the closing attorney on the alleged client's Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-14-1 et seq., claim because the alleged client did not show the required "pattern of racketeering" activity. Mays v. Askin, 262 Ga. App. 417, 585 S.E.2d 735 (2003).
Because the evidence showed that an attorney continued to represent a brother and sister as co-executors of an estate after conflicts of interest arose, that the attorney used information obtained from the brother to bring a collection action against the sister, and that the attorney retained another attorney to investigate more of the sister's debts, material issues of fact existed that precluded summary judgment on the sister's claims against the attorney for legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and conspiracy. Traub v. Washington, 264 Ga. App. 541, 591 S.E.2d 382 (2003).
Trial court properly granted summary judgment to an attorney after a client filed a legal malpractice claim against the attorney more than four years and 11 months after the attorney withdrew from representing the client in a bankruptcy matter as no genuine issue of material fact existed but that the client's claim was barred by the four-year limitations period and, thus, any act of malpractice on the attorney's part giving rise to the claim had to have occurred more than four years before the client filed the client's claim. Shores v. Troglin, 260 Ga. App. 696, 580 S.E.2d 659 (2003).
Attorneys' summary judgment motion in a legal malpractice case was properly denied as there was evidence that a nurse in the injured party's underlying negligence case deviated from the standard of care, and that but for the attorneys' negligence in dismissing the negligence case, intending to refile the case later, despite the passing of the time period limited by the statute of repose, the injured party would have won the underlying negligence case. Blackwell v. Potts, 266 Ga. App. 702, 598 S.E.2d 1 (2004).
In a legal malpractice action, because the attorneys' failure to exercise due diligence in procuring service of process constituted professional negligence, resulting in a loss of their clients' rights to pursue a claim against their own UM carrier, and conflicting evidence was presented as to the issue of whether the clients' rights under O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61 to pursue a claim against their own uninsured motorist insurance carrier were impeded by their attorneys' actions, summary judgment was reversed. Butler v. Gary, Williams, Parenti, Finney, Lewis, McManus, Watson & Sperando, P.L., 280 Ga. App. 207, 633 S.E.2d 614 (2006).
While an attorney was shielded from liability as to the issue of whether a breach occurred as to the duty of care owed to the clients by failing to verify the complaint pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(b), opting instead to dismiss the complaint and refile the complaint as a renewal action, summary judgment as to the issues of harm to the clients and a breach of the duty of ordinary care as a result of the attorney's failure to advise was reversed. Chatham Orthopaedic Surgery Ctr., LLC v. White, 283 Ga. App. 10, 640 S.E.2d 633 (2006).
Despite an attorney's claim that privity of contract with a decedent's widow was lacking, because the evidence supported a finding that the widow was an intended beneficiary of the decedent's will, the attorney owed the widow a similar duty to the one owed to the decedent, as the attorney's client, resulting in the attorney's liability upon a breach of that duty, making partial summary judgment in the widow's favor proper. Young v. Williams, 285 Ga. App. 208, 645 S.E.2d 624 (2007).
In a legal malpractice action, despite the fact that the trial court held that the client's failure to prove proximate causation supported an order granting summary judgment to the attorney and that attorney's law firm, the appeals court nevertheless held that summary judgment was properly granted to the attorney, under the "right for any reason" rule, as the suit was untimely filed. Moreover, the client's argument that the attorney could have amended the suit to add a damages claim up until the time of a pre-trial order, and that this later failure to act should be considered the triggering date for the malpractice action, was unavailing, as the attorney's failure to amend constituted a failure to avoid the effect of the earlier breach and a failure to mitigate damages, but was not a failure inflicting a new harm, thus triggering a new limitations period. Duke Galish, LLC v. Arnall Golden Gregory, LLP, 288 Ga. App. 75, 653 S.E.2d 791 (2007), cert. denied, No. S08C0416, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 212 (Ga. 2008).
Attorney contract claim reversed.
- Trial court's denial of a client's summary judgment motion was reversed as the oral contract between an attorney and the client was unenforceable in that: (1) there was no definition of what was to be considered the ultimate or logical conclusion of any given case assigned to the attorney, nor were there standards for determining if the attorney "didn't do the job"; (2) there was no stated duration of the agreement, and the public policy of Georgia was clear that, absent a definite term of employment, the contract was terminable at will under O.C.G.A. § 34-7-1; and (3) the attorney's claimed damages, the attorney's hourly rate times the number of hours it would have taken the attorney to bring each case to its ultimate or logical conclusion, were speculative and not objectively ascertainable from the oral contract. Furthermore, as to an attorney's breach of contract claim, the trial court failed to consider the public policy issues involved in the attorney-client relationship and should have granted summary judgment to the client; in Georgia, because of the fiduciary relationship between an attorney and a client, the client had the absolute right to discharge the attorney and terminate the relationship at any time, even without cause, and the client's freedom in ending the attorney-client relationship without financial penalty was favored over the attorney's right to enforce the damages provision in the attorney's retainer contract because requiring a client to pay damages for terminating the client's attorney's employment contract eviscerated the client's absolute right to terminate. Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Croley, 263 Ga. App. 659, 588 S.E.2d 840 (2003).
Ratification.
- When a company sued the company's accountants regarding the accountants' participation in a sale of the company's assets, summary judgment should have been granted in favor of the accountants because the company ratified the actions of the company's employee who had apparent authority to conduct the sale when the company retained the proceeds of the sale and accepted a return of the assets sold in settlement of another lawsuit. R.W. Holdco, Inc. v. Johnson, 267 Ga. App. 859, 601 S.E.2d 177 (2004).
Summary judgment was properly granted to an attorney in a former criminal client's legal malpractice action because the former client failed to establish any grounds to support the client's allegations of ineffective assistance and was merely relitigating the client's denied habeas petitions on which the attorney had represented the client. Cornwell v. Kirwan, 270 Ga. App. 147, 606 S.E.2d 1 (2004).
Denial of summary judgment affirmed.
- Trial court's denial of a client's summary judgment motion was affirmed as to an attorney's conversion claim because the issue of the attorney's consent to the removal of files from the attorney's office was not clear-cut. Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Croley, 263 Ga. App. 659, 588 S.E.2d 840 (2003).
Negligence.
- Even though the facts in the case are uncontradicted and uncontroverted, if the facts are such that there is room for a difference of opinion between reasonable persons as to whether or not negligence should be inferred, the right to draw the inference is peculiarly within the exclusive province of the jury. Yeager v. Jacobs, 111 Ga. App. 358, 141 S.E.2d 837 (1965);(decided under former Ga. L. 1959, p. 234, § 1 et seq.)
It is for a jury to decide in a negligence case whether the alleged acts constituted negligence and whether or not the acts were the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries, and the mere fact that it is shown without dispute that the plaintiff was guilty of certain acts that could be characterized as negligent would not authorize a grant of summary judgment for the defendant if reasonable minds could differ as to whether the plaintiff's acts amounted to negligence. Yeager v. Jacobs, 111 Ga. App. 358, 141 S.E.2d 837 (1965);(decided under Ga. L. 1959, p. 234, § 1 et seq.)
Questions necessitating a decision as to whether the facts show that lack of ordinary care for one's own safety, which will bar recovery, or only that comparative negligence, which will reduce it, are generally for the jury. Stukes v. Trowell, 119 Ga. App. 651, 168 S.E.2d 616 (1969).
In a negligence case, it must be plainly and palpably shown that the defendants in no way contributed to the proximate cause of damages incurred in order for the trial court to sustain a motion for summary judgment in their favor. Chastain v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 122 Ga. App. 90, 176 S.E.2d 487 (1970).
Issues of negligence, including the related issues of assumption of risk, lack of ordinary care for one's own safety, lack of ordinary care in avoiding the consequences of another's negligence, and comparative negligence, are ordinarily not susceptible of summary adjudication, whether for or against the plaintiff or the defendant, but must be resolved by trial. Reed v. Batson-Cook Co., 122 Ga. App. 803, 178 S.E.2d 728 (1970); Shuman Supply of Savannah, Inc. v. Skinner, 128 Ga. App. 431, 197 S.E.2d 152 (1973); North v. Toco Hills, Inc., 160 Ga. App. 116, 286 S.E.2d 346 (1981); Fort v. Boone, 166 Ga. App. 290, 304 S.E.2d 465 (1983).
Negligence, diligence, and contributory negligence are not ordinarily susceptible of adjudication on summary judgment. Lockhart v. Walker, 124 Ga. App. 241, 183 S.E.2d 503 (1971).
Party who moves for summary judgment in a case premised on negligence has a considerable burden, and if the defendant is the movant, sometimes summary judgment may not be obtained even though a directed verdict could be secured at trial. Turner v. Noe, 127 Ga. App. 870, 195 S.E.2d 463 (1973).
Questions involving negligence, and especially those involving whether, under the circumstances, the defendant exercised ordinary care, are properly for the jury. Lockhart v. Beaird, 128 Ga. App. 7, 195 S.E.2d 292 (1973).
Questions of negligence as to cause and proximate cause, and as to what negligence, and whose negligence, constitutes proximate cause of damages in tort cases are generally solely for the jury, except in plain and palpable cases. Summers v. Milcon Corp., 134 Ga. App. 182, 213 S.E.2d 515 (1975).
Summary judgment will not usually be as feasible in negligence cases, when the standard of the reasonable person must be applied to conflicting testimony, as it is in other kinds of litigation, since even if there is no dispute as to the facts, it is usually for the jury to say whether the conduct in question met the standard of the reasonable person. Epps Air Serv., Inc. v. DeKalb County, 147 Ga. App. 195, 248 S.E.2d 300 (1978); Jones v. Crown Constr. Co., 152 Ga. App. 578, 263 S.E.2d 460 (1979).
Unless no other conclusion is permissible, questions of negligence are matters for jury resolution and are not ordinarily susceptible to summary adjudication. Epps Air Serv., Inc. v. DeKalb County, 147 Ga. App. 195, 248 S.E.2d 300 (1978).
Questions of negligence and proximate cause are peculiarly questions for the jury except in clear, plain, palpable, and undisputed cases. Only in the rare case in which there is an admission of liability or an indisputable fact situation that clearly establishes liability should summary judgment be granted. Lozynsky v. Hutchinson, 159 Ga. App. 715, 285 S.E.2d 70 (1981).
Negligence in the workplace.
- In an action against the issuer of a property loss policy covering a boiler involved in an explosion, the defenses that the death of the decedent was the result of the negligence of others and that the decedent and the decedent's employer knew of the defective condition in the subject boiler and did not rely on inspections, did not require affirmative pleading and involved questions of fact, precluding a grant of partial summary judgment. Cleveland v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 163 Ga. App. 748, 295 S.E.2d 190 (1982).
If the facts conclusively show by plain, palpable, and undisputed evidence that the defendant was not at fault, including a case involving contentions of negligence, contributory negligence, or exercise of ordinary care for one's own safety, the case properly may be resolved as a matter of law through the vehicle of summary judgment. Fort v. Boone, 166 Ga. App. 290, 304 S.E.2d 465 (1983).
Issues of negligence, assumption of risk, contributory negligence, and comparative negligence are not susceptible of summary adjudication except in plain, palpable, and indisputable cases. Malvarez v. Georgia Power Co., 166 Ga. App. 498, 304 S.E.2d 542 (1983).
When issues of negligence, diligence, and contributory negligence are involved, it is necessary that such issues be resolved by a jury rather than by summary adjudication. Georgia Power Co. v. Knighton, 169 Ga. App. 416, 312 S.E.2d 872 (1984).
In an automotive negligence action, because the materials relied upon by the defendant pierced the plaintiff's pleadings, the plaintiff's failure to set forth specific facts showing there was a genuine issue for trial warranted an award of summary judgment for the defendant. Butler v. Huckabee, 209 Ga. App. 761, 434 S.E.2d 576 (1993).
In a negligence action, questions of proximate cause are peculiarly reserved for jury determination except in clear, plain, and undisputed cases. Coweta County v. Adams, 221 Ga. App. 868, 473 S.E.2d 558 (1996).
Because the plaintiff failed to present any evidence that raised a question of fact as to whether the defendant was negligent, the plaintiff's contentions regarding what might have happened disappeared in light of the uncontradicted witness testimony as to what did happen, and the trial court correctly granted summary judgment to the defendant. Etheredge v. Kersey, 236 Ga. App. 243, 510 S.E.2d 544 (1998).
Because the plaintiff in a negligence case failed to make a showing that the defendant's negligence caused the plaintiff's injuries, but could only speculate that a greasy substance caused the plaintiff to slip and fall, summary judgment was properly awarded to the defendant. Christopher v. Donna's Country Store, 236 Ga. App. 219, 511 S.E.2d 579 (1999).
Resolution of an employer's obligation to indemnify a manufacturer with regard to a claim brought by an employee did not turn on whether the employer was negligent but instead hinged on whether the manufacturer was solely negligent, and since the manufacturer submitted evidence creating a fact issue as to whether the employee failed to exercise ordinary care for the employee's own safety, the trial court erred when the court granted partial summary judgment to the employer on the manufacturer's contractual indemnification claim; the manufacturer failed to show that the employer did not adequately train the employee, so summary judgment as to that issue was affirmed, and the trial court did not err in denying partial summary judgment to the employer on the manufacturer's claim for a defense. Nat'l Gypsum v. Ploof Carriers Corp., 266 Ga. App. 565, 597 S.E.2d 597 (2004).
Even though later damage to a gas line left exposed in a home was an intervening act that led to a fatal gas fueled fire in the home, the liability of a corporation for the negligence of the corporation's employees in leaving the gas line exposed was still allowed if the employees could have reasonably anticipated or foreseen the intervening act as a consequence of the original negligence; as the evidence would have allowed a jury to find that the natural and probable consequence of leaving a line exposed was that the line would have been damaged, the issue of proximate cause should have been decided by a jury, and summary judgment in favor of the corporation in a wrongful death action brought by the decedent's children was reversed. Beasley v. A Better Gas Co., 269 Ga. App. 426, 604 S.E.2d 202 (2004).
Trial court properly granted summary judgment against an employee, in a third-party action against two contractors and a consultant, because: (1) the employee failed to present sufficient evidence that the alleged negligence by these third parties caused excessive clogging of the conveyor as the employee was injured and forced the employer to operate a conveyor without its cover; and (2) even if the employee established a factual issue as to whether these third parties were negligent in failing to install an emergency pull-cord on the conveyor or in failing to put a second light switch in the tunnel, the employee was still required to show that such was a proximate cause of the injury, which the employee failed to do; moreover, none of the third parties could have reasonably anticipated or foreseen that the employer would negligently seal off the access where the tunnel light switch was located and disregard the manufacturer's warnings and OSHA regulations by running the conveyor with a section of the cover removed. Cieplinski v. Caldwell Elec. Contrs., Inc., 280 Ga. App. 267, 633 S.E.2d 646 (2006).
Because any duty a construction site owner and various contractors had to warn a construction worker of the buried electrical lines was satisfied by notice to that worker's supervisor, who admitted to notice and knowledge of the buried lines, the trial court properly entered summary judgment against the worker in a negligence action filed against them as no other duties existed; moreover, the worker's denial as to being informed by the supervisor of the existence and location of the buried lines in the area worked on was neither relevant nor material to the issue of any duty owed to the worker, and was not a genuine issue of material fact that would have precluded summary judgment. McKinney v. Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 284 Ga. App. 250, 643 S.E.2d 736 (2007), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 497 (Ga. 2007).
Negligence from sporting event.
- Trial court properly granted summary judgment to a professional baseball player and the player's team, and against a baseball fan, in the latter's negligence suit as the fan voluntarily assumed the risk of injury from an errantly thrown baseball, and thus failed to come forth with specific evidence giving rise to a triable issue of fact. Dalton v. Jones, 260 Ga. App. 791, 581 S.E.2d 360 (2003).
Contractor's negligence.
- Trial court properly granted partial summary judgment to a contractor, the contractor's business, and a subcontractor under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(c) because: (1) a party was injured while attempting to put out a fire allegedly caused by the contractor's negligence, injuring the party's leg and foot; (2) despite being prescribed a removable cast and crutches, the injured party walked to the bathroom without the cast and crutches and fell, injuring the party's shoulder; (3) the treating physician testified that if the injured party was not experiencing pain, the injured party could walk short distances without the cast and crutches, however, the injured party had been experiencing pain; and (4) the injured party's own intervening act broke the chain of causation for the shoulder injury. Hynes v. Cagle, 264 Ga. App. 367, 590 S.E.2d 770 (2003).
Summary judgment is appropriate in negligence cases when, viewing all the facts and reasonable inferences from those facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, the evidence does not create a triable issue on the question of proximate cause; although the question of proximate cause is ordinarily for the jury to decide, plain and indisputable cases may be decided by the court as a matter of law and the inquiry in such cases is whether the causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury is too remote for the law to countenance a recovery. Brown v. All-Tech Inv. Group, Inc., 265 Ga. App. 889, 595 S.E.2d 517 (2004).
Negligence in auto accident.
- Summary judgment was properly entered for a trucker in a third-party negligence action brought by a driver who turned into a truck to avoid a head-on collision while the driver was attempting a pass that was illegal under O.C.G.A. § 40-6-42; there was nothing to show that the trucker knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care should have known, that the driver was likely to attempt an illegal pass and the trucker was complying with the traffic regulations at the time of the accident. Rios v. Norsworthy, 266 Ga. App. 469, 597 S.E.2d 421 (2004).
Trial court correctly rejected a res ipsa loquitur claim brought against a car owner by a passenger injured in an accident that occurred when the car suffered a sudden steering malfunction since there was evidence that negligent driving may have caused the accident and since the malfunction could have occurred for reasons other than negligent maintenance or repair; however, the trial court erred in denying the car owner's summary judgment motion on the injured passenger's negligence claims since the car owner showed that the owner diligently repaired and maintained the car for over two years until the accident here, since the injured person's evidence did not support a reasonable inference that the malfunction resulted from negligent repair or maintenance and since negligence by the owner could not have been reasonably inferred solely because the owner had repaired and maintained a car that suffered a malfunction. Ken Thomas of Ga., Inc. v. Halim, 266 Ga. App. 570, 597 S.E.2d 615 (2004).
Trial court properly granted summary judgment to a vehicle driver on the vehicle passenger's negligence action against the driver and a second driver after the second driver pulled into the intersection and caused a collision with the vehicle driven by the first driver; the passenger could not show that the first driver breached any duty owed to the passenger or that the first driver's actions were the proximate cause of the passenger's injuries. McQuaig v. Tarrant, 269 Ga. App. 236, 603 S.E.2d 751 (2004).
Trial court properly denied a driver's summary judgment motion in a police officer's personal injury action against the driver as the officer's suit was not barred by the Fireman's Rule given that the alleged negligence that occurred to cause the accident which injured the officer had nothing to do with the officer's presence at the scene. Davis v. Pinson, 279 Ga. App. 606, 631 S.E.2d 805 (2006).
Conclusion of the expert's testimony as to the cause of an auto accident was speculative and could not support summary judgment as the credibility of the expert and the weight to be given to the opinion were matters to be addressed by the jury; moreover, if the expert's opinion was based upon inadequate knowledge, this fact did not mandate the exclusion of the opinion but, rather, presented a jury question as to the weight which should be assigned to the opinion. Layfield v. DOT, 280 Ga. 848, 632 S.E.2d 135 (2006).
In a negligence action stemming from an auto accident between a driver and a farmer's cow, the trial court properly granted summary judgment on the driver's claim for consequential damages, which was sought for a "ruined vacation," as the driver failed to show any evidence of a physical injury which was a necessary element on a claim premised on ordinary negligence. Hoeflick v. Bradley, 282 Ga. App. 123, 637 S.E.2d 832 (2006).
In a personal injury action arising from a child's injuries as a pedestrian, because conflicting testimony was presented to the trial court as to the issue of a driver's negligence as well as a parent's comparative negligence and apportionment of fault, if any, the trial court properly denied the driver's motion for summary judgment. Sutton v. Justiss, 290 Ga. App. 565, 659 S.E.2d 903 (2008).
In a negligence action arising from a vehicular accident, the trial court did not err in denying summary judgment to the driver of the other car and its owner, because the injured party's testimony supplied a reasonable basis to conclude that the injuries were more likely than not the result of the impact of the collision with the car's driver. Wilson v. Allen, 272 Ga. App. 172, 612 S.E.2d 39 (2005).
In a personal injury action against a vehicle's owner filed by an injured passenger based on the negligence of the vehicle's driver, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the owner, finding no liability under the family purpose doctrine because: (1) the driver was not a member of the owner's immediate household; and (2) the passenger failed to present competent evidence in response to the owner's summary judgment motion as neither hearsay or evidence of conjecture and speculation was sufficient. Patterson v. Lopez, 279 Ga. App. 840, 632 S.E.2d 736 (2006).
In a personal injury action filed by a husband and wife against a driver and that driver's employer, a negligent entrustment claim asserted against the employer was properly disposed of on summary judgment, but because the motion did not include both their negligent hiring and respondeat superior claims, and the husband and wife were not given full and fair notice that those claims were to be included in the motion, those claims also survived. Parker v. Silviano, 284 Ga. App. 278, 643 S.E.2d 819 (2007).
Circumstantial evidence on causation of food poisoning sufficient to withstand summary judgment.
- In an action by rehearsal dinner guests against a caterer alleging food poisoning, summary judgment for the caterer was error; the caterer's circumstantial evidence of the absence of causation (others did not become ill, the guests consumed other food and drink, and did not become ill until days later) was contradicted by other evidence. There was no special element required to be shown in food poisoning cases. Patterson v. Kevon, LLC, 304 Ga. 232, 818 S.E.2d 575 (2018).
Gross negligence.
- Summary judgment was properly entered for the storage companies on an owner's gross negligence claim because: (1) assuming the owner's allegations were true, the storage companies' actions would only be ordinary negligence; (2) the storage companies owed no duty to the owner; and (3) the storage companies were not liable under Georgia's Good Samaritan Doctrine, as the companies did not assume a duty to conduct a vehicle count in the companies' operations manual, the owner was not aware of the manual until after the owner filed suit, and were the storage companies required to conduct a vehicle count, their failure to do so would not have increased the risk of theft as daily counts could only detect that a theft might have occurred after the theft had already occurred. Liberty v. Storage Trust Props., L.P., 267 Ga. App. 905, 600 S.E.2d 841 (2004).
Negligence by independent contractor.
- Although exculpatory clauses signed by a pilot and a safety pilot who flew an aircraft company's plane and engaged in simulated aerial combat were not against public policy under O.C.G.A. § 1-3-7, they were not enforceable if the company was found to have been grossly negligent or to have engaged in willful misconduct, which was an issue to be resolved by the jury; additionally, a jury issue remained as to whether one of the pilots was an independent contractor for purposes of the company's liability under O.C.G.A. § 51-2-5(5), and, accordingly, a grant of summary judgment pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56 to the company was error. McFann v. Sky Warriors, Inc., 268 Ga. App. 750, 603 S.E.2d 7 (2004).
To establish a negligence claim, a plaintiff must come forward with specific facts establishing the elements of negligence as to each defendant, including proximate causation, and may not rest upon generalized allegations. Summary judgment was properly granted to a construction company and an architectural firm in an action alleging construction work near the intensive care unit where a patient was being treated stirred up a fatal fungus that caused the patient's death because: (1) it was not established that the construction company performed the work; (2) no medical evidence supported a finding that any alleged construction work was the proximate cause of the transmission of the fungus; (3) the architectural firm was not responsible for deciding when or how the work would be performed; and (4) the architectural firm was not responsible for the hospital's decisions regarding patient treatment, treatment locations, or timing of treatment. Piedmont Hosp., Inc. v. Reddick, 267 Ga. App. 68, 599 S.E.2d 20 (2004).
Negligence by a restaurant.
- In a case brought by an injured person against a restaurant seeking damages arising from the injured person's slip and fall in a restroom, summary judgment for the restaurant was reversed; the restaurant failed to show that the restaurant lacked superior knowledge of the water condition in the restroom because the restaurant knew that a toilet in an adjacent restroom had overflown onto the floor, a restaurant employee had pushed water from the adjoining restroom into the restroom at issue, the restaurant was notified by the injured person's sister that there was water everywhere, the sister's warning to the injured person stopped short of expressly extending to the inside of the restroom, and there was no warning cone placed at either the door of or inside the restroom in question. Belcher v. Ky. Fried Chicken Corp., 266 Ga. App. 556, 597 S.E.2d 604 (2004).
Summary judgment, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(c), was properly granted to a restaurant by a trial court in an action by a restaurant patron, alleging emotional distress when the patron discovered two blood spots on the french fry container, fearing that the patron would contract HIV or hepatitis, because the patron failed to provide evidence of more than the patron's "fear" of exposure to the diseases; accordingly, the patron's claims for negligence, negligence per se, and breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, under O.C.G.A. §§ 11-2-314 and51-1-23, failed due to the patron's failure to meet the damages requirement. Wilson v. J & L Melton, Inc., 270 Ga. App. 1, 606 S.E.2d 47 (2004).
Administrative errors as negligent act.
- When a retired police officer, to whom a city paid more retirement benefits than the officer was entitled, sued the city for negligence when the city corrected the error, the city was entitled to summary judgment because the city had no authority to pay the officer more retirement benefits than were provided in the officer's retirement plan, and the officer's alleged "early retirement," based on a city clerk's representation that the officer would receive the higher benefit amount the officer was erroneously paid was not an injury for purposes of a negligence cause of action. Dodd v. City of Gainesville, 268 Ga. App. 43, 601 S.E.2d 352 (2004).
Assumption of risks.
- Summary judgment in favor of a skate center was affirmed in a claim brought by a skater who was injured when another skater collided with the skater on an ice rink; it was found that the skater assumed the risks of ice skating, which, by the skater's own admissions, were known to the skater. Fowler v. Alpharetta Family Skate Ctr., LLC, 268 Ga. App. 329, 601 S.E.2d 818 (2004).
Negligence by railroad.
- Appellate court erred in concluding that the trial court's denial of summary judgment to the town and railway on the estate representative's claim that they failed to keep a railroad right-of-way free of visual obstructions caused by overgrown vegetation should be reversed; genuine issues of material fact remained with respect to two separate, independent duties that they may have owed the decedent, whose tractor-trailer was struck by a train as the decedent drove the tractor-trailer across the town's railroad tracks, with one duty arising under the common law and one duty arising under O.C.G.A. § 32-6-51 if there was an absence of any governmental authorization that allegedly obstructed decedent's view. Fortner v. Town of Register, 278 Ga. 625, 604 S.E.2d 175 (2004).
Trial court erroneously denied summary judgment pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(c) to a railroad in a negligence action by an injured car driver, whose car was hit in the rear by a drunk driver, propelling the driver's vehicle forward into a train, as the injured car driver was unable to establish proximate cause between the accident and the negligence of the railroad in maintaining the crossing; whether the reflectorized crossbuck was at the wrong height or not was irrelevant as the drunk driver's intervening act broke the chain of causation. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Deen, 269 Ga. App. 641, 605 S.E.2d 50 (2004).
Simple negligence by medical professionals.
- While the trial court erred in granting summary judgment against a patient in a medical malpractice action based on a failure to attach an expert affidavit pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1 because the complaint could be construed as alleging claims of ordinary negligence, to the extent the complaint could be read to allege professional malpractice claims, summary judgment was proper; moreover, there were instances in which actions performed by a professional were nevertheless not professional acts constituting professional malpractice, but, rather, were acts of simple negligence which would not require proof by expert evidence. Brown v. Tift County Hosp. Auth., 280 Ga. App. 847, 635 S.E.2d 184 (2006).
Farmer's negligence.
- In a negligence action, summary judgment entered against a driver on a property damages claim was reversed, based on the collateral source rule, defendant farmer's failure to prove the existence of a subrogation agreement, and the issue of the farmer's liability to the driver, if any, was a jury question. Hoeflick v. Bradley, 282 Ga. App. 123, 637 S.E.2d 832 (2006).
Negligence of D.O.T.
- Because alternative grounds in a negligence action arising out of the construction and resurfacing of a road, specifically, whether competent evidence showed that there were any defects in the roadway and whether the Department of Transportation's acceptance of the paving project exonerated the contractor, presented questions of fact for a jury to decide, the Supreme Court of Georgia's reversal of an order granting summary judgment to the Department and the contractor was adopted. Layfield v. DOT, 283 Ga. App. 151, 640 S.E.2d 618 (2006).
Trial court's summary judgment order in a negligence suit was properly entered against a couple, and in favor of a parent, as: (1) the family purpose doctrine did not apply to the couple's lawsuit; (2) the parent's child was not a member of the parent's household; and (3) upon a review of the record, after the parent came forward with sufficient evidence to support the motion, the couple as the non-moving party failed to come forward with evidence in opposition to the motion. Hicks v. Newman, 283 Ga. App. 352, 641 S.E.2d 589 (2007).
Because the undisputed facts presented before the trial court showed that the insurer of the leased premises owed no duty to those who leased the premises, and did not undertake any duty itself or through the insurer's claims adjuster, the trial court erred in denying the insurer's summary judgment motion on the lessees' negligence claim filed against the lessee. GuideOne Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hunter, 286 Ga. App. 852, 650 S.E.2d 424 (2007).
Negligence based on breach of duty.
- In a lessee's negligence action against a lessor, because questions of fact remained regarding the lessor's breach of a duty owed to the lessee in reporting the recovery of a previously stolen rental trailer, and as to whether a breach of that duty proximately caused the lessee to become arrested for being in possession of stolen property and remained detained for a lengthy period of time, those issues could not be resolved as a matter of law; thus, an order granting the lessor summary judgment had to be reversed. Halilovic v. Penske Truck Leasing, 287 Ga. App. 215, 651 S.E.2d 160 (2007).
Negligence by court clerk.
- Because a litigant could not utilize a theory known as "outsider reverse veil-piercing" to support a claim of negligence against a superior court clerk to satisfy a judgment owed to that litigant by a third party, and because the litigant failed to present any other viable proximate cause argument, the clerk was entitled to complete summary judgment as to the issue. Lollis v. Turner, 288 Ga. App. 419, 654 S.E.2d 229 (2007).
Negligence by bus accident.
- In a negligence action between an injured bus passenger and a bus company, because the passenger failed to present evidence regarding the cause of the injuries the passenger sustained while walking in a field after disembarking from the bus after the bus had pulled over, and because the cause remained a matter of pure speculation or conjecture, the trial court had a duty to grant summary judgment to the bus company. Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Williams, 290 Ga. App. 450, 659 S.E.2d 867 (2008).
Negligence in felling tree.
- In a civil action for damages caused by felling of a tree under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the trial court erroneously denied the homeowner's motion for summary judgment as an independent contractor was hired to fell the tree and the homeowner had no control over the contractor's actions, and the act of felling the tree was not wrongful in itself; moreover, the homeowner's single suggestion or comment that the contractor could proceed with felling the tree as an entire unit did not necessarily have to be followed and did not create liability on the homeowner's part, but was simply confirming the freedom of the contractor to fell the tree as that contractor deemed appropriate. Whatley v. Sharma, 291 Ga. App. 228, 661 S.E.2d 590 (2008).
Good Samaritan law and negligence action.
- In a negligence action filed by the parents on behalf of their injured son, because jury questions remained as to whether a doctor had to provide immediate "emergency care at the scene of an accident or emergency" to the son within the meaning of the Good Samaritan statute, O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29, as well as the employer-hospital's immunity from any vicarious liability, summary judgment was erroneously entered against the parents and in favor of both the doctor and the hospital. Gilley v. Hudson, 283 Ga. App. 878, 642 S.E.2d 898 (2007).
Premises liability to licensee.
- Trial court properly entered summary judgment for a radio station in an injured party's negligence action as the injured party was a licensee and the station did not wilfully or wantonly injure the injured party by maintaining in a perfectly level condition the floor upon which the injured party fell. Howard v. Gram Corp., 268 Ga. App. 466, 602 S.E.2d 241 (2004).
Liability for hunter's death who was licensee on property.
- Premises owner and its operator were properly granted summary judgment in an action filed against them by a decedent's administrator, as the decedent, who was granted permission to hunt on the property without a permit, was not shown to be anything other than a licensee, no breach of any duty owed to the decedent as a licensee was presented, and an intervening illegal act by a third party was the proximate cause of the decedent's death; moreover, because the evidence showed that there had never been an accidental shooting of one hunter by another on the premises, no basis existed for holding that the owners or operator should have foreseen that a third party would come onto the property and illegally shoot at a target which the third party could not identify. Hadden v. ARE Props., LLC, 280 Ga. App. 314, 633 S.E.2d 667 (2006).
Premises liability to lessee.
- In a wrongful death action filed by a decedent-lessee's administrator in which the decedent was killed when crossing a public highway that the lessor did not control, the lessor was properly granted summary judgment as the administrator failed to show that the lessor was negligent per se or that the lessor breached either a common law or private duty owed to the lessee. Walton v. UCC X, Inc., 282 Ga. App. 847, 640 S.E.2d 325 (2006).
Trial court properly granted summary judgment to the homeowners, in a personal injury action filed by a caretaker who worked in the home, as the caretaker's equal knowledge of the improper construction of the stairs in the home barred recovery, despite the fact that the construction violated the applicable building code; moreover, the caretaker's claim was not saved by an admission of contributory negligence. Argo v. Chitwood, 282 Ga. App. 156, 637 S.E.2d 865 (2006).
In a premises liability action arising from a slip and fall on ice by an injured lessee, because jury issues existed as to whether the party exercised the requisite care, and as to the premises owner's knowledge of the hazard, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the owner and an insurer and in reasoning that the lessee failed to exercise due care. Little v. Alliance Fire Prot., Inc., 291 Ga. App. 116, 661 S.E.2d 173 (2008).
Appraisers were properly granted summary judgment on the buyers' professional negligence claim, alleging that the appraisers grossly over-inflated the value of the subject property, since the appraisers were not manifestly aware of the use to which the information was to be put and did not intend that the information be so used; despite the fact that the mortgagees were listed among the class of persons to whom the report could have been distributed, the appraisers were clearly unaware that one occupying such status would rely on the appraisal in purchasing the property. Martha H. West Trust v. Mkt. Value of Atlanta, Inc., 262 Ga. App. 90, 584 S.E.2d 688 (2003).
Negligent infliction of emotional distress.
- Trial court properly entered summary judgment under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56 for the owner of a truck and the truck owner's employee in a train engineer's suit for the negligent infliction of emotional distress arising out of an accident between a train and a truck as the engineer was not physically injured in the accident, and the engineer did not have a property interest injury resulting in a pecuniary loss arising out of the engineer's inability to continue working as the engineer was an at-will employee; the employee's argument that the zone of danger rule should be adopted in negligent infliction of emotional distress actions was rejected. Shores v. Modern Transp. Servs., 262 Ga. App. 293, 585 S.E.2d 664 (2003).
Because an injured party alleged a physical impact and physical injuries, but did not claim that these injuries caused the party mental suffering or emotional distress, the party's mental distress claim was barred by Georgia's impact rule; hence, the trial court erred in denying summary judgment to the driver of the other car involved in the accident and the owner of the car. Wilson v. Allen, 272 Ga. App. 172, 612 S.E.2d 39 (2005).
Trespass.
- Summary judgment was properly entered for a realtor as to a landowner's trespass claim; the landowner never determined that the offending silt fence was actually on the landowner's property, and the realtor testified that the fence was located on a public right-of-way. Sorrow v. Hadaway, 269 Ga. App. 446, 604 S.E.2d 197 (2004).
Person who rented space in a cousin's apartment without the landlord's knowledge or consent was a trespasser, and the trial court properly dismissed an action that the person filed against the landlord and a company that managed the apartment complex seeking damages for injuries the person sustained when the person slipped and fell, because the evidence showed that neither the landlord nor the property manager breached their duty not to willfully or wantonly injure trespassers. Gomez v. Julian LeCraw & Co., 269 Ga. App. 576, 604 S.E.2d 532 (2004).
Imputed liability for acts of independent contractor.
- Summary judgment was properly entered for a realtor and a developer as to a landowner's claim that the realtor and the developer were liable under O.C.G.A. §§ 51-2-4 and51-2-5 for failing to ascertain the location of the boundary between the realtor's lot and the landowner's lot and communicate the boundary line to an independent contractor hired by the developer to brush the realtor's; the developer testified that a creek and a transformer had been used as landmarks for the boundary line in instructing the contractor, and the landowner did not challenge the use of the landmarks. Sorrow v. Hadaway, 269 Ga. App. 446, 604 S.E.2d 197 (2004).
Contractors and subcontractors.
- Summary judgment was properly granted in favor of the home center company on the homeowners' negligence claim because welding was not an intrinsically dangerous activity for which the company remained responsible for its subcontractors; the company was not restricted by the contract in subcontracting the break down and removal of the trade-in mobile home, and was therefore not liable if this were done negligently. Luther v. Wayne Frier Home Ctr. of Tifton, Inc., 264 Ga. App. 827, 592 S.E.2d 470 (2003).
Since a cause of action alleging that a subcontractor had negligently installed wiring in a house accrued on the date of substantial completion of the house for purposes of damage to the realty, a trial court erred in denying the subcontractor's motion for summary judgment, which asserted that the case, filed more than four years after substantial completion of the house, was time barred as to damage to the real property; however, since the cause of action for damage to personal property damaged in the fire accrued on the date of the fire and not the date of substantial completion, the claim for damage to personalty was not time barred, and summary judgment as to that claim was properly denied. Stamschror v. Allstate Ins. Co., 267 Ga. App. 692, 600 S.E.2d 751 (2004).
Trial court properly granted summary judgment to the materialman on an action to recover on a lien release bond after an electrical subcontractor did not pay for materials supplied to the subcontractor by the materialman, and despite the claim of the general contractor and surety that the materialman did not comply with a lien statute notice requirement; the lien statute notice requirement was meant to protect prospective purchasers from unknowingly buying property encumbered by liens and did not apply to the materialman's situation because the materialman, acting as a lien claimant, was attempting to recover on a lien discharge bond that the general contractor and the surety had filed to discharge the lien against the electrical contractor. Washington Intl Ins. Co. v. Hughes Supply, Inc., 271 Ga. App. 50, 609 S.E.2d 99 (2004).
There was no such thing as a default summary judgment, and even if a building owner failed to respond to a subcontractor's summary judgment motion, the subcontractor was required to show that summary judgment was appropriate; summary judgment for the subcontractor against the building owner was reversed because there was no claim that the building owner was liable under the contract, no claim that the building owner received money to which the subcontractor was entitled, and no evidence that allowing the building owner to retain heat pumps supplied by the subcontractor violated some principle of equity, and the circumstances were insufficient to authorize summary judgment based on an implied constructive trust. Tabar, Inc. v. D & D Servs., 267 Ga. App. 659, 601 S.E.2d 143 (2004).
Contractor's suit against a homeowner seeking over $33,000 for remodeling services was subject to summary judgment; the contract was void and unenforceable under O.C.G.A. § 43-41-17(b) because the contract provided for electrical and plumbing work and the contractor did not have licenses for electrical and plumbing work as required by O.C.G.A. § 43-14-8. It was inconsequential whether the contractor met the definition of a "specialty contractor" in O.C.G.A. § 43-41-2(12). Restor-It, Inc. v. Beck, 352 Ga. App. 613, 835 S.E.2d 398 (2019).
Enforcement of materialman's liens.
- Because a notice under O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361.1(a)(3) was not filed within 14 days of a lien claimant's suit being initiated, the lien was unenforceable, and the trial court did not err in granting a developer's motion for partial summary judgment against the lien claimant; while the appeals court sympathized with the lien claimant's argument that the claimant received a file-stamped copy and as a result believed no fee was due, ultimately it was the responsibility of the plaintiff and plaintiff's counsel to see that the appropriate fees were paid in a timely manner. Kendall Supply, Inc. v. Pearson Cmtys., Inc., 285 Ga. App. 863, 648 S.E.2d 158 (2007).
Fair Business Practices Act.
- Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 10-1-401(a)(1), an action under the Fair Business Practices Act (FBPA), O.C.G.A. § 10-1-390 et seq., cannot be brought more than two years after the person bringing the action knew or should have known of the occurrence of the alleged violation; since the alleged contradictory language in a construction contract on which an FBPA claim was based was present when the contract was signed, the statute of limitations began running when the contract was signed; thus, an FBPA suit filed against a homebuilder more than two years after the date of the contract was untimely, and the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the homebuilder was affirmed. Tiismann v. Linda Martin Homes Corp., 268 Ga. App. 787, 603 S.E.2d 45 (2004).
Misappropriation of trade secrets.
- Because: (1) the trial court erred in holding that mere suspicion of a possible misappropriation of an employer's trade secrets by one of its former employees amounted to objectively reasonable notice sufficient to trigger the running of the statute; and (2) a fact issue existed as to whether the suspicions reflected in the employer's letters to the former employee's counsel were sufficient to cause a reasonable person to investigate whether its trade secrets had been misappropriated, the trial court erred in granting the former employee partial summary judgment on the basis of the five-year statute of limitations under O.C.G.A. § 10-1-766. Porex Corp. v. Haldopoulos, 284 Ga. App. 510, 644 S.E.2d 349 (2007), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 498 (Ga. 2007).
Fair Credit Reporting Act.
- Because the record evidence showed that a customer failed to file suit alleging claims under the Fair Credit Reporting Act within the two years after a wireless service provider reported the customer's outstanding debt to one credit agency, as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1681p, the suit was properly dismissed via summary judgment as time-barred. Lamb v. Verizon Wireless Servs., LLC, 284 Ga. App. 696, 644 S.E.2d 412 (2007).
General premises liability for commercial entities.
- In a customer's premises liability action, because factual issues existed as to whether a retailer knew or should have known of a hazardous condition when it left a rolled-up carpet mat leaning on its end in the produce department, and whether the retailer could foresee that it would be knocked over and become a tripping hazard, summary judgment in favor of the retailer, and against the customer, was reversed. Freeman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 281 Ga. App. 132, 635 S.E.2d 399 (2006).
In a wrongful death action against a church as a premises owner, because the decedent's husband, as administrator of the estate, failed to raise a material fact question of the church's liability for allowing its parishioners to park on the side of the roadway, and thus, obstruct the decedent's view of the adjacent intersection, causing the decedent to collide with an oncoming northbound vehicle, the church was properly granted summary judgment. Gay v. Redland Baptist Church, 288 Ga. App. 28, 653 S.E.2d 779 (2007).
Trial court properly granted summary judgment to a retailer, in a customer's negligence action filed against the retailer for injuries sustained when a tomato tower punctured an eye, as the customer's injury arose out of a third party's actions which the retailer did not and could not have foreseen, and hence no evidence was presented that the retailer breached a duty owed to the customer. Thomas v. Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc., 284 Ga. App. 699, 644 S.E.2d 538 (2007).
In a customer's personal injury action, a property owner was properly granted summary judgment as the owner had no duty to foresee any danger from the owner's criminally damaged pay phone falling on the customer's head, the way the injury occurred was not reasonably expected, and due to the fact that such could not occur except from the customer's unexpected acts. McAfee v. ETS Payphones, Inc., 283 Ga. App. 756, 642 S.E.2d 422 (2007).
Because: (1) the undisputed evidence presented to the trial court was that a retailer had no knowledge of a hazard posed by a previously loaded BB gun placed on an open display shelf and accessible to children; and (2) a parent failed to show that it was reasonably foreseeable that the parent's child would take the gun and shoot the child's sibling, the trial court did not err in granting the retailer summary judgment as to the issue of the retailer's liability. Roberts v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 287 Ga. App. 316, 651 S.E.2d 464 (2007).
In a premises liability action, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to a participant in a contest held by a licensee, without considering the question of whether the participant assumed the risk of falling by participating in a jump-rope in a suit and dress shoes, as that participant failed to show that the licensee had control over the condition of the premises where the contest was held, and had superior knowledge of the hazard or defect which allegedly caused the participant's injuries. Dixon v. Infinity Broad. East, Inc., 289 Ga. App. 71, 656 S.E.2d 211 (2007).
Because a party injured in a fall admitted to having actual knowledge not only of the alleged hazard which caused the fall, but of the specific danger the hazard presented, and as a result appreciated the danger involved, the trial court erred in denying summary judgment to the premises owner as to the issue of liability, given that based on the foregoing, the party should have avoided any injury in the exercise of ordinary care. Callaway Gardens Resort, Inc. v. Bierman, 290 Ga. App. 111, 658 S.E.2d 895 (2008).
Because a skating rink patron failed to present sufficient evidence showing that the rink owners breached a duty by failing to have identifiable floor guards on duty at the time of the patron's fall, and that the breach proximately caused the patron's injuries, but instead, the unequivocal evidence showed that a floor guard was on duty at that time of the fall, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the owners as to the issue of the owner's liability. Moreover, testimony from other management personnel, who were not at the rink at the time of the fall, did not contradict the assistant manager's positive assertions or written report and did not create a material issue of fact. Evans v. Sparkles Mgmt., LLC, 290 Ga. App. 458, 659 S.E.2d 860 (2008).
General premises liability for homeowners, landlords, and others.
- Summary judgment in favor of homeowners was affirmed in a premises liability claim based on an injury to a four-year-old child on a trampoline in the homeowners' yard because there was no showing that the homeowners willfully or wantonly led the child into a hidden peril on the homeowners' premises and, therefore, did not breach the duty of care owed to the homeowners' social guest; however, when jury questions existed as to whether the homeowners undertook the supervision of the child and whether the homeowners used reasonable care to protect the child from injury, summary judgment on a negligent supervision claim was reversed. Nunn v. Page, 265 Ga. App. 484, 594 S.E.2d 701 (2004).
In a personal injury action, because an injured party failed to show that the landlords could not have had constructive notice of the deteriorated condition of the steps upon which that party fell and was injured, the landlords were not liable for the landlords' failure to keep the premises in repair. Thus, the landlords were properly granted summary judgment as to the issue of liability for the party's injuries. Stelter v. Simpson, 288 Ga. App. 402, 655 S.E.2d 237 (2007).
In a premises liability action filed by a repairman arising from injuries suffered while repairing a roof, because the trial court properly found that an out-of-possession landlord and its tenants who surrendered control of the owned premises did not ratify the repairman's employer's actions in not providing safety equipment, and did not have superior knowledge of the dangers involved, the out-of-possession landlord and its tenants were properly granted summary judgment in the repairman's premises liability action. Saunders v. Indus. Metals & Surplus, Inc., 285 Ga. App. 415, 646 S.E.2d 294 (2007), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 624 (Ga. 2007).
Trial court properly granted summary judgment to an apartment complex owner, and against the decedent's personal representative, in the latter's premises liability action against the former as: (1) evidence was lacking that the vacant apartment where the decedent was murdered was negligently left unlocked; and (2) despite the criminal history of the area where the apartment was located, the owner had no reasonable belief to anticipate that a murder would have occurred on the owner's premises. Moreover, guesses or speculation which raised merely a conjecture or possibility were insufficient to create even an inference of fact for consideration on summary judgment. Wojcik v. Windmill Lake Apts., Inc., 284 Ga. App. 766, 645 S.E.2d 1 (2007), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 637 (Ga. 2007).
Because a painter failed to show that a homeowner's knowledge of an electrical wiring defect was superior to that of the painter, the homeowner was entitled to summary judgment as to the issue of the homeowner's liability. Schuessler v. Bennett, 287 Ga. App. 880, 652 S.E.2d 884 (2007), cert. denied, No. S08C0398, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 230 (Ga. 2008).
Landlord liability in guest's premises liability lawsuit.
- Trial court properly granted summary judgment to a landlord on the guest's premises liability lawsuit as the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and other material on file did not establish a genuine issue of material fact and the landlord was entitled to judgment as a matter of law; the guest did not show that the guest lacked knowledge of the hazard presented by descending a steep stairway to reach the tenant's basement apartment since the guest had descended the stairway on four occasions without incident before being injured in a fall, and the guest also did not show that the steep stairway was the only way to access the apartment. Yon v. Shimeall, 257 Ga. App. 845, 572 S.E.2d 694 (2002).
Slander of title.
- Petition that a husband and wife filed against an attorney seeking $50,000 "for humiliation and embarrassment" they experienced because an attorney initiated a foreclosure action after they refused to pay a promissory note did not state a claim for special damages, and the state supreme court held that the trial court properly granted the attorney's motion for summary judgment on the husband and wife's claim alleging slander of title, even though the trial court dismissed the claim on other grounds. Latson v. Boaz, 278 Ga. 113, 598 S.E.2d 485 (2004).
Negligent inspection claim.
- Trial court properly granted summary judgment dismissing a home buyers' claim of professional negligence against an engineering firm that performed an allegedly negligent inspection of the home because the buyers had no privity with the firm and none of the exceptions to this requirement applied. Smiley v. S & J Inves., Inc., 260 Ga. App. 493, 580 S.E.2d 283 (2003).
Summary judgment was properly entered for a railroad as to an injured party's premises liability claim based on a premises owner's non-delegable duty to keep the premises safe for the protection of invitees. The railroad neither owned nor occupied the sidetrack that was the site of the accident. Assuming that the railroad did own the sidetrack, there was no evidence that the railroad had any knowledge of the defective condition that was the result of its lessee's use of a defective iron grate. The injured party conceded that the defective grate was not readily apparent and the injured party failed to show that the railroad would have discovered the defect had the railroad conducted a reasonable inspection. Mixon v. Ga. Cent. Ry., L.P., 266 Ga. App. 365, 596 S.E.2d 807 (2004).
Landlord and tenant actions.
- Summary judgment under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56 for an owner, a manager, and a lessor of an apartment was properly entered in a tenant's action for trespass arising out of the tenant's eviction; the entry of the writ of possession was proper, on the writ's face, under O.C.G.A. § 44-7-50. Vickers v. Merry Land & Inv. Co., 263 Ga. App. 316, 587 S.E.2d 816 (2003).
Trial court properly granted summary judgment pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(c) to a lessor in a lessee's breach of contract action; pursuant to a lease for roof space to be used for a billboard, the lessee defaulted by interfering with a cellular antenna already placed on the roof, and the lessor provided the proper notice of termination. Tower Projects, LLC v. Marquis Tower, Inc., 267 Ga. App. 164, 598 S.E.2d 883 (2004).
Summary judgment was properly granted to a landlord in the landlord's dispossessory action against a tenant because: (1) the tenant failed to pay the rent timely on at least two prior occasions within the 12 months preceding the payment at issue; (2) the tenant mailed the rent payment on July 10th; (3) although the lease did not specifically state that the rent was to be paid and received by 5:00 p.m., "paid" did not mean "tendered," and the terms "normal hours of business" and "by 5:00 p.m." also implied that receipt of the rent was necessary, rather than just the rent's tender; (4) the lease provided that written notice of the lease's cancellation would be given after three late payments; and (5) a claimed conflict between the executive director's affidavit and a newsletter did not create an issue of material fact as the tenant's payment was mailed after the deadline set forth in the newsletter. Baker v. Hous. Auth. of Waynesboro, 268 Ga. App. 122, 601 S.E.2d 350 (2004).
Trial court properly entered summary judgment for a landlord against a tenant and a guarantor because the tenant admitted that the tenant withheld rent for over one year and the outstanding balances due under the lease and the guaranty were undisputed; the trial court was not required to wait until discovery was completed under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(a) as the matter was ripe for a ruling. Vick v. Tower Place, L.P., 268 Ga. App. 108, 601 S.E.2d 348 (2004).
After applying the rules of contract construction under O.C.G.A. §§ 13-2-2 and13-2-3, the Court of Appeals of Georgia upheld an order granting summary judgment to a lessee as the lessee was not required to pay the lessee's portion of the security related costs under the terms of the lease, according to the Common Area Costs formula contained therein; hence, the lessee was authorized to refuse to pay those costs without being in breach of the lease agreement. Covington Square Assocs., LLC v. Ingles Mkts., Inc., 283 Ga. App. 307, 641 S.E.2d 266 (2007).
In a case involving a commercial lease, because the tenant failed to prove all the elements of the tenant's constructive eviction defense, the landlord was properly granted summary judgment on the landlord's claim for rent and late fees; but because genuine fact issues remained as to the tenant's diminution of rent counterclaim when the landlord terminated the water service and for the time period the tenant was without water, as well as regarding the issue of whether the landlord waived a requirement that the tenant install a submeter, the landlord was not entitled to summary judgment regarding these issues. Delta Cleaner Supply Co. v. Mendel Drive Assocs., 286 Ga. App. 227, 648 S.E.2d 651 (2007).
While the trial court properly granted summary judgment to a lessee regarding the enforcement of a lease provision barring removal of certain improvements to the leasehold originally made by the lessor's predecessor-in-interest, despite the lessor's demand that such be removed, given a non-waiver provision in the lease, and the fact that a demand for reimbursement for insurance premiums paid over the life of the lease could be made at any time, the landlord was entitled to the premiums. Ranwal Props., LLC v. John H. Harland Co., 285 Ga. App. 532, 646 S.E.2d 730 (2007).
Specific performance of land sales contract.
- In a buyer's suit seeking specific performance of a land sales contract that contained a clear and unambiguous clause stating that time was of the essence, the trial court properly granted summary judgment against the buyer, due to the buyer's failure to timely tender additional earnest money, and because that action amounted to a breach authorizing the sellers to terminate the agreement. Chowhan v. Miller, 283 Ga. App. 749, 642 S.E.2d 428 (2007).
Because the evidence presented at trial made it clear that a lessor conveyed no ownership interest to a tenant, leaving that tenant with only a right to possess and use the leased property, and more specifically, a usufruct, the tenant did not own an interest in the property, and thus could not pursue an easement by necessity under O.C.G.A. § 44-9-40; hence, summary judgment in the lessor's favor as to this issue was upheld on appeal. Read v. Ga. Power Co., 283 Ga. App. 451, 641 S.E.2d 680 (2007).
In an action seeking specific performance of a land sales contract, because genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the $45,000 sales price was adequate in relation to the fair market value of the subject property, and whether enforcement of the contract was equitable, the trial court erred in granting the buyers of that land summary judgment. Weeks v. Rowell, 289 Ga. App. 507, 657 S.E.2d 881 (2008).
Class action suit for breach of lease.
- Trial court properly dismissed a class action suit arising out of a breach of a lease agreement and filed by a group of uninsured patients against a hospital for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, which the court converted to a motion for summary judgment, as the class members: (1) failed to timely object to the merits of the oral motion; (2) acquiesced to the evidence in support of the motion; and (3) failed to show they were third-party beneficiaries of the agreement, with sufficient standing to sue upon a breach of the agreement's terms. Davis v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., 280 Ga. App. 505, 634 S.E.2d 452 (2006).
Commercial lease agreements.
- In a lessor's action to enforce the provisions of a commercial lease pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 13-1-11, because a lessee's predecessor-in-interest failed to strictly comply with a cancellation option in the lease, and time was of the essence, the trial court erred in ruling otherwise, resulting in an expiration of the option due to the failure to timely exercise the option; thus, on remand the lessor was entitled to summary judgment on the lessor's possession claim and to the past rent due under the lease for the term sought. Piedmont Ctr. 15, LLC v. Aquent, Inc., 286 Ga. App. 673, 649 S.E.2d 733 (2007), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 749 (Ga. 2007).
Equipment lease agreements.
- In an action arising out of its lessee's breach of an equipment lease, the lessor was properly granted summary judgment, as a claim that an affidavit from the lessor's valuation expert was raised for the first time on appeal and thus was not addressed, and the lessee could not complain that the equipment or delivery was defective, as the lessee took the equipment under the lease "as is." Locke's Graphic & Vinyl Signs, Inc. v. Citicorp Vendor Fin., Inc., 285 Ga. App. 826, 648 S.E.2d 156 (2007).
Injunctive relief against housing authority.
- Since there was no evidence of a continuing trespass and since a housing authority had an adequate remedy at law, summary judgment granting an injunction barring entry on the housing authority's property by a husband and wife was reversed. Strange v. Hous. Auth. of Summerville, 268 Ga. App. 403, 602 S.E.2d 185 (2004).
Owners and occupiers of land.
- Homeowners' summary judgment motion should have been granted as the homeowners had no actual or constructive notice of a problem with a deck that collapsed, injuring the injured party; the home had been inspected one year earlier, and no problem with the deck was identified, although the inspection report indicated that the deck was not bolted to the house. Nailing a deck to a house was acceptable at the time of the inspection. Wingo v. Harrison, 268 Ga. App. 156, 601 S.E.2d 507 (2004).
Summary judgment on zoning issue.
- Because no evidence was presented regarding the content of the relevant county zoning ordinance at the time a landowner purchased the land in question, and whether the use of the property as a landfill was prohibited by the ordinance, and because laches did not apply against the state in which a zoning issue was involved, summary judgment was improperly granted in favor of a landowner. Further, the trial court erred in finding that the landfill was grandfathered as a non-conforming use under that zoning ordinance. Flippen Alliance for Cmty. Empowerment, Inc. v. Brannan, 267 Ga. App. 134, 601 S.E.2d 106 (2004).
Breach of warranty of title.
- In a breach of warranty of title action, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the title insurance company despite the company's failure to object to title within 30 days of the date the sales contract was executed since the sales contract provided that no provisions survived closing, including the title-objection; thus, after the closing, the provisions of the warranty deed superceded any time limitations regarding objections to the title in the contract. Weiss v. Old Republic Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 262 Ga. App. 120, 584 S.E.2d 710 (2003).
Quiet title actions.
- In quiet title actions initiated by each party regarding the same parcel of residential property, the trial court properly adopted a special master's order granting summary judgment in favor of a bank, who was the assignee of the holder of the loan secured by the property, finding that fee simple title vested in the bank, as the transfer of the property to the assignee of the holder of the security deed was valid when the deed under power was recorded; in the absence of any court order invalidating or setting aside that deed, the deed legally vested title in the property in the assignee of the holder of the security deed, and thus in the bank. Vereen v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co., 282 Ga. 284, 646 S.E.2d 667 (2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1143, 128 S. Ct. 1089, 169 L. Ed. 2d 811 (2008).
Action against partners for payment of judgment against another partner.
- In a case in which the plaintiff sued a limited partnership and two of its general partners for payment of a judgment gained against another general partner (a corporation), the trial court properly granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment because they were not parties to the prior suit. Hartley v. Shenandoah, Ltd., 170 Ga. App. 868, 318 S.E.2d 508 (1984).
Breach of fiduciary duty.
- When a company sued a company's accountants for breach of fiduciary duty regarding a sale of the company's assets, summary judgment was properly granted in favor of the accountants because the evidence was insufficient to create a factual dispute as to whether the accountants exercised a controlling influence over the will, conduct, and interest of the company as required under O.C.G.A. § 23-2-58 for a fiduciary relationship to arise. R.W. Holdco, Inc. v. Johnson, 267 Ga. App. 859, 601 S.E.2d 177 (2004).
Breach of settlement agreement.
- Trial court properly entered summary judgment for a company, the company's subsidiary, and an employee in an injured party's claim that the company breached its settlement agreement with the injured party by adding a term barring the injured party from the company's premises as the company's desire to keep the injured party off of the company's property was independent of the settlement agreement and did not change or vary the terms of the settlement agreement; a private property owner may at any time restrict persons from coming onto its property. Batayias v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 267 Ga. App. 848, 601 S.E.2d 174 (2004).
Issue of nonmaterial fact in beneficiary's suit for mishandling of funds.
- Although there was a genuine issue of fact as to whether a savings and loan association had knowledge of a court order requiring court permission before encroaching upon the corpus of a trust, it was not a material fact because, even if the association had such knowledge, the association was permitted by O.C.G.A. § 7-1-190 to pay out the funds on the order of the trustee under the presumption that the trustee was acting in compliance with the trustee's fiduciary duties, so summary judgment was properly granted in favor of the association in the beneficiaries' suit for mishandling of the trust. Chelena v. Georgia Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 256 Ga. 336, 349 S.E.2d 180 (1986).
Misappropriation of trade secrets.
- Because a doctor's patient list was not a trade secret within the meaning of the Georgia Trade Secrets Act, O.C.G.A. § 10-1-761(4)(A), and because an attorney the doctor sued for misappropriation was not in the same industry as the doctor, the attorney's possession of the list did not reduce the doctor's competitive advantage in the field, which was the main purpose of protecting a trade secret; thus, the attorney was entitled to summary judgment on the doctor's claim of misappropriation. Vito v. Inman, 286 Ga. App. 646, 649 S.E.2d 753 (2007), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 770 (Ga. 2007).
Promissory estoppel and reasonable reliance.
- Because promissory estoppel involves reasonable reliance, and questions of reasonable reliance are usually for the jury to resolve, the grant of summary judgment to the defendant was improper because jury issues remained on the plaintiff's promissory estoppel claim. Ambrose v. Sheppard, 241 Ga. App. 835, 528 S.E.2d 282 (2000).
Tortious interference with business relations.
- Trial court properly granted a hospital's summary judgment motion pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56 as to a doctor's claims for tortious interference with business relations because the doctor's claim was precluded as a matter of law by the stranger doctrine. Mulligan v. Brunswick Mem'l Hosp. Auth., 264 Ga. App. 39, 589 S.E.2d 851 (2003).
In an action alleging both tortious interference with business relations and a tortious interference with contract filed by an uncle against a nephew and the nephew's wife, summary judgment was properly entered against the uncle, as the evidence in support of the claims failed to show that the nephew had an improper purpose; more specifically, as regarding the former claim, the evidence amounted to either hearsay or double hearsay, and as to the second claim, the nephew could act with privilege with regards to the contract at issue. Kirkland v. Tamplin, 285 Ga. App. 241, 645 S.E.2d 653 (2007), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 616 (Ga. 2007); 552 U.S. 1297, 128 S. Ct. 1750, 170 L. Ed. 2d 541 (2008).
Tortious interference with employment relationship.
- Summary judgment was properly entered for a company, the company's subsidiary, and the company's employee in an injured party's tortious interference with employment relationship claim as the injured party was an at-will employee of a contractor working at the company's plant, and the action of requesting that the injured party leave the premises was not malicious and did not fit within the definition of wrongful conduct. Batayias v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 267 Ga. App. 848, 601 S.E.2d 174 (2004).
Tortious interference with contracts.
- Buyer's tortious interference with contracts claims were properly disposed of on summary judgment as: (1) all parties to an interwoven contractual arrangement were not liable for tortious interference with any of the contracts or business relationships; and (2) a claim for tortious interference with contractual relations could not be predicated upon an allegedly improper filing of a lawsuit. BKJB P'ship v. Moseman, 284 Ga. App. 862, 644 S.E.2d 874, cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 558 (Ga. 2007).
Business relationship.
- Proof that a defendant was no stranger to the business relations at issue is fatal to a claim of tortious interference with business relations. By offering the services of off-duty police officers to provide private security at baseball games, a security company brought a city and the city's police department into the business relationship. The stranger doctrine foreclosed the security company's tortious interference with a business relationship claim brought against the city and police supervisors based on the supervisors' decision to deny permission to the off-duty officers to provide private security through the security company, and summary judgment in favor of the city and the police supervisors was affirmed. Cox v. City of Atlanta, 266 Ga. App. 329, 596 S.E.2d 785 (2004).
Storage facility owner's duty of care.
- Disputed facts regarding whether a storage facility owner fulfilled the owner's duty of exercising ordinary care in keeping its approaches safe by providing a walk board with no means of securing the board to a loading dock or moving van precluded summary judgment. McGinnis v. Admiral Moving & Storage Co., 223 Ga. App. 410, 477 S.E.2d 841 (1996).
Usury.
- Trial court properly granted summary judgment to a water company in the purchaser's complaint that a late fee for unpaid water bills was a cloak for a usurious loan as there was no evidence giving rise to a triable issue regarding the agreement to provide water. Mallard v. Forest Heights Water Works, Inc., 260 Ga. App. 750, 580 S.E.2d 602 (2003).
Pending action.
- Motion for summary judgment will lie on the ground of pendency of the former original action, in a second action brought by the same plaintiff against the same defendant and involving the same cause of action as in the former action. Reeves Transp. Co. v. Gamble, 126 Ga. App. 165, 190 S.E.2d 98 (1972).
Interspousal immunity doctrine barred a suit by a husband's estate against a wife's estate for injuries sustained by the husband in an auto accident in which the wife was driving the auto occupied by the husband; the danger was that the wife's estate could have conceded fault to get insurance proceeds for both estates, and the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the wife's estate was affirmed. Larkin v. Larkin, 268 Ga. App. 127, 601 S.E.2d 487 (2004).
Intentional infliction of emotional distress.
- Trial court properly entered summary judgment against an uncle, and in favor of the uncle's nephew and the nephew's wife, on the uncle's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, as the complained of statements amounted to common expressions from family members and a common vicissitude of ordinary life, though given in a threatening tone of voice, and were not extreme and outrageous. Kirkland v. Tamplin, 285 Ga. App. 241, 645 S.E.2d 653 (2007), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 616 (Ga. 2007); 552 U.S. 1297, 128 S. Ct. 1750, 170 L. Ed. 2d 541 (2008).
Because an employee failed in the burden of showing that the conduct and behavior of the employee's former manager did not, as a matter of law, qualify as extreme and outrageous conduct, the trial court properly granted summary judgment as to the issue of liability to the employee's former employer and former manager; moreover, while comments made within the context of one's employment might be horrifying or traumatizing, the comments were generally considered a common vicissitude of ordinary life. Wilcher v. Confederate Packaging, Inc., 287 Ga. App. 451, 651 S.E.2d 790 (2007).
Official immunity.
- Trial court properly granted summary judgment to a county school board and the board's superintendent in a parents negligence action arising out of an attack on school grounds that injured their daughter as the board and the superintendent presented sufficient evidence that a school safety plan was in place at the elementary school at the time the child was attacked, entitling the board and the superintendent to official immunity barring the parents' negligence claims. Leake v. Murphy, 284 Ga. App. 490, 644 S.E.2d 328 (2007), cert. denied, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 671 (Ga. 2007).
In a tort action for personal injuries and property damage arising from an auto collision filed against a city and the city's police officer, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the officer, given that the officer was engaged in a discretionary function of responding to an emergency situation at the time the accident at issue occurred. Weaver v. City of Statesboro, 288 Ga. App. 32, 653 S.E.2d 765 (2007), cert. denied, No. S08C0421, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 221 (Ga. 2008).
Personal injury.
- Because the plaintiff was injured in a restaurant by an exploding bottle, the fact that the plaintiff 's evidence did not prove definitively which of the two manufacturers supplied the particular bottle - or, indeed, that the bottle's disintegration and the plaintiff's subsequent injuries were due to fault on the part of either manufacturer - was of no significance in determining whether summary judgment should be granted against the plaintiff. Scott v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 173 Ga. App. 19, 325 S.E.2d 402 (1984).
Defendant insurer was properly granted summary judgment on a claim by the plaintiffs, a postal worker and spouse, for underinsured motorist benefits in a case in which the plaintiffs received $95,554 from the tortfeasor who injured the postal worker, representing the tortfeasor's cumulative policy limits of $100,000 less $4,445 that was paid to the postal service for damage to a postal truck, because, even though $34,666 of the $95,554 went to a workers' compensation program and a health insurer on their subrogation claims, the subrogation sums represented money that the postal worker had already recovered in the form of workers' compensation and health benefits coverage for some of the worker's damages; thus, the subrogation claims did not constitute "payment of other claims or otherwise" that reduced the tortfeasor's available coverage. The plaintiffs recovered more than their available $75,000 in uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage, and the trial court was correct that the tortfeasor was not underinsured for purposes of O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(b)(1)(D)(ii). Thurman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 260 Ga. App. 338, 579 S.E.2d 746 (2003).
Trial court properly granted summary judgment to the amusement park operator on the injured party's personal injury claim after the party was struck in the face with a lap restraint bar as the party did not show that the ride was a perilous instrumentality, that the amusement park operator had a superior knowledge of the hazard, or that the amusement park operator was in exclusive control of the car the party was getting into at the time of the accident such that the party should have been allowed to apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to the party's case. Harrelson v. Wild Adventures, Inc., 263 Ga. App. 569, 588 S.E.2d 341 (2003).
Summary judgment was properly granted to a warehouse corporation because the record did not reflect a genuine issue of material fact as to causation in a worker's claim for an injury suffered in the warehouse since there was no evidence the worker actually tripped. Pennington v. Wjl, 263 Ga. App. 758, 589 S.E.2d 259 (2003).
Trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of a sheriff's deputy who was sued by a motorist who was injured when the motorist's car was struck by a car being driven by a suspect fleeing from police. Standard v. Hobbs, 263 Ga. App. 873, 589 S.E.2d 634 (2003).
Summary judgment in favor of a trading firm and a security company on a personal injury action was affirmed because the action was based on damages to victims of a shooting rampage by a former customer of the trading company; the shooter's criminal act was an intervening cause to any possible foreseeable injury the firm might have created, and the security company did not owe any of the victims of the rampage a duty. Brown v. All-Tech Inv. Group, Inc., 265 Ga. App. 889, 595 S.E.2d 517 (2004).
Trial court erred in granting summary judgment for a school board in an injured party's personal injuries claim based on the injured party's failure to present evidence that the injuries were actually caused by a defective condition in a slide as the argument was not presented in the school board's motion and the injured party had no opportunity to respond to it; the injured party did not have a full and final opportunity to meet and controvert the ground for summary judgment upon which the trial court relied, and the summary judgment could not be affirmed under the right for any reason rule. Hart v. Appling County Sch. Bd., 266 Ga. App. 300, 597 S.E.2d 462 (2004).
Summary judgment in favor of a ranch owner was affirmed in a case brought against the owner by an injured person who believed that the injured person had been hit by bullet shrapnel at a shooting range on the ranch owner's property but did not see the object after the bullet struck the injured person, did not know what had happened to the bullet, did not know who had shot the rifle, and did not know what type of rifle the person had used or the caliber of bullet involved; the injured person was unaware of anyone else being hit with any debris, and the injured person's expert testified to not having an opinion of what struck the injured person and could not say whether any particular target at the range would have caused a bullet to ricochet to the spot on which the injury occurred. Hobday v. Galardi, 266 Ga. App. 780, 598 S.E.2d 350 (2004).
In a personal injury action against a utility and the utility's independent contractor, the trial court properly granted summary judgment against a cable installer finding that: (1) the utility was not vicariously liable to the installer for the allegedly negligent acts of the utility's contractor; (2) the utility's right to inspect the work did not render the utility liable for the contractor's negligence as that right was intended for the limited purpose of making sure the contractor competently carried out the terms of the contract; (3) the utility was not liable for the utility's failure to flag a power line trench in which the installer fell and was injured, as surface markings showing the path of the trench would not have informed the installer of the danger, and the installer was not injured as a result of excavating or blasting; and (4) the High-voltage Safety Act, O.C.G.A. § 46-3-30 et seq., did not apply to afford the installer a remedy. Perry v. Georgia Power Co., 278 Ga. App. 759, 629 S.E.2d 588 (2006).
Retailer was properly granted summary judgment in a personal injury action filed against the retailer by one of the retailer's customers under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as the customer failed to show that the retailer retained exclusive control over the box that fell from a stationary position on a shelf and allegedly caused the customer's injuries, and the customer conceded that there was no evidence that the retailer had superior knowledge of an allegedly dangerous condition; further, the retailer was not required to show that the retailer's employees carried out an inspection of the shelved items within a reasonable time period before the incident. Aderhold v. Lowe's Home Ctrs., Inc., 284 Ga. App. 294, 643 S.E.2d 811 (2007).
In a personal injury action arising from the electrocution of two construction workers while operating a crane leased by a buyer and seller of heavy equipment, the trial court properly denied summary judgment to the buyer/seller of the crane as material fact issues remained as to the condition of the crane when the crane left the buyer/seller's possession, and as to the element of causation; moreover, the learned intermediary doctrine did not apply. Dozier Crane & Mach., Inc. v. Gibson, 284 Ga. App. 496, 644 S.E.2d 333 (2007).
In a personal injury action arising from a fall suffered by a lessee's visitor from a pull-down staircase, because no questions of fact remained as to an out-of-possession landlord's liability for failure to repair, defective construction, or failure to warn, the landlord was properly granted summary judgment as to those issues. Gainey v. Smacky's Invs., Inc., 287 Ga. App. 529, 652 S.E.2d 167 (2007).
Because a driver failed to present sufficient record evidence that a city received timely ante litem notice that the driver sustained a personal injury, much less the nature, character, or particularities of any such injury, but the notice submitted merely established that the driver sustained property damage, the driver did not substantially comply with O.C.G.A. § 36-33-5(b); thus, the trial court properly granted the city summary judgment on that issue. Harris-Jackson v. City of Cochran, 287 Ga. App. 722, 652 S.E.2d 607 (2007).
Recreational Property Act.
- Trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to a city on allegations of negligence asserted against the city by an injured motorcycle driver as the Recreational Property Act (Act), O.C.G.A. § 51-3-20 et seq., prevented the driver from recovering from the city based on allegations of simple negligence; moreover, the Act clearly applied because it was undisputed that the injuries occurred when the driver collided with the cable fence on the city's recreational property, and the city permitted the general public to use the park and open field where the accident occurred for recreational purposes without charge. Carroll v. City of Carrollton, 280 Ga. App. 172, 633 S.E.2d 591 (2006).
Wrongful death action brought by parent.
- Despite evidence of a parent's cruel treatment of the decedent, the trial court erred in finding that the parent forfeited parental rights, and thus lost the status as a parent and, in so doing, lost the right to recover as an heir of the decedent's estate as the loss of parental power did not necessarily result in a parent's loss of a right to inherit as an heir from the estate of that parent's child, short of having the parent's rights terminated prior to the child's death; hence, summary judgment against the parent on the issue was reversed. Blackstone v. Blackstone, 282 Ga. App. 515, 639 S.E.2d 369 (2006).
Wrongful death.
- In a wrongful death action, because the employer of a driver was not responsible for the personal activities the employee was involved in at the time of the fatal accident that killed the decedent, and the special mission exception did not apply, the employer was properly granted summary judgment in a suit filed against the employer by the decedent's estate and survivors. Banks v. AJC Intl., Inc., 284 Ga. App. 22, 643 S.E.2d 780 (2007).
In a wrongful death action filed against a county sheriff's deputy and the county, the administrator's claim that the deputy failed to report an accident and failed to render aid, in violation of both O.C.G.A. §§ 40-6-270(a)(3) and40-6-273 were rejected, and the deputy and the county were erroneously denied summary judgment as the evidence showed that: (1) the deputy radioed for officer assistance; (2) the two officers looked for a second vehicle that might have been involved in the accident, to no avail; and (3) based on the results of the investigation, no evidence existed that the deputy breached the duty imposed by § 40-6-273 Purvis v. Steve, 284 Ga. App. 116, 643 S.E.2d 380, cert. denied, No. S07C1063, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 517 (Ga. 2007).
In a wrongful death action filed on behalf of a deceased employee, because jury questions remained as to whether the defenses of assumption of the risk and equal knowledge of danger barred the claims of negligence, negligence per se, respondeat superior, and premises liability, and as to whether the claims were barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act, summary judgment to the decedent's employer was reversed. Champion v. Pilgrim's Pride Corp. of Del., Inc., 286 Ga. App. 334, 649 S.E.2d 329 (2007), cert. denied, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 83 (Ga. 2008).
Because the trial court properly found that a decedent's son, as a sole heir, could recover at least a portion of a settlement under 45 U.S.C. § 51 for the wrongful death of the decedent, and because the decedent father's widow validly waived a claim under 45 U.S.C. § 59, pursuant to a prenuptial agreement, the court did not err in granting partial summary judgment to the heir. But, the matter was remanded for the trial court to determine how the proceeds at issue should be divided between the survival and wrongful death claims. Tadlock v. Tadlock, 290 Ga. App. 568, 660 S.E.2d 430 (2008).
Wrongful death in workplace.
- Because a subsidiary had no ownership interest in the equipment that killed an employee, and to the extent that the subsidiary was acting in concert or in a joint enterprise with the employer/owner, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11 of the Workers' Compensation Act barred the spouse's wrongful death suit; consequently, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to the subsidiary pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(c). Jones v. Macon Soils, Inc., 270 Ga. App. 298, 606 S.E.2d 316 (2004).
Dog bite cases.
- In a plaintiff's suit against the dog owners to recover for injuries sustained from a dog bite, summary judgment against the plaintiff was improper because the plaintiff 's evidence that the owners' dog had bitten another person on the hand before the incident, that one of the owners had made a statement that the owner did not allow the dog in the house with guests because the dog could bite somebody, and that the same owner had admitted to the plaintiff's mother that the owner should have warned the plaintiff to stay away from the dog raised a jury question as to whether the owners knew that the dog had a propensity to bite; moreover, the evidence did not show that the plaintiff assumed the risk as a matter of law by ignoring the dog's growl; since a dog's growl does not put a dog owner on notice of the dog's propensity to bite, it is not plain evidence that a third party actually knew about and appreciated the danger that the dog might bite. Raith v. Blanchard, 271 Ga. App. 723, 611 S.E.2d 75 (2005).
Premises liability and injuries by animals.
- True ground of premises liability is the landowner's or occupier's superior knowledge of the perilous condition and the danger therefrom to persons coming upon the property; a trial court's summary judgment dismissing claims against real estate agents and brokers for injuries arising from a dog bite while the injured person was viewing listed property for sale was affirmed because there was no showing that the real estate agents and brokers had any knowledge that the dogs were dangerous. Gibson v. Rezvanpour, 268 Ga. App. 377, 601 S.E.2d 848 (2004).
In an action to enjoin enforcement of a judgment, the trial court improperly entered, sua sponte, summary judgment in favor of the judgment creditors because the trial court's judgment was based on an issue not previously raised by the parties, and judgment was entered without giving the judgment debtor a full opportunity to respond to the issues raised. Studenic v. Birk, 260 Ga. App. 364, 579 S.E.2d 788 (2003).
Trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the dog owners on the worker's negligence claim after the worker was knocked down allegedly by the dog owners' dog as a genuine issue of material fact existed about whether the one dog owner voluntarily undertook a duty to restrain the dogs on the owner's premises and, if so, whether that voluntary undertaking was negligently performed. Osowski v. Smith, 262 Ga. App. 538, 586 S.E.2d 71 (2003).
When premises owner was deemed to have superior knowledge of the hazard that was alleged to have caused the slip and fall, based on the testimony of the injured patron's daughter that the owner had actual knowledge of the hazard, summary judgment in the owner's favor was unauthorized, and the appeals court erred in finding otherwise. Dickerson v. Guest Servs. Co., 282 Ga. 771, 653 S.E.2d 699 (2007).
Slip and fall by pedestrian in pothole.
- Trial court erred in denying summary judgment to both a city and the Department of Transportation, in a slip and fall case filed against them by a pedestrian, as: (1) the pedestrian conceded that the pedestrian was a licensee with equal constructive knowledge of any hazard posed by potholes; (2) the pothole in which the pedestrian fell was not a concealed or camouflaged danger; and (3) no evidence was presented that the pothole was maintained wilfully or wantonly. Ga. DOT v. Strickland, 279 Ga. App. 753, 632 S.E.2d 416 (2006).
Normal household items causing fall by licensee in home.
- In a licensee's personal injury action, the trial court properly found that a homeowner was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law as the homeowner owed no duty to the licensee to warn of the obviousness of a broom handle, tools on the floor, or the couch corner, which the licensee alleged caused a fall, as such were plainly visible and not hidden perils. Ellis v. Hadnott, 282 Ga. App. 584, 639 S.E.2d 559 (2006).
Slip and fall in businesses.
- In a slip and fall case based on an injured party's fall in a truck stop's shower, the truck stop owner was not entitled to summary judgment because the owner's admitted lack of a regular inspection procedure created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the owner had constructive knowledge of the condition that caused the injured party to fall, and it was not shown that the injured party failed to exercise care for the party's own safety as the injured party removed two used bars of soap from the shower floor. Pylant v. Samuels Inc., 262 Ga. App. 358, 585 S.E.2d 696 (2003).
In a slip and fall case brought by an injured person who alleged that the fall was caused by a newly waxed tile floor in a golf course clubhouse, the trial court erred in finding, based on some deposition responses, that the injured person had abandoned the claim that the wax had caused the fall and was claiming only that the tile floor, not the wax on the floor, caused the fall, and that the injured person knew walking on a tile floor with spikes was risky; the injured person's complaint and the evidence offered that the injured person had not unequivocally conceded that the wax on the floor did not cause the fall, and the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the premises owner was reversed. Berson v. Am. Golf Corp., 265 Ga. App. 772, 595 S.E.2d 622 (2004).
In a slip and fall case, an injured person's knowledge of uneven, unlit steps at the place where the injured person fell, obtained from ascending the steps once in the dark, did not equal a hotel's knowledge from sweeping the area daily and maintaining the steps regularly; thus, a trial court's denial of the hotel's summary judgment motion was affirmed. Mac International-Savannah Hotel, Inc. v. Hallman, 265 Ga. App. 727, 595 S.E.2d 577 (2004).
Summary judgment for a grocery store in a slip and fall case was proper because an injured person slipped in water caused by another customer and the grocery store had no actual or constructive knowledge of the water. Mock v. Kroger Co., 267 Ga. App. 1, 598 S.E.2d 789 (2004).
Mere fact that an injured person slipped and fell while on a department store's premises did not give rise to liability absent some evidence that a foreign substance was present; a department store in a slip and fall case was entitled to summary judgment, and a trial court's denial of the department store's summary judgment motion was reversed because an injured person did not see or touch anything on the floor that caused the injured person to fall but was merely supposing or hypothesizing that there was some sort of substance on the ground that caused the injured person to fall, and a department store employee testified that the floor was clean and dry, and that no foreign substance was on the floor after the fall. Belk Dep't Store of Charleston, S.C., Inc. v. Cato, 267 Ga. App. 793, 600 S.E.2d 786 (2004).
Trial court erred in denying a corporation's motion for summary judgment on a customer's claim seeking damages for injuries the customer sustained by slipping and falling on a wet floor after entering a restaurant because the customer was aware of the hazard and the evidence did not show that people who worked at the restaurant possessed superior knowledge that the floor was wet and posed a hazard to customers. Flagstar Enters., Inc. v. Burch, 267 Ga. App. 856, 600 S.E.2d 834 (2004).
Summary judgment for a restaurant in a slip and fall case was proper and was affirmed because there was no showing that the restaurant had actual or constructive knowledge of the grease which allegedly caused the slip and fall that was superior to that of the injured person; an inspection by the restaurant manager only 5 to 10 minutes before the incident was sufficient, as a matter of law, to establish that the restaurant exercised ordinary care under O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 to inspect the premises and keep the premises safe. Markham v. Schuster's Enters., Inc., 268 Ga. App. 313, 601 S.E.2d 712 (2004).
In a customer's slip and fall action against a store, because genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the store had superior knowledge of the alleged water on the floor where the customer allegedly fell, summary judgment was erroneously entered in the store's favor. Durham v. Patel, 282 Ga. App. 437, 638 S.E.2d 851 (2006).
In a slip and fall action filed by a mall patron against the mall's owner and the mall's cleaning contractor, summary judgment was properly granted to the latter as no evidence was presented that the contractor wrongfully failed to clean the spot on which the patron slipped; however, summary judgment in the owner's favor was reversed as the owner failed to present evidence of any reasonable inspection procedures, giving the patron the benefit of an inference of the owner's constructive knowledge of a hazard. Prescott v. Colonial Props. Trust, Inc., 283 Ga. App. 753, 642 S.E.2d 425 (2007).
Because the trial court correctly determined that the parking lot in which a customer fell was owned and maintained by the grocery store's landlord, not by the grocery store, and was not an "approach" to the premises for purposes of O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1, the grocery store was properly granted summary judgment as to the issue of liability in a customer's personal injury suit filed against the store. Robinson v. Kroger Co., 284 Ga. App. 488, 644 S.E.2d 316 (2007).
Because an injured employee testified that the rain, and not any sloping surface, caused the slip and fall at issue, the employee was charged with equal knowledge of the rainy day conditions, and as a result no evidence was presented that the hospital exposed the employee to any unreasonable risk of harm; thus, the trial court erred in denying the employer's motion for summary judgment. Sunlink Health Sys. v. Pettigrew, 286 Ga. App. 339, 649 S.E.2d 532 (2007).
In a slip and fall case filed by a retailer's patron alleging a breach of the retailer's duty to keep the retailer's premises reasonably safe, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the retailer on the issue of whether the retailer's nearby employees were in a position to discover the hazard on which the patron slipped, specifically a grape on the floor; however, in the absence of clear evidence of how long the grape was present on the floor, and in the absence of evidence that the retailer actually carried out its inspection procedures, the retailer could not show as a matter of law that the retailer lacked constructive knowledge of the hazard which caused the patron's fall. Blocker v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 287 Ga. App. 588, 651 S.E.2d 845 (2007).
Court of appeals upheld an order granting summary judgment to a janitorial services company on claims filed against the company by a premises owner's invitee for damages sustained by the invitee resulting from a slip and fall on the owner's premises as the janitorial services company was an independent contractor and not an owner occupier of the premises where the invitee fell, and hence owed no contractual duty to the invitee. Taylor v. AmericasMart Real Estate, LLC, 287 Ga. App. 555, 651 S.E.2d 754 (2007).
In a personal injury action arising out of a slip and fall, because jury questions existed as to whether a premises owner's inspection procedure was reasonable, the appeals court refused to say that the owner lacked constructive knowledge of a hazard that allegedly caused a slip and fall as a matter of law. Thus, summary judgment entered in favor of the owner was reversed. Gibson v. Halpern Enters., 288 Ga. App. 790, 655 S.E.2d 624 (2007).
In a premises liability action against a retailer, because the patron failed to show proof that a single employee of the retailer was in the immediate area of the spill that allegedly caused the patron's fall, and could have easily seen and removed the spill prior to the slip and fall, or proof that the liquid had been there for a sufficient length of time that the retailer should have discovered and removed the spill during a reasonable inspection and: (1) inasmuch as the purported hazard was not readily visible to the patron; and (2) the patron failed to establish that the retailer's employees, who were at least 20 to 30 feet away, could have easily seen and removed the spill, or that the liquid had been on the retailer's floor long enough that the retailer should have discovered and removed the spill during a reasonable inspection, the trial court erred in denying the retailer's motion for summary judgment as to the retailer's liability to the patron. Kmart Corp. v. McCollum, 290 Ga. App. 551, 659 S.E.2d 913 (2008).
Because genuine material fact issues remained as to whether a supermarket's inspection procedures in the area in which a customer fell were reasonable and whether a reasonable inspection procedure would have detected a mixture of blood and water on the floor, summary judgment in favor of the supermarket was reversed; moreover, the appeals court rejected the supermarket's claim that the customer had equal knowledge of the hazard since the customer had previously walked down the aisle before the customer fell there. Food Lion, LLC v. Walker, 290 Ga. App. 574, 660 S.E.2d 426 (2008).
Summary judgment was proper because no evidence showed an office park knew of, or caused, material to collect at the place a pedestrian slipped on steps, there was no breach of a duty to discover the leaves, and the pedestrian did not show that handrails were required on the steps. Porter v. Omni Hotels, Inc., 260 Ga. App. 24, 579 S.E.2d 68 (2003).
Owner of a grocery store was erroneously granted summary judgment in a negligence suit by a store patron who slipped on a grape and fell as the testimony regarding the manager's unobstructed view of the area in which the fall occurred, the manager's admission that the manager could have seen the grape, and the evidence that the manager and two other employees were in the immediate vicinity and could easily have removed the hazard had they seen it, all revealed that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the store owner had constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition. Dix v. Kroger Co., 257 Ga. App. 19, 570 S.E.2d 89 (2002).
Summary judgment should have been granted to a property owner in a customer's suit to recover for injuries sustained when the customer slipped and fell on a bean on the floor of the owner's store because the owner did not have actual notice of the bean, and the evidence was insufficient to show that the owner had constructive notice of the bean, in that no bean was seen during an inspection of the area in which the customer fell five minutes before the fall, and no evidence showed that the owner's employees were in the immediate vicinity of the fall. Kroger Co. v. Williams, 274 Ga. App. 177, 617 S.E.2d 160 (2005).
Store owner was entitled to summary judgment in an action brought by a client who fell upon an allegedly slippery sidewalk because the plaintiff did not show that the sidewalk was negligently painted, and the record proved exactly the contrary. Caven v. Warehouse Home Furnishings Distribs., Inc., 209 Ga. App. 706, 434 S.E.2d 532 (1993).
Slip and fall in other cases.
- Executive Committee of the Baptist Convention was not entitled to summary judgment on the injured party's claim arising out of injuries sustained when the injured party fell in a pothole while attending a women's conference sponsored by the church because whether the injured party's failure to observe the defect amounted to a lack of reasonable care was a jury question. Thomas v. Exec. Comm. of the Baptist Convention, 262 Ga. App. 315, 585 S.E.2d 217 (2003).
Trial court erred in granting an owner's summary judgment motion in a slip and fall case brought by an injured party, as questions remained as to the owner's liability because: (1) the owner was on constructive notice as to the condition of a drainage culvert; (2) a reasonable inspection would have revealed that the cement surrounding the drainage culvert was slanted and had not been painted to alert pedestrians to any danger; (3) the injured party could not have seen the dramatic slope of the culvert from the injured person's vantage point on the median and could not appreciate the danger involved; (4) that the rough uneven pavement was a static condition did not automatically absolve the owner; and (5) the failure of the injured party to watch every step did not require summary judgment against the injured person. Hagadorn v. Prudential Ins. Co., 267 Ga. App. 143, 598 S.E.2d 865 (2004).
Premises owner was properly granted summary judgment in an occupant's personal injury action filed against it as the uneven and unstable brick-paved walkway where the occupant fell was an open and obvious static condition which the occupant was presumed to have knowledge of, given that the occupant had successfully traversed the area before; moreover, while the occupant might have disagreed with the trial court's application of the law to the facts presented, that disagreement did not warrant reversal. Nemeth v. RREEF Am., LLC, 283 Ga. App. 795, 643 S.E.2d 283 (2007).
Trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to a seller in a buyer's personal injury action alleging negligence and nuisance as: (1) speculation as to what caused the buyer's fall was insufficient to sustain the former; and (2) evidence was lacking that the seller created, continued, or maintained the alleged nuisance, or controlled the release of a discharge on the property that allegedly caused the buyer's slip and fall. Grinold v. Farist, 284 Ga. App. 120, 643 S.E.2d 253 (2007).
In a slip and fall case, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to a premises owner on grounds that: (1) no material issue of fact remained as to whether a roof repair contractor's injuries were caused by the owner's failure to keep the subject premises safe; (2) the contractor failed to present any evidence that a foreign substance or any unusual hazard on the roof surface caused the fall; (3) it was not raining on the day of the fall; and (4) prior to the fall, the contractor inspected the roof by walking the length of the roof and looking at the roof from below, satisfied that the area was safe. Hardnett v. Silvey, 285 Ga. App. 424, 646 S.E.2d 514 (2007).
Slip and fall in homes.
- Evidence that showed: (1) that a caretaker who was hired to care for a homeowner's invalid wife used stairs in the homeowner's house six to eight times before the caregiver was injured when the caregiver's knee buckled while carrying laundry down the stairs; (2) that the caregiver did not slip on a foreign substance that was on the stairs; and (3) that the stairs were properly manufactured and maintained, warranted summary judgment for the homeowner on the caretaker's claim alleging negligence, and the trial court's judgment denying the homeowner's motion for summary judgment was reversed. Duvall v. Green, 262 Ga. App. 669, 586 S.E.2d 369 (2003).
In a patron's slip and fall action filed against a home seller, the trial court properly found that the seller was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law because the patron could not show that the seller's knowledge of the condition which allegedly caused the patron's fall, specifically, loose gravel on the ground immediately adjacent to unbuffered metal trailer tongues, was superior to the patrons. Whitley v. H & S Homes, LLC, 279 Ga. App. 877, 632 S.E.2d 728 (2006).
In a slip and fall action between a daughter and the daughter's mother, because the evidence showed that the daughter was a mere social guest or licensee in the mother's home at the time of the daughter's injury, present only in the home for the daughter's convenience, and the mother did not act with any intent to harm the daughter, the mother was properly granted summary judgment on the issue of liability for the daughter's personal injuries resulting from a slip and fall. Behforouz v. Vakil, 281 Ga. App. 603, 636 S.E.2d 674 (2006).
Summary judgment for the tortfeasor was affirmed because the injured party failed to show a genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of a slippery floor, the tortfeasor's knowledge of the condition, or that the tortfeasor's knowledge of the condition was superior to the knowledge of the injured party, given the injured party's use of the hallway, and the injured party's responsibility to see that the tortfeasor did not fall as the injured party was the care giver to the alleged tortfeasor. Sudduth v. Young, 260 Ga. App. 56, 579 S.E.2d 7 (2003).
Drunk driving.
- Trial court properly granted the hosts' motion for summary judgment in an injured party's action under the Georgia Dram Shop Act, O.C.G.A. § 51-1-40(b), because: (1) the intoxicated driver's brother testified that the driver was not noticeably intoxicated at the party; (2) at the request of the brother, the driver agreed to stay with the hosts after the party because the driver had been drinking; (3) because there was direct evidence that the driver agreed not to drive soon, contrary knowledge could not be imputed to the hosts. Hodges v. Erickson, 264 Ga. App. 516, 591 S.E.2d 360 (2003).
When proof of spoliation present following drunk driving accident.
- Given proof of spoliation under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-22 in an action filed against a tavern pursuant to Georgia's Dram Shop Act, O.C.G.A. § 51-1-40(b), the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to an injured party's guardian, as the tavern's manager was aware of the potential for litigation and failed to preserve whatever videotaped evidence might have been captured as to whether one of the tavern's intoxicated patron's would soon be driving; hence, a rebuttable presumption arose against the tavern that the evidence destroyed would have been harmful to the tavern, rendering summary judgment inappropriate. Baxley v. Hakiel Indus., 282 Ga. 312, 647 S.E.2d 29 (2007).
Summary judgment was properly granted dismissing the motorists' suit against a restaurant under the Dram Shop Act, O.C.G.A. § 51-1-40(b), for injuries sustained in a collision with one of the restaurant's patrons because the evidence did not present a question of fact as to whether the restaurant knew that the patron would be driving soon after the patron left the premises. Sugarloaf Cafe, Inc. v. Willbanks, 279 Ga. 255, 612 S.E.2d 279 (2005).
Under the voluntary departure rule, if an invitee voluntarily departed from the route designated and maintained by the owner/occupier for the invitee's safety and convenience, the invitee assumed the risk of those hazards existent in the selected route as the conditions did not constitute a hazard when the traversed property was used for its intended purpose unless the hazard was common to both areas or the owner had notice that the unauthorized route was being regularly used improperly; because an injured person voluntarily departed from a sidewalk and fell on a partially exposed drainage pipe, and there was no evidence that the unauthorized route was being used improperly on a regular basis, summary judgment for a landlord in the injured person's premises liability case was affirmed. Chamblee v. Grayco, Inc., 266 Ga. App. 154, 596 S.E.2d 683 (2004).
Railroad not liable for railroad crossing fatality.
- Railroad and the town were entitled to summary judgment in a survivor's action claiming damages from the survivor's decedent's fatal collision with a train because the survivor failed to show that the allegedly vision-obstructing vegetation was planted or maintained in violation of any statute, code, or local ordinance, and although railroads could be liable under common law negligence principles, the failure to maintain a railroad right of way was addressed by the Georgia Code of Public Transportation, specifically by O.C.G.A. § 32-6-51. Town of Register v. Fortner, 262 Ga. App. 507, 586 S.E.2d 54 (2003).
Delivery drivers.
- In a personal injury action filed by an injured driver, the trial court granted summary judgment to a bus delivery courier on grounds that the delivery person who the driver alleged caused the accident was an independent contractor, and not the courier's employee as: (1) the courier did not control how the delivery person carried out the delivery of the bus, or what route to take in making the delivery; (2) the delivery person was required to comply with all governmental requirements, was required to maintain log books, and was required to pay all incidental fees and taxes; and (3) a requirement that the bus be delivered the next day was placed on the delivery person by the buyer, and not the courier. Larmon v. CCR Enters., 285 Ga. App. 594, 647 S.E.2d 306 (2007).
Uninsured motorist coverage.
- Insurer was properly granted summary judgment in an insured's action for uninsured motorist coverage because there was no evidence of actual physical contact between the insured and an unknown driver, who allegedly struck either a manhole cover or the bottom of a construction barrel that then struck the insured's car, nor was there any corroborating eyewitness evidence. Hambrick v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 260 Ga. App. 266, 581 S.E.2d 299 (2003).
Teenager driving past curfew.
- In a case in which the injured parties sought punitive damages from a motorist who collided with their vehicle because the motorist was a minor whose license did not allow the minor to drive after 1:00 a.m., and the collision occurred after 1:00 a.m., the minor was entitled to partial summary judgment dismissing the punitive damages claim because the time the motorist was driving did not proximately cause the accident, nor was the motorist's action part of a pattern or policy of dangerous driving, such as driving while intoxicated or speeding excessively. Brooks v. Gray, 262 Ga. App. 232, 585 S.E.2d 188 (2003).
Pending cross action.
- Motion for summary judgment will lie on the ground of pendency of substantially the same cross-claim filed against the party in a former action. Reeves Transp. Co. v. Gamble, 126 Ga. App. 165, 190 S.E.2d 98 (1972).
Summary judgment proper notwithstanding failure to show factual issues when counterclaim could not stand on own.
- Because a housing authority failed to show that factual issues regarding the counterclaim brought by a husband and wife alleging violations of the Open Records Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-18-70 et seq., must have been decided in its favor, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the authority on this claim; but since the husband and wife did not appeal the summary judgment for the authority on their slander claim, and since the civil conspiracy claim could not stand without this underlying tort, summary judgment for the authority on this issue was proper. Strange v. Hous. Auth. of Summerville, 268 Ga. App. 403, 602 S.E.2d 185 (2004).
Oral contract to make a will.
- Trial court properly granted summary judgment for an executor in a suit by a child of the decedent alleging that the decedent orally contracted to leave a portion of the decedent's estate to the child as: (1) the validity of an agreement to make a will was a substantive matter for choice of law purposes, so Florida law applied; (2) oral contracts to make a will were invalid under Fla. Stat. ch. 732.701(1); and (3) the decedent's child failed to identify any terms in an earlier will made by the decedent that stemmed from a contract to leave a portion of the estate to the child. Harper v. Harper, 267 Ga. App. 553, 600 S.E.2d 659 (2004).
Probate of will.
- If the evidence authorizes it, a superior court is empowered to grant summary judgment probating a will in solemn form so as to administer a decedent's estate. Taylor v. Donaldson, 227 Ga. 496, 181 S.E.2d 340, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 805, 92 S. Ct. 163, 30 L. Ed. 2d 38 (1971).
On appeal to the superior court from the probate court of a proceeding to probate a will, under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56, either party may move for summary judgment. Tony v. Pollard, 248 Ga. 86, 281 S.E.2d 557 (1981).
Trial court properly granted the widow's and the co-executor's motion for summary judgment and denied the family members' motion against the decedent's widow and the co-executor for partial summary judgment in the family members' lawsuit seeking their alleged share of the portion of the decedent's estate that the decedent inherited under the decedent's father's will, because of the transfer documents from a family settlement that occurred under the father's will and because the decedent left a lineal descendent surviving the descendent in decedent's adopted child. Haley v. Regions Bank, 277 Ga. 85, 586 S.E.2d 633 (2003).
Summary judgment, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56, was reversed because a genuine issue of material fact remained as to whether a transfer of money to the decedent's child before the decedent died was an advancement on the child's inheritance, and whether the child breached a fiduciary duty as a result. Walters v. Stewart, 263 Ga. App. 475, 588 S.E.2d 248 (2003).
Trial court erred in granting summary judgment pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56 to will caveators in a will propounder's action seeking to probate a decedent's will because the decedent had sufficiently signed the will on the signature line of the self-proving clause, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 53-2-40.1, and there existed two competent witness signatures, which were sufficient for attestation purposes; accordingly, the statutory requirements for proper execution of a will under O.C.G.A. § 53-2-40 appeared to have been met and a jury issue was raised as to whether, in fact, the requirements were met. Miles v. Bryant, 277 Ga. 362, 589 S.E.2d 86 (2003).
Will provision did not require the executors to fund a marital trust with non-publicly traded stock, and did not conflict with the executor's power to fund the trust with assets the executor deemed advisable; since the will empowered the executors to sell the estate's assets and did not require them to fund the trust with the specific stock, the parol evidence rule barred use of an affidavit of the attorney who prepared the will to shed light on the testator's intent, and summary judgment in favor of a wife and against the executors was reversed. Reynolds v. Harrison, 278 Ga. 495, 604 S.E.2d 184 (2004).
In a probate action, because the testatrix's older four children failed in their burden of showing undue influence at the time that the will was executed, and an affidavit submitted by one of the testatrix's older children did not change this result, as such consisted of inadmissible hearsay, the superior court properly granted summary judgment to the testatrix's youngest child. Barber v. Holmes, 282 Ga. 768, 653 S.E.2d 448 (2007).
Co-executors' conduct in an estate administration.
- Trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the co-executors in claims of breach of fiduciary duty and constructive fraud or conspiracy filed by the beneficiaries of an estate because it was necessary for a jury to decide whether the co-executors breached their fiduciary duties to the beneficiaries or committed constructive fraud or engaged in a conspiracy through their actions due to the factual questions that arose regarding the co-executors' actions. Bloodworth v. Bloodworth, 260 Ga. App. 466, 579 S.E.2d 858 (2003).
Processioning proceeding.
- When the protestant in a processioning proceeding pleaded a defense of res judicata and moved for summary judgment on this ground, the supporting motion with the record of a prior processioning proceeding between the same parties concerning the same issue of boundary, and in which the protestant obtained judgment, and the applicant made no contrary showing, a motion for summary judgment was properly granted. Souther v. Kichline, 124 Ga. App. 111, 183 S.E.2d 87 (1971).
Promissory note.
- Ordinarily, summary judgment offers a speedy and efficient disposition of a case if there is an executed promissory note and the sole question is how much, if any, is due. Pollard v. First Nat'l Bank, 169 Ga. App. 598, 313 S.E.2d 785 (1984).
Because a guarantor's daughter and son-in-law's bankruptcy plan did not identify the guarantor's obligation on promissory notes that the guarantor co-signed in favor of a bank, the inquiry mandated by 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(1) was not performed, the guarantor's liability to the bank was not discharged by the bankruptcy court's judgment, the bank was entitled to recover principal and interest due on the promissory notes in an action filed in state court, and the state trial court properly granted the bank's motion for summary judgment against the guarantor. Hampton v. Bank of Lafayette, 259 Ga. App. 677, 578 S.E.2d 486 (2003).
In an action filed by a trust on a promissory note and guaranty against a guarantor, the trial court properly granted the trust summary judgment as the guarantor's unsworn affidavit did not qualify as competent evidence creating a factual issue as to the issue of whether the guarantor was entitled to a setoff; moreover, the court disagreed that the guaranty showed that the guarantor signed the guaranty in a representative capacity. Keane v. Annice Heygood Trevitt Support Trust, 285 Ga. App. 155, 645 S.E.2d 641 (2007).
Former member of a golf club was not entitled to summary judgment in the club's suit on a promissory note for an installment plan of a non-refundable membership as the member breached the note by failing to pay the final two installments, the club was entitled to keep the sums paid as liquidated damages, consideration was adequate, the fees paid for initiation were not contingent on the continuation of a membership, and nothing in the record showed that the membership contract was ever rescinded. Bonem v. Golf Club of Ga., Inc., 264 Ga. App. 573, 591 S.E.2d 462 (2003).
After obtaining consent from the probate court to sell construction equipment an executrix's decedent secured with a promissory note, the executrix was entitled to summary judgment as to the tort claims alleged against the decedent's corporation, after the corporation wrongfully retained possession of the equipment, converted two certificates of deposit, and the decedent's liability on the notes was extinguished under a provision of a stock sales agreement; furthermore, evidence was presented that the corporation's failure to release the equipment prevented the equipment's sale to third parties and thereby constituted a breach of a duty to mitigate damages. Midway R.R. Constr. Co. v. Beck, 281 Ga. App. 412, 636 S.E.2d 110 (2006).
In an action to recover on two promissory notes, because material fact issues remained regarding the consideration given for the promissory notes, creating an ambiguity for which parol evidence was admissible, and as to whether the notes were signed as part of the same transaction, summary judgment to either the lender or the debtor was inappropriate. Foreman v. Chattooga Int'l Techs., Inc., 289 Ga. App. 894, 658 S.E.2d 470 (2008).
Negotiable instruments.
- Trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to a bank and a credit union on claims of conversion, civil conspiracy, and for attorney fees and punitive damages as: (1) no probative evidence existed that th