(Code 1981, §53-5-50, enacted by Ga. L. 1996, p. 504, § 10; Ga. L. 2020, p. 377, § 1-26/HB 865.)
Law reviews.- For annual survey on wills, trusts, guardianships, and fiduciary administration, see 71 Mercer L. Rev. 327 (2019).
COMMENTThis section carries forward former OCGA Sec. 53-3-60. See Code Sec. 53-5-3, which establishes the time limit within which a will may be offered for probate.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Editor's notes.
- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, opinions under former O.C.G.A. § 53-3-60 are included in the annotations for this Code section.
Applicability of section.
- Statute, which gives original jurisdiction to the probate court over an action in which it alleged that a later will is entitled to be admitted to probate, is not applicable to an appeal filed before the effective date of former O.C.G.A. § 53-3-60. Lee v. Wainwright, 256 Ga. 478, 350 S.E.2d 238 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 53-3-60).
Civil Practice Act not applicable to petition to set-aside in probate proceeding.
- Probate court erred in rejecting the step-son's set-aside petition on the basis that the petition did not satisfy O.C.G.A. § 9-11-60(d) as that provision set out the narrow grounds on which a motion to set aside a judgment could be brought under the Civil Practice Act, O.C.G.A. T. 9, Ch. 11, but set-aside petitions in probate proceedings were special statutory proceedings, and the specific rules of practice and procedure for such petitions were set out at O.C.G.A. §§ 53-5-50 and53-5-51; thus, to the extent that those specific rules of practice and procedure conflicted with the Civil Practice Act, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-81, the Civil Practice Act did not apply; thus, the probate court's order ruling on the set-aside petition was reversed. In re Estate of Jones, 346 Ga. App. 877, 815 S.E.2d 599 (2018).
Because the Civil Practice Act's (O.C.G.A. T. 9, Ch. 11) procedure for attacking a judgment through a set-aside motion was more restrictive than the Probate Code's procedure for attacking an order admitting a will to probate on the ground that another will should be admitted to probate, the constraints of the Civil Practice Act did not apply in the probate proceeding, and the probate court erred in denying the step-son's set-aside petition for failing to meet the requirements of the Civil Practice Act, rather than ruling on the merits of the petition. In re Estate of Jones, 346 Ga. App. 877, 815 S.E.2d 599 (2018).