False imprisonment is the unlawful detention of the person of another, for any length of time, whereby such person is deprived of his personal liberty.
(Orig. Code 1863, § 2932; Code 1868, § 2939; Code 1873, § 2990; Code 1882, § 2990; Civil Code 1895, § 3851; Civil Code 1910, § 4447; Code 1933, § 105-901.)
Cross references.- Criminal penalties for false imprisonment, §§ 16-5-41,16-5-42.
Law reviews.- For article surveying torts law, see 34 Mercer L. Rev. 271 (1982).
JUDICIAL DECISIONSANALYSIS
This section is a codification of common law. Westberry v. Clanton, 136 Ga. 795, 72 S.E. 238 (1911); Mansour v. Mobley, 96 Ga. App. 812, 101 S.E.2d 786 (1957).
False imprisonment is an intentional tort, not a tort of negligence. Williams v. Smith, 179 Ga. App. 712, 348 S.E.2d 50 (1986).
False imprisonment is an intentional tort. The action must be brought within two years of its accrual, which is from the release from imprisonment. Collier v. Evans, 199 Ga. App. 763, 406 S.E.2d 90 (1991).
To arrest one illegally and detain one for any length of time is a criminal offense, and is likewise a tort for which an action for damages will lie; if the imprisonment be the act of several persons, they may be sued jointly or severally. Livingston v. Schneer's Atlanta, Inc., 61 Ga. App. 637, 7 S.E.2d 190 (1940); Duchess Chenilles, Inc. v. Masters, 84 Ga. App. 822, 67 S.E.2d 600 (1951).
Whoever arrests or imprisons person without warrant is guilty of a tort, unless one can justify under one of the exceptions prescribed by law; and the burden of proving that the case lies within the exception rests upon the person making the arrest or inflicting the imprisonment. Sheppard v. Hale, 58 Ga. App. 140, 197 S.E. 922 (1938); Duchess Chenilles, Inc. v. Masters, 84 Ga. App. 822, 67 S.E.2d 600 (1951).
Suspected shoplifting.
- O.C.G.A. § 51-7-60 implicitly recognizes the right of a shop owner to protect oneself from shoplifting by detaining a customer who has acted in a suspicious manner. Fields v. Kroger Co., 202 Ga. App. 475, 414 S.E.2d 703 (1992).
Right of action for false imprisonment accrues at time of release from imprisonment. Meyers v. Glover, 152 Ga. App. 679, 263 S.E.2d 539 (1979), overruled on other grounds, McCord v. Jones, 168 Ga. App. 891, 311 S.E.2d 209 (1983).
Statute of limitations.
- Actions for malicious prosecution, for malicious abuse of legal process, for false arrest or false imprisonment, or for malicious use of civil process were all actions for damages for injuries to the person of the party complainant; and under former Code 1933, § 3-1004 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33) such actions were not barred until two years after the issues arise. McCullough v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 50 Ga. App. 237, 177 S.E. 601 (1934), rev'd on other grounds, 181 Ga. 502, 182 S.E. 898 (1935).
Action for false imprisonment will not lie when it appears that arrest and imprisonment were by virtue of valid process. See Grist v. White, 14 Ga. App. 147, 80 S.E. 519 (1914); Mathews v. Murray, 101 Ga. App. 216, 113 S.E.2d 232 (1960); Fleming v. U-Haul Co., 246 Ga. App. 681, 541 S.E.2d 75 (2000); Stanford v. City of Manchester, 246 Ga. App. 129, 539 S.E.2d 845 (2000).
When a detention is predicated upon procedurally valid process, false imprisonment is not an available remedy. Williams v. Smith, 179 Ga. App. 712, 348 S.E.2d 50 (1986); Britt v. Whitehall Income Fund, 891 F. Supp. 1578 (M.D. Ga. 1993).
When there was no evidence of invalid process there was no claim for false imprisonment. Franklin v. Consolidated Gov't, 236 Ga. App. 468, 512 S.E.2d 352 (1999).
When the detention is predicated on no process, false imprisonment is an available remedy and liability depends upon whether a detention without supporting process was legally authorized under the circumstances. Gantt v. Patient Communication Systems, 200 Ga. App. 35, 406 S.E.2d 796 (1991), overruled on other grounds, Ferrell v. Mikula, 295 Ga. App. 326, 672 S.E.2d 7 (2008).
If warrant or process is void, action for false imprisonment is exclusive remedy. Lovell v. Drake, 60 Ga. App. 325, 3 S.E.2d 783 (1939); Lowe v. Turner, 115 Ga. App. 503, 154 S.E.2d 792 (1967).
If warrant or process is valid, malicious arrest or malicious prosecution is exclusive remedy and an action for false imprisonment will not lie. Lovell v. Drake, 60 Ga. App. 325, 3 S.E.2d 783 (1939).
No false imprisonment when detained pursuant to valid warrant.- District court properly dismissed the plaintiff's claims against the sheriff because as to a § 1983 false arrest claim, the plaintiff did not allege the sheriff played a role in the probable cause determination; as to the Eighth Amendment excessive bail claim, the complaint did not allege the sheriff was involved in setting bail or that the sheriff could alter bail; as to the state malicious arrest claim, the sheriff was not involved in the decision to arrest the plaintiff, nor was the arrest carried out as result of a policy made by the sheriff; as to a state law false imprisonment claim, by the time the sheriff knew of imprisonment, the plaintiff was detained pursuant to a valid warrant; and as to an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, the allegations did not meet the required standard. Henley v. Payne, 945 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 2019).
Claim stated when there is unlawful detention without warrant.- Plaintiff's false imprisonment claim against a deputy should not have been dismissed because the plaintiff alleged the plaintiff was unlawfully detained for the time between the plaintiff's arrest and when the plaintiff's arrest warrant was procured. Henley v. Payne, 945 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 2019).
False imprisonment, false arrest, and malicious prosecution are not mutually exclusive, and a plaintiff can proceed before a jury on all three theories. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Johnson, 249 Ga. App. 84, 547 S.E.2d 320 (2001), overruled on other grounds, Ferrell v. Mikula, 295 Ga. App. 326, 672 S.E.2d 7 (2008).
When detention is maliciously procured by civil process, rather than criminal, the appropriate cause of action would be for malicious use of process. Williams v. Smith, 179 Ga. App. 712, 348 S.E.2d 50 (1986).
Officer's independent judgment in making arrest.
- Actions for false arrest, malicious prosecution, and false imprisonment may successfully be defended by an uncontroverted affidavit of the arresting officer that the decision to arrest the plaintiff was made solely by the officer in the exercise of the officer's professional judgment and independently of any exhortations by the defendants. Jacobs v. Shaw, 219 Ga. App. 425, 465 S.E.2d 460 (1995).
Official immunity for police personnel.
- Summary judgment in favor of police personnel was proper in an action against the police chief and officers for false imprisonment under O.C.G.A. § 51-7-20 because the record did not show any support for the plaintiff's contentions that the actions of the police officers in arresting the plaintiff following an altercation demonstrated the requisite malice to overcome official immunity under state law. Plaintiff's unsupported allegations of conspiracy to frame the plaintiff for an altercation are insufficient to pierce the protections of official immunity on these claims. Goree v. City of Atlanta, 276 Fed. Appx. 919 (11th Cir. 2008)(Unpublished).
Warrantless detention by private person amounts to false imprisonment unless it comes within certain specific exceptions. McWilliams v. Interstate Bakeries, Inc., 439 F.2d 16 (5th Cir. 1971).
There is illegal arrest and false imprisonment of another when one is detained for any length of time against one's will. Everett, Ridley & Co. v. Holcomb, 1 Ga. App. 794, 58 S.E. 287 (1907); Conoly v. Imperial Tobacco Co., 63 Ga. App. 880, 12 S.E.2d 398 (1940); Burrow v. K-Mart Corp., 166 Ga. App. 284, 304 S.E.2d 460 (1983).
False imprisonment at common law and elsewhere consists in the unlawful detention of the person of another for any length of time, whereby one is deprived of one's personal liberty, and furnishes a right of action for damages to the person so detained. Mansour v. Mobley, 96 Ga. App. 812, 101 S.E.2d 786 (1957).
Restraint used.
- The restraint used to create the detention must be against the plaintiff's will and be accomplished by either force or fear. Bryant v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 203 Ga. App. 770, 417 S.E.2d 688, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 905, 417 S.E.2d 688 (1992).
Any restraint, however slight, upon another's liberty to come and go as one pleases, constitutes arrest. Turney v. Rhodes, 42 Ga. App. 104, 155 S.E. 112 (1930); Conoly v. Imperial Tobacco Co., 63 Ga. App. 880, 12 S.E.2d 398 (1940); Burrow v. K-Mart Corp., 166 Ga. App. 284, 304 S.E.2d 460 (1983).
Restraint constituting false imprisonment may arise out of words, acts, gestures, or the like, which induce a reasonable apprehension that force will be used if the plaintiff does not submit, and it is sufficient if they operate upon the will of the person threatened and result in a reasonable fear of personal difficulty or personal injuries. Mansour v. Mobley, 96 Ga. App. 812, 101 S.E.2d 786 (1957); Abner v. W.T. Grant Co., 110 Ga. App. 592, 139 S.E.2d 408 (1964); Greenbaum v. Brooks, 110 Ga. App. 661, 139 S.E.2d 432 (1964); Seligman & Latz of Atlanta, Inc. v. Grant, 116 Ga. App. 539, 158 S.E.2d 483 (1967); Burrow v. K-Mart Corp., 166 Ga. App. 284, 304 S.E.2d 460 (1983).
Touching or laying hands on person is not sufficient to constitute unlawful detention. Markovitz v. Blake, 26 Ga. App. 153, 105 S.E. 622 (1921); Hines v. Adams, 27 Ga. App. 155, 107 S.E. 618 (1921).
One who actively instigates or procures an arrest, without lawful process, is generally regarded as principal for whom the officer acts, and one may be liable to respond in damages. Webb v. Prince, 62 Ga. App. 749, 9 S.E.2d 675 (1940); Melton v. LaCalamito, 158 Ga. App. 820, 282 S.E.2d 393 (1981).
Generally, a private person who causes or directs the arrest of another by an officer without a warrant may be held liable for false imprisonment in the absence of justification. Webb v. Prince, 62 Ga. App. 749, 9 S.E.2d 675 (1940).
No liability attaches unless defendant caused plaintiff's detention.
- However maliciously and without probable cause, the defendant may act in reporting to an officer facts which justify an arrest if the arrest is made without the defendant's command, request or direction, the defendant is not liable. Webb v. Prince, 62 Ga. App. 749, 9 S.E.2d 675 (1940).
One who merely states to an officer what one knows of a supposed offense, even though one expresses the opinion that there is ground for the arrest, but without making any charge or requesting an arrest, does not thereby make oneself liable for false imprisonment. Webb v. Prince, 62 Ga. App. 749, 9 S.E.2d 675 (1940).
Although defendant need not have expressly directed arrest.
- In order to render responsible a person causing the arrest of another without a warrant it is not necessary that one direct the arrest in express terms; it is sufficient that the person alleged to have caused the plaintiff's arrest, by one's conduct and acts, should have procured and directed the arrest. Webb v. Prince, 62 Ga. App. 749, 9 S.E.2d 675 (1940).
Only elements essential to a cause of action are detention and its unlawfulness; malice and want of probable cause need not be shown. Westberry v. Clanton, 136 Ga. 795, 72 S.E. 238 (1911); Wyatt v. Baker, 41 Ga. App. 750, 154 S.E. 816 (1930); Vlass v. McCrary, 60 Ga. App. 744, 5 S.E.2d 63 (1939); Conoly v. Imperial Tobacco Co., 63 Ga. App. 880, 12 S.E.2d 398 (1940); Abner v. W.T. Grant Co., 110 Ga. App. 592, 139 S.E.2d 408 (1964); Greenbaum v. Brooks, 110 Ga. App. 661, 139 S.E.2d 432 (1964); Seligman & Latz of Atlanta v. Grant, 116 Ga. App. 539, 158 S.E.2d 483 (1967); Young v. City of Atlanta, 631 F. Supp. 1498 (N.D. Ga. 1986).
In an action to recover damages for false imprisonment, the only essential elements of the action are the detention and the unlawfulness of the detention. Burrow v. K-Mart Corp., 166 Ga. App. 284, 304 S.E.2d 460 (1983).
The only essential elements for false imprisonment are: (1) detention; and (2) the unlawfulness thereof. Collier v. Evans, 199 Ga. App. 763, 406 S.E.2d 90 (1991).
Citizen's arrest lawful when probable cause exists.
- An arrest by a private person when one has probable cause to believe an offense is being committed in one's presence is a lawful arrest so as to defeat an allegation of false imprisonment. Nunnally v. Revco Disct. Drug Ctrs. of Ga., Inc., 170 Ga. App. 320, 316 S.E.2d 608 (1984).
To sustain action for false imprisonment, it is not necessary to show malice and want of probable cause, but it is only essential to show that the imprisonment was unlawful. Sheppard v. Hale, 58 Ga. App. 140, 197 S.E. 922 (1938); Lowe v. Turner, 115 Ga. App. 503, 154 S.E.2d 792 (1967).
In a case of illegal arrest and false imprisonment, probable cause is not essential to support a case; however, evidence affording reasonable and probable cause, or suspicion of the plaintiff's guilt, is relevant in mitigation of damages. Conoly v. Imperial Tobacco Co., 63 Ga. App. 880, 12 S.E.2d 398 (1940).
In a false imprisonment case premised upon a warrantless arrest, the mere existence of probable cause standing alone has no real defensive bearing on the issue of liability. Collins v. Sadlo, 167 Ga. App. 317, 306 S.E.2d 390 (1983).
The existence of probable cause standing alone is not a complete defense because, even if probable cause to believe a crime has been committed exists, a warrantless arrest would still be illegal unless it was accomplished pursuant to one of the "exigent circumstances" applicable to law enforcement officers enumerated in O.C.G.A. § 17-4-20 or applicable to private persons as set forth in O.C.G.A. § 17-4-60. Arbee v. Collins, 219 Ga. App. 63, 463 S.E.2d 922 (1995).
A person need not make an effort to escape or await application of open force before the person can recover for false imprisonment, but there must be restraint whether by force or fear. J.H. Harvey Co. v. Speight, 178 Ga. App. 812, 344 S.E.2d 701 (1986).
Person need not make effort to escape or to await application of open force (and possibly suffer physical injury) before one can recover for false imprisonment, but there must be actual physical restrain whether by force or fear. Abner v. W.T. Grant Co., 110 Ga. App. 592, 139 S.E.2d 408 (1964); J.H. Harvey Co. v. Speight, 178 Ga. App. 812, 344 S.E.2d 701 (1986).
It is no defense that person perpetrating illegal arrest or imprisonment is ignorant of illegality of one's acts; knowingly committing or participating in the act is sufficient to fix liability. Lowe v. Turner, 115 Ga. App. 503, 154 S.E.2d 792 (1967).
Proof that plaintiff in false imprisonment suit was actually guilty of crime for which the plaintiff was illegally arrested can be used to mitigate damages. McWilliams v. Interstate Bakeries, Inc., 439 F.2d 16 (5th Cir. 1971).
Direction of verdict by court improper.
- The court has no authority to direct a verdict unless the case is very plain. Manning v. Mitchell, 73 Ga. 660 (1884).
False imprisonment and false arrest distinguished.
- Because the elements of false imprisonment and false arrest are different, the denial of summary judgment on one claim does not preclude the grant of summary judgment on the other. Simmons v. Kroger Co., 218 Ga. App. 721, 463 S.E.2d 159 (1995), overruled on other grounds, Ferrell v. Mikula, 295 Ga. App. 326, 672 S.E.2d 7 (2008).
Cited in Thorpe v. Wray, 68 Ga. 359 (1882); Michael v. Bacon, 5 Ga. App. 331, 63 S.E. 228 (1908); Butler v. Tattnall, 140 Ga. 579, 79 S.E. 456 (1913); Brookshier v. Williams, 19 Ga. App. 685, 91 S.E. 1056 (1917); Collins v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 72 Ga. App. 875, 35 S.E.2d 474 (1945); Brown v. Triton, Inc., 115 Ga. App. 785, 156 S.E.2d 200 (1967); Wilder v. Irvin, 423 F. Supp. 639 (N.D. Ga. 1976); Kendrick v. Metropolitan Psychiatric Ctr., Inc., 158 Ga. App. 839, 282 S.E.2d 361 (1981); Colonial Stores, Inc. v. Fishel, 160 Ga. App. 739, 288 S.E.2d 21 (1981); Harrison v. Johnson, 161 Ga. App. 54, 289 S.E.2d 287 (1982); Nunnally v. Revco Disct. Drug Ctrs. of Ga., Inc., 170 Ga. App. 320, 316 S.E.2d 608 (1984); Luckie v. Piggly-Wiggly S., Inc., 173 Ga. App. 177, 325 S.E.2d 844 (1984); Scott Hous. Sys. v. Hickox, 174 Ga. App. 23, 329 S.E.2d 154 (1985); Franklin v. Piggly Wiggly Food S., Inc., 175 Ga. App. 20, 332 S.E.2d 329 (1985); Williams v. Summit Psychiatric Ctrs., 185 Ga. App. 264, 363 S.E.2d 794 (1987); Smith v. Holeman, 212 Ga. App. 158, 441 S.E.2d 487 (1994); Kelly v. Curtis, 21 F.3d 1544 (11th Cir. 1994); Jackson v. KMart Corp., 851 F. Supp. 469 (M.D. Ga. 1994); Wallace v. Stringer, 250 Ga. App. 850, 553 S.E.2d 166 (2001).
Applicability to Specific Cases
Since the plaintiff was not guilty of a criminal offense, the plaintiff's arrest without warrant justified an award of damages against the officer who made the arrest and the persons who procured the officer to do so. Sheppard v. Hale, 58 Ga. App. 140, 197 S.E. 922 (1938).
Under allegations that the plaintiff was arrested without a warrant when the plaintiff was not guilty of any offense under the laws of this state or under any city ordinance and, without being carried before a committing magistrate, was held under arrest and deprived of the plaintiff's liberty until the plaintiff and the plaintiff's brother paid to the defendant a sum of money, whereupon the defendant accepted the money and caused or permitted the plaintiff to be released from custody, the arrest and detention of the plaintiff were clearly illegal, and a cause of action for false imprisonment was set out. Duchess Chenilles, Inc. v. Masters, 84 Ga. App. 822, 67 S.E.2d 600 (1951).
In a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit filed by a Florida business person alleging false arrest based upon the business person giving postdated checks to a Georgia payee, issues of fact remained with respect to the business person's false imprisonment/false arrest claims under O.C.G.A. § 51-7-20 against a Georgia sheriff's deputy and the payee; the defense in O.C.G.A. § 51-7-21 did not apply because the Georgia arrest warrant was invalid, and the safe harbor provision in O.C.G.A. § 16-9-20(h)(2) had no relevance to the good cause inquiry under O.C.G.A. § 51-7-21. Brown v. Camden County, 583 F. Supp. 2d 1358 (S.D. Ga. 2008).
Claim was ripe for adjudication.
- While a city and two police officers argued that an arrestee's claim of false imprisonment under O.C.G.A. § 51-7-20 was not ripe because the arrestee's criminal prosecution had not terminated in the arrestee's favor, it was not certain that the arrest was procured by an invalid arrest warrant and it was not beyond doubt that the arrestee could prove a set of facts to support a false imprisonment claim. Holmes v. City of East Point, F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Dec. 20, 2005).
Time limitation.- Plaintiffs' malicious prosecution claim was not time barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations because that claim did not accrue until the charges against the plaintiffs were dropped, which was within the two-year limitations period; the plaintiffs' claim for false imprisonment was time barred because the plaintiffs were no longer falsely imprisoned after the defendants obtained an arrest warrant, which was more than two years prior to the plaintiffs filing their complaint, and the plaintiffs did not suffer a continuing tort of false imprisonment once the plaintiffs were held pursuant to the warrant. Black v. Wigington, F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Feb. 4, 2015), aff'd in part and rev'd on other grounds, 811 F.3d 1259 (11th Cir. Ga. 2016).
Trial court erred by refusing to file in forma pauperis complaint.
- Trial court erred by refusing an inmate's request to proceed in forma pauperis under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-2(d) and to file the inmate's complaint because the court could not decipher the inmate's complaint as construing the complaint in the light most favorable to the inmate, the inmate did state justiciable claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and violation of the inmate's civil rights. Thompson v. Reichert, 318 Ga. App. 23, 733 S.E.2d 342 (2012).
Private citizen who forcibly detained the plaintiff who had indecently exposed oneself to the citizen and arrest did not occur until four days after the offense, was guilty of falsely imprisoning the plaintiff. McWilliams v. Interstate Bakeries, Inc., 439 F.2d 16 (5th Cir. 1971).
Illegal detention of plaintiff at defendant's command.
- Allegations that the defendants, without swearing out any warrant or taking any other proceeding, procured, directed and instructed certain police officers to arrest and detain the plaintiff, that the plaintiff was not then nor had the plaintiff been violating any law, nor was the plaintiff attempting to escape, that after the plaintiff's arrest by the police officer the plaintiff was taken into custody and restrained of the plaintiff's liberty, and that the plaintiff was afterwards charged with illegal parking, but was acquitted after a trial thereon, set out a cause of action for false imprisonment. Livingston v. Schneer's Atlanta, Inc., 61 Ga. App. 637, 7 S.E.2d 190 (1940).
Allegation that the defendant restaurant operators "called in said officers and caused plaintiff's arrest," (when the plaintiff, being a customer, tried to cash a check), taken in connection with the context, when it was alleged that the arrest was caused and instigated by the defendants, amounted to an allegation that the defendants, through the defendants' agents, procured or directed the arrest of the plaintiff, and the petition therefore set out a cause of action. Webb v. Prince, 62 Ga. App. 749, 9 S.E.2d 675 (1940).
Appellee's claim of false imprisonment failed as a matter of law as the undisputed evidence showed that the appellant did not cause or direct the police to detain the appellee because the evidence showed only that the appellant's employee reported having seen the appellee with what the employee believed was an illegal sawed-off shotgun, but the employee did not swear out a warrant against the appellee nor did the employee urge or direct the police to arrest the appellee; the employee's 911 call prompted an investigation only; and the arresting officers stated unequivocally that the officers independently decided to detain the appellee based on the appellee's disorderly conduct and efforts to obstruct their investigation. Examination Mgmt. Servs. v. Steed, 340 Ga. App. 51, 794 S.E.2d 687 (2016).
Illegal restraint of refugees.- Each of the four refugees was detained without an arrest warrant and without being told of the charges against them. The refugees showed that the former Bosnian-Serb soldier subjected them to restraint and physical violence in detention and was complicit in their ongoing arbitrary detention; therefore, the former soldier was liable to the refugees under Georgia law for false imprisonment. Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322 (N.D. Ga. 2002).
Summary judgment was improperly granted to the employer because a question of fact remained as to whether the employer procured the employee's false imprisonment when there was a conflict in the evidence about whether the employer caused the detective to arrest the employee when the evidence did not show, as a matter of law, that the police made a sufficiently independent investigation of the theft; and a question of fact remained as to whether the detective had probable cause to arrest the employee in connection with the theft as there was a dispute about whether the employee actually saw a person take the electronics out of a case and failed to report it, giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that the employee was working with the thieves. Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, 330 Ga. App. 340, 765 S.E.2d 518 (2014).
In a claim that the employer procured the employee's false imprisonment when the employee was arrested by a detective, although the employee offered the employee's report of the detective's question to a loss prevention officer for the employer about what to do with the employee after the employee arrived at the police station to show the truth of the matter asserted - that was, that the employer had some substantial control over the police investigation - the detective's question as reported by the employee was admissible at trial as an inconsistent statement made prior to the detective's later testimony that the detective never asked the question at all. Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, 330 Ga. App. 340, 765 S.E.2d 518 (2014).
Illegal restraint of minor.
- Irrespective of whether the minor wrongfully charged with burglary voluntarily accompanied the police officer and private citizen charging the minor with that offense from the schoolhouse, when the minor's parent thereafter demanded that the police officer and the private citizen deliver the minor to the parent, their refusal to do so and their retention of the minor in their custody and taking the minor elsewhere constituted a restraint of the minor's liberty. Conoly v. Imperial Tobacco Co., 63 Ga. App. 880, 12 S.E.2d 398 (1940).
Summary judgment was properly denied on a parent's claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, false arrest, false imprisonment, and invasion of privacy arising out of an accusation by store employees that the parent's nine-year-old child stole from the store because the child was below the age of 13, the age of criminal responsibility under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-1, and was legally incapable of giving consent to their actions under O.C.G.A. §§ 51-11-2 and51-11-6. Todd v. Byrd, 283 Ga. App. 37, 640 S.E.2d 652 (2006), overruled on other grounds, Ferrell v. Mikula, 295 Ga. App. 326, 672 S.E.2d. 7 (2008).
Whether unlawful detention took place was factual question.
- Summary judgment was properly denied on a parent's false imprisonment claim under O.C.G.A. § 51-7-20 arising out of an accusation by store employees that the parent's nine-year-old child stole from the store, even if the child were old enough to consent, because whether the child was unlawfully detained or imprisoned when an employee led the child back into the store by the hand for questioning about the alleged theft was a factual question to be resolved by a jury. Todd v. Byrd, 283 Ga. App. 37, 640 S.E.2d 652 (2006), overruled on other grounds, Ferrell v. Mikula, 295 Ga. App. 326, 672 S.E.2d. 7 (2008).
Action arising from arrest of invited guest in an action for false imprisonment, when an employee of an apartment complex had given notice to the plaintiff that the plaintiff was forbidden to enter the property, even though the plaintiff entered as the guest of a tenant, the employee had probable cause to arrest and detain the plaintiff for malicious trespass when the plaintiff deviated from the purpose for which the plaintiff was invited and entered upon a portion of the premises unrelated to the invitation. Arbee v. Collins, 219 Ga. App. 63, 463 S.E.2d 922 (1995).
Illegal restraint of person in elevator.
- When a person who has gone into an office building, whether the person is lawfully or illegally there, is ordered to enter an elevator in the building and to go to the basement of the building, and is carried, by the persons so ordering and the operator of the elevator, against the person's will and over the person's protest, the transportation of the person to the basement of the building is done for a purpose other than to eject the person from the building, the forcing of the person into the elevator and the taking of the person, against the person's will, to the basement of the building, constitutes an illegal arrest and an illegal restraint of the person's liberty. Turney v. Rhodes, 42 Ga. App. 104, 155 S.E. 112 (1930).
Momentary pause in progress of patron through check out line was not too inconsequential to constitute "detention" or "imprisonment" for purposes of the patron's false imprisonment claim. Williams v. Food Lion, Inc., 213 Ga. App. 865, 446 S.E.2d 221 (1994).
Store patron's voluntary surrender of freedom.
- Grocery store was not liable for false imprisonment when a patron by the patron's own free choice surrendered the patron's freedom of motion by remaining in the checking aisle to clear oneself of suspicion. Williams v. Food Lion, Inc., 213 Ga. App. 865, 446 S.E.2d 221 (1994).
Loss of position by detained person.
- When a person loses one's position, as the result of an unlawful detention, it is a proper element of damages. Waters v. National Woolen Mills, 142 Ga. 133, 82 S.E. 535 (1914).
Employer did not restrain employee.
- For purposes of the employee's false imprisonment claim based on the employee's encounter with two loss prevention officers in the employer's back office, the evidence did not authorize a conclusion that the employee was detained as the employee signed a statement that no threats and promises were made by anyone to get the employee to make a statement and that the employee had complete freedom to leave the premises throughout; and the employee testified at a deposition that the loss prevention officers told the employee at or before the conclusion of the encounter that the employee was free to leave, that the officers never touched the employee, and that the officers never suggested that the officers were going to arrest the employee or have the employee arrested. Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, 330 Ga. App. 340, 765 S.E.2d 518 (2014).
Summary judgment was improperly granted in favor of the employer based on the employer procuring the employee's false imprisonment when the employee was arrested by a detective because, although two of the loss prevention officers both averred that neither of them encouraged or directed the police to arrest the employee, the officers told a third loss prevention officer that the officers were going to obtain the employee's arrest based on a videotape; there was a conflict in the evidence as to whether the employer directly or indirectly caused police to arrest the employee; and a question of fact remained regarding whether the detective had probable cause to believe that the employee was involved in the theft or lied when denying being so involved. Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, 330 Ga. App. 340, 765 S.E.2d 518 (2014).
False imprisonment claim against co-workers failed.
- Plaintiff's claim for false imprisonment against the individual defendants, who were plaintiff's co-workers, failed because there was no evidence the co-workers wrongfully procured the plaintiff's arrest by a detective, but only that the co-workers conveyed factual information to the detective, who, with a supervisor, made the decision to arrest the plaintiff. McClendon v. Harper, 349 Ga. App. 581, 826 S.E.2d 412 (2019).
Money paid to secure release not accord and satisfaction barring suit for false imprisonment.
- Alleged payment of money by the plaintiff to the defendants, demanded of the plaintiff for the plaintiff's release from illegal imprisonment, did not amount to an accord and satisfaction or bar the plaintiff from maintaining an action for false imprisonment or for slander. Duchess Chenilles, Inc. v. Masters, 84 Ga. App. 822, 67 S.E.2d 600 (1951).
Party not liable for false imprisonment when not authorized to provide release.
- When it was not alleged that the duties of the foreperson included any control by the foreperson over the gates and doors to the factory, the foreperson's refusal to "allow" the doors and gates to be opened and the petitioner to be released from the factory, did not amount to a restraint by the foreperson of the plaintiff's liberty and, therefore, constituted no false imprisonment. Timmons v. Fulton Bag & Cotton Mills, 45 Ga. App. 670, 166 S.E. 40 (1932).
Arrest for contempt of court.
- Plaintiff's detention was not a false imprisonment since the judicial order authorizing the sheriff to arrest the plaintiff for contempt of court was in the nature of a warrant, and the process had therefore been properly issued. Carruth v. Roberts, 189 Ga. App. 247, 375 S.E.2d 499 (1988).
Party not liable for false imprisonment when judge improperly jails other litigant for contempt.
- When a court has jurisdiction of the subject matter, including as such jurisdiction to render a judgment adjudicating the defendant in contempt of court and committing the defendant to imprisonment, but when, in the particular case, the court in the judgment rendered may have exceeded the court's jurisdiction by the rendition of a judgment adjudicating the defendant in contempt and ordering the defendant to jail, a litigant or the litigant's attorney, who in good faith prosecutes the suit and invokes the ruling and judgment of the court, is not, when the defendant is afterwards, in the proceedings, by a judgment of the court adjudicated in contempt and committed to jail, guilty of false imprisonment. Melton v. Jenkins, 50 Ga. App. 615, 178 S.E. 754 (1935).
Section applicable to employer's illegal restraint of employee.
- The unmistakable language of this section makes it clear that the unlawful detention of the person of another depriving that person of one's personal liberty is an actionable tort even though the one restrained is an employee of the offender and is at the time of the illegal restraint being paid by the offender. Greenbaum v. Brooks, 110 Ga. App. 661, 139 S.E.2d 432 (1964).
This section does not apply to case of admitted embezzler who intends to plead guilty and undertakes restitution under the belief that restitution will lessen the punishment and under assurance of assistance by agents of the bank to be rendered after the plea is entered in lessening the punishment. Hawkes v. Mobley, 174 Ga. 481, 163 S.E. 494 (1932).
Unlawful arrest of landowner.
- A person, upon whose land a crew of a telephone company erected poles without authority, may remove the poles, and if a constable arrests the person without a warrant for such acts, an action for false imprisonment will lie. Holliday v. Coleman, 12 Ga. App. 779, 78 S.E. 482 (1913).
Wrong person arrested.
- The arrest of the wrong person by a sheriff without a warrant gives rise to a cause of action. Mitchell v. Malone, 77 Ga. 301 (1886).
Restaurant manager told a security guard to follow a car the manager believed was occupied by patrons who had left without paying; it was actually occupied by siblings who had paid their bill. As police detained the siblings without a warrant, the siblings had a claim for false imprisonment under O.C.G.A. § 51-7-20; neither malice nor lack of probable cause had to be shown, and it was not alleged that the siblings were arrested pursuant to exigent circumstances. Ferrell v. Mikula, 295 Ga. App. 326, 672 S.E.2d 7 (2008).
Warrant naming another person.
- Sole remedy of person who was arrested pursuant to a warrant naming another person was for the false imprisonment, not false arrest or malicious prosecution. Reese v. Clayton County, 185 Ga. App. 207, 363 S.E.2d 618 (1987).
Good faith identification of suspect.
- Store's establishment of the store employee's good faith identification of the defendants as robbery suspects did not render the defendants' detention unlawful as required by O.C.G.A. § 51-7-20. Mayor & Aldermen v. Wilson, 214 Ga. App. 170, 447 S.E.2d 124 (1994), overruled on other grounds, Ferrell v. Mikula, 295 Ga. App. 326, 672 S.E.2d 7 (2008).
False imprisonment from exercise of dominion over plaintiff's property.
- The exercise of dominion over one's property serves also to exercise dominion over the person owning such property. Burrow v. K-Mart Corp., 166 Ga. App. 284, 304 S.E.2d 460 (1983).
Probable cause and exigent circumstances found to exist so as to justify warrantless detention. Hill v. Georgia Power Co., 786 F.2d 1071 (11th Cir. 1986).
Detention not found.
- When the plaintiff was observed by several different store employees who characterized the plaintiff's behavior as "suspicious" and was later followed to a parking lot where the plaintiff was asked by an assistant store manager if the plaintiff had anything belonging to the store, there was no detention which could support the plaintiff's action for false imprisonment. Lord v. K-Mart Corp., 177 Ga. App. 651, 340 S.E.2d 225 (1986).
Since the plaintiff was not touched or physically detained but was merely asked a question, and the plaintiff's response to that question provoked no further action on the defendant's part, no detention occurred. Fields v. Kroger Co., 202 Ga. App. 475, 414 S.E.2d 703 (1992).
The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to an employer on an employee's claim for false imprisonment since there was no evidence that the employee was ever physically restrained in an office or threatened with physical force. The employee argued that the employee was threatened with the loss of the employee's job and with criminal prosecution, but such threats did not constitute detention for purposes of a false imprisonment claim. Shannon v. Office Max N. Am., Inc., 291 Ga. App. 834, 662 S.E.2d 885 (2008).
Photographer could not establish a claim for false imprisonment because the assistant chief of police was acting under the auspices of a valid temporary protective order (TPO) when the assistant chief of police ordered the photographer to leave a council meeting, and the later dismissal of a council member's petition for stalking TPO did not change the fact that the TPO was in effect at the time of the meeting. Davis v. Wallace, 310 Ga. App. 340, 713 S.E.2d 446 (2011).
Trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the employer on the employee's claim of false imprisonment as the employee was never detained at the employer's store as the employee signed a statement that the employee had complete freedom to leave the premises throughout the questioning by two loss prevention officers for the employer. Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, 330 Ga. App. 340, 765 S.E.2d 518 (2014).
Proper detention by store.
- There was probable cause for the defendant store to detain the plaintiff when it appeared that the plaintiff had used another person's charge account without authorization. Mitchell v. Lowe's Home Ctrs., Inc., 234 Ga. App. 339, 506 S.E.2d 381 (1998).
A claim of false imprisonment based upon involuntary mental examination and treatment is analytically identical to any other claim for false imprisonment. Williams v. Smith, 179 Ga. App. 712, 348 S.E.2d 50 (1986).
One who is admitted as a mental health patient pursuant to a physician's "good faith" compliance with the applicable procedures of O.C.G.A. § 37-3-40 et seq. has no right of recovery for false imprisonment. Williams v. Smith, 179 Ga. App. 712, 348 S.E.2d 50 (1986).
If one is taken into custody pursuant to a procedurally valid certificate of a physician authorizing involuntary mental treatment, the resulting detention is not "unlawful." Although such detention may give rise to other claims, a cause of action for false imprisonment is not among them. Williams v. Smith, 179 Ga. App. 712, 348 S.E.2d 50 (1986).
If one is held in custody pursuant to a void or defective physician's certificate of mental illness, there is a viable claim for false imprisonment, but only if the certificate was not issued in "good faith." Williams v. Smith, 179 Ga. App. 712, 348 S.E.2d 50 (1986).
Illegal restraint of hospital patient.
- Summary judgment in favor of a hospital was not warranted since there was evidence that the patient never voluntarily admitted herself to the hospital's behavioral health unit and was held there after demanding to be released. Brand v. University Hosp., 240 Ga. App. 824, 525 S.E.2d 374 (1999).
Directed verdict was precluded in action against hospital and physician for false imprisonment and assault, when there were jury questions as to whether there was a grave emergency justifying the plaintiff's admission for treatment, whether the consent of the plaintiff's daughter satisfied a "next of kin" requirement, and whether the doctors could proceed under legally implied consent. Davis v. Charter By-The-Sea, Inc., 183 Ga. App. 213, 358 S.E.2d 865 (1987).
In an action alleging false arrest, malicious prosecution, and false imprisonment, as the arresting officers were parties, not disinterested witnesses, their deposition testimony that the arrest of both the plaintiffs was based solely upon their professional judgment, constituted a mere statement of self-serving opinion and a legal conclusion that could not support the grant of summary judgment; moreover, a jury, not a judge, was to construe the facts upon which such opinion was based and could reach a diametrically different conclusion to that reached by the witness. Adams v. Carlisle, 278 Ga. App. 777, 630 S.E.2d 529 (2006).
Officer arresting restaurant invitee.
- Summary judgment was properly granted to a police officer on a restaurant invitee's false imprisonment claim under O.C.G.A. § 51-7-20. The officer, who was told by the restaurant manager that the invitee refused an order to leave the premises, had probable cause to arrest the invitee without a warrant for criminal trespass under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-21. Kline v. KDB, Inc., 295 Ga. App. 789, 673 S.E.2d 516 (2009).
Arrest for driving under the influence.- In an arrest for driving under the influence, the arrestee's false imprisonment claim failed because the officer was entitled to official immunity since the officer was performing a discretionary act when the officer arrested the arrestee; the arrestee's general allegations of malice did not overcome official immunity. Bannister v. Conway, F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. Oct. 23, 2013).
Official immunity did not apply.
- Under respondeat superior, a principal had no defense based on an agent's immunity from civil liability for an act committed in the course of employment; thus, because the official immunity of a public employee did not protect a governmental entity from liability under respondeat superior, a trial court's summary judgment for a city based on allegations of false arrest was improper, despite the fact that the officers carrying out the arrest were immune. Rodriguez v. Kraus, 275 Ga. App. 118, 619 S.E.2d 800 (2005).
Deputy did not show entitlement to official immunity under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. IX(d) as to the claims of false arrest and malicious prosecution because the plaintiff offered evidence tending to show that the deputy violated Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. XXIII and O.C.G.A. § 51-7-20; thus, there were material fact issues precluding summary judgment. Jordan v. Mosley, 487 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 2007).
Bad faith shown in procuring arrest warrants.
- Trial court properly denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the false imprisonment claim because the plaintiff produced evidence showing that the defendants did not act in good faith in procuring the warrants to collect on the 55 returned checks since the magistrate judge was not informed that the trailers had been delivered pursuant to a 30-day payment term and the checks were not given for present consideration and some of the trailers had already been repossessed. Sheffield v. Futch, 354 Ga. App. 661, 839 S.E.2d 294 (2020).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d.
- 32 Am. Jur. 2d, False Imprisonment, § 1 et seq.
C.J.S.- 35 C.J.S., False Imprisonment, § 1 et seq.
ALR.
- Civil liability of judicial officer for false imprisonment, 13 A.L.R. 1344; 55 A.L.R. 282; 173 A.L.R. 802.
Malice and want of probable cause as elements of action for false imprisonment, 19 A.L.R. 671; 137 A.L.R. 504.
Necessity of showing termination of prosecution in action for false imprisonment, 25 A.L.R. 1518.
Detention as result of dispute over payment of bill for cash service as false imprisonment, 26 A.L.R. 1333.
Charge of larceny and circumstances accompanying same as detention that will support action for false imprisonment, 31 A.L.R. 314.
Liability of jailer for false imprisonment, 46 A.L.R. 806.
False imprisonment predicated upon conduct of master towards servant not amounting to actual arrest, 49 A.L.R. 1309.
Action for malicious prosecution or false arrest based on extradition proceeding, 55 A.L.R. 353.
Venue of civil action for false imprisonment, 133 A.L.R. 1122.
Liability, for false imprisonment or arrest, of a private person answering call of known or asserted peace or police officer to assist in making arrest which turns out to be unlawful, 29 A.L.R.2d 825.
When statute of limitations begins to run against action for false imprisonment or false arrest, 49 A.L.R.2d 922.
Truant or attendance officer's liability for assault and battery or false imprisonment, 62 A.L.R.2d 1328.
Judgment in false imprisonment action as res judicata in later malicious prosecution action, or vice versa, 86 A.L.R.2d 1385.
Delay in taking before magistrate or denial of opportunity to give bail as supporting action for false imprisonment, 98 A.L.R.2d 966; 3 A.L.R.4th 1057.
False arrest or imprisonment: entrapment as precluding justification of arrest or imprisonment, 15 A.L.R.3d 963.
False imprisonment: civil liability of private person as affected by invalidity of statute or ordinance for violation of which arrest was made, 16 A.L.R.3d 535.
Liability, for false arrest or imprisonment, of private person detaining child, 20 A.L.R.3d 1441.
Attorneys' fees as element of damages in action for false imprisonment or arrest, or for malicious prosecution, 21 A.L.R.3d 1068.
Liability of attorney acting for client, for false imprisonment or malicious prosecution of third party, 27 A.L.R.3d 1113; 46 A.L.R.4th 249.
Liability for false imprisonment predicated upon institution of, or conduct in connection with, insanity proceedings, 30 A.L.R.3d 523.
Construction and effect, in false imprisonment action, of statute providing for detention of suspected shoplifters, 47 A.L.R.3d 998.
Principal's liability for punitive damages because of false arrest or imprisonment, or malicious prosecution, by agent or employee, 93 A.L.R.3d 826.
Defendant's state of mind necessary or sufficient to warrant award of punitive damages in action for false arrest or imprisonment, 93 A.L.R.3d 1109.
False imprisonment: liability of private citizen, calling on police for assistance after disturbance or trespass, for false arrest by officer, 98 A.L.R.3d 542.
Delay in taking before magistrate or denial of opportunity to give bail as supporting action for false imprisonment, 3 A.L.R.4th 1057.
False imprisonment in connection with confinement in nursing home or hospital, 4 A.L.R.4th 449.
Construction and application of state statute providing compensation for wrongful conviction and incarceration, 34 A.L.R.4th 648.
Excessiveness or inadequacy of punitive damages awarded in personal injury or death cases, 35 A.L.R.4th 441.
Liability for false arrest or imprisonment under warrant as affected by mistake as to identity of person arrested, 39 A.L.R.4th 705.
Excessiveness or inadequacy of compensatory damages for false imprisonment or arrest, 48 A.L.R.4th 165.
Excessiveness or inadequacy of punitive damages awarded in personal injury or death cases, 12 A.L.R.5th 195.
Construction and application of Federal Tort Claims Act provision (28 USCA § 2680(h)) excepting from coverage claims arising out of false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, or abuse of process, 152 A.L.R. Fed. 605.