Supersedeas of Criminal Conviction; Bond; Affidavit of Indigence; Effect of Supersedeas

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  1. Any person who has been convicted of any criminal or quasi-criminal offense or violation of any ordinance, in any inferior judicatory by whatever name called, except constitutional city courts or state courts, exercising criminal or quasi-criminal jurisdiction, who desires a writ of certiorari to review and correct the judgment of conviction in the case shall be entitled to a supersedeas of the judgment if he files with the clerk of the court, or, if there is no clerk, with the judge thereof, or with the commissioners if it is a court presided over by commissioners with no clerk, a bond payable to the state, or, if the conviction is in a municipal court, payable to the municipality, in amount and with security acceptable to and to be approved by the clerk, judge, or majority of the commissioners, as the case may be, conditioned that the defendant will personally appear and abide the final judgment, order, or sentence upon him in the case. The bond, if payable to the state, may be forfeited in the same manner as any other criminal bond in any court having jurisdiction. If the bond is payable to the municipal corporation, it may be forfeited according to the procedure prescribed in the municipal ordinance or charter. Alternatively, an action may be brought on the bond in any court having jurisdiction. Upon the giving of bond the defendant shall be released from custody in like manner as defendants are released upon supersedeas bonds in criminal cases where a notice of appeal has been filed.
  2. If the defendant is unable because of his indigence to give bond and makes this fact appear by affidavit to be filed with the judge, clerk, or commissioners, as the case may be, the same shall operate as a supersedeas of the judgment; provided, however, that the defendant shall not be set at liberty unless he gives bond as prescribed in subsection (a) of this Code section.
  3. The supersedeas provided for in this Code section shall operate to suspend the judgment of conviction until the case is finally heard and determined by the superior court to which it is taken by certiorari or by the Court of Appeals upon appeal, provided that within the time prescribed by law the defendant shall apply for and procure the writs and remedies provided by law for reviewing the judgment complained of. The supersedeas shall be equally applicable whether the judge of the superior court to whom the petition for certiorari is presented sanctions it or refuses it, provided that within the time provided by law the defendant diligently files a notice of appeal.
  4. The object of this Code section is to provide a method by which a defendant may obtain a supersedeas so long as he is prosecuting or is entitled under the law to prosecute the proceeding brought or to be brought to review the conviction of which he is complaining, or any intermediate appellate judgment rendered thereon, in order that the defendant shall not be deprived of his right to apply to the courts by being compelled to serve his sentence or pay a fine before he has had the full opportunity allowed him by law of taking the necessary proceedings to correct and review his conviction.

(Ga. L. 1902, p. 105, § 1; Ga. L. 1909, p. 148, §§ 1-3; Civil Code 1910, §§ 5192, 5193, 5194; Code 1933, §§ 19-214, 19-215, 19-216; Ga. L. 1982, p. 3, § 5.)

Cross references.

- Bonds and recognizances generally, T. 17, C. 6.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

ANALYSIS

  • General Consideration
  • Applicability
  • Bond

General Consideration

Applies to certiorari from inferior judicatories exercising criminal or quasi-criminal jurisdiction.

- In all cases for writ of certiorari from inferior judicatory exercising criminal or quasi-criminal jurisdiction, filing of bond, or making of pauper's affidavit, is condition precedent to application. Sauceman v. State, 209 Ga. 60, 70 S.E.2d 754 (1952).

Condition to certiorari from municipal court judgment.

- Filing of bond or making of pauper affidavit, required under this section, relating to certiorari sued to review judgment of municipal court, is condition precedent to application for certiorari. Nilsen v. City of La Grange, 55 Ga. App. 676, 191 S.E. 175 (1937).

Condition precedent to review of conviction in recorder's court.

- Filing of bond required by subsection (a) or pauper's affidavit provided for under subsection (b) is condition precedent to application for certiorari to review judgment of conviction in recorder's court. Long v. City of Crawfordville, 55 Ga. App. 182, 189 S.E. 685 (1937); West v. City of College Park, 116 Ga. App. 355, 157 S.E.2d 491 (1967).

Condition precedent to review of conviction in city court.

- Filing of security bond or pauper's affidavit is condition precedent to application for certiorari to review judgment of conviction in city court. Ellett v. City of College Park, 135 Ga. App. 269, 217 S.E.2d 374 (1975).

Failure to give bond required by section authorizes refusal to sanction petition. Roberts v. Mayor of Colquitt, 17 Ga. App. 557, 87 S.E. 816 (1916).

Unless it appears that requirements as to giving bond have been fully complied with, petition for certiorari should not be sanctioned. Mantovani v. City of Atlanta, 43 Ga. App. 787, 160 S.E. 129 (1931).

Appearance-supersedeas bond in certiorari must be executed according to provisions of this section as condition precedent to sanctioning of the application. Soles v. City of Vidalia, 92 Ga. App. 839, 90 S.E.2d 249 (1955).

Failure to aver filing of bond or affidavit renders petition void.

- Failure to aver in petition for certiorari that bond has been filed or affidavit made, renders petition void. Nilsen v. City of La Grange, 55 Ga. App. 676, 191 S.E. 175 (1937).

Petition sanctioned in spite of noncompliance with bond requirements should be dismissed on hearing. Mantovani v. City of Atlanta, 43 Ga. App. 787, 160 S.E. 129 (1931).

If writ has been improperly sanctioned, dismissal will be necessary. Flynn v. City of E. Point, 18 Ga. App. 729, 90 S.E. 372 (1916).

Dismissal proper for failure to file bond or make affidavit.

- When neither bond nor the pauper affidavit in lieu thereof was filed in the mayor's court as provided by this section there was no error in dismissing certiorari. Archer v. City of Fayetteville, 14 Ga. App. 24, 80 S.E. 34 (1913).

Cited in Laws v. State, 15 Ga. App. 361, 83 S.E. 279 (1914); Hubert v. City of Thomasville, 18 Ga. App. 756, 90 S.E. 720 (1916); Ronemous v. State, 87 Ga. App. 588, 74 S.E.2d 676 (1953); Hodges v. Bruce, 209 Ga. 871, 76 S.E.2d 801 (1953); Beard v. City of Atlanta, 91 Ga. App. 584, 86 S.E.2d 672 (1955); Clegg v. City of Vidalia, 91 Ga. App. 852, 87 S.E.2d 362 (1955); Coleman v. Mayor of Savannah, 102 Ga. App. 664, 117 S.E.2d 186 (1960); City of Gainesville v. Butts, 127 Ga. App. 140, 193 S.E.2d 59 (1972); Ellett v. City of College Park, 233 Ga. 858, 213 S.E.2d 700 (1975); Mulling v. Wilson, 245 Ga. 773, 267 S.E.2d 212 (1980).

Applicability

Motion to vacate and set aside verdict and judgment in criminal case.

- Hodges v. Balkcom, 209 Ga. 856, 76 S.E.2d 798 (1953).

No authority exists to fine or imprison defendant.

- A case is not a criminal or quasi-criminal proceeding when issues before police committee of general council of city were in nature of a civil proceeding, and committee had no authority to fine or to deprive officer of the officer's liberty, but the only authority vested in the committee was to exonerate, to suspend, or to discharge. City of Atlanta v. Stallings, 72 Ga. App. 52, 33 S.E.2d 18 (1945).

Certiorari from proceeding in municipal court to determine whether nuisance exists.

- Proceeding in municipal court to determine question of whether nuisance exists was not criminal or quasi-criminal in nature since the court cannot fine or imprison the defendant in error, and the bond required for certiorari was that provided for in former Code 1933, §§ 19-206, 19-207, 19-208 (see O.C.G.A. § 5-4-5) for civil proceedings, and bond under former Code 1933, §§ 19-214, 19-215, 19-216 (see O.C.G.A. § 5-4-20) would not suffice. City of Atlanta v. Pazol, 95 Ga. App. 598, 98 S.E.2d 216 (1957).

Review of revocation of probationary sentences is not review of judgment of conviction.

- Defendants, who were confined upon revocation of probationary sentences and who sought review by certiorari of order of revocation, were not entitled to be released on bond, since the defendants were not seeking to review a judgment of conviction within the provisions of former Code 1933, §§ 19-214, 19-215, 19-216, and 27-901 (see O.C.G.A. §§ 5-4-20 and17-6-1). Foster v. Jenkins, 210 Ga. 383, 80 S.E.2d 277 (1954).

Bond

1. In General

Bond shall be conditioned to abide final judgment of superior court as well as inferior court.

- Bond approved by clerk of lower court, if there be one, conditioned to abide final judgment of superior court, as well as inferior court, must be filed as a condition precedent to obtaining writ of certiorari. Moon v. City of Jefferson, 10 Ga. App. 572, 73 S.E. 854 (1912).

Should be conditioned that defendant appear and abide by judgment.

- Bond conditioned for appearance of defendant to abide final judgment of superior court is insufficient. It should be conditioned to appear "and" abide by final judgment, as the two conditions are not synonymous. Scott v. City of Camilla, 7 Ga. App. 689, 67 S.E. 846 (1910); Ruffin v. City of Millen, 18 Ga. App. 784, 90 S.E. 654 (1916).

Abrogation of bond.

- When one convicted of misdemeanor in county criminal court has appealed by certiorari and successive writs of error all the way up to the Supreme Court of the United States, and verdict and sentence have been affirmed, and remittitur from the Court of Appeals of Georgia affirming such verdict and sentence has been made the judgment of superior court, such verdict and sentence become final; and when the defendant is thereafter arrested, the supersedeas certiorari bond executed in that case is abrogated and becomes functus officio, and the defendant is not thereafter entitled to remain at liberty by virtue of such bond. Hodges v. Balkcom, 209 Ga. 856, 76 S.E.2d 798 (1953).

Application may be amended to show valid bond.

- Defendant convicted in municipal court of leaving the scene of an accident and driving without insurance failed to comply with the bond requirement in O.C.G.A. § 5-4-20(a) before the defendant filed the defendant's application for writ of certiorari; however, under O.C.G.A. § 5-4-10, the defendant was entitled to amend the defendant's petition once the defendant had a valid bond. Williams v. City of Douglasville, 354 Ga. App. 313, 840 S.E.2d 715 (2020).

2. Execution and Signatures

When agent for surety signs certiorari bond, agent's authority must expressly appear.

- When on certiorari from trial court, certiorari bond is signed by one as agent for surety named thereon, authority of such agent must expressly appear. Taylor v. City of Atlanta, 84 Ga. App. 739, 67 S.E.2d 143 (1951).

When attorney signs bond for surety without power of attorney attached.

- When defendant in certiorari made a motion to dismiss certiorari for reason that surety on certiorari bond had executed the bond by the defendant's attorney and that the bond was not a valid bond, because no power of attorney was attached thereto showing authority of the attorney to sign the bond for the surety, the court properly sustained the motion and dismissed certiorari. Mantovani v. City of Atlanta, 43 Ga. App. 787, 160 S.E. 129 (1931).

3. Validity of Bond

Bond payable to city recorder charged with responsibilities involving forfeiture of appearance bonds.

- When city recorder is person charged with responsibility of forfeiting appearance bonds when the bond's conditions have not been complied with, and the recorder necessarily does so for and on behalf of the city as such officer, petition showing that bond hereunder was made payable to city recorder or the recorder's successors in office affirmatively shows a valid contract between obligors and city for this purpose, and it was not subject to dismissal upon this ground. Soles v. City of Vidalia, 92 Ga. App. 839, 90 S.E.2d 249 (1955).

Bonds filed in municipal court, payable to Governor.

- Bonds filed by defendants in municipal trial court, naming therein as obligee the Governor of Georgia and the Governor's successor in office are not legal bonds as are contemplated under provisions of this section, and failure of petitioners to give proper bond rendered the petition for certiorari void. Coleman v. Mayor of Savannah, 102 Ga. App. 664, 117 S.E.2d 186 (1960).

Filing of bond is not affirmatively established by allegations to that effect in petition. Hubert v. City of Thomasville, 18 Ga. App. 756, 90 S.E. 720 (1916).

Certificate of clerk or trial judge approving bond is not conclusive of bond's validity.

- While certificate from clerk or presiding officer of trial court that bond has been accepted and approved should be accepted as prima facie true, it is not conclusive that proper bond has been given; and if bond itself is sent up with the record and shows on the bond's face that legal bond has not been given, certiorari should be dismissed. Mantovani v. City of Atlanta, 43 Ga. App. 787, 160 S.E. 129 (1931).

In petition for certiorari from recorder's court, approval of bond by city clerk is insufficient.

- When, in petition for certiorari to superior court to correct judgment of recorder's court convicting the petitioner of violation of a city ordinance, instead of being approved by clerk of recorder's court or by recorder in absence of clerk, the supersedeas-appearance bond attached to petition was approved by the city clerk, the superior court did not err in overruling the petition for certiorari, as conditions precedent to application for certiorari, established by this section in such cases as this, are mandatory. Griffin v. City of Albany, 88 Ga. App. 229, 76 S.E.2d 436 (1953).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Signing one's own bond and depositing security in cash.

- Bond requirements do not specify posting of property bond, but only that bond should be "in amount and with security acceptable to and to be approved by the clerk"; apparently there would be no prohibition against a person signing the person's own bond and depositing required security in cash. 1963-65 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 32.

Whether a person signs the person's own bond and deposits the required security in cash addresses itself to sole discretion of clerk approving bond. 1963-65 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 32.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 14 Am. Jur. 2d, Certiorari, §§ 21 et seq., 74 et seq.

ALR.

- What costs or fees are contemplated by statute authorizing proceeding in forma pauperis, 98 A.L.R.2d 292.

CHAPTER 5 NEW TRIAL Article 1 General Provisions.
  • 5-5-1. Power of probate, superior, state, juvenile, State-wide Business, and City of Atlanta courts.
Article 2 Grounds.
  • 5-5-20. Verdict contrary to evidence and justice.
  • 5-5-21. Verdict against weight of evidence.
  • 5-5-22. Illegal admission or exclusion of evidence.
  • 5-5-23. Newly discovered evidence.
  • 5-5-24. Error in instructions; objection required in civil cases; requested instructions; review of charges involving substantial error.
  • 5-5-25. Other grounds.
Article 3 Procedure.
  • 5-5-40. Time of motion for new trial generally; amendments; extension of time for filing transcript; time of hearing; priority to cases in which death penalty imposed; appeal not limited to grounds urged; new trial on court's own motion.
  • 5-5-41. Requirements as to extraordinary motions for new trial generally; notice of filing of motion; limitations as to number of extraordinary motions in criminal cases; DNA testing.
  • 5-5-42. Form for motion for new trial.
  • 5-5-43. Allowance of filing of motion by judge other than trial judge.
  • 5-5-44. Service of rule nisi; filing and recordation of motion.
  • 5-5-45. Amendment of rule nisi.
  • 5-5-46. Operation of rule nisi as supersedeas in criminal cases; superseding of sentence.
  • 5-5-47. Right to give supersedeas bond for bailable offense upon filing of new trial motion; assessment and approval of bond.
  • 5-5-48. Time of new trial generally.
  • 5-5-49. Trial of cases returned for new trial by appellate courts.
  • 5-5-50. Standard for review by appellate court of first grant of new trial.
  • 5-5-51. Written basis for exercise of judicial discretion for new trial.
Cross references.

- Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Para. IV.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

- Propriety of limiting to issue of damages alone new trial granted on ground of inadequacy of damages awarded, 98 A.L.R. 941; 29 A.L.R.2d 1199.

Right of trial court to grant new trial as affected by appellate proceedings, 139 A.L.R. 340.

Power of trial court or judge to revoke order granting new trial in criminal case, 145 A.L.R. 400.

ARTICLE 1 GENERAL PROVISIONS


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