(Orig. Code 1863, § 3957; Code 1868, § 3977; Code 1873, § 4049; Code 1882, § 4049; Civil Code 1895, § 4634; Civil Code 1910, § 5180; Code 1933, § 19-101; Ga. L. 1986, p. 982, § 3.)
Editor's notes.- Ga. L. 1986, p. 982, § 25, not codified by the General Assembly, provided that that Act would apply to all cases filed on or after July 1, 1986.
Law reviews.- For annual survey on trial practice and procedure, see 38 Mercer L. Rev. 383 (1986). For survey of 1995 Eleventh Circuit cases on trial practice and procedure, see 47 Mercer L. Rev. 907 (1996). For annual survey of law on administrative law, see 62 Mercer L. Rev. 1 (2010). For annual survey on administrative law, see 69 Mercer L. Rev. 15 (2017). For annual survey on local government law, see 69 Mercer L. Rev. 205 (2017). For annual survey on real property, see 69 Mercer L. Rev. 251 (2017). For annual survey on zoning and land use law, see 69 Mercer L. Rev. 371 (2017). For annual survey on administrative law, see 70 Mercer L. Rev. 1 (2018).
JUDICIAL DECISIONSANALYSIS
General Consideration
Editor's notes.
- In light of the similarity of the provisions, decisions under former Code 1882, § 4157j; former Civil Code 1895, § 4149; former Civil Code 1910, § 4749; and former Code 1933, § 19-204 are included in the annotations for this Code section.
Section provides for review of decisions in exercise of judicial powers.
- Certiorari is a remedy whereby a litigant may have review of judgment or decision of inferior judicatory or a person exercising judicial powers. Richardson v. Rector, 134 Ga. App. 116, 213 S.E.2d 488 (1975).
Legislative intent.
- It was the intention of the framers of the Constitution, and of the legislature, to provide writ of certiorari to superior courts to all persons dissatisfied with judgments of inferior judicatories and who desire to have those judgments corrected by the superior court. Cochran v. City of Rockmart, 242 Ga. 732, 251 S.E.2d 259 (1978).
Right of certiorari is a constitutional right. Wrenn v. Bowden, 56 Ga. App. 713, 193 S.E. 456 (1937).
Constitutional as well as a statutory remedy. The legislature has provided by general law the manner and means for carrying out Ga. Const. 1976, Art. VI, Sec. IV, Para. V (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Para. IV). Cochran v. City of Rockmart, 242 Ga. 732, 251 S.E.2d 259 (1978).
Constitutional limitation on legislature's power to provide for superior court review.
- Only power and authority given by the Georgia Constitution to superior courts to correct errors in inferior courts, is by writ of certiorari. The legislature has no power to provide other means than those prescribed in the Georgia Constitution for correcting errors in inferior courts by superior courts. Cochran v. City of Rockmart, 242 Ga. 732, 251 S.E.2d 259 (1978).
Relationship to other laws.- Plaintiff's action seeking to set aside a reprimand from defendant city employer via writ of certiorari was remanded to state court because the cause of action was a uniquely state remedy for writ of certiorari to the state court, the resolution of which could turn on a conclusion that the conduct in question was in violation of federal law; the fact that the state court may look to federal law to determine whether to grant the relief sought by plaintiff did not confer subject matter jurisdiction on the federal court. Lockette v. City of Albany, F. Supp. 2d (M.D. Ga. Aug. 11, 2005).
Federal district court did not err in concluding that university professor's procedural due process claim was actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the district court reached the plausible conclusion that the state courts may have summarily dismissed the professor's mandamus request without considering the merits thereof; while a writ of certiorari was not available to the professor upon the state court's determination that the termination proceedings were purely administrative, the professor was still entitled to seek a writ of mandamus. Laskar v. Peterson, 771 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2014).
When errors complained of are sufficient to authorize certiorari, it should not be refused.
- When errors complained of in petition for certiorari were sufficient in law to have authorized the judge to have sanctioned certiorari under former Code 1868, §§ 3977 and 3980 (see O.C.G.A. §§ 5-4-1 and5-4-3), it was error to refuse to do so. McCardle v. Fogarty, 41 Ga. 626 (1871).
If there is specific remedy by certiorari, remedy of mandamus does not exist. Hayes v. Brown, 205 Ga. 234, 52 S.E.2d 862 (1949).
Writ of certiorari as full and adequate remedy at law.
- Writ of certiorari ordinarily furnishes a full and adequate remedy at law for correction of errors in decisions by municipal corporations, courts, or councils, rendered in exercise of judicial powers; so that even though a property right may be primarily involved in such manner as would authorize an injured party to resort to equity, the injured party is not entitled to claim such relief, when the injured party has already appeared before municipal judicatory, and that body has rendered an adverse decision. Ballard v. Mayor of Carrollton, 194 Ga. 489, 22 S.E.2d 81 (1942); Wilson v. Latham, 227 Ga. 530, 181 S.E.2d 830, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 955, 92 S. Ct. 312, 30 L. Ed. 2d 272 (1971); Wallace v. Board of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 967 F. Supp. 1287 (S.D. Ga. 1997).
Payment of fine imposed by inferior court generally precludes certiorari.
- Defendant who has paid fine imposed by police court, with alternative of imprisonment, cannot, after paying such fine, prosecute writ of error to review judgment, unless fine was paid under protest and under duress. Ellett v. City of College Park, 135 Ga. App. 269, 217 S.E.2d 374 (1975).
Writ of certiorari from justice's court lies only after final determination of case.
- Writ of certiorari does not lie from decision of justice of peace, in case pending in justice's court, until after final determination of case in which decision was made. Felker v. Freeman, 46 Ga. App. 767, 169 S.E. 247 (1933).
Judgment of justice of peace refusing to allow amendment to petition is not final determination. Felker v. Freeman, 46 Ga. App. 767, 169 S.E. 247 (1933).
Review of recorder's court decisions.
- Proper method for obtaining review of a decision of a recorder's court is either by direct appeal to the superior court, in the case of traffic violations, or by application for certiorari to the superior court. Franklin v. Recorder's Court, 174 Ga. App. 498, 330 S.E.2d 429 (1985).
The proper procedure for appealing decisions from a county recorder's court is by certiorari to the superior court. Smith v. Gwinnett County, 246 Ga. App. 865, 542 S.E.2d 616 (2000).
Review limited to record of hearing below.
- Review under O.C.G.A. § 5-4-1 is limited to matters raised in the record of the hearing below. Baxter v. Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth., 764 F. Supp. 1510 (N.D. Ga. 1991).
Certiorari available irrespective of questions or amount involved.
- After verdict has been rendered by jury in justice's court, certiorari is available to party dissatisfied, in all cases, irrespective of character of questions involved or amount in controversy. Brown & Bigelow v. Parian Paint Co., 4 Ga. App. 632, 62 S.E. 95 (1908) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 4149).
Verdict, not judgment, is reviewed on certiorari. Western & A.R.R. v. Carson, 70 Ga. 388 (1883) (decided under former Code 1882, § 4157j).
Certiorari will not lie where appeal to jury in superior court has been entered. Miller v. Hensley, 65 Ga. 556 (1880) (decided under former Ga. L. 1878-79, p. 142, § 1); Boroughs v. White & Stone, 69 Ga. 841 (1883); Neal v. Fox, 114 Ga. 164, 39 S.E. 860 (1901) (decided under former Code 1882, § 4157j);(decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 4149).
Certiorari may be refused when evidence supports verdict. Stewart v. Murray, 14 Ga. App. 438, 81 S.E. 382 (1914) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 4749).
Certiorari may be refused although preponderance of evidence may be in favor of defendant. Mitchell v. Bennett, 17 Ga. App. 657, 87 S.E. 1092 (1916) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 4749).
Answer must show that verdict was rendered. Southern Ry. v. Chestnut Mt. Merchandise Co., 1 Ga. App. 731, 58 S.E. 247 (1907) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 4149).
Answer's failure to show that verdict was rendered will result in dismissal. Manning v. Mayor of Gainesville, 125 Ga. 239, 53 S.E. 1002 (1906) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 4149).
Voluntary dismissal of request for certiorari.
- Absent any judicial determination that dismissal was required for lack of an approved bond, the petitioners were entitled to voluntarily dismiss the petitioners' first request for certiorari, filed pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 5-4-1, relying on the renewal statute codified at O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61(a), and file a second request after the 30-day limitation period expired. Buckler v. DeKalb County, 290 Ga. App. 190, 659 S.E.2d 398 (2008).
Petition subject to renewal.
- Trial court properly denied the city's motion to dismiss the landowner's renewed petition for writ of certiorari because the case was capable of renewal under O.C.G.A. § 9-2-61(a) as the trial court had properly determined that the lack of personal service as to the zoning board of appeals did not render the petition void and, thus, a bar to renewal. City of Dunwoody v. Discovery Practice Management, Inc., 338 Ga. App. 135, 789 S.E.2d 386 (2016).
Firefighter did not have right to writ of certiorari.
- Because the firefighter did not have a hearing, the firefighter was correct that the firefighter did not have a right to a writ of certiorari, O.C.G.A. § 5-4-1(a); however, pursuant to Georgia law, when no other specific legal remedy was available and a party had a clear right to have a certain act performed, a party could seek mandamus, O.C.G.A. § 9-6-20. Under Georgia law, this procedure could be used to compel a governmental body to act in compliance with the law, for instance to require a governmental board to hold a hearing as provided by law. East v. Clayton County, 436 Fed. Appx. 904 (11th Cir. 2011)(Unpublished).
Review of tenant's housing assistance by writ of certiorari.
- Because a decision of a hearing officer of a local housing authority terminating a tenant's housing assistance under Section 8 of the Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f, did not bear the third essential indicia of a quasi-judicial decision - that it be final, binding, and conclusive of the rights of the interested parties - no writ of certiorari would lie for review of the hearing officer's decision in superior court under O.C.G.A. § 5-4-1. Hous. Auth. of Augusta v. Gould, 305 Ga. 545, 826 S.E.2d 107 (2019).
Discretionary nature of judge's decision.
- Grant of writ of mandamus to the defendant was reversed because mandamus was not an allowable remedy since the opportunity for review via a writ of certiorari existed as to the municipal judge's decision as the municipal court's duty under O.C.G.A. § 36-32-6(c) as to the defendant's marijuana possession was a discretionary act allowing the opportunity for review via a writ. Schaeffer v. Kearney, 355 Ga. App. 449, 844 S.E.2d 515 (2020).
Cited in Johnston v. Brenau College-Conservatory, 146 Ga. 182, 91 S.E. 85 (1916); Daniels v. Commissioners of Pilotage, 147 Ga. 295, 93 S.E. 887 (1917); Von Schmidt v. Noland Co., 176 Ga. 784, 169 S.E. 11 (1933); McDonald v. Georgia Fed'n of Labor, 178 Ga. 313, 173 S.E. 662 (1933); Gullatt v. Slaton, 189 Ga. 758, 8 S.E.2d 47 (1940); Butler v. City of Dublin, 191 Ga. 551, 13 S.E.2d 362 (1941); City of Atlanta v. Lopert Pictures Corp., 217 Ga. 432, 122 S.E.2d 916 (1961); Murdock v. Perkins, 219 Ga. 756, 135 S.E.2d 869 (1964); Manning v. A.A.B. Corp., 223 Ga. 111, 153 S.E.2d 561 (1967); Freeman v. City of Valdosta, 119 Ga. App. 345, 167 S.E.2d 170 (1969); Sonesta Int'l Hotels Corp. v. Colony Square Co., 482 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1973); McClung v. Richardson, 232 Ga. 530, 207 S.E.2d 472 (1974); Shantha v. Municipal Court, 240 Ga. 280, 240 S.E.2d 32 (1977); Housworth v. Glisson, 485 F. Supp. 29 (N.D. Ga. 1978); Mulling v. Wilson, 245 Ga. 773, 267 S.E.2d 212 (1980); Board of Trustees v. Christy, 154 Ga. App. 488, 269 S.E.2d 33 (1980); Kariuki v. DeKalb County, 253 Ga. 713, 324 S.E.2d 450 (1985); Lee v. Hutson, 810 F.2d 1030 (11th Cir. 1987); Hunter v. City of Warner Robins, 842 F. Supp. 1460 (M.D. Ga. 1994); Focus Entm't Int'l, Inc. v. Bailey, 256 Ga. App. 283, 568 S.E.2d 183 (2002); Macon-Bibb County Planning & Zoning Comm'n v. Epic Midstream, LLC, 349 Ga. App. 568, 826 S.E.2d 403 (2019); Amazing Amusements Group, Inc. v. Wilson, 353 Ga. App. 256, 835 S.E.2d 781 (2019); Williams v. City of Douglasville, 354 Ga. App. 313, 840 S.E.2d 715 (2020).
Decisions Subject to Review by Certiorari
Availability generally.
- Writ of certiorari to the superior court is a constitutional as well as statutory remedy available when a party is dissatisfied with a decision or judgment of an inferior judicatory exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers. Flacker v. Berr-Nash Corp., 157 Ga. App. 638, 278 S.E.2d 180 (1981), overruled on other grounds, Smith v. Elder, 174 Ga. App. 316, 329 S.E.2d 511 (1985), overruled on other grounds as stated in, Norris v. Henry County, 255 Ga. App. 718, 566 S.E.2d 428 (2002).
Function of writ of certiorari is to review erroneous verdict or judgment. Gilbert v. Land Estates, Inc., 62 Ga. App. 845, 9 S.E.2d 914 (1940).
Certiorari lies to correct judgments which are irregular or erroneous. Sawyer v. City of Blakely, 2 Ga. App. 159, 58 S.E. 399 (1907); McDonald v. Farmers Supply Co., 143 Ga. 552, 85 S.E. 861 (1915).
Judgments which are wholly void.
- Certiorari does not lie as to judgments which are wholly void. Sawyer v. City of Blakely, 2 Ga. App. 159, 58 S.E. 399 (1907); McDonald v. Farmers Supply Co., 143 Ga. 552, 85 S.E. 861 (1915).
Writ of certiorari does not lie to set aside a void finding or judgment. Anderson v. Ledbetter-Johnson Contractors, 62 Ga. App. 732, 9 S.E.2d 860 (1940).
Writ of certiorari unavailable to set aside verdict or judgment which is absolutely void. City of Cedartown v. Pickett, 193 Ga. 840, 20 S.E.2d 263 (1942), criticized, Frese v. Link, 76 Ga. App. 709, 47 S.E.2d 170 (1948); Thompson v. Allen, 69 Ga. App. 638, 26 S.E.2d 490 (1943).
Entities whose decisions are reviewable.
- Writ of certiorari lies for correction of errors in decisions by municipal corporations, courts, or councils, like other inferior judicatories, when rendered in exercise of their judicial powers. City of Cedartown v. Pickett, 193 Ga. 840, 20 S.E.2d 263 (1942); 106 Forsyth Corp. v. Bishop, 362 F. Supp. 1389 (M.D. Ga. 1972), aff'd, 482 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1044, 95 S. Ct. 2660, 45 L. Ed. 2d 696 (1975).
Superior court erred in dismissing the appellant's petition for certiorari in which the appellant sought review of a hearing officer's decision upholding the public housing authority's decision to terminate the appellant's Section 8 voucher benefits as the hearing officer's decision was subject to review on certiorari because the hearing officer's decision was the result of quasi-judicial action as the appellant had the right to proper notice and a fair hearing, the appellant was afforded the opportunity to present evidence under judicial forms of procedure, and the hearing officer made a decision after determining the facts under a preponderance of the evidence standard and applying the appropriate law. Hous. Auth. of Augusta v. Gould, 305 Ga. 545, 826 S.E.2d 107 (2019).
Termination of city employee.
- City manager's decision approving the termination of a city employee was subject to review by a petition for a writ of certiorari. Salter v. City of Thomaston, 200 Ga. App. 536, 409 S.E.2d 88 (1991).
In the employee's case alleging that the employee was improperly terminated by the City of Atlanta, the city, under O.C.G.A. § 5-4-1(a), was not entitled to a writ of certiorari, reversing the decision of the City of Atlanta Civil Service Board reinstating the employee after finding that the employee had been wrongfully terminated; evidence supported the determination that the termination of the employee pursuant to the reduction in force violated a city ordinance. City of Atlanta v. Harper, 276 Ga. App. 460, 623 S.E.2d 553 (2005).
Although a trial court's decision to dismiss an action by dismissed city employees was erroneously based on the court's determination that the employees had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies from their claim that the reduction-in-force ordinance, Atlanta, Ga., Code § 114-55, was not properly followed, as they had properly appealed to the Service Board and the Board had denied their claims on appeal, the dismissal was proper for other reasons; after the Board's final decision denying the employees' appeals, they failed to properly and timely file a writ of certiorari in the trial court pursuant to O.C.G.A. §§ 5-4-1(a) and5-4-6 in order to obtain review of that decision. Jordan v. City of Atlanta, 283 Ga. App. 285, 641 S.E.2d 275 (2007).
Trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to review, pursuant to a writ of certiorari, the termination of a city employee because a city manager was not acting in a quasi-judicial capacity in permitting an employee to present evidence prior to finalizing the city manager's decision to terminate the employee; the city charter and personnel ordinance did not grant city employees a right to pretermination hearings. Goddard v. City of Albany, 285 Ga. 882, 684 S.E.2d 635 (2009).
Termination of county employee.
- Certiorari provided an adequate postdeprivation remedy for reviewing the actions of a board of county commissioners in terminating a county administrator. Board of Comm'rs v. Farmer, 228 Ga. App. 819, 493 S.E.2d 21 (1997).
Other employment actions.
- Writ of certiorari was a remedy to correct errors committed by any inferior judicatory or any person exercising judicial powers, and since the county police sergeant's hearing on the county police sergeant's demotion was a quasi-judicial hearing, and the availability of petitioning for a writ of certiorari was not otherwise limited by law, the county police sergeant was authorized to seek relief in the trial court without first pursuing a discretionary appeal to the county board of commissioners. Crumpler v. Henry County, 257 Ga. App. 615, 571 S.E.2d 822 (2002).
Denial of "line of duty" disability benefits by county school employees board was judicial in nature, and review of the decision by certiorari was required. Starnes v. Fulton County Sch. Dist., 233 Ga. App. 182, 503 S.E.2d 665 (1998).
Exercises of legislative, executive or ministerial functions.
- Writ of certiorari lies to correct errors or restrain excesses of jurisdiction of inferior courts and officers acting judicially only; the writ will, therefore, not be issued to officers whose functions and duties are ministerial, executive, or legislative and not judicial. Southeastern Greyhound Lines v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 181 Ga. 75, 181 S.E. 834, answer conformed to, 52 Ga. App. 35, 182 S.E. 204 (1935).
Certiorari is not an appropriate remedy to review or obtain relief from judgment, decision, or action of inferior judicatory or body rendered in exercise of legislative, executive, or ministerial functions. City of Cedartown v. Pickett, 193 Ga. 840, 20 S.E.2d 263 (1942); Presnell v. McCollum, 112 Ga. App. 579, 145 S.E.2d 770 (1965); 106 Forsyth Corp. v. Bishop, 362 F. Supp. 1389 (M.D. Ga. 1972), aff'd, 482 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1044, 95 S. Ct. 2660, 45 L. Ed. 2d 696 (1975).
In determining whether a writ of certiorari will lie to a decision or judgment of an inferior court, a paramount question for consideration is whether there was exercised a judicial function as distinguished from a ministerial act, for certiorari is available for correction of erroneous judgments in exercise of judicial powers, but ordinarily is not a proper remedy to correct errors relating to ministerial acts. Hayes v. Brown, 205 Ga. 234, 52 S.E.2d 862 (1949).
Review of a recorder's court decision lies in the superior court by writ of certiorari. McMillian v. City of Rockmart, 653 F.2d 907 (5th Cir. 1981).
Denial of conditional use permit was quasi-judicial.
- Because a decision denying a conditional use permit required the zoning board to determine the facts and apply the ordinance's legal standards to them, which was a decision-making process akin to a judicial act, the decision was reviewable by certiorari under O.C.G.A. § 5-4-1(a); the owner's failure to file a certiorari petition barred the owner's claims. O.C.G.A. § 36-66-3(4)(E)'s reference to "legislative" action was not determinative. Riverdale Land Group, LLC v. Clayton County, 354 Ga. App. 1, 840 S.E.2d 132 (2020).
Review by writ defined by statute.
- In an action wherein a property owner was challenging the denial of a site development permit, the grant of the county's motion to dismiss was reversed, in part, as to the owner seeking review by writ of certiorari because the scope of review by writ of certiorari was defined by statute and the statute's scope could not be enlarged by local ordinance regardless of whether the zoning ordinance provided specifically for such review. Kammerer Real Estate Holdings, LLC v. Forsyth County Bd. of Comm'rs, 302 Ga. 284, 806 S.E.2d 561 (2017).
What Is Judicial Action
1. In General
What is judicial action.
- Judicial action is an adjudication upon rights of parties who in general appear or are brought before tribunal by notice or process, and upon whose claims some decision or judgment is rendered; it implies impartiality, disinterestedness, a weighing of adverse claims, and is inconsistent with discretion on one hand - for tribunal must decide according to law and rights of parties - or with dictation on the other; for in first instance the court must exercise the court's own judgment under the law, and not act under a mandate from another power. Southeastern Greyhound Lines v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 181 Ga. 75, 181 S.E. 834, answer conformed to, 52 Ga. App. 35, 182 S.E. 204 (1935).
Character of action determinative.
- Character of action in a given case must decide whether that action is judicial, ministerial, or legislative, or whether it be simply that of a public agent of the county or state, as in its varied jurisdiction it may by turns be each. Southeastern Greyhound Lines v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 181 Ga. 75, 181 S.E. 834, answer conformed to, 52 Ga. App. 35, 182 S.E. 204 (1935).
Test in determining whether proceeding is judicial.
- In determining whether proceeding is judicial in character, question hinges not on whether parties at interest were in fact given an opportunity to be heard, but the test is whether parties at interest had a right under law to demand a trial in accordance with judicial procedures. South View Cem. Ass'n v. Hailey, 199 Ga. 478, 34 S.E.2d 863 (1945); What It Is, Inc. v. Jackson, 146 Ga. App. 574, 246 S.E.2d 693, cert. denied, 242 Ga. 204, 249 S.E.2d 614 (1978).
Effect of fact that tribunal could have acted nonjudicially.
- If a person or tribunal has right under proper delegated authority to act in judicial capacity, character of such judicial procedure, when had as prescribed, is not impaired because under the law such tribunal might have had alternative right to act ex parte without trial, but refused to exercise such right. South View Cem. Ass'n v. Hailey, 199 Ga. 478, 34 S.E.2d 863 (1945).
Fact of trial when none is authorized by statute.
- Statute giving county commissioners in certain counties power to grant or refuse permission to establish cemeteries outside limits of incorporated towns does not confer upon such commission the duties and functions of a court, so that writ of certiorari might issue from its action taken upon any such application; rather the commission's action is merely entertainment and refusal of a request pertaining to executive duties of commissioners, and fact that there is a trial, when none is authorized under statute, does not operate to change nature and character of procedure. South View Cem. Ass'n v. Hailey, 199 Ga. 478, 34 S.E.2d 863 (1945).
Exercise of discretion does not render action taken judicial.
- Fact that public agent exercises judgment or discretion in performance of duties does not make the agent's action or functions judicial. Southeastern Greyhound Lines v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 181 Ga. 75, 181 S.E. 834, answer conformed to, 52 Ga. App. 35, 182 S.E. 204 (1935).
Distinction between judicial and quasi-judicial action.
- Performance of judicial acts under authority conferred upon courts is judicial in character, while performance of judicial acts under authority conferred upon other persons, boards, or tribunals is quasi-judicial. South View Cem. Ass'n v. Hailey, 199 Ga. 478, 34 S.E.2d 863 (1945).
Basic distinction between administrative and judicial act by officers other than judges is that a quasi-judicial action, contrary to an administrative function, is one in which all parties are as a matter of right entitled to notice and to a hearing, with opportunity afforded to present evidence under judicial forms of procedure; and that no one deprived of such rights is bound by action taken. South View Cem. Ass'n v. Hailey, 199 Ga. 478, 34 S.E.2d 863 (1945).
Chief distinction between legislative and judicial function is that former sets up rights or inhibitions, usually general in character; while latter interprets, applies, and enforces existing law as related to subsequent acts of persons amenable thereto. South View Cem. Ass'n v. Hailey, 199 Ga. 478, 34 S.E.2d 863 (1945).
2. Application
Decisions of trial judge of municipal court of Atlanta.
- Certiorari to superior court lies from decisions of trial judge of municipal court of Atlanta, Fulton section, for party who wishes to complain of judgment, order, or ruling. Gavant v. Berger, 182 Ga. 277, 185 S.E. 506, answer conformed to, 53 Ga. App. 304, 185 S.E. 726 (1936); Wrenn v. Bowden, 56 Ga. App. 713, 193 S.E. 456 (1937).
Probate judge's refusal to entertain petition to commit incompetent veteran.
- Refusal of court of ordinary (now probate court) to entertain jurisdiction of petition to commit incompetent World War I veteran to a United States hospital, is not reviewable by mandamus; certiorari is the appropriate remedy by which that judgment should be reviewed. Cheek v. Eve, 182 Ga. 30, 184 S.E. 700 (1936).
Decision, after trial, by governing body that alleged acts constitute nuisance.
- Decision by governing body of municipality as to whether alleged acts constitute a nuisance in violation of city ordinance, and whether the nuisances should be abated as provided by other city ordinances, made after trial in which parties at interest participated, is a judicial determination from which certiorari lies, and not an exercise of mere legislative, executive, or ministerial functions. City of Cedartown v. Pickett, 193 Ga. 840, 20 S.E.2d 263 (1942).
Trial and conviction of police officer for conduct unbecoming an officer.
- Trial and conviction of a police officer, pursuant to city ordinance, on charges of conduct unbecoming an officer and violation of a police department rule, is a judicial proceeding from final judgment in which a writ of certiorari will lie. Heath v. City of Atlanta, 67 Ga. App. 85, 19 S.E.2d 746 (1942).
Revocation of certificate by Board for Examination, Qualification, and Registration of Architects is a judicial act and certiorari to superior court is available. Beckanstin v. Dougherty County Council of Architects, 215 Ga. 543, 111 S.E.2d 361 (1959).
City council decision denying application for liquor license.
- Restaurant owner's exclusive remedy from the city's denial of the owner's application for a liquor license was review of the city's decisions via writ of certiorari under O.C.G.A. § 5-4-1(a). The hearing on the owner's application was pursuant to notice, and the parties were provided with the opportunity to appear, to be represented by counsel, and to present evidence. Rozier v. Mayor, City of Savannah, 310 Ga. App. 178, 712 S.E.2d 596 (2011).
Hearing before a city procurement appeals hearing officer was a quasi-judicial proceeding as contemplated by O.C.G.A. § 5-4-1 because the ordinance authorizing the hearing entitled the litigants to a hearing "in accordance with judicial procedures" and because the hearing officer acted judicially, rather than administratively. Mack v. City of Atlanta, 227 Ga. App. 305, 489 S.E.2d 357 (1997).
Decision granting special use permit was quasi-judicial.
- Decision by a county board to grant a special use permit was a quasi-judicial decision because the process involved determining the facts and applying the county ordinance's legal standards to the permits, which was akin to a judicial act; the applicant therefore waived the applicant's challenge to two property owners' standing by failing to object before the board. O.C.G.A. § 36-66-3(4)(E) did not apply or compel the conclusion that the board of commissioner's decision was legislative. York v. Athens College of Ministry, Inc., 348 Ga. App. 58, 821 S.E.2d 120 (2018).
Proceedings before civil service board of county are quasi-judicial in character. Since board therefore exercises judicial powers, writ of certiorari lies for correction of errors committed by the board. Thompson v. Dunn, 102 Ga. App. 164, 115 S.E.2d 754 (1960).
Adverse decisions of city personnel boards regarding discharge.
- Discharged employees of city who are authorized to appeal their discharge to personnel board of city, are entitled to petition superior court for writ of certiorari from adverse decision of personnel board. Willis v. Jackson, 148 Ga. App. 432, 251 S.E.2d 341 (1978).
Decisions rendered by county boards of education.
- County board of education is at times a court of limited jurisdiction, and the board's decisions rendered in this sphere are judicial in nature, and are therefore reviewable by writ of certiorari. Fuller v. Williams, 150 Ga. App. 730, 258 S.E.2d 538, rev'd on other grounds, 244 Ga. 846, 262 S.E.2d 135 (1979).
Decision of state university dismissing tenured professor.
- Trial court properly dismissed a tenured professor's petition for writ of certiorari challenging the professor's dismissal from a state university because the hearing committee process resulting in the professor's dismissal was administrative, not judicial in nature; therefore, the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the matter. Laskar v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 320 Ga. App. 414, 740 S.E.2d 179 (2013).
Board of trustees of Employees' Retirement System of Georgia is not a judicial body within the meaning of this section. Cantrell v. Board of Trustees of Employees' Retirement Sys., 135 Ga. App. 445, 218 S.E.2d 97 (1975), aff'd, 237 Ga. 287, 227 S.E.2d 379 (1976).
Petition for writ of certiorari was appropriate remedy for homeowners denied building permit.
- Mandamus was not the appropriate remedy for homeowners whose building permit had been denied by a city; rather, the homeowners were required to pursue the homeowners' appeal through the filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari, pursuant to Statesboro, Ga., Zoning Ordinance § 1809 and O.C.G.A. § 5-4-1(a); moreover, the homeowners' appeal was untimely under O.C.G.A. § 5-4-6(a). City of Statesboro v. Dickens, 293 Ga. 540, 748 S.E.2d 397 (2013).
Decisions of police chief.
- Because the police officer identified no evidence that employees seeking injured on the job benefits were entitled to notice, a hearing in accordance with judicial procedure, and an opportunity to present evidence, the police chief's action constituted the discretionary exercise of executive power; consequently, the superior court correctly determined that there was no judicial or quasi-judicial action below and properly dismissed the officer's petition for writ of certiorari under O.C.G.A. § 5-4-1. Laughlin v. City of Atlanta, 265 Ga. App. 61, 592 S.E.2d 874 (2004).
County authorities' order to sheriff to take charge of room in courthouse.
- Action of county authorities in ordering sheriff to take charge of room in courthouse occupied by justice of peace was mere exercise of administrative power, and possessed no such attribute of judicial function as to permit certiorari therefrom under this section. McDonald v. Marshall, 185 Ga. 438, 195 S.E. 571 (1938).
Ruling of city council upholding the suspension of police officer was judicatory act, and certiorari would lie to review the ruling. Raughton v. Town of Fort Oglethorpe, 177 Ga. App. 171, 338 S.E.2d 754 (1985).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d.
- 5 Am. Jur. 2d, Appellate Review, § 329 et seq. 14 Am. Jur. 2d, Certiorari, § 1 et seq. 47 Am. Jur. 2d, Justices of the Peace, § 49.
C.J.S.- 14 C.J.S., Certiorari, § 6 et seq. 24 C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 2330 et seq. 51 C.J.S., Justices of the Peace, § 430 et seq.
ALR.- Right of prosecution to writ of certiorari in criminal case, 91 A.L.R.2d 1095.