Terms of Office; Vacancies; Removal by County Governing Authority

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  1. Each member of the county board of tax assessors appointed to such office on and after July 1, 1996, shall be appointed by the county governing authority for a term of not less than three nor more than six years. A county governing authority shall, by resolution, within the range provided by this subsection, select the length of terms of office for members of its county board of tax assessors. Following the adoption of such resolution, all new appointments and reappointments to the county board of tax assessors shall be for the term lengths specified in the resolution; however, such resolution shall not have the effect of shortening or extending the terms of office of current members of the board of assessors whose terms have not yet expired. The county governing authority shall not be authorized to again change the term length until the expiration of the term of office of the first appointment or reappointment following the resolution that last changed such terms of office. If the resolution changing the terms of office of members of the board of tax assessors would result in a voting majority of the board of tax assessors having their terms expire in the same calendar year, the county governing authority shall provide in the resolution for staggered initial appointments or reappointments of a duration of not less than three nor more than six years that will prevent such an occurrence. The county governing authority shall transmit to the board of assessors a copy of the resolution setting the length of terms of members of the county board of tax assessors within ten days of the date the resolution is adopted. Any member of the county board of tax assessors shall be eligible for reappointment after review of his or her service on the board by the appointing authority. Such review shall include education and certification information furnished by the commissioner. Any member of the county board of tax assessors who fails to maintain the certification and qualifications specified pursuant to Code Section 48-5-291 shall not be eligible for reappointment until all requirements have been met. In case of a vacancy on the board at any time, whether caused by death, resignation, removal, or otherwise, the vacancy shall be immediately filled by appointment of the county governing authority. Any person appointed to fill a vacancy shall be appointed only to serve for the remainder of the unexpired term of office and shall possess the same qualifications required under this part for regular appointment to a full term of office.
  2. A member of the county board of tax assessors may be removed by the county governing authority only for cause shown for the failure to perform the duties or requirements or meet the qualifications imposed upon such member by law including, but not limited to, the duties, requirements, and qualifications specified pursuant to Code Section 48-5-295.1 and subsection (e) of Code Section 48-5-262. No member of the board who is also employed by the county as a staff appraiser under Code Section 48-5-262 and no member whose removal is attempted based on this subsection may be removed by the county governing authority during such member's term of appointment until the member has been afforded an opportunity for a hearing before the judge of the superior court of the county for recommendations by the judge of the superior court to the county governing authority regarding such removal.
  3. As used in subsection (b) of this Code section, the term "failure to perform the duties" shall include a finding by the county governing authority that the member of the county board of tax assessors has shown a pattern of decisions in his or her capacity as such member that has provided substantially incorrect assessments or substantially inconsistent tax assessments between similar properties.
  4. The provisions of subsection (b) of this Code section shall be a supplemental alternative to proceedings for removal under Code Section 48-5-296; and the existence of one remedy shall not bar the other.

(Ga. L. 1913, p. 123, § 3; Code 1933, § 92-6904; Ga. L. 1972, p. 1114, § 1; Code 1933, § 91A-1433, enacted by Ga. L. 1978, p. 309, § 2; Ga. L. 1981, p. 1554, § 4; Ga. L. 1996, p. 190, § 2; Ga. L. 2000, p. 416, § 1; Ga. L. 2000, p. 1370, § 2; Ga. L. 2002, p. 1009, § 1; Ga. L. 2006, p. 819, § 4/HB 1502.)

Code Commission notes.

- The amendment of this Code section by Ga. L. 2000, p. 416, § 1, irreconcilably conflicted with and was treated as superseded by Ga. L. 2000, p. 1370, § 2. See County of Butts v. Strahan, 151 Ga. 417 (1921).

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 2000, the reference to "subsection (d) of Code Section 48-5-298" was changed to "subsection (e) of Code Section 48-5-262" in the first sentence of subsection (b) and the reference to "member that have provided" was changed to "member that has provided" in subsection (c).

Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 2002, "has provided" was substituted for "have provided" near the end of subsection (c).

Law reviews.

- For article surveying legislative and judicial developments in Georgia local government law for 1978-79, see 31 Mercer L. Rev. 155 (1979).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

- Statute is constitutional and not in violation of Ga. Const. 1945, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. III (see now Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. I). Kirton v. Biggers, 232 Ga. 223, 206 S.E.2d 33 (1974).

Constitutional notice and hearing requirements.

- Statute, providing for dismissal of tax assessors for cause shown, implies the necessity of notice and hearing so as to satisfy the constitutional requirements of due process of law. Hughes v. Russell, 148 Ga. App. 143, 251 S.E.2d 70 (1978).

After the members of a board of tax assessors were removed from office for, inter alia, failing to file tax digests by the deadline provided in O.C.G.A. § 48-5-302, the abbreviated procedure provided for the members to challenge their removal did not violate their due process rights since their defense was considered and rejected, and the members did not indicate what additional evidence, if any, the members would have presented had the members had more time to prepare. Pope v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 276 Ga. App. 121, 622 S.E.2d 471 (2005).

Phrase "for cause shown" necessarily implies that notice and hearing are required. Kirton v. Biggers, 232 Ga. 223, 206 S.E.2d 33 (1974).

Review by superior court.

- Chief tax assessor against whom discharge was sought was not entitled to a hearing before the superior court since the assessor did not request a formal hearing within the time limit set forth in the superior court's order. The court had acted in substantial compliance with the provisions of subsection (b) of O.C.G.A. § 48-5-295 since the court ordered the parties to conduct the hearing before a tribunal of commissioners who had previously voted to discharge the chief tax assessor without a hearing and provided in the court's order that the board shall state the grounds for removal, but shall not act until the appellant had an opportunity to have a hearing before this court should the appellant request one. Parsons v. Chatham County Bd. of Comm'rs, 204 Ga. App. 130, 418 S.E.2d 459 (1992), overruled in part on other grounds, Swafford v. Dade County Bd. of Comm'rs, 266 Ga. 646, 469 S.E.2d 666 (1996).

Requirements as to notice of discharge.

- When a statute provides that a public employee may not be discharged except after notice, the charges must be in terms sufficiently explicit to enable the employee to make an explanation. Mere vagaries or generalities are insufficient, and the notice must be sufficiently specific and detailed to convey to the employee the substantial nature of the charge without requiring speculation on the employee's part as to the precise complaint the employee must answer. Hughes v. Russell, 148 Ga. App. 143, 251 S.E.2d 70 (1978).

Requirement as to form of charges.

- The statement or charges must be such that the employee would have sufficient knowledge or reason to know the basis on which the employee's removal is sought. Kirton v. Biggers, 135 Ga. App. 416, 218 S.E.2d 113 (1975).

Sufficiency of charges or reasons.

- Charges or reasons given in an action to remove the county tax assessors from office must be sufficient in their nature to warrant removal. Allen v. Norris, 148 Ga. App. 261, 251 S.E.2d 145 (1978).

Service on county not required.

- When the superior court was petitioned to review a quasi-judicial decision of the county board of commissioners under O.C.G.A. § 48-5-295(b), because the plaintiff's petition for certiorari was procedurally sound, the superior court erred in dismissing the petition for lack of service on the county. Pope v. Board of Comm'rs, 248 Ga. App. 201, 546 S.E.2d 333 (2001).

Allegations of a wholly political conspiracy to remove the plaintiff as chair of a county board of tax assessors failed to state a cause of action under the federal civil rights act after the plaintiff failed to allege the deprivation of a protected property interest and showed no equal protection violation vis-a-vis anyone else similarly situated. Smith v. Turner, 764 F. Supp. 632 (N.D. Ga. 1991).

Preferential treatment resulted in discharge of assessor.

- Chief tax assessor's granting of preferential treatment to one taxpayer's property violated the long-established laws requiring tax assessors to perform the assessors' duties in good faith and to ensure that the fair market value between individual taxpayers is fairly and justly equalized and therefore justified the chief tax assessor's discharge. Parsons v. Chatham County Bd. of Comm'rs, 204 Ga. App. 130, 418 S.E.2d 459 (1992), overruled in part on other grounds, Swafford v. Dade County Bd. of Comm'rs, 266 Ga. 646, 469 S.E.2d 666 (1996).

No differentiation among duties for purposes of removal from office.

- Statute does not differentiate either between duties which are mandatory or directory, joint or several, or between failures of performance of duties which are intentional or negligent. Kirton v. Biggers, 135 Ga. App. 416, 218 S.E.2d 113 (1975).

Liability of chair of board of tax assessors.

- Board of commissioners (now county governing authority) is within the board's rights in holding the chair of the board of tax assessors accountable for the failure of statutory compliance of the whole board. Kirton v. Biggers, 135 Ga. App. 416, 218 S.E.2d 113 (1975).

Judicial review of appointing body's decisions.

- Scope and criteria of judicial review of the appointing body's decisions is closely analogous to standards for judicial review of an agency as set out in Ga. L. 1964, p. 338, § 20 (see now O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19(h)). Kirton v. Biggers, 135 Ga. App. 416, 218 S.E.2d 113 (1975).

At a hearing conducted for the discharge of the chief tax assessor, testimony regarding the assessor's intoxication and conduct while attending certain county-financed activities, the assessor's conduct regarding certain female personnel who were employed in the assessor's office, and the assessor's attempted display of a jar of dog testicles to a female employee, was relevant to establish whether the assessor had violated a duty imposed on the assessor by law, and accordingly was admissible. Parsons v. Chatham County Bd. of Comm'rs, 204 Ga. App. 130, 418 S.E.2d 459 (1992), overruled in part on other grounds, Swafford v. Dade County Bd. of Comm'rs, 266 Ga. 646, 469 S.E.2d 666 (1996).

Assessors' failure to complete the digest required by O.C.G.A. § 48-5-302 did not mandate the assessors' removal, but this breach of duty gave the commission discretion to remove the assessors. Cashin v. Hardman, 223 Ga. App. 301, 477 S.E.2d 433 (1996).

Evidence sufficient that assessors failed to complete digest.

- After the members of board of tax assessors were removed from office for, inter alia, failing to file tax digests by the deadline provided in O.C.G.A. § 48-5-302, the members' statement that it was impossible to comply with the statute and that no board of tax assessors had complied with the statute since 1988 tacitly admitted the allegation against the assessors and was sufficient evidence supporting the assessors' removal. Pope v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 276 Ga. App. 121, 622 S.E.2d 471 (2005).

Claims under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. - Eleventh Amendment barred the employees' 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against a county board of tax assessors (Board) because: (1) the Board was independent of county government, under O.C.G.A. §§ 48-5-290 and48-5-295; (2) the state controlled the Board and mandated county funding as well as employee qualifications and duties; and (3) the Board was liable for any judgment. Ballard v. Chattooga County Bd. of Tax Assessors, F.3d (11th Cir. July 7, 2015)(Unpublished).

Cited in Swafford v. Dade County Bd. of Comm'rs, 266 Ga. 646, 469 S.E.2d 666 (1996); Wheeler County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Gilder, 256 Ga. App. 478, 568 S.E.2d 786 (2002).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

C.J.S.

- 84 C.J.S., Taxation, §§ 497 et seq., 504 et seq.


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