(Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 77, § 45; Ga. L. 1943, p. 204, § 3; Code 1933, § 91A-255, enacted by Ga. L. 1978, p. 309, § 2; Ga. L. 1979, p. 5, § 15; Ga. L. 1991, p. 716, § 1; Ga. L. 2012, p. 318, § 5/HB 100; Ga. L. 2017, p. 723, § 3/HB 337.)
The 2017 amendment, effective January 1, 2018, added "or at any time after the department records a state tax execution pursuant to Code Section 48-3-42" at the end of subsection (b).
Editor's notes.- Ga. L. 2012, p. 318, § 16(b)/HB 100, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "Sections 1 through 14 of this Act shall become effective on January 1, 2013, provided that cases pending on January 1, 2013, shall continue to be governed by the law in effect on December 31, 2012, until the conclusion of the case."
Ga. L. 2017, p. 723, § 1/HB 337, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "This Act shall be known and may be cited as the 'State Tax Execution Modernization Act.'"
Law reviews.- For article discussing remedies for tax illegally assessed under the Georgia Retailers' and Consumers' Sales and Use Tax Act, Ga. L. 1951, p. 360, § 1 et seq., see 9 Ga. St. B. J. 45 (1972). For article discussing and comparing principal means by which a Georgia taxpayer may obtain judicial review of his state tax liability with emphasis on income and sales taxes, see 27 Mercer L. Rev. 309 (1975). For article on the 2012 amendment of this Code section, see 29 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 70 (2012).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Bond requirement of this statute is constitutional. Lee v. Chilivis, 234 Ga. 255, 215 S.E.2d 256 (1975).
Applicability.
- Ga. L. 1943, p. 204, § 3 (see now O.C.G.A. § 48-2-59) relates to individual assessments and tax digest revisions made by the commissioner pursuant to Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 77, § 1 et seq. (see now O.C.G.A. Ch. 2, T. 48). It is not applicable to the commissioner's denial of liquor license pursuant to Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 103, § 8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 3-2-3). Blackmon v. Alexander, 233 Ga. 832, 213 S.E.2d 842 (1975).
State could not hold out what plainly appeared to be a "clear and certain" postdeprivation remedy and then declare, only after the disputed taxes had been paid, that no such remedy existed. Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106, 115 S. Ct. 547, 130 L. Ed. 2d 454 (1994).
Extending time for appeal.
- Assessment by the commissioner pursuant to Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 77, § 39 (see now O.C.G.A. § 48-2-51) may not be cancelled or abated and a new assessment issued after the time for appeal has expired solely for the purpose of extending the time for appeal. Undercofler v. VFW Post 4625, 110 Ga. App. 711, 139 S.E.2d 776 (1964), later appeal, 112 Ga. App. 27, 143 S.E.2d 684 (1965).
Appeal procedure.
- Trial court properly dismissed a tobacco retailer's appeal of a decision of the Georgia Tax Tribunal that the retailer owed unpaid taxes as the general intention behind the creation of the Tribunal did not permit the court to ignore the plain language of O.C.G.A. § 48-11-18 concerning the designated appellate forum available to tobacco tax payers. Moosa Co. LLC v. Dep't of Revenue, 353 Ga. App. 429, 838 S.E.2d 108 (2020).
Modification of commissioner's original order.
- When the commissioner modifies original executive order in a material manner so as to be tantamount to a new determination, the modification has the effect of superseding or vacating an earlier judgment with respect to computation of time allowable for appeal under this statute. Nikas v. Oxford, 103 Ga. App. 721, 120 S.E.2d 677 (1961).
When commissioner fails to certify record to superior court within 30 days after appeal, the taxpayer should not be penalized because of the commissioner's neglect, and the taxpayer's appeal should not be dismissed. State Bd. of Equalization v. Pineland Tel. Coop., 135 Ga. App. 796, 219 S.E.2d 1 (1975).
Burden of proof on appeal.
- An assessment pursuant to Ga. L. 1960, p. 210, §§ 1, 2 (see now O.C.G.A. § 48-2-52) is deemed to be prima facie correct, and when an assessed party appeals to the superior court in order to contest the validity of the assessment, which is a de novo proceeding, one comes into court as a plaintiff and has the burden of proof, while the commissioner occupies the status of the defendant, who by transmitting the record showing the fact of assessment, has provided sufficient answer to entitle the defendant to rebut offers of proof by the plaintiff. Blackmon v. Ross, 123 Ga. App. 89, 179 S.E.2d 548 (1970).
Presumption on appeal as to validity of assessment.
- When party assessed under Ga. L. 1960, p. 210, §§ 1, 2 (see now O.C.G.A. § 48-2-52) has appealed under Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 77, § 45 (see now O.C.G.A. § 48-2-59) to contest the validity of the assessment, thereby opening the door to a de novo judicial investigation, the assessment must be regarded as prima facie correct. Hawes v. Le Craw, 121 Ga. App. 532, 174 S.E.2d 382 (1970).
Effect of judgment rendered against named commissioner after leaving office.
- Since cases arising in the administration of state revenue laws appear in the name of its successive agents, designated as commissioners, as provided by Ga. L. 1937-38, Ex. Sess., p. 77, § 8 (see now O.C.G.A. § 48-2-9), a verdict and judgment against a named commissioner in the commissioner's representative capacity, rendered after the commissioner is no longer in office, is not binding on the state. Williams v. Lawler Hosiery Mills, Inc., 212 Ga. 617, 94 S.E.2d 699 (1956).
When an appeal was taken to the superior court by the taxpayer against the commissioner, and judgment is rendered approximately nine months after that commissioner had been succeeded in office by another person, nothing having been done prior to the rendition of the judgment to substitute the name of the latter as agent of the state in lieu of the former, such judgment is a nullity, and no further proceedings can be had in the cause until the parties have been made, when the case must be tried de novo. Williams v. Lawler Hosiery Mills, Inc., 212 Ga. 617, 94 S.E.2d 699 (1956).
Res judicata on appeal or other review.
- Taxpayer has available at least three remedial procedures for use in disputing the correctness of an assessment rendered against the taxpayer by the commissioner. The taxpayer may proceed by: (1) appeal under Ga. L. 1937-38. Ex. Sess., p. 77, § 45 (see now O.C.G.A. § 48-2-59); (2) contesting the assessment and collection after issuance and levy of execution by filing affidavit of illegality under former Code 1933, § 92-7301 (see now O.C.G.A. § 48-3-1); or (3) paying taxes illegally exacted and bringing an action for refund. By following any of these procedures through adjudication on the merits, the question becomes res judicata. Undercofler v. Ernhardt, 111 Ga. App. 598, 142 S.E.2d 317 (1965); Ingalls Iron Works Co. v. Blackmon, 133 Ga. App. 164, 210 S.E.2d 377 (1974).
Right of appeal as complete and adequate remedy at law.
- Since the right of appeal provided for in this statute is a full, complete, and adequate remedy provided by law, the trial court properly dismissed the action seeking to enjoin the commissioner from holding a hearing on the revocation of a liquor license. Rozier v. Redwine, 211 Ga. 208, 85 S.E.2d 34 (1954).
Taxpayer's right to proceed in equity when no appeal taken.
- When taxpayer fails to complain of valuations or uniformity, as prescribed by law for settling such matters, and tax digest conforming with the commissioner's direction has been approved by the commissioner, and no appeal therefrom has been taken under this statute, it is not permissible for either the taxpayer or the county to attack in a court of equity either the individual assessment or the commissioner's order approving the tax digest. Grafton v. Turner, 227 Ga. 809, 183 S.E.2d 458 (1971).
Jurisdiction of federal court.
- O.C.G.A. §§ 9-4-1,9-5-1,40-2-8,40-3-6,40-3-21, and48-2-60 provided the plaintiff challenging the automobile "title transfer fee" (O.C.G.A. § 40-3-21.1) [repealed] with "plain, speedy and efficient" pre-tax and post-tax remedies by which a taxpayer might challenge the constitutional validity of a state tax, and so satisfied the criteria of the Tax Injunction Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, so as to bar jurisdiction of the federal court. Johnsen v. Collins, 875 F. Supp. 1571 (S.D. Ga. 1994).
Cited in Strickland v. W.E. Ross & Sons, 251 Ga. 324, 304 S.E.2d 719 (1983); Kariuki v. DeKalb County, 253 Ga. 713, 324 S.E.2d 450 (1985); Waldron v. Collins, 788 F.2d 736 (11th Cir. 1986).
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Appeal costs.
- Taxpayers appealing from decisions of the state revenue commissioner pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 48-2-59 need only comply with the specific requirements of that section with regard to court costs; taxpayers need not pay the advance court cost deposit set forth in O.C.G.A. §§ 9-15-4 and15-6-77. 1985 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U85-17.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d.
- 71 Am. Jur. 2d, State and Local Taxation, §§ 405 et seq. 72 Am. Jur. 2d, State and Local Taxation, §§ 617, 673, 674, 701, 702, 707.
C.J.S.- 84 C.J.S., Taxation, § 859 et seq.
ALR.
- Right of public officer or board to appeal from a judicial decision affecting his or its order or decision, 117 A.L.R. 216.
Who may complain of underassessment or nonassessment of property for taxation, 5 A.L.R.2d 576; 9 A.L.R.4th 428.
What constitutes plain, speedy, and efficient state remedy under Tax Injunction Act (28 USCS § 1341), prohibiting federal district courts from interfering with assessment, levy, or collection of state business taxes, 31 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 237.