Using Telephone Communications for Obscene, Threatening, or Harassing Purposes

1. Law
2. Georgia Code
3. Public Utilities and Public Transportation
4. Telephone Service
5. Telephone Service
6. General Provisions
7. Using Telephone Communications for Obscene, Threatening, or Harassing Purposes

1. It shall be a misdemeanor for any person, by means of telephone communication in this state, to:
   1. Make any comment, request, suggestion, or proposal which is obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent;
   2. Make a telephone call, whether or not conversation ensues, without disclosing his identity and with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass any person at the called number;
   3. Make or cause the telephone of another repeatedly or continuously to ring, with intent to harass any person at the called number; or
   4. Make repeated telephone calls, during which conversation ensues, solely to harass any person at the called number.
2. Any person who knowingly permits any telephone under his control to be used for any purpose prohibited by this Code section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.

(Ga. L. 1968, p. 9, § 1.)

Cross references.

- Further provisions regarding unlawful communications by telephone, § 16-11-39.1.

Law reviews.

- For annual survey of criminal law, see 57 Mercer L. Rev. 113 (2005).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Constitutionality.

- Former Code 1933, § 26-2610 (see now § 16-11-39.1) and Ga. L. 1968, p. 9, § 1 (see O.C.G.A. § 46-5-21), which prohibit telephone calls for the purpose of harassing, were clear and can be readily understood by people of ordinary intelligence seeking to avoid their violation, and therefore these sections were not unconstitutionally vague or broad and did not violate due process. Constantino v. State, 243 Ga. 595, 255 S.E.2d 710, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 940, 100 S. Ct. 293, 62 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1979).

Defendant's conviction for violating O.C.G.A. § 46-5-21(a)(1) was reversed as the statute was an overbroad infringement on defendant's First Amendment and Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Para. V rights to free speech; the statute does not contain the necessary language setting out the least restrictive means to further a compelling state interest as it applies to indecent or obscene speech, whether heard by children or adults, and whether not welcomed by listeners or spoken with intent to please. McKenzie v. State, 279 Ga. 265, 626 S.E.2d 77 (2005).

Evidence sufficient for conviction.

- See Moss v. State, 245 Ga. App. 811, 538 S.E.2d 876 (2000).

Cited in Tuggle v. Wilson, 158 Ga. App. 411, 280 S.E.2d 628 (1981); Tuggle v. Wilson, 248 Ga. 335, 282 S.E.2d 110 (1981); Vines v. State, 269 Ga. 438, 499 S.E.2d 630 (1998).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 74 Am. Jur. 2d, Telecommunications, §§ 194, 195.

C.J.S.

- 86 C.J.S., Telecommunications, §§ 130, 131.

ALR.

- Right of telephone or telegraph company to refuse, or discontinue, service because of use of improper language, 32 A.L.R.3d 1041.

Unsolicited mailing, distribution, house call, or telephone call as invasion of privacy, 56 A.L.R.3d 457.

Validity, construction, and application of state criminal statute forbidding use of telephone to annoy or harass, 95 A.L.R.3d 411.

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