Exemptions From Liability in Operation of 9-1-1 System

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  1. Whether participating in a state-wide emergency 9-1-1 system or an emergency 9-1-1 system serving one or more local governments, neither the state nor the authority nor any local government of the state nor any emergency 9-1-1 system provider or service supplier or its employees, directors, officers, contractors, and agents, except in cases of wanton and willful misconduct or bad faith, shall be liable for death or injury to any person or for damage to property as a result of either developing, adopting, establishing, participating in, implementing, maintaining, or carrying out duties involved in operating the emergency 9-1-1 system or in the identification of the telephone number, address, or name associated with any person accessing an emergency 9-1-1 system.
  2. No local government of the State of Georgia shall be required to release, indemnify, defend, or hold harmless any emergency 9-1-1 system provider from any loss, claim, demand, suit, or other action or any liability whatsoever which arises out of subsection (a) of this Code section, unless the local government agrees or has agreed to assume such obligations.

(Code 1981, §46-5-131, enacted by Ga. L. 1984, p. 652, § 1; Ga. L. 1990, p. 179, § 2; Ga. L. 2005, p. 660, § 9/HB 470; Ga. L. 2007, p. 318, § 2/HB 394; Ga. L. 2018, p. 689, § 2-10/HB 751.)

The 2005 amendment, effective July 1, 2005, substituted "9-1-1" for "'911'" throughout this Code section.

The 2007 amendment, effective July 1, 2007, in subsection (a), substituted "or service supplier or" for a comma near the beginning, substituted "any" for "the" near the middle, and substituted "emergency 9-1-1" for "9-1-1 emergency telephone" near the end.

The 2018 amendment, effective January 1, 2019, in subsection (a), inserted "the authority nor" near the middle and inserted "contractors," in the middle. See Editor's notes for applicability.

Cross references.

- Limitation of liability of persons rendering emergency care generally, § 51-1-29.

Editor's notes.

- Ga. L. 2018, p. 689, § 4-1(b)/HB 751, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "The provisions of this Act shall not in any manner diminish, extinguish, reduce, or affect any cause of action for audits, services, or the recovery of funds from service providers which may have existed prior to January 1, 2019. Any such cause of action is expressly preserved."

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

No waiver of defense of sovereign and official immunity.

- The General Assembly, in its enactment of the "Georgia Emergency Telephone Number '911' Service Act," O.C.G.A. § 46-5-121 et seq., has not waived defenses of sovereign and official immunity which could otherwise be asserted by the county and its employees and officers in their implementation and operation of the "911" telephone system. Hendon v. DeKalb County, 203 Ga. App. 750, 417 S.E.2d 705, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 906, 417 S.E.2d 705 (1992).

Trial court did not err in dismissing the spouse's wrongful death claim against the county based on sovereign immunity because O.C.G.A. § 46-5-131(a) did not strictly meet the criteria for the statutory wavier of sovereign immunity. Marshall v. McIntosh County, 327 Ga. App. 416, 759 S.E.2d 269 (2014).

Wanton and willful conduct defined.

- Wanton and willful conduct differs from gross negligence. Willful conduct is based on an actual intention to do harm or inflict injury, while wanton conduct is that which is so reckless or so charged with indifference to the consequences as to justify the jury in finding a wantonness equivalent in spirit to actual intent. Hendon v. DeKalb County, 203 Ga. App. 750, 417 S.E.2d 705, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 906, 417 S.E.2d 705 (1992).

Allegations sufficient to support immunity in official but not individual capacity.

- While the claim against the director of 911 emergency services in the director's official capacity was properly dismissed, as such a claim was considered a suit against the county, also subject to dismissal based on sovereign immunity, the trial court erred in dismissing the spouse's claim against the director in the director's individual capacity because the spouse sufficiently alleged a claim of wanton and willful misconduct and bad faith by the director to survive a motion to dismiss. Marshall v. McIntosh County, 327 Ga. App. 416, 759 S.E.2d 269 (2014).


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