(Code 1981, §46-4-160.2, enacted by Ga. L. 2001, p. 1084, § 4; Ga. L. 2001, p. 1206, § 4; Ga. L. 2002, p. 475, § 17.)
The 2002 amendment, effective April 25, 2002, in subsection (a), in the first sentence, inserted "reported to or", deleted "or admitted to" preceding "by the marketer" and substituted ", the marketer shall have 30 days to correct the billing error from the date said error is reported to or acknowledged by the marketer" for "and resulting", added the second and third sentences, and added "In the event the billing error results" at the beginning of the fourth sentence.
Editor's notes.- Ga. L. 2001, p. 1084, § 4, effective April 27, 2001, and Ga. L. 2001, p. 1206, § 4, effective April 28, 2001, enacted identical versions of this Code section.
Ga. L. 2002, p. 475, § 1, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "This Act shall be known and may be cited as the 'Natural Gas Consumers' Relief Act.'"
Law reviews.- For note on the 2001 enactment of O.C.G.A. § 46-4-160.2, see 18 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 273 (2001).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Construction of statute.
- Class representatives motion for reconsideration on the ground that O.C.G.A. § 46-4-160.2 barred the voluntary payment doctrine was denied because although the class representatives urged the court to adopt an expansive interpretation of the term "billing errors", contrary to the class representatives' characterization, that sort of error would not be a mistake of fact, but a difference of interpretation in what constituted a "billing error" under the statute. Although the scope of "billing errors" was arguable, differing interpretations of that term did not constitute grounds on which to vacate the order of dismissal. Robbins v. Scana Energy Mktg., F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ga. July 30, 2008).
Applicability.- Georgia Supreme Court's decisions under the Georgia Territorial Electric Service Act (GTESA), in cases involving under-billing by electricity providers, are not necessarily binding with regard to billing by other utility companies however, there is no case law suggesting that natural gas providers warrant greater protection than that afforded to electric vendors under the GTESA; with regard to electric provider under-billing cases, the Georgia Supreme Court has not limited the assertion of affirmative defenses to "innocent" electric consumers only. City of Lawrenceville v. Ricoh Elecs., Inc., 370 F. Supp. 2d 1328 (N.D. Ga. 2005).
Corporation was granted summary judgment with regard to a city's claims for additional payment for natural gas that it had provided to the corporation's manufacturing plant: (1) the city failed to present any evidence showing that it should not be bound by its account as originally billed, as the billing errors resulted from its own negligence; (2) although it was not clear that the Georgia Supreme Court's decisions under the Georgia Territorial Electric Service Act (GTESA), O.C.G.A. § 46-3-1 et seq., were necessarily applicable to cases involving non-electric utility providers, there was no case law suggesting that natural gas providers warranted greater protection than that afforded to electric vendors under the GTESA; and (3) the corporation did not have to establish that it was an "innocent consumer" in order to assert affirmative defenses in the suit. City of Lawrenceville v. Ricoh Elecs., Inc., 370 F. Supp. 2d 1328 (N.D. Ga. 2005).
Cited in Ellison v. Southstar Energy Servs., LLC, 298 Ga. App. 170, 679 S.E.2d 750 (2009).