Nothing in this article shall be construed as waiving any immunity or privilege of any kind now or hereafter enjoyed by any municipality, county, or other public body or by any member of the governing body thereof or by any supervisor, administrator, employee, or other elected or appointed officer or by any other public body, board, agency, or political subdivision of this state.
(Ga. L. 1974, p. 702, § 2; Ga. L. 1982, p. 3, § 45; Ga. L. 1987, p. 3, § 45.)
Cross references.- Liability of public agents on public contracts, § 10-6-88.
Liability of municipal corporations for acts or omissions generally, T. 36, C. 33.
Law reviews.- For article on insurance and indemnity for Georgia local government officers under Georgia law, see 13 Ga. L. Rev. 747 (1979).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Legislative intent.
- It is the intent of the Code sections comprising Article 2, O.C.G.A. § 45-9-20 et seq, with certain exceptions, to authorize a county, municipality, or other public body to purchase insurance or adopt policies to indemnify governmental employees or officers against personal liability for damages arising out of the performance of their duties, and to defend actions in which such damages are sought, in those instances in which a defense of sovereign or official immunity is unavailable. Hendon v. DeKalb County, 203 Ga. App. 750, 417 S.E.2d 705, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 906, 417 S.E.2d 705 (1992).
General rule concerning extent of public officer's immunity.
- It is the general rule that public officers, when acting in good faith and within the scope of their duty, are not liable to private action, but this immunity is not extended to them when they do things not authorized by law, or act in a wanton or malicious way and with intent to injure the property of another. Haze Edwards Elec. Co. v. Turvey, 153 Ga. App. 173, 264 S.E.2d 706 (1980).
General rule concerning county immunity.
- It is the general rule that a county when exercising governmental functions and acting as an agency of the state is not liable, in the absence of a statute imposing liability, for its failure to perform a duty or for its negligent performance of the duty, not even when the duty is imposed by statute; and there is no distinction in the application of this rule between the neglect to perform an act which ought to have been performed, and the performance of the duty in a negligent manner. Miree v. U.S., 242 Ga. 126, 249 S.E.2d 573 (1978).
Defense and indemnification fund for personnel.
- County's establishment and maintenance of the defense and indemnification fund for its personnel does not constitute a waiver of its sovereign immunity. Hendon v. DeKalb County, 203 Ga. App. 750, 417 S.E.2d 705, cert. denied, 203 Ga. App. 906, 417 S.E.2d 705 (1992).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
- Appealability, under collateral order doctrine, of order denying qualified immunity in 42 USCS § 1983 or Bivens action for damages where claim for equitable relief is also pending - post-Harlow cases, 105 A.L.R. Fed. 851.
ARTICLE 3 EMPLOYEES OPERATING STATE MOTOR VEHICLES
Cross references.
- Motor vehicle accident insurance generally, T. 33, C. 34.
Purchase and use of state motor vehicles, § 50-19-1 et seq.