Estates which may extend during the life of a person but which must terminate at his death are deemed life estates during their existence. Estates during widowhood are life estates.
(Orig. Code 1863, § 2234; Code 1868, § 2228; Code 1873, § 2254; Code 1882, § 2254; Civil Code 1895, § 3089; Civil Code 1910, § 3665; Code 1933, § 85-603.)
Law reviews.- For comment on Eller v. Wages, 220 Ga. 58, 136 S.E.2d 730 (1964), see 1 Ga. St. B.J. 557 (1965).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Life estates subject to termination under particular circumstances may be created under this statute. Mid-State Homes, Inc. v. Johnson, 218 Ga. 397, 128 S.E.2d 197 (1962) (see O.C.G.A. § 44-6-80).
Effect of termination on condition earlier than death.
- Fact that estate may terminate on condition earlier than death does not destroy the estate's character as a life estate. Martin v. Heard, 239 Ga. 816, 238 S.E.2d 899 (1977).
Estate for life or widowhood found.
- Will giving property to the wife "during lifetime or widowhood to give to our children" created an estate for life or during widowhood in the wife. Glore v. Scroggins, 124 Ga. 922, 53 S.E. 690 (1906). See also Fields v. Bush, 94 Ga. 664, 21 S.E. 827 (1894).
Deed conveyed life estate and an estate in remainder.
- Deed conveyed to a widow a fee simple estate in the property upon a decedent's death because the deed conveyed to the decedent and widow a life estate in the property as tenants in common, which terminated upon the death of either of them, and the language of the deed conveyed a fee simple estate in remainder to the surviving grantee; therefore, upon the decedent's death, the life estate of the decedent and widow in the property ended and fee simple title to the property vested in the widow. Greene v. Greene, 311 Ga. App. 132, 714 S.E.2d 650 (2011).
Trial court erred in declaring that a deed conveyed a joint tenancy to a decedent and widow because the trial court construed the deed in a manner contrary to the deed's terms, ignoring the provision granting the decedent's widow a tenancy in common for their joint lives; instead, the deed should have been construed to convey first a life estate and then an estate in remainder so as to give effect to all of the deed's provisions. Greene v. Greene, 311 Ga. App. 132, 714 S.E.2d 650 (2011).
Burial or last-illness expenses not necessarily chargeable against life estate.
- Burial expenses of a life tenant or the expenses of the tenant's last illness are not, as a matter of law, chargeable against the life estate; when the life tenancy is created by will, such expenses are not chargeable against the corpus if the will does not expressly or by clear implication so provide. Reece v. McCrary, 51 Ga. App. 746, 181 S.E. 697 (1935).
Cited in McDonald v. Suarez, 212 Ga. 360, 93 S.E.2d 16 (1956); Eller v. Wages, 220 Ga. 58, 136 S.E.2d 730 (1964).