provided, however, that the person taking the affidavit shall not be protected thereby where the affidavit alleges the county of the affiant's residence and the lien of the claimant is at such time on file in the office of the clerk of the superior court of the county and is recorded in the name of the patient as it appears in the affidavit.
(Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 105, § 4; Ga. L. 1982, p. 3, § 44; Ga. L. 2002, p. 1141, § 4; Ga. L. 2002, p. 1429, § 4; Ga. L. 2004, p. 394, § 4; Ga. L. 2006, p. 334, § 4/SB 306.)
The 2002 amendments. The first 2002 amendment, effective July 1, 2002, inserted ", nursing home, or provider of traumatic burn care medical practice" in subsection (b) and paragraph (c)(1) and substituted ", nursing home, or traumatic burn care medical practice care, treatment, or services were" for "service or treatment was" near the middle of subsection (b). The second 2002 amendment, effective July 1, 2002, in subsection (a), added "or such person, firm, or corporation's insurer" at the end of the first sentence and inserted "or such person's insurer" in the last sentence; and substituted "before or" for "within then days" near the beginning of subsection (b).
The 2004 amendment, effective July 1, 2004, inserted "physician practice," throughout this Code section.
The 2006 amendment, effective July 1, 2006, in subsection (b), deleted "physician practice," following "nursing home," near the beginning, inserted "or, with respect to a physician practice, which is made after the patient first sought treatment from the physician practice for the injuries", substituted "in accordance with Code Section 44-4-471, if such lien is perfected prior to the date of the release, covenant not to bring an action, or settlement unless consented to by the lien claimant" for "in due time as provided in subsection (a) of this Code section, regardless of whether the release, covenant not to bring an action, or settlement was made prior to the time of the filing of the lien as specified in Code Sections 44-14-470 and 44-14-471" near the middle, and substituted "procures from the injured party" for "procures therefrom" near the end.
Law reviews.- For annual survey on insurance law, see 66 Mercer L. Rev. 93 (2014). For annual survey on trial practice and procedure, see 66 Mercer L. Rev. 211 (2014).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Action filed before limitations period ran.
- Hospitals' action to recover on liens related to medical treatment was not barred by the limitations period in O.C.G.A. § 44-14-473(a) as the statute of limitations began to run on the date that the release was executed, as that was the date liability was finally determined, and the action was filed less than one year after that date. Hosp. Auth. of Clarke County v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co., 294 Ga. 477, 754 S.E.2d 358 (2014).
Section allows hospital lien on tort-feasor, not patient.
- Hospital's petition failed to allege a cause arising under the hospital lien law against the defendant patient, for the reason that O.C.G.A. § 44-14-473 gives no right of action against the patient to whom hospitalization is furnished, but only against those liable to pay the patient damages; the right created is analogous to the remedy provided by the garnishment laws. Hospital Auth. v. Boyd, 96 Ga. App. 705, 101 S.E.2d 207 (1957).
Lien not enforceable against tortfeasor's insurer.
- Hospital could not enforce its medical lien against the tortfeasor's insurer on the ground that insurer settled the injured driver's claims without the hospital's knowledge and consent, since insurer was not one against whom an action could be brought under O.C.G.A. § 44-14-473, and it was not liable for the driver's damages under the policy, by any other statute, or by agreement. Integon Indem. Corp. v. Henry Medical Ctr., Inc., 235 Ga. App. 97, 508 S.E.2d 476 (1998).
Insurer's obligation to timely pay settlement demand did not impermissibly conflict with duty to satisfy hospital's lien.
- An injured party's time-limited demand on an insurer to settle the injured party's claim for policy limits, and a hospital's assertion of a lien for the injured party's care, did not place the insurer in the position of being required to make payments in excess of policy limits because the insurer could create a "safe harbor" from liability for a bad faith refusal to settle when (1) the hospital promptly settled a case involving clear liability and special damages exceeding policy limits, and (2) the sole reason for an inability to settle was an injured party's unreasonable refusal to assure satisfaction of outstanding hospital liens. Southern Gen. Ins. Co. v. Wellstar Health Sys., 315 Ga. App. 26, 726 S.E.2d 488 (2012).
Inclusion of lien language did not invalidate settlement agreement.
- Trial court properly awarded summary judgment to plaintiffs to enforce a settlement agreement because inclusion of the statutory healthcare-provider lien affidavit release information did not constitute a counteroffer and did not alter the fact that a meeting of the minds has occurred with regard to the terms of the settlement. Sherman v. Dickey, 322 Ga. App. 228, 744 S.E.2d 408 (2013).
Parol evidence may negate words in release indicating payment on security instrument.
- Words in a release placed upon a recorded security instrument importing payment of the secured indebtedness are not a contract but constitute only prima facie evidence of payment and may be denied or explained by parol evidence. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Parsons, 155 Ga. App. 46, 270 S.E.2d 230 (1980).
Hospital's lien was invalid.
- Although contract provisions between the U.S. Department of Defense TRICARE health insurance program and a hospital allowed the filing of a hospital lien against a tortfeasor's insurer under O.C.G.A. § 44-14-470(b), the lien was invalid because other provisions of the contract negated any debt that could support it. MCG Health, Inc. v. Owners Ins. Co., 302 Ga. App. 812, 692 S.E.2d 72 (2010).
Cited in Dawson v. Hospital Auth., 98 Ga. App. 792, 106 S.E.2d 807 (1958); Valentine v. Allstate Ins. Co., 140 Ga. App. 411, 231 S.E.2d 799 (1976).