(Code 1981, §42-8-100, enacted by Ga. L. 1991, p. 1135, § 2; Ga. L. 1992, p. 3221, § 7; Ga. L. 1995, p. 396, § 2; Ga. L. 1996, p. 1107, § 2; Ga. L. 2000, p. 1554, § 2; Ga. L. 2001, p. 813, § 2; Ga. L. 2006, p. 727, § 2/SB 44; Code 1981, §42-8-101, as redesignated by Ga. L. 2015, p. 422, § 3-2/HB 310; Ga. L. 2016, p. 443, § 7-2/SB 367.)
The 2015 amendment, effective July 1, 2015, redesignated former subsections (g) and (h) of Code Section 42-8-100 as present subsections (a) and (b) of Code Section 42-8-101; and rewrote the section. See Editor's notes for applicability.
The 2016 amendment, effective July 1, 2016, rewrote this Code section.
Editor's notes.- Ga. L. 1995, p. 396, § 4, not codified by the General Assembly, provides in subsection (b): "No local funds shall be used to implement Sections 1 and 2 of this Act without the consent of the local governing authority."
Ga. L. 2015, p. 422, § 6-1/HB 310, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "This Act shall become effective July 1, 2015, and shall apply to sentences entered on or after such date."
Law reviews.- For annual survey of local government law, see 56 Mercer L. Rev. 351 (2004). For article on the 2014 amendment of this Code section, see 31 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 159 (2014). For article on the 2015 amendment of this Code section, see 32 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 231 (2015). For article on the 2016 amendment of this Code section, see 33 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 139 (2016). For note, "Safe Haven No Longer: The Role of Georgia Courts and Private Probation Companies in Sustaining a De Facto Debtors' Prison System," see 48 Ga. L. Rev. 227 (2013).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Constitutionality.
- In a suit brought by misdemeanor defendants challenging the privatization of probation services under O.C.G.A. § 42-8-100(g)(1), the Georgia Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that § 42-8-100(g)(1) was not unconstitutional on the statute's face and did not offend due process or equal protection nor condone imprisonment for debt. Sentinel Offender Svcs., LLC v. Glover, 296 Ga. 315, 766 S.E.2d 456 (2014).
Requirement for payment of probation supervision fees by probationers to private probation services company did not violate the separation of powers since the imposition of the fees pursuant to contract constituted a civil fee for services, not a criminal punishment. Furthermore, the mere act of privatizing probation services did not violate the Georgia Constitution since a probation services company was not authorized to deprive probationers of property or liberty without due process, the private probation services were not fundamentally unfair, and the sentencing court continued to oversee the probation process. Keen v. Judicial Alternatives of Ga., Inc., 124 F. Supp. 3d 1334 (S.D. Ga. 2015), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 637 Fed. Appx. 546 (11th Cir. Ga. 2015).
Collection of electronic monitoring fees by private probation service.
- Trial court erred by finding that electronic monitoring fees imposed by the sentencing court and collected by a private probation service for monitoring services rendered during a probationer's original term of sentence were prohibited because only when electronic monitoring was unlawfully imposed by the court on a misdemeanor probationer after the expiration of the probationers' original sentence would such fees potentially be recoverable. Sentinel Offender Services, LLC v. Glover, 296 Ga. 315, 766 S.E.2d 456 (2014).
Under current Georgia statutes, the tolling of a misdemeanor probationer's sentence is not permitted and courts utilizing probation systems established pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 42-8-100(g)(1) are specifically precluded from applying the provisions of the State-wide Probation Act, O.C.G.A. § 42-8-20 et seq., including those pertaining to tolling, to the defendants the courts sentence. Sentinel Offender Services, LLC v. Glover, 296 Ga. 315, 766 S.E.2d 456 (2014).
Validity of private probation services.
- Under Georgia law, a private probation company can act as a probation provider and the company's employees may serve as probation officers only if the company complies with the terms and provisions of O.C.G.A. § 42-8-100(g)(1). Sentinel Offender Services, LLC v. Glover, 296 Ga. 315, 766 S.E.2d 456 (2014).
Contract between a court and a probation services company was valid since the contract was not formally terminated and was thus automatically renewed year to year regardless of the lack of express approval by the governing authority of the county. Keen v. Judicial Alternatives of Ga., Inc., 124 F. Supp. 3d 1334 (S.D. Ga. 2015), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 637 Fed. Appx. 546 (11th Cir. Ga. 2015).
Class certification in suit challenging private probation services.
- In a suit challenging private probation services, the trial court's orders conditionally certifying class actions on behalf of misdemeanor probationers were reversed and the cases remanded to the trial court for reconsideration of the class certification issues in light of the Georgia Supreme Court's opinion and its requirement that the trial court carefully consider issues of justiciability with respect to the scope of any class certified and the relief available to potential class members. Sentinel Offender Services, LLC v. Glover, 296 Ga. 315, 766 S.E.2d 456 (2014).
Tolling of probationer's sentence prohibited.
- Georgia Supreme Court held that the private probation statutory framework did not allow for the tolling of misdemeanor probationers' sentences and to the extent Georgia courts have recognized O.C.G.A. § 42-8-36 as a basis for allowing courts utilizing probation systems established pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 42-8-100(g)(1) to toll a probationer's sentence, such analysis was in error and was disapproved. Sentinel Offender Svcs., LLC v. Glover, 296 Ga. 315, 766 S.E.2d 456 (2014).
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERALIntergovernmental agreements for probation services are legal in instances in which the contracting parties are authorized by law to provide probation services. Also, when providing probation services for a judicial circuit, a probation entity must be authorized to provide the service and must enter into separate agreements with the court of each county that composes that judicial circuit. 2012 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 12-7.