(Code 1981, §40-8-73.1, enacted by Ga. L. 1983, p. 1300, § 1; Ga. L. 1984, p. 1211, § 1; Ga. L. 1984, p. 22, § 40; Ga. L. 1985, p. 149, § 40; Ga. L. 1989, p. 896, § 1; Ga. L. 1992, p. 2785, § 27; Ga. L. 2000, p. 951, § 5B-3; Ga. L. 2005, p. 331, § 1/HB 20; Ga. L. 2005, p. 334, § 19-3/HB 501; Ga. L. 2006, p. 782, § 1/SB 570; Ga. L. 2007, p. 206, § 1/HB 79; Ga. L. 2011, p. 479, § 16/HB 112.)
Code Commission notes.- The amendment of this Code section by Ga. L. 2005, p. 331, § 1/HB 20, irreconcilably conflicted with and was treated as superseded by Ga. L. 2005, p. 334, § 19-3/HB 501. See County of Butts v. Strahan, 151 Ga. 417 (1921).
Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 2005, "Public" was substituted for "Motor Vehicle" following "The Department of" in subsection (f) (now subsection (g)).
Administrative Rules and Regulations.- Safety Glazing Material and Window Tinting Manufacturer and Installer Requirements, Official Compilation of the Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia, Department of Public Safety, Chapter 570-22.
Law reviews.- For annual survey of criminal law, see 57 Mercer L. Rev. 113 (2005).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Constitutionality.
- Appellate court's finding that O.C.G.A. § 40-8-73.1 was unconstitutional as no rational connection existed between the residence of the driver of a vehicle and the goal of improving law enforcement officer safety during traffic stops, did not warrant suppression of evidence seized during a traffic stop of the defendant's vehicle, because the investigating officer had reason to believe that the vehicle's windows were tinted darker than that permitted by the statute. Ciak v. State, 278 Ga. 27, 597 S.E.2d 392 (2004).
Basis for traffic stop.
- Trial court erred in granting the defendants' motion to suppress the drug evidence seized following a traffic stop for a violation of O.C.G.A. § 40-8-73.1 as an officer's observations of a vehicle's dark tinted windows, and belief that such violated the statute were sufficient to justify the stop; moreover, a free air search by a drug-sniffing dog did not violate the defendants' Fourth Amendment rights. State v. Simmons, 283 Ga. App. 141, 640 S.E.2d 709 (2006).
Convictions for violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 472 and 922(g) were affirmed since the district court did not err by denying the defendant's motion to suppress evidence because the vehicle stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment; a police officer had a reasonable suspicion that the defendant's vehicle violated the Georgia window tint law, O.C.G.A. § 40-8-73.1(b)(2). United States v. Moody, 240 Fed. Appx. 858 (11th Cir. 2007)(Unpublished).
When an officer decided to stop the defendant's truck, the officer knew state law prohibited excessive window tinting and that the officer could not see the driver or inside the truck, thus, the officer reasonably believed the defendant had violated O.C.G.A. § 40-8-73.1(b), thus there was no error in denying the defendant's Fourth Amendment motion to suppress in connection with the defendant's drug conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). United States v. Garcia, 284 Fed. Appx. 791 (11th Cir. 2008)(Unpublished).
Trial court's denial of a defendant's motion to suppress the evidence of drugs found in the defendant's vehicle was upheld as the trial court properly determined that the stop of the defendant's vehicle was not pretextual in that two officers observed the defendant's vehicle with tinted windows and following another vehicle too closely. Pollack v. State, 294 Ga. App. 400, 670 S.E.2d 165 (2008).
Trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress after finding that the excessive-window-tinting statute, O.C.G.A. § 40-8-73.1(b), was unconstitutional because an officer had a reasonable articulable suspicion to justify the traffic stop; the officer observed that the defendant's vehicle had darkly tinted windows and reasonably believed that to be in violation of § 40-8-73.1, and the fact that the statute was later found to be unconstitutional did not render the stop invalid. Christy v. State, 315 Ga. App. 647, 727 S.E.2d 269 (2012).
When cocaine was found during a traffic stop after a dog sniff, suppression was not warranted because the officer had probable cause to believe that the car had illegal window tint. United States v. Whitlock, F.3d (11th Cir. Oct. 19, 2012)(Unpublished).
Officer's traffic stop of the defendants' vehicle was not pretextual for purposes of their request for suppression because it was undisputed that the officer believed that the vehicle had a window tint violation which, upon testing the window, was confirmed. State v. Price, 322 Ga. App. 778, 746 S.E.2d 258 (2013).
No pretermination of whether windows were tinted before factory delivery necessary.
- Exception in O.C.G.A. § 40-8-73.1(c)(6)(D) did not require that police determine whether the windows were darkened before factory delivery or as permitted by federal law before stopping a vehicle for a window tint violation, nor did it mean that an officer's failure to do so required suppression of evidence found during a search subsequent to such a stop based on a lack of probable cause. State v. Williams, 354 Ga. App. 418, 841 S.E.2d 66 (2020).
Officer had a reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle based on a belief of a window tint violation as the officer could see the officer's reflection in the window. State v. Williams, 354 Ga. App. 418, 841 S.E.2d 66 (2020).
Cited in Williams v. State, 293 Ga. App. 842, 668 S.E.2d 825 (2008); Sommese v. State, 299 Ga. App. 664, 683 S.E.2d 642 (2009); Perry v. State, 317 Ga. App. 885, 733 S.E.2d 57 (2012).
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Fingerprintable offense.
- Offense in O.C.G.A. § 40-8-73.1, which provides that a resident who operates a motor vehicle in this state that has material applied to the windshield or front windows that restricts the amount of light entering the vehicle shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, is designated as an offense for which persons charged with a violation shall be fingerprinted. 1984 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 84-44.