Powers of Local Authorities Generally

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  1. This chapter shall not be deemed to prevent local authorities with respect to streets and highways under their jurisdiction and within the reasonable exercise of the police power from:
    1. Regulating or prohibiting stopping, standing, or parking;
    2. Regulating traffic by means of police officers or official traffic-control devices;
    3. Regulating or prohibiting processions or assemblages on the highways;
    4. Designating particular highways or roadways for use by traffic moving in one direction as authorized in Code Section 40-6-47;
    5. Establishing speed limits for vehicles in public parks, notwithstanding any provisions of law establishing a minimum speed limit for an area outside an urban or residential district;
    6. Designating any highway as a through highway or designating any intersection or junction of roadway as a stop or yield intersection or junction;
    7. Requiring the registration and inspection of bicycles, including the requirement of a registration fee;
    8. Designating any highway intersection as a "yield right of way" intersection and requiring vehicles facing a "yield right of way" sign to yield the right of way to other vehicles;
    9. Regulating or prohibiting the turning of vehicles or specified types of vehicles;
    10. Altering or establishing speed limits as authorized by law;
    11. Designating no-passing zones as authorized in Code Section 40-6-46;
    12. Prohibiting or regulating the use of controlled-access roadways by any class of vehicle or kind of traffic as authorized in Code Section 40-6-51;
    13. Prohibiting or regulating the use of heavily traveled streets by any class of vehicle or kind of traffic found to be incompatible with the normal and safe movement of traffic;
    14. Establishing minimum speed limits as authorized by law;
    15. Designating hazardous railroad grade crossings as authorized in Code Section 40-6-141;
    16. Designating and regulating traffic on play streets;
    17. Regulating persons propelling push carts;
    18. Regulating persons upon skates, coasters, sleds, and other toy vehicles;

      (18.1) Regulating the operation of electric personal assistive mobility devices, provided that such regulations are no less restrictive than those imposed by Part 2A of Article 13 of this chapter;

      (18.2) Regulating the operation of personal transportation vehicles, provided that such regulations comply with Parts 3 and 6 of Article 13 of this chapter;

    19. Adopting and enforcing such temporary or experimental regulations as may be necessary to cover emergencies or special conditions; or
    20. Adopting such other traffic regulations as are specifically authorized by this chapter.
  2. No local authority shall erect or maintain any official traffic-control device at any location so as to require the traffic on any state highway to stop before entering or crossing any intersecting highway unless approval in writing has first been obtained from the Department of Transportation of the State of Georgia. If this issue is on trial in a civil or criminal action, the proper authority shall be presumed.
  3. No ordinance or regulation enacted under paragraph (4), (5), (6), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17), (18), or (18.2) of subsection (a) of this Code section shall be effective until official traffic-control devices giving notice of such local traffic regulations are erected upon or at the entrances to the highway or the part thereof affected as may be most appropriate.

(a.1)No fine imposed by a local authority for violation of an ordinance or regulation for conduct which constitutes a violation of a provision of this chapter shall exceed any maximum fine specified by this chapter for such violation.

(Ga. L. 1955, p. 736, § 1; Ga. L. 1973, p. 98, § 1; Code 1933, § 68A-1502, enacted by Ga. L. 1974, p. 633, § 1; Ga. L. 1975, p. 1582, § 4; Ga. L. 1990, p. 2048, § 5; Ga. L. 2001, p. 770, § 3; Ga. L. 2003, p. 308, § 5; Ga. L. 2014, p. 745, § 12/HB 877.)

Cross references.

- Challenges to speed limits or traffic laws established by local governing authorities, § 40-6-9.

Law reviews.

- For note on the 2003 amendment of this Code section, see 20 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 198 (2003).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1910, §§ 1770(12), 1770(57) and Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556 are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Admissibility of chapter in civil cases.

- As Ga. L. 1974, p. 633 (see O.C.G.A. Art. 14, Ch. 6, T. 40) did not prevent local authorities with respect to streets and highways under their jurisdiction and within the reasonable exercise of the police power from regulating or prohibiting stopping, standing, or parking, in the course of duties they may by reference adopt any or all provisions of former Code 1933, Ch. 68A (see O.C.G.A. § 40-6-370 et seq.), and as a violation which was both a violation of the state traffic regulations and the city ordinance may be tried in either jurisdiction, there seems no reason why that former chapter should not be generally admissible in civil cases, with the burden on the party contending it inapplicable to prove any change effectuated by local authorities. Fabian v. Vincent, 155 Ga. App. 464, 270 S.E.2d 858 (1980).

City's ordinances prohibiting the use of amphibious vehicles as tour vehicles in parts of the city were not preempted by the state law giving the Public Service Commission the authority to issue certificates of public convenience and necessity; the ordinances fall within the constitutional exception to the doctrine of preemption since the General Assembly enacted general laws authorizing the local government to exercise its police powers and enact the local laws at issue. Old South Duck Tours, Inc. v. Mayor & Aldermen of Savannah, 272 Ga. 869, 535 S.E.2d 751 (2000).

Charge to jury based on O.C.G.A. § 40-6-371 valid. Banks v. City of Brunswick, 529 F. Supp. 695 (S.D. Ga. 1981), aff'd, 667 F.2d 97 (11th Cir. 1982).

Ordinance failing to sufficiently define prohibited activity.

- City ordinance which undertakes to make punishable the operation of an automobile upon one of the streets of the city "in a careless or reckless manner" is null and void because it fails to sufficiently define the prohibited act. Hayes v. State, 11 Ga. App. 371, 75 S.E. 523 (1912).

Regulations allowed within ordinance.

- City ordinance regulating the operation of automobiles may contain other regulations, not consistent with the laws of the state, and dealing with circumstances which are not included within it, but the city ordinance must accord with the state speeding provisions. Carter v. State, 12 Ga. App. 430, 78 S.E. 205 (1913).

State's right to regulate inadequate municipal regulations.

- State would not abdicate right to deal with speed of automobiles in populous communities, when the dangers from the operation of such machines are far greater than elsewhere, if the municipal regulations should in any respect fall short of the state law on the subject. Carter v. State, 12 Ga. App. 430, 78 S.E. 205 (1913).

Municipal ordinance with speed limit greater than allowed by state.

- Ordinance attempting to make punishable the running of automobiles in a certain manner at a rate of speed greater than ten miles per hour at corners and crossings within the limits of the municipality is void because the ordinance is in conflict with state law. Carter v. State, 12 Ga. App. 430, 78 S.E. 205 (1913).

Speeding automobile defying municipal limit.

- Driver must so operate the driver's automobile as to have the automobile's speed at all times under the driver's control, and whenever it is necessary, for the preservation of either persons or property, that the automobile should be brought to a stop, the exercise of reasonable care requires that the vehicle be stopped instantly. O'Dowd v. Newnham, 13 Ga. App. 220, 80 S.E. 36 (1913).

Proximate cause and contributory negligence fact questions.

- In view of the plaintiff's testimony as to the defendant's making a left turn in violation of a city ordinance, it was a question of fact for the trial judge to determine what was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury, and whether the negligence of the plaintiff or of the defendant caused or contributed to the plaintiff's injury. Faggart v. Rowe, 33 Ga. App. 422, 126 S.E. 731 (1925).

Uncontrolled intersection not "through street."

- When it is undisputed that a collision in question occurred at an uncontrolled intersection, there is no merit to the contention that the street was a "through street" under a city ordinance. Phillips v. Reece, 106 Ga. App. 779, 128 S.E.2d 370 (1962).

Cited in Russell v. Fletcher, 244 Ga. 854, 262 S.E.2d 138 (1979).

OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Section is not in conflict with the state Constitution.

- 1972 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 72-79.

Municipal erection of traffic control device.

- Municipality may not, by ordinance, seek to regulate streets which are a part of the state highway system, unless the municipality is attempting to erect or maintain a traffic-control device on a road which is a part of the state highway system and written approval has first been obtained from the department. 1974 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U74-94.

Use of cameras for traffic control by local government.

- Municipalities are not prohibited by Georgia's Constitution or laws from enacting ordinances regarding enforcement of traffic control devices by the use of cameras. 2000 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U00-7.

Counties may enact ordinances regarding enforcement of traffic control devices by the use of cameras. 2000 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U00-12.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, § 20 et seq.

ALR.

- Validity of statute or ordinance forbidding running of automobile so as to inflict damage or injury, 47 A.L.R. 255.

Power of municipal corporation to limit exclusive use of designated lanes or streets to buses and taxicabs, 43 A.L.R.3d 1394.


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