(18.1) Regulating the operation of electric personal assistive mobility devices, provided that such regulations are no less restrictive than those imposed by Part 2A of Article 13 of this chapter;
(18.2) Regulating the operation of personal transportation vehicles, provided that such regulations comply with Parts 3 and 6 of Article 13 of this chapter;
(a.1)No fine imposed by a local authority for violation of an ordinance or regulation for conduct which constitutes a violation of a provision of this chapter shall exceed any maximum fine specified by this chapter for such violation.
(Ga. L. 1955, p. 736, § 1; Ga. L. 1973, p. 98, § 1; Code 1933, § 68A-1502, enacted by Ga. L. 1974, p. 633, § 1; Ga. L. 1975, p. 1582, § 4; Ga. L. 1990, p. 2048, § 5; Ga. L. 2001, p. 770, § 3; Ga. L. 2003, p. 308, § 5; Ga. L. 2014, p. 745, § 12/HB 877.)
Cross references.- Challenges to speed limits or traffic laws established by local governing authorities, § 40-6-9.
Law reviews.- For note on the 2003 amendment of this Code section, see 20 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 198 (2003).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Editor's notes.
- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1910, §§ 1770(12), 1770(57) and Ga. L. 1953, Nov.-Dec. Sess., p. 556 are included in the annotations for this Code section.
Admissibility of chapter in civil cases.
- As Ga. L. 1974, p. 633 (see O.C.G.A. Art. 14, Ch. 6, T. 40) did not prevent local authorities with respect to streets and highways under their jurisdiction and within the reasonable exercise of the police power from regulating or prohibiting stopping, standing, or parking, in the course of duties they may by reference adopt any or all provisions of former Code 1933, Ch. 68A (see O.C.G.A. § 40-6-370 et seq.), and as a violation which was both a violation of the state traffic regulations and the city ordinance may be tried in either jurisdiction, there seems no reason why that former chapter should not be generally admissible in civil cases, with the burden on the party contending it inapplicable to prove any change effectuated by local authorities. Fabian v. Vincent, 155 Ga. App. 464, 270 S.E.2d 858 (1980).
City's ordinances prohibiting the use of amphibious vehicles as tour vehicles in parts of the city were not preempted by the state law giving the Public Service Commission the authority to issue certificates of public convenience and necessity; the ordinances fall within the constitutional exception to the doctrine of preemption since the General Assembly enacted general laws authorizing the local government to exercise its police powers and enact the local laws at issue. Old South Duck Tours, Inc. v. Mayor & Aldermen of Savannah, 272 Ga. 869, 535 S.E.2d 751 (2000).
Charge to jury based on O.C.G.A. § 40-6-371 valid. Banks v. City of Brunswick, 529 F. Supp. 695 (S.D. Ga. 1981), aff'd, 667 F.2d 97 (11th Cir. 1982).
Ordinance failing to sufficiently define prohibited activity.
- City ordinance which undertakes to make punishable the operation of an automobile upon one of the streets of the city "in a careless or reckless manner" is null and void because it fails to sufficiently define the prohibited act. Hayes v. State, 11 Ga. App. 371, 75 S.E. 523 (1912).
Regulations allowed within ordinance.
- City ordinance regulating the operation of automobiles may contain other regulations, not consistent with the laws of the state, and dealing with circumstances which are not included within it, but the city ordinance must accord with the state speeding provisions. Carter v. State, 12 Ga. App. 430, 78 S.E. 205 (1913).
State's right to regulate inadequate municipal regulations.
- State would not abdicate right to deal with speed of automobiles in populous communities, when the dangers from the operation of such machines are far greater than elsewhere, if the municipal regulations should in any respect fall short of the state law on the subject. Carter v. State, 12 Ga. App. 430, 78 S.E. 205 (1913).
Municipal ordinance with speed limit greater than allowed by state.
- Ordinance attempting to make punishable the running of automobiles in a certain manner at a rate of speed greater than ten miles per hour at corners and crossings within the limits of the municipality is void because the ordinance is in conflict with state law. Carter v. State, 12 Ga. App. 430, 78 S.E. 205 (1913).
Speeding automobile defying municipal limit.
- Driver must so operate the driver's automobile as to have the automobile's speed at all times under the driver's control, and whenever it is necessary, for the preservation of either persons or property, that the automobile should be brought to a stop, the exercise of reasonable care requires that the vehicle be stopped instantly. O'Dowd v. Newnham, 13 Ga. App. 220, 80 S.E. 36 (1913).
Proximate cause and contributory negligence fact questions.
- In view of the plaintiff's testimony as to the defendant's making a left turn in violation of a city ordinance, it was a question of fact for the trial judge to determine what was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury, and whether the negligence of the plaintiff or of the defendant caused or contributed to the plaintiff's injury. Faggart v. Rowe, 33 Ga. App. 422, 126 S.E. 731 (1925).
Uncontrolled intersection not "through street."
- When it is undisputed that a collision in question occurred at an uncontrolled intersection, there is no merit to the contention that the street was a "through street" under a city ordinance. Phillips v. Reece, 106 Ga. App. 779, 128 S.E.2d 370 (1962).
Cited in Russell v. Fletcher, 244 Ga. 854, 262 S.E.2d 138 (1979).
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Section is not in conflict with the state Constitution.
- 1972 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 72-79.
Municipal erection of traffic control device.- Municipality may not, by ordinance, seek to regulate streets which are a part of the state highway system, unless the municipality is attempting to erect or maintain a traffic-control device on a road which is a part of the state highway system and written approval has first been obtained from the department. 1974 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U74-94.
Use of cameras for traffic control by local government.- Municipalities are not prohibited by Georgia's Constitution or laws from enacting ordinances regarding enforcement of traffic control devices by the use of cameras. 2000 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U00-7.
Counties may enact ordinances regarding enforcement of traffic control devices by the use of cameras. 2000 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U00-12.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d.
- 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, § 20 et seq.
ALR.
- Validity of statute or ordinance forbidding running of automobile so as to inflict damage or injury, 47 A.L.R. 255.
Power of municipal corporation to limit exclusive use of designated lanes or streets to buses and taxicabs, 43 A.L.R.3d 1394.