(Code 1981, §40-5-75, enacted by Ga. L. 1990, p. 1149, § 1; Ga. L. 1990, p. 1097, § 1.5; Ga. L. 1991, p. 1767, § 1; Ga. L. 1992, p. 779, § 25; Ga. L. 1992, p. 2785, § 13; Ga. L. 1994, p. 97, § 40; Ga. L. 1994, p. 730, §§ 3-5; Ga. L. 1997, p. 143, § 40; Ga. L. 2000, p. 20, § 23; Ga. L. 2000, p. 951, § 5-39; Ga. L. 2004, p. 471, § 7; Ga. L. 2005, p. 334, § 17-16/HB 501; Ga. L. 2006, p. 449, § 11/HB 1253; Ga. L. 2007, p. 47, § 40/SB 103; Ga. L. 2007, p. 117, § 1/HB 419; Ga. L. 2009, p. 679, § 7/HB 160; Ga. L. 2010, p. 932, § 15/HB 396; Ga. L. 2011, p. 355, § 10/HB 269; Ga. L. 2013, p. 222, § 15/HB 349; Ga. L. 2013, p. 294, § 4-47/HB 242; Ga. L. 2015, p. 60, § 4-18/SB 100; Ga. L. 2016, p. 443, § 4-7/SB 367; Ga. L. 2017, p. 608, § 4/SB 176; Ga. L. 2017, p. 774, § 40/HB 323; Ga. L. 2020, p. 345, § 1/HB 799.)
The 2016 amendment, effective July 1, 2016, inserted "'three-year driving" throughout; in subsection (a), added a comma following "Code Section 40-6-391", and inserted "equivalent" in the middle of the introductory language, added the second sentence in paragraph (a)(3), and, in the ending paragraph, inserted "such" in the first sentence, substituted "three-year driving permit" for "limited driving permit" in the third sentence, and added the last sentence; in subsection (b), inserted a comma following "Code Section 40-6-391", inserted "equivalent" in the first sentence, and substituted "be governed by subsection (e) of Code Section 40-5-61" for "begin on the date of surrender of the driver's license or on the date that the department processes the conviction or citation, whichever shall first occur" in the last sentence; substituted "(1), (2), or (3)" for "(1) or (2)" near the beginning of first sentence of subsection (c); and substituted the present provisions of subsection (g) for the former provisions, which read: "Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter to the contrary, the suspension imposed pursuant to this Code section shall be in addition to and run consecutively to any other suspension imposed by the department at the time of the conviction that results in said suspension. If the person has never been issued a driver's license in the State of Georgia or holds a driver's license issued by another state, the person shall not be eligible for a driver's license for the applicable period of suspension following his or her submission of an application for issuance thereof."
The 2017 amendments. The first 2017 amendment, effective July 1, 2017, rewrote paragraph (a)(3); designated the existing provisions of paragraph (g)(1) as subparagraph (g)(1)(A); in subparagraph (g)(1)(A), substituted "Effective July 1, 2016," for "Upon July 1, 2016," at the beginning of the first sentence, in the second sentence, substituted "subparagraph" for "paragraph" near the beginning and inserted "other" near the middle; and added subparagraph (g)(1)(B). The second 2017 amendment, effective May 9, 2017, part of an Act to revise, modernize, and correct the Code, substituted "Effective July 1, 2016," for "Upon July 1, 2016," at the beginning of paragraph (g)(1).
The 2020 amendment, effective July 29, 2020, substituted "Reserved." for "Notwithstanding any other provision of this Code section or any other provision of this chapter, any person whose license is suspended pursuant to this Code section shall not be eligible for early reinstatement of his or her license and shall not be eligible for a limited driving permit, but such person's license shall be reinstated only as provided in this Code section or Code Section 40-5-76." in subsection (d).
Code Commission notes.- Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1994, in the first sentence in subsection (b), "paragraph (2), (4), or (6)" was substituted for "paragraphs (2), (4), or (6)."
Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 2016, "July 1, 2016" was substituted for "the effective date of this subsection" in paragraph (g)(1) (now subparagraph (g)(1)(A)).
Editor's notes.- Ga. L. 1990, p. 1097, § 2, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that subsection (h) applies to all adjudications on or after July 1, 1990.
Ga. L. 2013, p. 222, § 21/HB 349, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: "This Act shall become effective on July 1, 2013, and shall apply to offenses which occur on or after that date. Any offense occurring before July 1, 2013, shall be governed by the statute in effect at the time of such offense."
Ga. L. 2013, p. 294, § 5-1/HB 242, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: "This Act shall become effective on January 1, 2014, and shall apply to all offenses which occur and juvenile proceedings commenced on and after such date. Any offense occurring before January 1, 2014, shall be governed by the statute in effect at the time of such offense and shall be considered a prior adjudication for the purpose of imposing a disposition that provides for a different penalty for subsequent adjudications, of whatever class, pursuant to this Act. The enactment of this Act shall not affect any prosecutions for acts occurring before January 1, 2014, and shall not act as an abatement of any such prosecutions."
Ga. L. 2015, p. 60, § 6-1/SB 100, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "Section 4-9 of Part IV of this Act shall become effective on January 1, 2016, and all other parts of this Act shall become effective on July 1, 2015, and shall apply to offenses which occur on or after that date."
Law reviews.- For annual survey on criminal law and procedure, see 44 Mercer L. Rev. 165 (1992). For article, "Appeal and Error: Appeal or Certiorari by State in Criminal Cases," see 30 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 17 (2013). For article on the 2016 amendment of this Code section, see 33 Georgia St. U.L. Rev. 139 (2016). For note on 1990 enactment of this Code section, see 7 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 337 (1990). For note on 1991 amendment of this Code section, see 8 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 126 (1992).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Constitutionality.
- O.C.G.A. § 40-5-75 does not violate the due process or equal protection clauses of the United States or Georgia Constitutions. Quiller v. Bowman, 262 Ga. 769, 425 S.E.2d 641, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 818, 114 S. Ct. 72, 126 L. Ed. 2d 41 (1993).
Construction with O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7. - Because O.C.G.A. § 40-5-75 is a recidivist statute and not a habitual traffic offense violator statute it should be construed together with the general recidivist statute, O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7, such that multiple counts of a single indictment are deemed as a single conviction. Bowman v. Griffith, 204 Ga. App. 851, 420 S.E.2d 795 (1992).
Effect of first offender treatment.
- Defendant who is given first offender treatment has not been "convicted" within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 40-5-75 and mandatory driver's license suspension is not required. Priest v. State, 261 Ga. 651, 409 S.E.2d 657 (1991).
Three-year suspension for recidivists.
- Trial court did not err by reducing the suspension of the defendant's license to 180 days since it was undisputed that the defendant had no prior conviction of possession of a controlled substance or marijuana and therefore the three-year suspension for recidivists was inapplicable. Bowman v. Griffith, 204 Ga. App. 851, 420 S.E.2d 795 (1992).
Verification of information prior to traffic stop.
- Since, in most cases, a driver must wait a minimum of 30 days after the driver's license is suspended before applying for reinstatement and, in some cases, up to five years, a police officer was not required to verify that the information the officer received within the few weeks preceding a stop regarding the suspension of the driver's license was still accurate before making a brief stop of the car. State v. Harris, 236 Ga. App. 525, 513 S.E.2d 1 (1999).
Officers knowledge of driver's DUI as probable cause for stop.
- Assuming arguendo that the defendant's license was suspended for only 120 days, and the defendant did not have to wait to reapply for reinstatement for 180 days under O.C.G.A. §§ 40-5-63 and40-5-75, the defendant was pulled over and arrested 122 days after the suspension, which was the first business day on which the defendant could have applied for reinstatement under § 40-5-63(a)(1), and based on that timeline, it was reasonable for the officers to believe the defendant had not yet applied for reinstatement, especially in light of the fact that the officers knew the defendant had not even appeared for the DUI hearing that caused the suspension, thus, the suspended license provided a valid basis for the traffic stop. United States v. Woods, F.3d (11th Cir. July 2, 2010)(Unpublished).
Application for reinstatement.
- Letters to the department that were not on forms prescribed by the commissioner, were not accompanied by proof of completion of a risk reduction program, and were not accompanied by a restoration fee did not constitute applications for reinstatement. Department of Pub. Safety v. Schueman, 243 Ga. App. 369, 532 S.E.2d 487 (2000).
After a second conviction of violating the Georgia Controlled Substances Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-1 et seq., for an application for reinstatement to initiate the start of a new suspension, it is not required that the applicant must be eligible for reinstatement from the prior suspension. Department of Pub. Safety v. Schueman, 243 Ga. App. 369, 532 S.E.2d 487 (2000).
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Additional penalties called for in O.C.G.A. §§ 15-21-100 and 40-5-75 are to be imposed upon convictions for drug-related felonies and misdemeanors. 1990 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U90-21.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
- Validity and application of statute or regulation authorizing revocation or suspension of driver's license for reason unrelated to use of, or ability to operate, motor vehicle, 18 A.L.R.5th 542.