(c) (1) (A) Except as provided in subparagraph (C) of this paragraph, the points to be assessed for each offense shall be as provided in the following schedule:
(i) Aggressive driving ..6 points (ii) Reckless driving ..4 points (iii) Unlawful passing of a school bus ..6 points (iv) Improper passing on a hill or a curve ..4 points (v) Exceeding the speed limit by more than 14 miles per hour but less than 19 miles per hour ..2 points (vi) Exceeding the speed limit by 19 miles per hour or more but less than 24 miles per hour ..3 points (vii) Exceeding the speed limit by 24 miles per hour or more but less than 34 miles per hour ..4 points (viii) Exceeding the speed limit by 34 miles per hour or more ..6 points (ix) Disobedience of any traffic-control device or traffic officer ..3 points (x) Too fast for conditions ..0 points (xi) Possessing an open container of an alcoholic beverage while driving ..2 points (xii) Failure to adequately secure a load, except fresh farm produce, resulting in loss of such load onto the roadway which results in an accident ..2 points (xiii) Violation of child safety restraint requirements, first offense ..1 point (xiv) Violation of child safety restraint requirements, second or subsequent offense ..2 points (xv) First violation of Code Section 40-6-241 ..1 point (xvi) Second violation of Code Section 40-6-241 ..2 points (xvii) Third or subsequent violation of Code Section 40-6-241 ..3 points (xviii) All other moving traffic violations which are not speed limit violations ..3 points
The commissioner shall suspend the driver's license of any person who has accumulated a violation point count of 15 or more points in any consecutive 24 month period, as measured from the dates of previous arrests for which convictions were obtained to the date of the most current arrest for which a conviction is obtained.A second or subsequent plea of nolo contendere, within the preceding five years, as measured from the dates of previous arrests for which pleas of nolo contendere were accepted to the date of the most current arrest for which a plea of nolo contendere is accepted, to a charge of committing an offense listed in this subsection shall be considered a conviction for the purposes of this Code section.At the end of the period of suspension, the violation point count shall be reduced to zero points.
A court may order a person to attend a defensive driving course approved by the commissioner pursuant to Code Section 40-5-83 for any violation for which points are assessed against a driver's license under this subsection or may accept the attendance by a person at a driver improvement clinic approved by the commissioner pursuant to Code Section 40-5-83 after the issuance of a citation for such offense and prior to such person's appearance before the court, in which event the court shall reduce the fine assessed against such person by 20 percent, and no points shall be assessed by the department against such driver.The disposition and court order shall be reported to the department and shall be placed on the motor vehicle record with a zero point count.This plea may be accepted by the court once every five years as measured from date of arrest to date of arrest.
Any points assessed against an individual for exceeding the speed limit shall be deducted from that individual's accumulated violation point count and the uniform traffic citation issued therefor shall be removed from the individual's record if:
The points were assessed based on the use of a radar speed detection device by a county or municipality during a period of time when the commissioner has determined that such county or municipality was operating a radar speed detection device in violation of Chapter 14 of this title, relating to the use of radar speed detection devices; and
The commissioner has suspended or revoked the radar speed detection device permit of such county or municipality pursuant to Code Section 40-14-11.
Any person who has such points assessed against him as to require the suspension of his license pursuant to subsection (a) or (b) of this Code section shall have his license suspended as follows:
The periods of suspension provided for in this Code section shall begin on the date the license is surrendered to and received by the department, from the date a license is surrendered to a court under any provision of this chapter, or on the date that the department processes the citation or conviction, whichever date shall first occur. If the license cannot be surrendered to the department, the period of suspension may begin on the date set forth in a sworn affidavit setting forth the date and reasons for such impossibility, if the department shall have sufficient evidence to believe that the date set forth in such affidavit is true; in the absence of such evidence, the date of receipt of such affidavit shall be controlling.
In all cases in which the department may return a license to a driver prior to the termination of the full period of suspension, the department may require such tests of driving skill and knowledge as it determines to be proper, and the department's discretion shall be guided by the driver's past driving record and performance, and the driver shall pay the fee provided for in Code Section 40-5-84 for the return of his or her license.
(Ga. L. 1968, p. 430, §§ 1-5; Code 1933, § 68B-307, enacted by Ga. L. 1975, p. 1008, § 1; Ga. L. 1977, p. 1235, § 1; Ga. L. 1978, p. 1655, § 1; Ga. L. 1980, p. 691, § 1; Ga. L. 1982, p. 1633, §§ 1, 2; Ga. L. 1983, p. 3, § 29; Ga. L. 1985, p. 758, § 3; Code 1981, §40-5-57.1, enacted by Ga. L. 1985, p. 758, § 4; Ga. L. 1989, p. 555, § 1; Code 1981, §40-5-57, as redesignated by Ga. L. 1990, p. 2048, § 4; Ga. L. 1991, p. 1587, § 1; Ga. L. 1992, p. 1967, § 1; Ga. L. 1992, p. 2755, § 1; Ga. L. 1992, p. 2785, § 7; Ga. L. 1995, p. 917, § 3; Ga. L. 1996, p. 469, § 1; Ga. L. 1999, p. 515, § 1; Ga. L. 2000, p. 951, § 5-19; Ga. L. 2001, p. 208, § 1-2; Ga. L. 2004, p. 471, § 2; Ga. L. 2006, p. 275, § 3-12/HB 1320; Ga. L. 2010, p. 1156, § 1/HB 23; Ga. L. 2010, p. 1158, § 2/SB 360; Ga. L. 2014, p. 710, § 1-8/SB 298; Ga. L. 2018, p. 127, § 2/HB 673.)
The 2018 amendment, effective July 1, 2018, in subparagraph (c)(1)(A), added the division designations, substituted the present provisions of division (c)(1)(A)(xv) for the former provisions, which read: "Violation of usage of wireless telecommunications device requirements ... 1 point", substituted the present provisions of division (c)(1)(A)(xvi) for the former provisions, which read: "Operating a vehicle while text messaging .... 1 point"; and added division (c)(1)(A)(xvii).
Cross references.- Certain restrictions on suspension or revocation of drivers' licenses for speeding violations reported by counties and municipalities to Department of Driver Services, § 40-14-16.
Code Commission notes.- Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 1992, in subparagraph (c)(1)(C) "motor vehicle record" was substituted for "Motor Vehicle Record" and "court" was substituted for "Court".
Editor's notes.- Ga. L. 1996, p. 469, § 4, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: "This Act shall become effective July 1, 1996, and shall apply with respect to offenses committed on or after that date. The provisions of this Act shall not apply to or affect offenses committed prior to that effective date."
Ga. L. 2006, p. 275, § 1-1/HB 1320, not codified by the General Assembly, provides: "This Act shall be known and may be cited as the 'Comprehensive Litter Prevention and Abatement Act of 2006'."
Ga. L. 2006, p. 275, § 5-1/HB 1320, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that the Act shall become effective April 21, 2006 for purposes of adopting local ordinances to become effective on or after July 1, 2006.
Ga. L. 2010, p. 1156, § 4/HB 23, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that the amendment by that Act shall be applicable to offenses committed on or after July 1, 2010.
Ga. L. 2010, p. 1158, § 1/SB 360, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "This Act shall be known and may be cited as the 'Caleb Sorohan Act for Saving Lives by Preventing Texting While Driving.'"
Ga. L. 2010, p. 1158, § 6/SB 360, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that the amendment by that Act shall apply to offenses committed on or after July 1, 2010.
Ga. L. 2018, p. 127, § 1/HB 673, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "This Act shall be known and may be cited as the 'Hands-Free Georgia Act.'"
Law reviews.- For article on the effect on receiving government-issued licenses after a conviction based on a nolo contendere plea, see 13 Ga. L. Rev. 723 (1979). For article, "Motor Vehicles and Traffic," see 27 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 155 (2011). For article on the 2018 amendment of this Code section, see 35 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 139 (2018).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Editor's notes.
- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under Ga. L. 1937, p. 322 are included in the annotations for this Code section.
Constitutionality of different treatment of habitual violators.
- Because the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not deny a state the power to treat different classes of people in different ways, the General Assembly could have reasonably concluded that habitual violators are more dangerous than those who have had their licenses suspended or revoked. Thus, a defendant was not denied equal protection when the defendant was sentenced as a habitual violator under O.C.G.A. § 40-5-58(c) rather than being sentenced under O.C.G.A. § 40-5-121. Gaines v. State, 260 Ga. 267, 392 S.E.2d 524 (1990).
Bond conditions did not constitute criminal punishment for double jeopardy purposes.
- Conducting a hearing to modify the bond conditions of a third-time DUI offender and placing limitations upon the offender's driving privileges, predicated upon the necessity to protect the welfare and safety of the citizens of Georgia from a recidivist offender, was not punishment, nor was the hearing prosecution, for the purposes of double jeopardy. Strickland v. State, 300 Ga. App. 898, 686 S.E.2d 486 (2009).
Notice of suspension.
- Notice contemplated by O.C.G.A. § 40-5-60 applies to all suspensions provided for in O.C.G.A. Ch. 5, T. 40, and suspensions under O.C.G.A. § 40-5-57 fall within this class and are not excepted from the general rule. Moreover, O.C.G.A. § 40-5-57 does not allow notice of license suspension by operation of law. Thus, without proof by the state of actual or legal notice to a defendant of the defendant's license suspension, a conviction under O.C.G.A. § 40-5-121 cannot be sustained. State v. Fuller, 289 Ga. App. 283, 656 S.E.2d 902 (2008).
Administrative and criminal prosecutions not double jeopardy.
- Suspension of defendant's operator's license pursuant to administrative proceedings did not constitute former punishment foreclosing prosecution for driving under the influence in violation of double jeopardy provisions. Jackson v. State, 218 Ga. App. 677, 462 S.E.2d 802 (1995).
Conviction for driving under the influence upheld.
- Conviction in a city court of driving under the influence was sufficient to authorize revocation of the license of the driver to operate an automobile. Watson v. Department of Pub. Safety, 66 Ga. App. 633, 18 S.E.2d 789 (1942) (decided under Ga. L. 1937, p. 322).
Out-of-state violations.
- Points are assessed for out-of-state violations which would be assessed points if committed within Georgia. Williams v. Cofer, 246 Ga. 344, 271 S.E.2d 486 (1980).
Surrender of out of state license improper.
- Even if a defendant's speeding conviction were affirmed, O.C.G.A. § 40-5-51(a) provided that no points were to be assessed for any violation committed by a non-resident; accordingly, even if the conviction had been proper, the trial court erred in ordering defendant to surrender the defendant's Texas driver's license. In the Interest of R.G., 272 Ga. App. 276, 612 S.E.2d 94 (2005).
Liberal construction of statute relieving against forfeiture.
- Statute relieving against forfeiture (such as reduction of points for violations) must be construed liberally. Williams v. Cofer, 246 Ga. 344, 271 S.E.2d 486 (1980).
Effect of subsequent relieving statute.
- Forfeiture is not imposed when there is a subsequent relieving statute. Williams v. Cofer, 246 Ga. 344, 271 S.E.2d 486 (1980).
Date of conviction time for calculating points.
- Since former Code 1933, § 68B-307 required the assessment of points for convictions, the date of conviction is the rational choice as the time for the calculation of the number of points to be assessed. Cofer v. Gurley, 146 Ga. App. 420, 246 S.E.2d 436 (1978), overruled on other grounds, Williams v. Cofer, 246 Ga. 344, 271 S.E.2d 486 (1980) (see O.C.G.A. § 40-5-57).
Reasonable period of time for sending notice of suspension.
- Four months after the last adjudication of a violation was a patently reasonable period of time within which to issue a notice of suspension, and in the absence of an unreasonable delay, there is no deprivation of a constitutional right. Williams v. Cofer, 246 Ga. 344, 271 S.E.2d 486 (1980).
Classification of mandatory suspension of license.
- Mandatory suspension of license imposed under violation point system cannot be classified as criminal punishment resulting from a criminal prosecution. It is accomplished administratively by a designated public officer, and there is a complete absence of any judicial action and no attribute of a criminal case. Cofer v. Gurley, 146 Ga. App. 420, 246 S.E.2d 436 (1978), overruled on other grounds, Williams v. Cofer, 246 Ga. 344, 271 S.E.2d 486 (1980).
Period of revocation for third assessment of points.
- O.C.G.A. § 40-5-57 not only clearly contemplates that a driver's license can be suspended at least three times during a five-year period, but establishes a longer period of revocation for the third assessment of the requisite points. Bowman v. Parrot, 200 Ga. App. 405, 408 S.E.2d 115, cert. denied, Bowden v. State, 202 Ga. App. 802, 415 S.E.2d 527 (1992).
Cited in Hardison v. Shepard, 246 Ga. 196, 269 S.E.2d 458 (1980); Williams v. State, 162 Ga. App. 415, 291 S.E.2d 732 (1982); Goblet v. State, 174 Ga. App. 675, 331 S.E.2d 56 (1985); Hardison v. Booker, 179 Ga. App. 693, 347 S.E.2d 681 (1986); Cabral v. White, 181 Ga. App. 816, 354 S.E.2d 162 (1987).
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Applications for limited permits.
- Driver whose license was suspended under former Code 1933, § 68B-307 (see O.C.G.A. § 40-5-57) more than once may apply for a limited permit with respect to each suspension occurring within a ten-year (now five-year) period, provided that no more than two limited permits, excluding renewals, may be issued to one driver during this period. 1977 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 77-54.
Driver may not apply for limited permit when license was revoked under former Code 1933, § 68B-312 (see O.C.G.A. § 40-5-63). 1977 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 77-54.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d.
- 7A Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic, §§ 116 et seq., 143 et seq.
C.J.S.- 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, §§ 353 et seq., 359.
ALR.
- Validity of statute or ordinance relating to granting or revocation of license or permit to operate automobile, 108 A.L.R. 1162; 125 A.L.R. 1459.
What amounts to conviction or satisfies requirement as to showing of conviction, within statute making conviction a ground for refusing to grant or for canceling license or special privilege, 113 A.L.R. 1179.
Validity, construction, and application of statute or ordinance relating to granting or revocation of license or permit to operate automobile, 125 A.L.R. 1459.
What amounts to conviction or adjudication of guilt for purposes of refusal, revocation, or suspension of automobile driver's license, 79 A.L.R.2d 866.
Suspension or revocation of driver's license for refusal to take sobriety test, 88 A.L.R.2d 1064.
Conviction or acquittal in previous criminal case as bar to revocation or suspension of driver's license on same factual charges, 96 A.L.R.2d 612.
Statute providing for judicial review of administrative order revoking or suspending automobile driver's license as providing for trial de novo, 97 A.L.R.2d 1367.
Regulations establishing a "Point System" as regards suspension or revocation of license of operator of motor vehicle, 5 A.L.R.3d 690.
Denial, suspension, or cancellation of driver's license because of physical disease or defect, 38 A.L.R.3d 452.
Sufficiency of notice and hearing before revocation or suspension of motor vehicle driver's license, 60 A.L.R.3d 427.
Admissibility in criminal case of evidence that accused refused to take test of intoxication, 26 A.L.R.4th 1112.
Automobiles: validity and construction of legislation authorizing revocation or suspension of operator's license for "habitual," "persistent," or "frequent" violations of traffic regulations, 48 A.L.R.4th 367.
Validity and application of statute or regulation authorizing revocation or suspension of driver's license for reason unrelated to use of, or ability to operate, motor vehicle, 18 A.L.R.5th 542.