In circumstances where a motor carrier is engaged in both interstate and intrastate commerce, it shall nevertheless be subject to all the provisions of this part so far as it separately relates to commerce carried on exclusively in this state. It is not intended that the department shall have the power of regulating the interstate commerce of such motor carrier, except to the extent expressly authorized by this part as to such commerce. The provisions of this part do not apply to purely interstate commerce nor to carriers exclusively engaged in interstate commerce. When a motor carrier is engaged in both intrastate and interstate commerce, it shall be subject to all the provisions of this part so far as they separately relate to commerce carried on in this state.
(Code 1981, §40-1-126, enacted by Ga. L. 2012, p. 580, § 1/HB 865.)
Law reviews.- For annual survey on insurance law, see 69 Mercer L. Rev. 117 (2017).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Editor's notes.
- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, § 68-633 and former O.C.G.A. § 46-7-36 are included in the annotations for this Code section.
Direct action against insurers of interstate carriers allowed.- Proper interpretation of the provision in former Code 1933, § 68-612 allowing for direct actions against insurance carriers, in conjunction with former Code 1933, § 68-633, was that the statute applied to interstate carriers as well as intrastate carriers. Kimberly v. Bankers & Shippers Ins. Co., 490 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 68-633).
Direct action against carrier's insurer not authorized.
- Trial court properly denied the insurer's summary judgment motions claiming that the direct actions against it were not authorized because, although it was apparent that the plain language of O.C.G.A. § 40-1-126 evinced the legislative intent that the direct action provision of O.C.G.A. § 40-1-112(c) did not apply to purely interstate commerce or to a carrier engaged exclusively in interstate commerce, and the tractor-trailer driver and the trucking company were engaged in an interstate trip at the time of the accident, the joinder of the insurer as a defendant was authorized by the direct action provision of O.C.G.A. § 40-2-140(d)(4) as that statute indicated that injured parties were able to join the insurers of interstate motor carriers. Daily Underwriters of America v. Williams, 354 Ga. App. 551, 841 S.E.2d 135 (2020).
Cause of action for tort occurring out-of-state.
- Since, under former O.C.G.A. § 46-7-16(e), a certificate and bond or insurance was not required at all when carrier was engaged solely in interstate commerce over the public highways of Georgia, the certificate of convenience which permitted joinder of the insurer in a suit against a carrier "subject to action" in Georgia applied specifically to causes of action for a tort which occurred on public highways of other states. Johnson v. Woodard, 208 Ga. App. 41, 429 S.E.2d 701 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 46-7-36).
Cited in Record Truck Line v. Harrison, 220 Ga. 289, 138 S.E.2d 578 (1964).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d.
- 13 Am. Jur. 2d, Carriers, § 36 et seq.
C.J.S.- 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, §§ 201 et seq., 206 et seq., 226.
ALR.
- State regulation of carriers by motor vehicle as affected by interstate commerce clause, 47 A.L.R. 230; 49 A.L.R. 1203; 62 A.L.R. 52; 85 A.L.R. 1136; 109 A.L.R. 1245; 135 A.L.R. 1358.