All contracts entered into by the county governing authority with other persons in behalf of the county shall be in writing and entered on its minutes.
(Orig. Code 1863, § 465; Code 1868, § 527; Code 1873, § 493; Code 1882, § 493; Civil Code 1895, § 343; Civil Code 1910, § 386; Code 1933, § 23-1701.)
Law reviews.- For article surveying important general legal principles of municipal and county government purchasing and contracting in Georgia, see 16 Mercer L. Rev. 371 (1965). For article surveying 1979 developments in Georgia contract law, see 31 Mercer L. Rev. 27 (1979). For article surveying legislative and judicial developments in Georgia local government law for 1978-79, see 31 Mercer L. Rev. 155 (1979). For article surveying Georgia cases in the area of county contracts from June 1979 through May 1980, see 32 Mercer L. Rev. 283 (1980). For article, "Local Government Law," see 53 Mercer L. Rev. 389 (2001). For survey article on construction law for the period from June 1, 2002 through May 31, 2003, see 55 Mercer L. Rev. 85 (2003). For annual survey of local government law, see 58 Mercer L. Rev. 267 (2006). For survey article on local government law, see 59 Mercer L. Rev. 285 (2007) and 60 Mercer L. Rev. 263 (2008). For annual survey on local government law, see 65 Mercer L. Rev. 205 (2013).
JUDICIAL DECISIONSANALYSIS
General Consideration
Policy.
- This section is designed to keep the public's business open to inspection. Thus, no one can seriously contend that a party has entered into a legal contract with county officers and is entitled to the benefits of a contract, unless there has been a full compliance with the requirements of this section. Graham v. Beacham, 189 Ga. 304, 5 S.E.2d 775 (1939).
Purpose.
- Purpose and effect of this section was to furnish a defense for the county against the claim of any contractor with the county who might enter into a contract with the county without compliance with the condition imposed by this section. Ward v. State Hwy. Bd., 172 Ga. 414, 157 S.E. 328 (1931).
Not applicable to municipality.
- Requirement of O.C.G.A. § 36-10-1 is not applicable to a municipality. City of Powder Springs v. WMM Properties, Inc., 253 Ga. 753, 325 S.E.2d 155 (1985).
For construction of section as against Act creating county public school system.
- See County Bd. of Educ. v. Young, 187 Ga. 644, 1 S.E.2d 739 (1939).
Oral contracts on behalf of a county have repeatedly been held to be void. City of Warrenton v. Johnson, 235 Ga. 665, 221 S.E.2d 429 (1975).
An oral agreement is unenforceable, even though the agreement is embodied or recited in a resolution adopted by the county commissioners and entered on the minutes. Murray County v. Pickering, 42 Ga. App. 739, 157 S.E. 343 (1931).
Subsequent oral modification.
- Subsequent modification to a contract with a county may not be oral even though the contract leaves the general purpose and effect of the subject matter of the contract intact. Lester Witte & Co. v. Rabun County, 245 Ga. 382, 265 S.E.2d 4 (1980).
Requirement of entry on minutes not satisfied.
- Entry on the minutes of a county board of commissioners concerning preparation of supplemental indexes to the public records of the county does not meet the requirement of this section. Fulton County v. Holland, 71 Ga. App. 455, 31 S.E.2d 202 (1944).
Attempted delegation of contracting power illegal.
- Authorization for a county employee to purchase a dumptruck was an attempted delegation of the authority of the commission which was illegal since only the board would have the authority to make such purchase contract. Floyd v. Thomas, 211 Ga. 656, 87 S.E.2d 846 (1955).
Grounds for injunction.
- When the petition alleges that the board of commissioners illegally entered into a contract for the purchase of certain automotive equipment by authorizing a county employee to purchase a certain type dumptruck without stating from whom it was to be purchased and at what price, and prays that the defendants be restrained and enjoined from paying for the equipment purchased, it shows a good cause of action for the relief sought, and the court did not err in overruling the general demurrer (now motion to dismiss) thereto. Floyd v. Thomas, 211 Ga. 656, 87 S.E.2d 846 (1955).
Use of word "chairman" and signatures of board members.
- When contract was signed for and on behalf of county by the board's chairman, in accordance with the board's directive, it was not necessary, as urged, for the word "chairman" to follow the signature, or for all of the members of the board to sign the contract. Malcom v. Fulton County, 209 Ga. 392, 73 S.E.2d 173 (1952).
Presumption of warrants' validity.
- Contrary not being shown, it will be presumed that county warrants when issued are based upon a valid contract duly recorded as provided in this section. Thompson v. Shurling, 184 Ga. 836, 193 S.E. 880 (1937).
Cited in Douglas v. Austin-Western Rd. Mach. Co., 173 Ga. 834, 161 S.E. 811 (1931); Austin-Western Rd. Mach. Co. v. Fayette County, 99 F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1938); Rainey v. Marion County, 63 Ga. App. 35, 10 S.E.2d 258 (1940); McCloy v. Christian, 206 Ga. 590, 58 S.E.2d 171 (1950); Bulloch County v. Ritzert, 213 Ga. 818, 102 S.E.2d 40 (1958); Gwinnett County v. Archer, 102 Ga. App. 813, 118 S.E.2d 97 (1960); Polk County v. Anderson, 116 Ga. App. 546, 158 S.E.2d 315 (1967); Robinson Explosives, Inc. v. Dalon Contracting Co., 132 Ga. App. 849, 209 S.E.2d 264 (1974); DeKalb County v. Scruggs, 147 Ga. App. 711, 250 S.E.2d 159 (1978); City of Saint Marys v. Stottler Stagg & Assocs., 163 Ga. App. 45, 292 S.E.2d 868 (1982); Ogletree v. Chester, 682 F.2d 1366 (11th Cir. 1982); Ellenberg v. DeKalb County (In re Maytag Sales & Serv., Inc.), 23 Bankr. 384 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1982); Smith v. Gwinnett County, 182 Ga. App. 875, 357 S.E.2d 316 (1987); City of Atlanta v. North By Northwest Civic Ass'n, 262 Ga. 531, 422 S.E.2d 651 (1992); Faulk v. Twiggs County, 269 Ga. 809, 504 S.E.2d 668 (1998); Maner v. Chatham County, 246 Ga. App. 265, 540 S.E.2d 248 (2000); Montgomery County v. Sharpe, 261 Ga. App. 389, 582 S.E.2d 545 (2003).
Enforceability of Contracts
Mandate of this law is absolute and applicable to each and every contract made and executed on behalf of a county; and to be valid and enforceable every contract must conform to these essential requirements. Graham v. Beacham, 189 Ga. 304, 5 S.E.2d 775 (1939).
Nonconforming contracts unenforceable.
- If a contract with a county is not in writing, the contract is not enforceable. Killian v. Cherokee County, 169 Ga. 313, 150 S.E. 158 (1929).
If contracts are not in writing and not entered on the minutes, the contracts are not enforceable. Griffin v. Maddox, 181 Ga. 492, 182 S.E. 847 (1935); Malcom v. Fulton County, 209 Ga. 392, 73 S.E.2d 173 (1952); Ferguson v. Randolph County, 211 Ga. 103, 84 S.E.2d 70 (1954); Lasky v. Fulton County, 145 Ga. App. 120, 243 S.E.2d 330 (1978).
Any negotiations or oral agreements, or even written agreements that have not been entered on the minutes, fall short of being valid contracts conferring any right upon a party, and will not constitute a basis for an action against a county. Graham v. Beacham, 189 Ga. 304, 5 S.E.2d 775 (1939).
While a person has a legal right to have a written contract made with the county entered on the official minutes, if the contracts are not in writing and not entered on the proper minutes, the contracts are not enforceable. Hatcher v. Hancock County Comm'rs of Rds. & Revenues, 239 Ga. 229, 236 S.E.2d 577 (1977).
Contract with a county is not enforceable unless in writing and entered on the proper minutes. Though unenforceable, the oral lease agreement was not illegal. Overlin v. Boyd, 598 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1979).
Contracts entered into by a county were required to be written, and thus, quantum meruit was unavailable against a county; a trial court properly entered summary judgment for a board of education, a school system, a principal, and a superintendent in a former employee's quantum meruit claim against the employees for employment compensation. Harden v. Clarke County Bd. of Educ., 279 Ga. App. 513, 631 S.E.2d 741 (2006).
Negotiations are not contract.
- Mere negotiations which contemplate a written contract, followed by a vote of the governing body to accept a bid, will not constitute a contract and may later be reconsidered. Malcom v. Webb, 211 Ga. 449, 86 S.E.2d 489 (1955).
Any negotiations or oral agreements, or even written agreements that have not been entered on the minutes, fall short of being valid contracts and will not constitute a basis for an action against the county. Commercial Credit Corp. v. Mason, 151 Ga. App. 443, 260 S.E.2d 352 (1979).
Duty to pay inapplicable.
- When one party furnishes and another accepts valuable services, the law generally imposes a duty to pay, regardless of the intention of the parties, but this theory of recovery is not available when a county is the defendant. PMS Constr. Co. v. DeKalb County, 243 Ga. 870, 257 S.E.2d 285 (1979).
Effect of valid contract not entered upon minutes.
- County contract, otherwise valid, is not rendered void by not being entered of record by those whose duty it is to record the contract upon their minutes; but it is, through such failure, rendered unenforceable until the contract is recorded, and mandamus will lie to require its record. Malcom v. Fulton County, 209 Ga. 392, 73 S.E.2d 173 (1952).
Warrant to pay contract not entered on minutes' record illegal.
- When under the facts alleged, the purchase was such a contract as must be entered on the minutes of the commissioners, and was not so entered, the issuance of the warrant to pay off the purchase price of the material was illegal, and the court was not authorized to issue a mandamus absolute, under which the commissioners are required to raise by taxation the specified amount annually as will finally pay the claim. Douglas v. Austin-Western Rd. Mach. Co., 173 Ga. 386, 160 S.E. 409 (1931).
County can be directed to spread a written contract it has entered into on its minutes through a writ of mandamus. Lester Witte & Co. v. Rabun County, 245 Ga. 382, 265 S.E.2d 4 (1980).
No rescission after failure of duty to record.
- County commissioners cannot make a contract in behalf of the county, fail to record the contract in discharge of their official duty, and then rescind the contract because the contract is not recorded. Malcom v. Fulton County, 209 Ga. 392, 73 S.E.2d 173 (1952).
Sovereign immunity barred contract claim.
- Claim for breach of contract brought by a homeowner against a county after a sewer line flooded part of the owner's home was barred by sovereign immunity since there was no written contract. Merk v. DeKalb County, 226 Ga. App. 191, 486 S.E.2d 66 (1997).
Contract of sale of timber was not void merely because the contract was not read in full by the county attorney when the attorney presented the contract to the county commissioners for consideration and action, and because the contract was not read by the county commissioners themselves before being acted upon. Malcom v. Fulton County, 209 Ga. 392, 73 S.E.2d 173 (1952).
Ultra vires contract not enforceable under quantum meruit theory of recovery.
- Appellate court erred by holding that an environmental engineering company could recover against a city on the company's quantum meruit claim because quantum meruit was not an available remedy against the city since the claim was based on a municipal contract that was ultra vires as the contract was never approved by city council. City of Baldwin v. Woodard & Curran, Inc., 293 Ga. 19, 743 S.E.2d 381 (2013).
Entry upon Minutes
Duty to enter contracts upon minutes.
- Law imposes a duty upon those officers who govern the county's affairs to enter the contracts the officers make in behalf of the county upon the officers' minutes, and the continued neglect on the officer's part to discharge an official duty does not cause the duty to terminate. Malcom v. Fulton County, 209 Ga. 392, 73 S.E.2d 173 (1952).
Mandamus as remedy.
- If the proper county authorities refuse to make the entry, mandamus will lie to compel the authorities to do so, upon the application of a person authorized to institute the proceeding. Jones v. Bank of Cumming, 131 Ga. 614, 63 S.E. 36 (1908); Wagener v. Forsyth County, 135 Ga. 162, 68 S.E. 1115 (1910); King v. Casey, 164 Ga. 117, 137 S.E. 776 (1927).
When a person has a written contract with a county, the person has the legal right to have the contract entered on the minutes of proper authorities and if the proper county authorities fail or refuse to enter such contract, the judge of the superior court should by mandamus compel the authorities to so enter the contract. In a proceeding for mandamus to compel the performance of such duty, the court will not inquire into the validity of the contract further than to see that on the contract's face the contract is prima facie valid. Douglas v. Austin-Western Rd. Mach. Co., 173 Ga. 834, 161 S.E. 811 (1931).
Mandamus will lie to compel a commissioner or the commissioner's successor in office to record a contract, unless the applicant for such relief has with respect thereto been guilty of gross laches, or has permitted an unreasonable period of time to lapse before applying to the proper court therefor. Southern Airways Co. v. Williams, 213 Ga. 38, 96 S.E.2d 889 (1957).
Mandamus available only if contract valid.
- The contract must be prima-facie legal to obtain mandamus. Weathers v. Easterling, 153 Ga. 601, 113 S.E. 152 (1922); Board of Comm'rs v. MacDougald Constr. Co., 157 Ga. 595, 122 S.E. 317 (1924).
Mandamus against successors in office.
- When the successors in office of the commissioners fail and refuse to enter the contract upon the commissioners' minutes, the commissioners may be compelled by mandamus to do so. Weathers v. Easterling, 153 Ga. 601, 113 S.E. 152 (1922).
Person who has made a valid written contract with the county authorities has a legal right, though a nonresident of the state, to have the contract entered on such minutes. If the county authorities refuse to make the entry, the judge of the superior court should by mandamus compel the county authorities to do so. Milburn v. Commissioners of Glynn County, 112 Ga. 160, 37 S.E. 178 (1900).
Who may apply for mandamus.
- When a contractor in the progress of work procured loans from a bank for the purpose of completing the loan, and gave written orders to the bank authorizing the bank to receive the remaining warrants issued under the contract, the bank had such a special interest as authorized the bank to proceed by mandamus to compel the ordinary (now judge of the probate court) to enter the building contract on the minutes. Jones v. Bank of Cumming, 131 Ga. 614, 63 S.E. 36 (1908).
Curative effect of mandamus.
- Entry after the completion of the work, in compliance with a judgment in mandamus proceedings instituted to compel the entry of the contract on the minutes, cures the defect resulting from a failure to enter the contract on the minutes before the work was begun or completed. Wagener v. Forsyth County, 135 Ga. 162, 68 S.E. 1115 (1910).
No time limit for entering on minutes.
- This section does not state when the contract must be entered on the minutes of the ordinary (now judge of the probate court) or county commission, nor does the statute say that the contract cannot be reduced to writing or signed by the parties at a date after the contract is made. Burke v. Wheeler County, 54 Ga. App. 81, 187 S.E. 246 (1936).
Statute fixes no limit of time during which a county contract may be entered of record. Malcom v. Fulton County, 209 Ga. 392, 73 S.E.2d 173 (1952).
Sufficiency of entry.
- All the material terms of a contract entered into in behalf of a county by the county authorities having jurisdiction over county matters must be in writing and entered on their minutes. Spalding County v. Chamberlin & Co., 130 Ga. 649, 61 S.E. 533 (1908).
When the record shows that the contract was entered upon the minutes of the board of commissioners, but that certain specifications were omitted, it was legal for the judge to order the entry of the contract on the minutes. King v. Casey, 164 Ga. 117, 137 S.E. 776 (1927).
Specific contract must be entered.
- Although the superintendent of public works had general written authority, duly entered upon the minutes, of the board of commissioners of roads and revenues to employ men, if the specific contract with the plaintiff was not in writing and had never been entered upon the minutes of the board, the plaintiff cannot recover. Garner v. Floyd County, 24 Ga. App. 693, 101 S.E. 918 (1920).
Simple memorandum on minutes of county commissioners that designated person was elected county physician will not authorize suit against county. Laurens County v. Thomas, 6 Ga. App. 568, 65 S.E. 302 (1909).
Signature of the chair of the board of commissioners is sufficient if authorized. Pilcher v. English, 133 Ga. 496, 66 S.E. 163 (1909).
Types of Contracts
When fiscal affairs governed by commissioners.
- When a board of commissioners, or a board consisting of a single commissioner, has been created to take the place of the ordinary (now judge of the probate court) in the management of certain county affairs, this section applies. Wood v. Puritan Chem. Co., 178 Ga. 229, 172 S.E. 557 (1934).
When the fiscal affairs of a county have been placed in the hands of commissioners, this section is applicable to contracts made in behalf of the county by the commissioners. Graham v. Beacham, 189 Ga. 304, 5 S.E.2d 775 (1939).
Statute is applicable to contracts made in behalf of the county by commissioners. Malcom v. Webb, 211 Ga. 449, 86 S.E.2d 489 (1955).
When the fiscal affairs of a county have been placed in the hands of commissioners, this law is applicable to contracts made in behalf of the county by the commissioners. Commercial Credit Corp. v. Mason, 151 Ga. App. 443, 260 S.E.2d 352 (1979).
Assignment not within section.
- Assignment by a county of claims to a certain bonus was held not to be such a contract as is contemplated by this section. Brown v. Rutledge & Summerour, 20 Ga. App. 118, 92 S.E. 774 (1917).
Creation of relation of principal and agent between a city and a county by which the former authorizes the latter to contract in behalf of the city for the paving of the city's streets, which are to constitute links in an interconnecting county seat highway which the State Highway Department (now Department of Transportation) and the county propose to construct, is not such a contract as is required to be in writing and spread upon the minutes of the board of county commissioners of such county. Faver v. Mayor of Washington, 159 Ga. 568, 126 S.E. 464 (1925).
Effect on tax levy.
- It is not essential to the validity of a tax levy for specified purposes that contracts for effectuating such purposes should have been previously made and entered on the minutes. Blalock v. Adams, 154 Ga. 326, 114 S.E. 345 (1922).
Applicability to board of education.
- This section does not apply to a county board of education. Wilson v. Strange, 235 Ga. 156, 219 S.E.2d 88 (1975).
Contract by county board of education with a person for the transportation of pupils to and from a public school is not one which is required by this section to be in writing and spread upon its minutes. Board of Educ. v. Hunt, 159 Ga. 749, 126 S.E. 789 (1925).
Applicability to salaries of county officials.
- This section refers only to contracts, and the payment of salaries of county officials and employees is not contractual within the statute's provisions. First Nat'l Bank v. Mann, 211 Ga. 706, 88 S.E.2d 361 (1955).
While this section provides that all contracts entered into by the governing authority with other persons in behalf of the county shall be in writing and entered on the minutes, the payment of salaries of county officials and employees is not contractual within the statute's provisions. Deason v. DeKalb County, 222 Ga. 63, 148 S.E.2d 414 (1966).
In a dispute between a county and a county state court judge over a supplement to the judge's salary, summary judgment for the judge was proper on the county's claim for reimbursement of the judge's salary supplement because the county failed to show that the supplement was paid with the total absence or want of power. Even if the supplement was paid in violation of the Open Meetings Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-14-1 et seq., the county's counterclaim was filed well outside the 90-day limitation period in O.C.G.A. § 50-14-1(b)(2). Heiskell v. Roberts, 342 Ga. App. 109, 802 S.E.2d 385 (2017).
No waiver of sovereign immunity without written contract.
- Developer failed to meet the developer's burden of showing waiver of sovereign immunity because even if the parties' conduct after the expiration of the contract could be found to demonstrate that the developer was to continue to perform under the original contract, as a matter of law, neither that conduct nor the internal documents created by state agency after the contract expired established a written contract to do so and without a written contract, the state's sovereign immunity was not waived. Georgia Department of Labor v. RTT Associates, Inc., 299 Ga. 78, 786 S.E.2d 840 (2016).
County attorney.
- The exercise of the implied power conferred upon the county commissioners to designate a county attorney and to fix the attorney's term and salary may be effectually executed by a resolution of the county commissioners, duly passed and spread upon their minutes. Such transaction does not fall within the purview of this section, which requires all contracts entered into with other persons on behalf of the county to be in writing and entered on their minutes. The relation between the county and the county attorney does not rest upon contract, but arises from appointment impliedly authorized by legislative enactment. Templeman v. Jeffries, 172 Ga. 895, 159 S.E. 248 (1931).
When the relation between a county and an attorney does not rest upon contract, but arises from the appointment of the attorney as a public officer, the transaction does not fall under this section. Walker v. Stephens, 175 Ga. 405, 165 S.E. 99 (1932).
Procedure
Compliance must be alleged in plaintiff's petition. Milburn v. Glynn County, 109 Ga. 473, 34 S.E. 848 (1899); Carolina Metal Prods. Co. v. Taliaferro County, 28 Ga. App. 57, 110 S.E. 331 (1922).
In an action against a county for the breach of an alleged contract with the county authorities in charge of the county's fiscal affairs, it is necessary to allege that the contract was in writing and was entered upon the minutes of such authorities in order to make the contract a valid and enforceable contract against the county. A failure to so allege makes the petition subject to general demurrer (now motion to dismiss). Sosebee v. Hall County, 50 Ga. App. 21, 177 S.E. 71 (1934).
Suit against a county, based upon an alleged contract with the county, is defective unless it is alleged that such contract is in writing and has been entered on the minutes as required by the statute. When the petition fails to make such essential allegations, it is subject to demurrer (now motion to dismiss). Graham v. Beacham, 189 Ga. 304, 5 S.E.2d 775 (1939).
Petition is subject to general demurrer (now motion to dismiss) which alleges that contracts have been entered into with a county but which fails to allege that the contracts were in writing and entered on the minutes of the proper county authority. Hobbs v. Howell, 204 Ga. 370, 49 S.E.2d 827 (1948).
All contracts entered into with other persons on behalf of the county shall be in writing and entered upon its minutes. If the fiscal affairs of the county are in charge of a board of commissioners, the law applicable to judges of the probate court with respect to the management of county affairs governs. Unless there has been a full compliance with the statutory provisions relative to contracts with a county, which fact must appear from the plaintiffs' petition, the petition is subject to demurrer (now motion to dismiss). Moore v. Baker, 85 Ga. App. 234, 68 S.E.2d 911 (1952).
Petition sufficient.
- Petition alleging that county commissioners had entered into contracts with one of the commissioner's members for the construction of roads in the county without the contracts being in writing and being entered on the minutes of the board, and in violation of the contracts between the State Highway Department (now Department of Transportation) and the county was sufficient as against a general demurrer (now motion to dismiss) to show that the plaintiffs were entitled to some of the substantial relief prayed for. Ferguson v. Randolph County, 211 Ga. 103, 84 S.E.2d 70 (1954).
Failure to record is a matter of defense against payment, when suit is brought on county warrants, and not upon the contract itself. Americus Grocery Co. v. Pitts Banking Co., 169 Ga. 70, 149 S.E. 776 (1929).
Waiver of noncompliance.
- Failure to comply with this section is waived when no objection is made until after the verdict. Early County v. Fielder & Allen Co., 4 Ga. App. 268, 63 S.E. 353 (1908).
Objection must be timely.
- Whether or not the provisions of former Code 1933, § 23-1701 (see now O.C.G.A. § 36-10-1), would in any event apply to a written agreement to submit a matter in suit to arbitration under former Code 1933, § 7-411 (see now O.C.G.A. § 9-9-70), the fact that the agreement was never so entered was not available as a defense in the instant suit for mandamus, since an objection based upon this ground, if valid, should have been made before the entry of the judgment on the award. Hall County v. Smith, 178 Ga. 212, 172 S.E. 645 (1934).
Conformity a matter of proof at trial.
- Under this section, and in view of the construction placed upon the statute by the Supreme Court, a suit based upon an alleged contract with the county cannot prevail when it is not shown that there has been compliance with this section. Spears v. Robertson, 170 Ga. 368, 152 S.E. 903 (1930).
Plaintiff may not recover from a county on a contract unless the contract is on the minutes; this is a matter of proof at trial and not a matter of pleading. PMS Constr. Co. v. DeKalb County, 243 Ga. 870, 257 S.E.2d 285 (1979).
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERALStatute applies to implied and written county contracts without distinction. 1980 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 80-128.
County may enforce implied contract but implied contract cannot be enforced against a county. 1980 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 80-128.
Not entered upon minutes.- Although county contracts which are written but not entered in the minutes are unenforceable, such failure is a curable defect. 1980 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 80-128.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
C.J.S.
- 20 C.J.S., Counties, § 231.
ALR.
- Elements bearing directly upon the quality of a contract as affecting the character of one as independent contractor, 20 A.L.R. 684.
Construction of paving contract or contractor's bond in respect of the contractor's obligation as to repairs, 72 A.L.R. 644.
Power of municipality to fix specific scale of wages or hours for employees of contractors or subcontractors for municipal contracts, 81 A.L.R. 349; 129 A.L.R. 763.
Inclusion in contract for public work of provision regarding extension of time for performance not specifically set out in the call for bids, 114 A.L.R. 1437.