Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of Code Section 34-9-2, relative to the exempt status of individuals employed as farm laborers, an employer of farm laborers may elect to provide workers' compensation coverage to individuals employed as farm laborers by giving written notice to the board in such manner and form as provided by rule of the board.Upon the filing of the notice with the board, the employer of farm laborers shall be deemed an employer for the purposes of this chapter and each individual employed as a farm laborer shall be deemed an employee for the purposes of this chapter. An employer of farm laborers who has filed a notice pursuant to this Code section shall not discontinue the provision of workers' compensation insurance coverage for individuals employed as farm laborers until the notice filed with the board is revoked in a manner to be specified by rule of the board and written notice is given to each affected employee in a manner to be specified by rule of the board.
(Code 1981, §34-9-2.3, enacted by Ga. L. 1990, p. 293, § 1.)
Code Commission notes.- Pursuant to Code Section 28-9-5, in 2003, "health care" was substituted for "healthcare" in paragraph (c)(2).
Editor's notes.- Ga. L. 1995, p. 642, § 13, not codified by the General Assembly, provides for severability.
Law reviews.- For article, "Workers' Compensation," see 53 Mercer L. Rev. 521 (2001). For survey article on workers' compensation law for the period from June 1, 2002 to May 31, 2003, see 55 Mercer L. Rev. 459 (2003). For article on the 2013 amendment of this Code section, see 30 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 185 (2013). For annual survey on workers' compensation, see 65 Mercer L. Rev. 311 (2013). For note on the 2000 amendment of this Code section, see 17 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 231 (2000).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Constitutionality.
- Fact that O.C.G.A § 34-9-203 requires the employer to compensate an employee for the consequences of a physician's malpractice, without giving the employer the corresponding right to recover its losses through subrogation, does not deprive the employer of any constitutional right of due process. K-Mart Apparel Corp. v. Temples, 260 Ga. 871, 401 S.E.2d 5 (1991).
Exclusivity.
- Pursuant to the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act, set forth at O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11(a), an employer was entitled to summary judgment against claims by an injured employee who obtained benefits under the Act and then sued the employer under independent tort theories of vicarious liability on behalf of medical staff that worked for the employer, a hospital, who had rendered treatment to the employee for the injuries; the exclusivity provisions barred the employee's assertion of malpractice by treating physicians against the employer, as any consequences of malpractice or delay in treatment were part of the injury and were compensated as such under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-203(b). Crisp Reg'l Hosp., Inc. v. Oliver, 275 Ga. App. 578, 621 S.E.2d 554 (2005).
Doctors employed at on-site medical facility were co-workers.
- Trial court erred by denying an employer's motion for summary judgment in a negligence suit filed by a worker alleging a failure to diagnosis the worker's cancer on the part of the doctors employed by the employer at an on-site medical facility as the doctors were co-employees of the worker and, therefore, the tort action was barred pursuant to the exclusivity provision of the Georgia Worker's Compensation Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11(a). Rheem Mfg. v. Butts, 292 Ga. App. 523, 664 S.E.2d 878 (2008).
Cited in Doss v. Food Lion, Inc., 267 Ga. 312, 477 S.E.2d 577 (1996).