(Ga. L. 1920, p. 167, § 59; Code 1933, § 114-710; Ga. L. 1963, p. 141, § 15; Ga. L. 1979, p. 619, § 4; Ga. L. 1987, p. 806, § 3; Ga. L. 1988, p. 535, § 1; Ga. L. 1988, p. 1679, § 20; Ga. L. 1989, p. 579, § 2; Ga. L. 1997, p. 1367, § 4.)
Cross references.- Procedure for appeals from decisions of superior courts reviewing decisions of the board, § 5-6-35.
Editor's notes.- Ga. L. 1988, p. 535, § 2, not codified by the General Assembly, provided: "This Act shall become effective on July 1, 1988, and shall apply to all awards or decisions of the administrative law judges or members of the State Board of Workers' Compensation issued on or after July 1, 1988."
Law reviews.- For article surveying developments in Georgia workers' compensation law from mid-1980 through mid-1981, see 33 Mercer L. Rev. 323 (1981). For annual survey of workers' compensation, see 38 Mercer L. Rev. 431 (1986). For annual survey of law of workers' compensation, see 56 Mercer L. Rev. 479 (2004). For annual survey of workers' compensation law, see 58 Mercer L. Rev. 453 (2006). For survey article on workers' compensation law, see 59 Mercer L. Rev. 463 (2007). For survey article on workers' compensation law, see 60 Mercer L. Rev. 433 (2008). For annual survey on workers' compensation, see 61 Mercer L. Rev. 399 (2009). For annual survey of law on workers' compensation, see 62 Mercer L. Rev. 383 (2010). For annual survey on workers' compensation law, see 66 Mercer L. Rev. 247 (2014). For annual survey on decisions impacting workers' compensation, see 69 Mercer L. Rev. 357 (2017). For annual survey on administrative law, see 70 Mercer L. Rev. 1 (2018). For annual survey on workers' compensation, see 70 Mercer L. Rev. 289 (2018). For note discussing compensation under this chapter for original injuries aggravated by subsequent injury, continued employment, or ordinary activity, see 31 Mercer L. Rev. 325 (1979). For comments on Baggett Transp. Co. v. Barnes, 108 Ga. App. 68, 132 S.E.2d 229 (1963), see 26 Ga. B. J. 214 (1963); 16 Mercer L. Rev. 357 (1964).
JUDICIAL DECISIONSANALYSIS
Constitutionality of the provision as to the finality and binding effect of the award and findings of fact of the board, see City of Macon v. Benson, 176 Ga. 502, 166 S.E. 26 (1932).
Regarding the unconstitutionality of the 1963 amendment to former Code 1933, § 114-710, Ga. L. 1963, p. 141, § 15, see Baggett Transp. Co. v. Barnes, 108 Ga. App. 68, 132 S.E.2d 229 (1963), for comments, see 26 Ga. B.J. 214 (1963) and 16 Mercer L. Rev. 357 (1964).
Superior court's jurisdiction is defined by this section.
- Jurisdiction of the superior court in cases appealed from the department (now board) is not as provided in other laws relating to appeals, but is as defined in Ga. L. 1920, p. 167, § 59 (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-105). Department of Indus. Relations v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 177 Ga. 669, 170 S.E. 883, answer conformed to, 47 Ga. App. 553, 171 S.E. 169 (1933).
Superior courts have jurisdiction of the person and subject matter in appeals from awards of the board. Bentley v. Buice, 102 Ga. App. 101, 115 S.E.2d 706 (1960).
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-105 confers subject matter jurisdiction on the superior courts of this state. Fowler v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 159 Ga. App. 190, 283 S.E.2d 69 (1981).
Venue provisions of O.C.G.A. § 34-9-105 do not limit the subject matter jurisdiction of the superior courts of this state. Fowler v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 159 Ga. App. 190, 283 S.E.2d 69 (1981).
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-105 allows a superior court not only to exercise its appellate power to review board decisions, but in cases of alleged fraud it grants the superior court the power to consider evidence of such fraud which may be presented to the superior court for the first time on appeal. This procedure, establishing a dual role for the superior court as both a trial court and an appellate court in workers' compensation appeals, promotes judicial economy and the prevention of abuses in this governmentally administered program. Dennington v. Rockdale Package Stores, Inc., 161 Ga. App. 450, 288 S.E.2d 709 (1982).
Amendment of subsection (b).
- When an award of the appellate division was affirmed by operation of law because of the failure to hold a hearing within 60 days after the notice of appeal was filed, the 1997 amendment of O.C.G.A. § 34-9-105(b), giving the court 60 days from the docketing of the appeal, could not be applied retroactively to change an award that had become final almost a year before the effective date of the amendment. Truckstops of Am., Inc. v. Engram, 229 Ga. App. 616, 494 S.E.2d 709 (1998).
Failure to hear case within 60 days jurisdictional.
- When almost six months elapsed after notice of appeal was filed but before the record was transmitted to the superior court, and the record contained no indication that the superior court heard the case at any time within the 60-day statutory limit, the court lost jurisdiction of the case 60 days after the notice of appeal was filed. The superior court having lost jurisdiction by operation of law, any order entered was a nullity and could not serve as a basis for appeal. Synthetic Indus. v. Camp, 196 Ga. App. 637, 396 S.E.2d 518 (1990).
When the appeal from the full board to the superior court was not timely heard in accordance with O.C.G.A. § 34-9-105(b), the decision of the full board was affirmed by operation of law and the trial court had no jurisdiction to review the merits of the case or remand the case to the board. Lanier v. Jim Brown Dev. Corp., 199 Ga. App. 255, 404 S.E.2d 626 (1991).
Despite both parties agreement to waive oral argument and submit the case on briefs, when no hearing was held or order entered within 60 days after the notice of appeal was filed, the superior court lost jurisdiction of the case by operation of law and its order was a nullity. Borden, Inc. v. Holland, 212 Ga. App. 820, 442 S.E.2d 916 (1994).
Award of attorney fees under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 that was not completed within the time limitations of O.C.G.A. § 34-9-105(b) was a nullity because, once the time limitation had run, the court was without subject matter jurisdiction. Taylor Timber Co. v. Baker, 226 Ga. App. 211, 485 S.E.2d 819 (1997).
Automatic affirmance.
- O.C.G.A. § 34-9-105(b) does not require that the superior court enter a written order within the 60-day limit to avoid automatic affirmance. Travelers Ins. Co. v. McNabb, 201 Ga. App. 297, 410 S.E.2d 788, cert. denied, 201 Ga. App. 904, 410 S.E.2d 788 (1991), overruled on other grounds, Yoho v. Ringier of Am., Inc., 263 Ga. 338, 434 S.E.2d 57 (1993).
Effect of continuing hearing beyond 60-day limit.
- Policy promoting speedy resolution of workers' compensation cases was not violated by allowing the trial court to continue the hearing to a date certain outside the 60-day period from the date the notice of appeal was filed in order to allow the parties 10 days' notice. Felton Pearson Co. v. Nelson, 260 Ga. 513, 397 S.E.2d 431 (1990).
Continuance of case to a date certain.
- In the case of an appeal from a decision of the state board of workers' compensation, an order of the court providing that the hearing would "be continued for an additional 90 days, through and including 18 December 1993, to allow for another judge to be assigned to the case" clearly continued the case to a "date certain" within the meaning of O.C.G.A. § 34-9-105(b). Fulton County Bd. of Workers' Comp. v. Robinson, 215 Ga. App. 378, 450 S.E.2d 850 (1994).
Order not entered in time deemed nullity.
- When a superior court order affirming an award of the board was not entered within 20 days from the date of the hearing on the appeal, the order was a nullity and could not serve as a basis for appeal to the Court of Appeals. Coronet Carpets v. Reynolds, 199 Ga. App. 383, 405 S.E.2d 103, cert. denied, 199 Ga. App. 905, 405 S.E.2d 103 (1991).
Court order must dispose of issues.
- Superior court's order which merely announced the court's intention to issue an order in the future which would be dispositive of the issues and which, although providing the award, was reversed in part and affirmed in part, did not state the parts of the award affirmed or reversed, the prevailing party, nor the disposition of the appeal, was not dispositive of the issues in the case and, therefore, in accordance with the terms of O.C.G.A. § 34-9-105(b), the decision of the full board was affirmed by operation of law. Miller v. Merck & Co., 199 Ga. App. 722, 405 S.E.2d 761 (1991).
Resetting time of hearing after continuance.
- There was no violation of the letter or the spirit of the statute, when the original hearing date was set within the prescribed 60 days, as was an initial continuance, and a second resetting within the initially extended time frame was made in order to attempt to satisfy the ten-day notice requirement to the party responding to the appeal below, precipitated by the responding party's mistake of fact that statutory notice had not been given. Action Staffing v. Spalding Ford-Lincoln-Mercury, 198 Ga. App. 764, 403 S.E.2d 61, cert. denied, 198 Ga. App. 897, 403 S.E.2d 61 (1991).
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-105 does not make scheduling a hearing mandatory upon the superior court. West Marietta Hdwe. v. Chandler, 227 Ga. App. 436, 489 S.E.2d 584 (1997).
This section established procedure whereby an appeal may be taken from the decision in a workers' compensation award. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 150 Ga. App. 345, 258 S.E.2d 31 (1979).
Judicial review restricted to method prescribed by statute.
- Right to have an award by the board reviewed by the superior court is restricted by the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) to the method herein prescribed, which is by appeal to the superior court of the county in which the injury occurred. Porter v. Employers Liab. Ins. Co., 85 Ga. App. 497, 69 S.E.2d 384 (1952).
Right to judicial review of an award of the commission (now board) is restricted to the method prescribed by the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.). Dudley v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 115 Ga. App. 411, 154 S.E.2d 699 (1967).
Board cannot remit case without appeal by party.
- Board has no authority to remit a case to the superior court without appeal by a party. McDevitt & Street Co. v. Trammell, 193 Ga. App. 646, 389 S.E.2d 3 (1989).
For information on the effect of Ga. L. 1965, p. 18, § 19 (see now O.C.G.A. § 5-6-50) on procedure for appealing workers' compensation claims, see Peters v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 113 Ga. App. 41, 147 S.E.2d 26 (1966).
Form of appeal.
- Application for appeal must be in writing, must state generally the grounds on which the appeal is sought, and must be signed by the applicant, or the applicant's attorney, or some other authorized person, in order to give it validity and effect. Scott v. Minor, 55 Ga. App. 714, 191 S.E. 263 (1937).
It was not essential to valid appeal that exact language of former Code 1933, § 114-710 (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-105) be embodied in the assignment of error; it was sufficient if the appeal can reasonably be construed as assigning error on one of the grounds provided for by that section. Thompson v. Walker, 99 Ga. App. 748, 109 S.E.2d 833 (1959); Truckstops of Am., Inc. v. Engram, 220 Ga. App. 289, 469 S.E.2d 425 (1996).
Appeal as exclusive remedy for erroneous finding.
- When all allegations of fact were introduced before the board, and its finding was erroneous as a matter of law, the remedy was to appeal from the ruling of the board and have it corrected as provided by the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.), and an aggrieved party could not, by failure to appeal from such decision, bring suit in another forum and rely on such erroneous decision to confer jurisdiction in the superior court in contravention of the workers' compensation law which confers exclusive jurisdiction in the board. Minchew v. Huston, 66 Ga. App. 856, 19 S.E.2d 422 (1942).
Essential element of appeal is finality; this is shown in use of the phrases "final award," "final order or judgment," and "any other final decision." Garner v. Owens-Illinois Glass Container, 134 Ga. App. 917, 216 S.E.2d 709 (1975).
Award denying compensation was an appealable order, and it became final when no timely appeal was filed. McDevitt & Street Co. v. Trammell, 193 Ga. App. 646, 389 S.E.2d 3 (1989).
Res judicata and estoppel by judgment are applicable to awards of the board of workers' compensation on all questions of fact in matters in which it has jurisdiction. Woods v. Delta Air Lines, 237 Ga. 332, 227 S.E.2d 376 (1976); Mimms v. Sisk Decorating Co., 156 Ga. App. 572, 275 S.E.2d 148 (1980).
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-105(b) is designed to expedite the disposition of workers' compensation claims that have been appealed to the courts of this state. Felton Pearson Co. v. Nelson, 260 Ga. 513, 397 S.E.2d 431 (1990).
Time for appeal to superior court.
- Appellants should be afforded 20 days from the date of certification and transmittal of the record by the board to the clerk of the superior court in which to request a hearing before the superior court and to file briefs therein. Southeastern Aluminum Recycling, Inc. v. Rayburn, 251 Ga. 365, 306 S.E.2d 240 (1983).
Appeal period commences when award is issued.
- Date when the 30-day (now 20-day) period for appeal in O.C.G.A. § 34-9-105(b) commences is not the date of the full board's vote but the date that the award is issued by the full board. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Barden, 179 Ga. App. 442, 346 S.E.2d 588 (1986).
Award final when no exception taken.
- When no exception is taken to an award denying compensation, such award becomes final, unless it is shown that an alleged change in condition resulted from the accident which caused the first injury. Swift & Co. v. Ware, 53 Ga. App. 500, 186 S.E. 452 (1936).
Failure to appeal makes award final.
- Failure to appeal within the time specified makes award of single commissioner (now administrative law judge) final. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Lindsey, 63 Ga. App. 658, 11 S.E.2d 512 (1940).
Award not timely appealed is res judicata.
- If an award is not supported by sufficient competent evidence and is contrary to law because it was without evidence to support it, but was not appealed on these grounds within the time provided by law, such award is res judicata. Lavender v. Zurich Ins. Co., 110 Ga. App. 196, 138 S.E.2d 118 (1964).
The superior court erred in determining that the original award of attorney's fees should be reversed for a lack of sufficient evidence to support it when no appeal was taken before the time for appeal had passed. The only issue that the superior court was authorized to consider was whether the subsequent construction of the original award as evidencing an award of add-on attorney's fees was correct. Dawson v. Atlanta Processing Co., 190 Ga. App. 293, 378 S.E.2d 695 (1989).
Appeal may be made from board member's award.
- Appeal to the superior court may be made from award of a single director (now member or administrative law judge) in workers' compensation proceedings. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Williams, 75 Ga. App. 129, 42 S.E.2d 578 (1947).
Appeal to full board as waiver of direct appeal to superior court.
- Appeal from the award of a single director (now member or administrative law judge) to the full board within 30 (now 20) days from the date of the award would be a waiver of the right of the appellant to appeal from such award directly to the superior court. Rose City Foods, Inc. v. Usry, 86 Ga. App. 307, 71 S.E.2d 649 (1952).
Timely application may reopen case as de novo proceeding.
- Award of director (now member or administrative law judge) is final and conclusive only when no application for review is timely filed with the full board; when timely application for review is made by any party, the case is reopened as a de novo proceeding to all parties concerned. Thornberg v. Richmond County Bd. of Educ., 110 Ga. App. 676, 139 S.E.2d 454 (1964).
Termination of compensation on change in condition as final award.
- Determination of the board as to a change in condition, resulting in termination of right to compensation, unless appealed from, is a final award and is binding and conclusive as to all questions of fact and entitled to res judicata effect in subsequent actions in the superior court to recover for overpayment of benefits. Seaboard Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Smith, 146 Ga. App. 893, 247 S.E.2d 607 (1978).
Approved agreement res judicata.
- Agreement fixing compensation between employer and employee, approved by the board and not appealed from, is res judicata as to matters therein determined, and the parties are precluded from thereafter contradicting or challenging matters thus agreed upon. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Hammond, 90 Ga. App. 595, 83 S.E.2d 576 (1954).
Finality absent appeal by claimant of award favorable to one of two employers.
- When an employee filed a claim against two employers and the board made an award against one of them but not against the other, and the employee did not appeal, within the time prescribed, from the award insofar as it was favorable to one of the employers, the award became final as to this employer; and when the employer against whom the award was made appealed and obtained a reversal in the superior court, the employer on appeal from the judgment of the superior court was not entitled to review by the Court of Appeals of the question of the other employer's liability. Bryant v. J.C. Distribs., Inc., 108 Ga. App. 401, 133 S.E.2d 109 (1963).
Distinction between finality of awards granting and denying compensation is that case is kept pending when compensation is awarded, while judgment denying compensation in the first instance is a final judgment, ending the entire case for all purposes, in which case the only remedy is an appeal within the time prescribed. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Garner, 76 Ga. App. 87, 45 S.E.2d 109 (1947); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Haney, 92 Ga. App. 319, 88 S.E.2d 492 (1955).
Right of appeal from unfavorable award.
- Award finding that claimant was entitled to any benefits provided by the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.), whether medical expenses, weekly payments, or other payments, would constitute an award favorable to claimant, from which adverse party would have the right of appeal; likewise, if claimant thinks an award inadequate, appeal would lie in claimants behalf. Chevrolet Div., GMC v. Dempsey, 212 Ga. 560, 93 S.E.2d 703 (1956).
General Assembly contemplated only that final awards be appealed from the board to the superior courts. Garner v. Owens-Illinois Glass Container, 134 Ga. App. 917, 216 S.E.2d 709 (1975).
The workers' compensation act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq., makes no provision for an appeal to the superior court from a decision by the full board other than one which grants or denies compensation. Conwood Corp. v. Guinn, 190 Ga. App. 595, 379 S.E.2d 621 (1989).
Nowhere in the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) is there provision for an interlocutory appeal, and undoubtedly this is by design, since its goal is to provide a speedy disposition of claims of injured employees. Garner v. Owens-Illinois Glass Container, 134 Ga. App. 917, 216 S.E.2d 709 (1975).
When the Appellate Division of the Board of Workers' Compensation vacated an administrative law judge's decision and remanded the case to the trial division for additional proceedings, including a hearing if needed, the superior court lacked jurisdiction to hear the employer's interlocutory appeal, which was not authorized under the Workers' Compensation Act. The order remanding the case was not a final award, order, judgment or decision. Strickland v. Crossmark, Inc., 298 Ga. App. 568, 680 S.E.2d 606 (2009).
Award final despite failure to address potential item covered by Act.
- Fact that there was no final disposition of a potential item covered by the Workers' Compensation Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq., that of current or future medical expenses not addressed by an award of an administrative law judge, did not nullify the finality of the board's award and preclude appeal to the superior court. K-Mart Corp. v. Anderson, 163 Ga. App. 493, 295 S.E.2d 186 (1982).
Court should have remanded instead of striking finding.
- Trial court properly held that the issue of the compensability of a workers' compensation claimant's injuries was not before an administrative law judge (ALJ), as nothing suggested that the parties or the ALJ believed this was an issue. The trial court lacked the authority, however, to strike the factual finding as to compensability; rather, as the evidence at the hearing did raise the issue of whether the back injury was compensable, the trial court should have remanded the case to the State Board of Workers' Compensation for further hearing. Home Depot v. Pettigrew, 298 Ga. App. 501, 680 S.E.2d 450 (2009).
Finality of award when attorney fees not finally determined.
- When pursuant to award under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-108, the issue of attorney fees has not been finally determined, the board's ruling is not final, and the superior court lacks jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the ruling. Farist v. Blue Ridge Carpet Mills, 162 Ga. App. 586, 291 S.E.2d 741 (1982).
Order of board overruling motion to dismiss not appealable.
- Order of the full board overruling a motion to dismiss left the claim pending before the board for hearing, just as though such motion had not been filed, and settled nothing so far as the right to or amount of compensation was concerned; it was accordingly not an appealable order under this section. Milledgeville State Hosp. v. Clodfelter, 99 Ga. App. 49, 107 S.E.2d 289 (1959); State Hwy. Dep't v. Cooper, 104 Ga. App. 130, 121 S.E.2d 258 (1961).
Grant of request for change of physicians not appealable.
- There was no provision in this section for a hearing on the question of whether claimant shall be authorized to change physicians, and the board's order granting claimant's request for a change of physicians was not appealable under that section. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Sams, 116 Ga. App. 531, 157 S.E.2d 823 (1967).
Only direct appeal to superior court from report of medical board is one which is taken from the award of the full board pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 34-9-105 and which enumerates the grounds stated in § 34-9-312(e) [repealed]. Seitzingers, Inc. v. Barnes, 161 Ga. App. 855, 289 S.E.2d 315 (1982).
Order on a discovery dispute covered an interlocutory matter and was not a final order or award granting or denying compensation; thus, the issues involved could not be reviewed upon the entry thereof. Cartwright v. Midtown Hosp., 243 Ga. App. 828, 534 S.E.2d 504 (2000).
Illegal admission or exclusion of evidence not new ground of appeal.
- Although former Code 1933, § 114-707 (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-102) provided an opportunity for opposing counsel to object to medical reports, it did not provide a new ground of appeal based on the contention that evidence was illegally admitted or excluded. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Porter, 150 Ga. App. 513, 258 S.E.2d 135 (1979).
Appealability of superior court judgment recommitting case to board.
- When court deferred judgment on appeal and recommitted the case to the board, it lost jurisdiction thereof and deprived claimant of the benefit of an award in claimant's favor; such judgment was tantamount to a judgment setting the award aside, and so was subject to a direct bill of exceptions (now appeal) to the Court of Appeals. Butler v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 88 Ga. App. 620, 76 S.E.2d 813 (1953).
Frivolous appeals provision inapplicable.
- Provisions of O.C.G.A. § 5-3-31 providing for the award of attorney's fees against a party bringing a frivolous appeal do not apply to appeals to the superior court of decisions of the Workers' Compensation Board pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 34-9-105. Butlerhouse Maintenance Co. v. Greeson, 174 Ga. App. 637, 331 S.E.2d 46 (1985).
Waiver of questions not raised below.
- When an application for an award of damages is made to the commission (now board), questions not raised when the case is heard by one of the commissioners (now administrative law judges), or on appeal to the full commission (now board), cannot be raised for the first time on appeal to the superior court. Integrity Mut. Cas. Co. v. Hankins, 33 Ga. App. 339, 126 S.E. 554 (1925); Martin v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 58 Ga. App. 59, 197 S.E. 660 (1938).
When the defendant failed to raise question of venue before the director (now member), and made no appeal to the full board, the defendant waived this defense, and could not raise it for the first time on appeal to the superior court. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Wilson, 48 Ga. App. 34, 171 S.E. 827 (1933).
If claimant does not seek review by the full board or the superior court of an issue within the time prescribed, the award becomes final as to that issue, and claimant will not be entitled to review by the Court of Appeals of the issue that was not appealed in time. Bryant v. J.C. Distribs., Inc., 108 Ga. App. 401, 133 S.E.2d 109 (1963).
Constitutional challenges must be raised first in the workers' compensation tribunal in order to be considered on appeal to the superior court. Harrison v. Southern Talc Co., 245 Ga. 212, 264 S.E.2d 2 (1980).
Judgment to be based on record as transmitted.
- There is no provision for the introduction of evidence in the superior court in a case in which compensation is sought for an injury and the case is on appeal to that court from an award of the board; the judgment of the superior court must be based on the record as transmitted to it by the board. Burdett v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 40 Ga. App. 92, 149 S.E. 55 (1929).
Facts upon which the superior court is authorized to exercise jurisdiction in an appeal from the board are those, and only those, contained in the record transmitted to it by the board. Turner v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 109 Ga. App. 721, 137 S.E.2d 385 (1964).
Trial court erred by setting aside an award of temporary total disability benefits made to a claimant by the State Board of Workers' Compensation because the court did not have before it the transcript of the relevant evidentiary hearing when the judge ruled to set aside the award, and the court incorrectly held that the claimant had to demonstrate certain facts not required by the law. Burns v. State Dep't of Admin. Servs., 331 Ga. App. 11, 769 S.E.2d 733 (2015), cert. denied, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 406 (Ga. 2015).
Record, as presented to superior court, must authorize findings of the board; if such findings are not so authorized, such award must be reversed. Clay v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 102 Ga. App. 498, 116 S.E.2d 686 (1960); Turner v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 109 Ga. App. 721, 137 S.E.2d 385 (1964).
No authority of courts to consider deposition not considered by board.
- Superior court and Court of Appeals were without authority to consider the deposition of a physician included in the record but not offered at a change of condition hearing and not considered by the hearing officer or the full board, even though it might have afforded some basis for comparison with the evidence actually adduced to show a change of condition. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Dutton, 116 Ga. App. 535, 158 S.E.2d 272 (1967).
Sole fact-finding body under the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) is the board. Bituminous Cas. Co. v. Dyer, 62 Ga. App. 279, 7 S.E.2d 415 (1940).
Exclusive authority to make findings of fact in claims under the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) is vested in Board of Workers' Compensation. General Accident, Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Titus, 104 Ga. App. 85, 121 S.E.2d 196 (1961).
Exclusive authority to make findings of fact in claims under the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) is vested in Board of Workers' Compensation, and neither the superior court nor the Court of Appeals has authority to substitute itself as a fact-finding body in lieu of the board. Employees Ins. Co. v. Amerson, 109 Ga. App. 275, 136 S.E.2d 12 (1964).
Awards not predicated on facts meaningless.
- Award of the board, which is not predicated upon findings of fact made by the board but rather upon findings made by the superior court, which is without power and authority to make an award, is like a verdict which is wholly unsupported by any competent evidence and is contrary to law. Employees Ins. Co. v. Amerson, 109 Ga. App. 275, 136 S.E.2d 12 (1964).
Acceptance of untimely brief.
- Permitting the claimant's untimely brief to be accepted without also permitting the employer to respond to that brief denied the employer its rights under the rules and thus was in excess of the board's power. Times-Georgian v. Thompson, 201 Ga. App. 854, 412 S.E.2d 871 (1991).
Courts do not have authority to substitute themselves as fact-finding bodies in lieu of the board. Mission Ins. Co. v. Ware, 143 Ga. App. 550, 239 S.E.2d 162 (1977).
Courts are not fact finders.
- On appeal from an award of the board to the superior court, superior court is not vested with any fact-finding power. Callaway Mills Co. v. Hurley, 104 Ga. App. 811, 123 S.E.2d 7 (1961); Employees Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Young, 134 Ga. App. 369, 214 S.E.2d 381 (1975).
Trial court erred in determining that future medical expenses related to a heart condition were not compensable after affirming an award of workers' compensation to an injured employee for expenses arising out of the heart attack, which was found to have been occasioned by a fall from a ladder; the trial court exceeded the scope of its authority under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-105(c), as that issue had not been considered by the workers' compensation administrative law judge or on administrative appeal, and the trial court had no authority to make findings of fact. Sears v. Macon Water Auth., 276 Ga. App. 194, 622 S.E.2d 867 (2005).
Board is presumed, absent showing to the contrary, to have based award only on legal evidence having probative value. Zurich Ins. Co. v. Hightower, 113 Ga. App. 503, 148 S.E.2d 464 (1966).
Court of Appeals must examine record.
- It is mandatory upon the Court of Appeals to examine record to see if there is sufficient competent evidence therein to support the award. Chevrolet-Atlanta Div., GMC v. Nash, 81 Ga. App. 671, 59 S.E.2d 681 (1950).
Effect, on standard of review, of affirmance by operation of law.
- Court of Appeals will apply the same principles of review to an affirmance of the board's award by operation of law that it would apply had such an affirmance been by order of a superior court. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Adkins, 200 Ga. App. 278, 407 S.E.2d 775 (1991).
Effect on motion to vacate and re-enter judgment.
- In a workers' compensation case, when the trial court did not send the parties its judgment as required by O.C.G.A. § 15-6-21(c), it erred in denying the employer's motion under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-60(g) to vacate and re-enter the judgment so that the employer could file a timely appeal; O.C.G.A. § 34-9-105(b) did not prevent granting of the motion because the trial court complied with its time limitations, and it was improper for the trial court to decide the motion based upon its determination that the employer knew or should have known that a judgment had been entered. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Parker, 283 Ga. App. 708, 642 S.E.2d 387 (2007).
Courts cannot weigh evidence.
- When there is any evidence to support an award of the board, neither the superior court nor the Court of Appeals has any authority to review the evidence and decide that the weight of the evidence is contrary to such award; if such award is authorized it must be affirmed, even though the single director and the full board based the award on an erroneous finding and conclusion of fact. Ford v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 99 Ga. App. 257, 108 S.E.2d 311 (1959).
Neither the superior court nor any other reviewing court has any authority to decide that the weight of the evidence is contrary to an award; competent supporting evidence is all that is required. Fox v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 125 Ga. App. 285, 187 S.E.2d 305 (1972).
Court of Appeals does not weigh evidence, but looks only to see if there is any evidence to support a finding supporting adjudication. American Motorist Ins. Co. v. Ward, 151 Ga. App. 402, 260 S.E.2d 372 (1979).
Neither the superior court nor the Court of Appeals has any authority to substitute itself as the factfinding body in lieu of the Board of Workers' Compensation. Spalding County Comm'rs v. Tarver, 167 Ga. App. 661, 307 S.E.2d 58 (1983).
Testimony of nonexperts as competent evidence.
- Competent evidence to support a finding of the board may be supplied by the testimony of a nonexpert and lay witnesses, as well as by that of experts. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Childers, 110 Ga. App. 466, 138 S.E.2d 923 (1964).
Evidence which is conflicting and not altogether complete and satisfactory may be sufficient to sustain an award by the board. Zurich Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 127 Ga. App. 113, 192 S.E.2d 533 (1972).
"Any evidence" test applied by court.
- Questions concerning credibility and preponderance address themselves to the trier of fact, whereas the appellate tribunal utilizes the "any evidence" test in workers' compensation cases. Dixie-Cole Transf. Trucking Co. v. Fudge, 147 Ga. App. 306, 248 S.E.2d 694 (1978).
State Board of Workers' Compensation is the factfinder in compensation cases, and its findings are reviewed under the "any evidence" rule. Carroll v. Mission Ins. Co., 147 Ga. App. 262, 248 S.E.2d 542 (1978).
The issue on appeal to the superior court is whether there is "any evidence" to authorize a finding in accordance with the contentions of the prevailing party before the full board. Cobb Gen. Hosp. v. Burrell, 174 Ga. App. 631, 331 S.E.2d 23 (1985).
The 1994 amendment to O.C.G.A. § 34-9-103(a) did not change the standard of review to be applied by the superior court in reviewing the findings of the appellate division, i.e., the court may not substitute its findings for the division's findings of fact. The court is bound by the "any evidence" standard of review and is not authorized to substitute its judgment as to the weight of the evidence or credibility of the witnesses. Owens Brockway Packaging, Inc. v. Hathorn, 227 Ga. App. 110, 488 S.E.2d 495 (1997).
Courts should construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. Davis v. Bibb Mfg. Co., 75 Ga. App. 515, 43 S.E.2d 780 (1947); Lockhart v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 141 Ga. App. 476, 233 S.E.2d 810 (1977); Home Indem. Co. v. Swindle, 146 Ga. App. 520, 246 S.E.2d 507 (1978).
Court, in reviewing an award by the full board denying compensation, must accept that evidence most favorable to the employer; and if, so viewed, it authorizes an award denying compensation, it must be affirmed. Austin v. General Accident, Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 56 Ga. App. 481, 193 S.E. 86 (1937); Merry Bros. Brick & Tile Co. v. Holmes, 57 Ga. App. 281, 195 S.E. 223 (1938); Stapleton v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 74 Ga. App. 86, 38 S.E.2d 848 (1946); Malcom v. Sudderth, 98 Ga. App. 674, 106 S.E.2d 367 (1958); Garrett v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 105 Ga. App. 308, 124 S.E.2d 450 (1962).
Appellate court must accept that evidence most favorable to sustain the award. Continental Cas. Co. v. Bennett, 69 Ga. App. 683, 26 S.E.2d 682 (1943).
Decision not set aside upon assertion of newly-discovered evidence.
- While the superior court does have the authority to set aside the board's decision and remand, it can do so only for one of the five statutory grounds. They do not encompass an assertion of newly-discovered evidence as such. Action Staffing v. Spalding Ford-Lincoln-Mercury, 198 Ga. App. 764, 403 S.E.2d 61, cert. denied, 198 Ga. App. 897, 403 S.E.2d 61 (1991).
Appeal from award cannot be converted into an original suit, either in law or equity, nor can new parties be added on appeal to the superior court from such award. Martin v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 58 Ga. App. 59, 197 S.E. 660 (1938).
No power to amend award so as to make the defendant rather than their business personally liable.
- Workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.) provides for an appeal from the award itself as rendered by the commission (now board), but since the commission (now board) has no power or authority to reopen a case for the purpose of amending its award, by making it operative against one of the defendants personally instead of against the tradename under which that defendant conducted the defendant's business, the superior court would also be without jurisdiction for that purpose, on appeal. Bishop v. Bussey, 164 Ga. 642, 139 S.E. 212 (1927).
Alleged dependent held necessary party to appeal filed by common-law spouse.
- When single director (now member or administrative law judge) made an award in favor of alleged common-law spouse of deceased as against alleged dependent, and this decision was appealed by the alleged dependent to the full board, who asked the board to reopen the case for additional testimony and thereby joined with the employer and insurance carrier on their appeal to the full board, the dependent was a necessary party to a bill of exceptions (appeal) subsequently filed by the alleged common-law spouse after judgment of the superior court. Grooms v. Globe Indem. Co., 90 Ga. App. 68, 81 S.E.2d 851 (1954).
Applicability of "in writing" requirement to superior court orders continuing hearings.
- Although O.C.G.A. § 34-9-105(b) does require that the appeal filed with the board and the ten-day notice given to the opposing party be "in writing", nothing in the statute suggests that this requirement applies to superior court orders continuing hearings. Travelers Ins. Co. v. McNabb, 201 Ga. App. 297, 410 S.E.2d 788, cert. denied, 201 Ga. App. 904, 410 S.E.2d 748 (1991), overruled on other grounds, Yoho v. Ringier of Am., Inc., 263 Ga. 338, 434 S.E.2d 57 (1993).
Court affirmed compensation based on psychological injuries.
- Because there was evidence that the psychological problems encountered by an employee constituted a real fear of death from further asthma attacks and concern for the special needs children that the employee transported, the superior court did not err in affirming an award of workers' compensation benefits under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-105(c)(5). DeKalb County Bd. of Educ. v. Singleton, 294 Ga. App. 96, 668 S.E.2d 767 (2008).
Slip and fall in break room.
- In a workers' compensation case, the Georgia Supreme Court overruled Ocean Acc. and Guar. Corp. v. Farr, 180 Ga. 266 (1935) and held that an employee injured in the employer's break room by a slip and fall during a lunch break was not beyond the scope of compensability under the Workers' Compensation Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq. Frett v. State Farm Emple. Workers' Comp., Ga. , 844 S.E.2d 749 (2020).
Cited in Travelers Ins. Co. v. Bacon, 30 Ga. App. 728, 119 S.E. 458 (1923); London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Shockley, 31 Ga. App. 762, 122 S.E. 99 (1924); Georgia Cas. Co. v. Martin, 157 Ga. 909, 122 S.E. 881 (1924); Gravitt v. Georgia Cas. Co., 158 Ga. 613, 123 S.E. 897 (1924); American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Adams, 32 Ga. App. 759, 124 S.E. 801 (1924); Maryland Cas. Co. v. England, 160 Ga. 810, 129 S.E. 75 (1925); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Hall, 34 Ga. App. 307, 129 S.E. 305 (1925); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Hamilton, 35 Ga. App. 182, 132 S.E. 240 (1926); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Christian, 35 Ga. App. 326, 133 S.E. 639 (1926); Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp. v. Martin, 35 Ga. App. 504, 134 S.E. 174 (1926); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Bohannon, 36 Ga. App. 34, 134 S.E. 319 (1926); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Wells, 35 Ga. App. 759, 134 S.E. 788 (1926); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Miller, 36 Ga. App. 631, 137 S.E. 788 (1927); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Washington, 37 Ga. App. 140, 139 S.E. 359 (1927); Savannah River Lumber Co. v. Bush, 37 Ga. App. 539, 140 S.E. 899 (1927); Robertson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 37 Ga. App. 703, 141 S.E. 504 (1928); Lattimore v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 37 Ga. App. 688, 141 S.E. 669 (1928); Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Huhn, 165 Ga. 667, 142 S.E. 121, 59 A.L.R. 719 (1928); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Bartlett, 37 Ga. App. 777, 142 S.E. 189 (1928); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Durden, 38 Ga. App. 182, 143 S.E. 511 (1928); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Price, 38 Ga. App. 346, 144 S.E. 146 (1928); Brown v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 38 Ga. App. 461, 144 S.E. 343 (1928); Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Dallas, 39 Ga. App. 38, 146 S.E. 37 (1928); Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Pardue, 39 Ga. App. 87, 146 S.E. 638 (1928); Washington v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 39 Ga. App. 481, 147 S.E. 533 (1929); Southern Sur. Co. v. Byck, 39 Ga. App. 699, 148 S.E. 294 (1929); Blanchard v. Savannah River Lumber Co., 40 Ga. App. 416, 149 S.E. 793 (1929); City of Macon v. Whittington, 170 Ga. 612, 154 S.E. 139 (1930); Homes Accident Ins. Co. v. Daniels, 42 Ga. App. 648, 157 S.E. 245 (1931); McBrayer v. Columbia Cas. Co., 44 Ga. App. 59, 160 S.E. 556 (1931); Swift & Co. v. Ware, 53 Ga. App. 500, 186 S.E. 452 (1936); King v. Western Union Tel. Co., 54 Ga. App. 388, 187 S.E. 888 (1936); City of Hapeville v. Preston, 54 Ga. App. 418, 188 S.E. 264 (1936); London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Boynton, 54 Ga. App. 419, 188 S.E. 265 (1936); White Provision Co. v. Culbreath, 58 Ga. App. 628, 199 S.E. 318 (1938); Ware v. Swift & Co., 59 Ga. App. 836, 2 S.E.2d 128 (1939); Whisenant v. Bostick, 61 Ga. App. 447, 6 S.E.2d 146 (1939); City of Hapeville v. Preston, 67 Ga. App. 350, 20 S.E.2d 202 (1942); Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. McIntyre, 67 Ga. App. 666, 21 S.E.2d 446 (1942); Kirkland v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 195 Ga. 402, 24 S.E.2d 676 (1943); Kirkland v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 69 Ga. App. 433, 25 S.E.2d 723 (1943); American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Kent, 197 Ga. 733, 30 S.E.2d 599 (1944); Patillo v. City of Atlanta, 72 Ga. App. 198, 33 S.E.2d 527 (1945); Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Wilkes, 77 Ga. App. 764, 49 S.E.2d 916 (1948); Free v. Associated Indem. Corp., 78 Ga. App. 839, 52 S.E.2d 325 (1949); General Accident, Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Prescott, 80 Ga. App. 421, 56 S.E.2d 137 (1949); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Garland, 81 Ga. App. 667, 59 S.E.2d 560 (1950); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fricks, 81 Ga. App. 727, 59 S.E.2d 671 (1950); Shealy v. Benton, 82 Ga. App. 514, 61 S.E.2d 582 (1950); American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Ellison, 82 Ga. App. 712, 62 S.E.2d 656 (1950); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Harden, 85 Ga. App. 830, 70 S.E.2d 89 (1952); Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Gulledge, 86 Ga. App. 493, 71 S.E.2d 571 (1952); Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rolax, 87 Ga. App. 733, 75 S.E.2d 205 (1953); American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. King, 88 Ga. App. 176, 76 S.E.2d 81 (1953); Taylor v. Smith, 91 Ga. App. 125, 85 S.E.2d 52 (1954); American Employer's Ins. Co. v. Hardeman, 91 Ga. App. 462, 85 S.E.2d 805 (1955); Fortson v. American Sur. Co., 92 Ga. App. 625, 89 S.E.2d 671 (1955); Woodum v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 212 Ga. 386, 93 S.E.2d 12 (1956); Arnold v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 94 Ga. App. 493, 95 S.E.2d 29 (1956); Smith v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 94 Ga. App. 507, 95 S.E.2d 35 (1956); Weathers v. American Cas. Co., 94 Ga. App. 530, 95 S.E.2d 436 (1956); Royal Indem. Co. v. Coulter, 213 Ga. 277, 98 S.E.2d 899 (1957); Rittenhouse v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 96 Ga. App. 407, 100 S.E.2d 145 (1957); Sweatman v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 100 Ga. App. 734, 112 S.E.2d 440 (1959); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Motes, 101 Ga. App. 628, 114 S.E.2d 795 (1960); Rhodes v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 101 Ga. App. 642, 115 S.E.2d 363 (1960); Royal Indem. Co. v. Warren, 102 Ga. App. 501, 116 S.E.2d 757 (1960); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Gammage, 103 Ga. App. 457, 119 S.E.2d 601 (1961); American Hdwe. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Burt, 103 Ga. App. 811, 120 S.E.2d 797 (1961); Owensby v. Riegel Textile Corp., 104 Ga. App. 800, 123 S.E.2d 147 (1961); Moore v. Atlanta Transit Sys., 105 Ga. App. 70, 123 S.E.2d 693 (1961); Continental Cas. Co. v. Bump, 106 Ga. App. 826, 128 S.E.2d 525 (1962); Surgener v. American Ins. Co., 107 Ga. App. 573, 130 S.E.2d 810 (1963); Baggett Transp. Co. v. Barnes, 108 Ga. App. 68, 132 S.E.2d 229 (1963); Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Shipman, 108 Ga. App. 184, 132 S.E.2d 568 (1963); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Williams, 108 Ga. App. 354, 133 S.E.2d 59 (1963); American Legion Post 69 v. Undercofler, 108 Ga. App. 521, 133 S.E.2d 418 (1963); McArthur v. Roadway Express, Inc., 109 Ga. App. 30, 135 S.E.2d 67 (1964); Cofield v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 110 Ga. App. 225, 138 S.E.2d 115 (1964); Petteway v. Continental Cas. Co., 112 Ga. App. 496, 145 S.E.2d 635 (1965); Proctor v. Dixie Bell Mills, Inc., 113 Ga. App. 787, 149 S.E.2d 550 (1966); Griffith v. Coggins Granite Indus., Inc., 114 Ga. App. 537, 152 S.E.2d 15 (1966); Mallory v. American Cas. Co., 114 Ga. App. 641, 152 S.E.2d 592 (1966); Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Whitehead, 114 Ga. App. 630, 152 S.E.2d 706 (1966); Bryant v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 114 Ga. App. 853, 152 S.E.2d 759 (1966); Commonwealth Ins. Co. v. Arnold, 114 Ga. App. 835, 152 S.E.2d 896 (1966); Blackburn v. Hall, 115 Ga. App. 235, 154 S.E.2d 392 (1967); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Ledford, 116 Ga. App. 402, 157 S.E.2d 318 (1967); National Engine Rebuilding, Inc. v. Noles, 116 Ga. App. 762, 159 S.E.2d 178 (1967); Zurich Ins. Co. v. McDuffie, 117 Ga. App. 90, 159 S.E.2d 423 (1968); Georgia Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Conner, 117 Ga. App. 233, 160 S.E.2d 436 (1968); Anderson v. GMC, 118 Ga. App. 4, 162 S.E.2d 464 (1968); Gusler v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 118 Ga. App. 846, 165 S.E.2d 877 (1968); Snider v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 119 Ga. App. 118, 166 S.E.2d 379 (1969); Williams v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 121 Ga. App. 175, 173 S.E.2d 250 (1970); Cline v. Lever Bros. Co., 124 Ga. App. 22, 183 S.E.2d 63 (1971); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Merritt, 124 Ga. App. 42, 183 S.E.2d 73 (1971); Security Ins. Group v. Gillespie, 125 Ga. App. 163, 186 S.E.2d 575 (1971); Chambers v. Powell, 126 Ga. App. 393, 190 S.E.2d 823 (1972); Fox v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 130 Ga. App. 104, 202 S.E.2d 568 (1973); City of Atlanta v. Madaris, 130 Ga. App. 783, 204 S.E.2d 439 (1974); Fleming v. Phoenix of Hartford Ins. Co., 130 Ga. App. 771, 204 S.E.2d 460 (1974); Frost v. Morone, 130 Ga. App. 878, 204 S.E.2d 796 (1974); Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Miller, 131 Ga. App. 681, 206 S.E.2d 574 (1974); Greyhound Van Lines v. Collins, 132 Ga. App. 806, 209 S.E.2d 250 (1974); Hall v. West Point Pepperell, Inc., 133 Ga. App. 24, 209 S.E.2d 659 (1974); International Ins. Co. v. Whitfield, 135 Ga. App. 216, 217 S.E.2d 192 (1975); Miller v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 136 Ga. App. 101, 220 S.E.2d 89 (1975); Brown v. Lithonia Lighting Prods. Co., 138 Ga. App. 600, 226 S.E.2d 607 (1976)
Cotton States Ins. Co. v. Bates, 140 Ga. App. 428, 231 S.E.2d 445 (1976); Sprayberry v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 140 Ga. App. 758, 232 S.E.2d 111 (1976); Pike v. Greyhound Bus Lines, 140 Ga. App. 863, 232 S.E.2d 143 (1977); Carriers Ins. Co. v. McConnell, 141 Ga. App. 44, 232 S.E.2d 606 (1977); McElhannon v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 141 Ga. App. 169, 233 S.E.2d 28 (1977); Smith v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 141 Ga. App. 578, 234 S.E.2d 156 (1977); Hartford Ins. Co. v. White, 142 Ga. App. 307, 235 S.E.2d 740 (1977); Wills v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 143 Ga. App. 562, 239 S.E.2d 219 (1977); Jones v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 144 Ga. App. 460, 241 S.E.2d 578 (1978); Phinazee v. Boston Old Colony Ins. Co., 146 Ga. App. 175, 245 S.E.2d 857 (1978); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Walthall, 151 Ga. App. 372, 259 S.E.2d 647 (1979); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Smith, 151 Ga. App. 270, 259 S.E.2d 675 (1979); DeKalb County Merit Sys. v. Johnson, 151 Ga. App. 405, 260 S.E.2d 506 (1979); Employers Fire Ins. Co. v. Heath, 152 Ga. App. 185, 262 S.E.2d 474 (1979); Willis v. Holloway, 154 Ga. App. 3, 267 S.E.2d 795 (1980); Village Ctrs., Inc. v. DeKalb County, 248 Ga. 177, 281 S.E.2d 522 (1981); Roadway Express, Inc. v. Warren, 163 Ga. App. 759, 295 S.E.2d 743 (1982); Russell v. Fast Framers, Inc., 164 Ga. App. 771, 298 S.E.2d 303 (1982); City of Atlanta v. Walker, 169 Ga. App. 34, 311 S.E.2d 479 (1983); Dycol, Inc. v. Crump, 169 Ga. App. 930, 315 S.E.2d 460 (1984); Watkins Mem. Hosp. v. Chadwick, 171 Ga. App. 446, 319 S.E.2d 876 (1984); St. Regis Flexible Packaging Corp. v. Helm, 172 Ga. App. 251, 322 S.E.2d 549 (1984); C & G Clothing Co. v. Rowell, 173 Ga. App. 296, 325 S.E.2d 906 (1985); Keenan v. Jackson & Keenan Constr. Co., 175 Ga. App. 730, 334 S.E.2d 329 (1985); Clark v. Georgia Kraft Co., 178 Ga. App. 884, 345 S.E.2d 61 (1986); Wilson v. Manville Bldg. Materials Prods., Inc., 179 Ga. App. 408, 346 S.E.2d 851 (1986); McLean Trucking Co. v. Florence, 179 Ga. App. 514, 347 S.E.2d 333 (1986); Howard v. Superior Contractors, 180 Ga. App. 68, 348 S.E.2d 563 (1986); Fidelity & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Cigna/Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 180 Ga. App. 159, 348 S.E.2d 702 (1986); Ledbetter v. Pine Knoll Nursing Home, 180 Ga. App. 654, 350 S.E.2d 299 (1986); Galmon v. Seabreeze Mfg. Co., 181 Ga. App. 132, 351 S.E.2d 521 (1986); N.G. Gilbert Corp. v. Cash, 181 Ga. App. 775, 353 S.E.2d 840 (1987); Carrollton Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Brown, 185 Ga. App. 588, 365 S.E.2d 143 (1988); American Centennial Ins. Co. v. Flowery Branch Nursing Center, 258 Ga. 222, 367 S.E.2d 788 (1988); Levco Wood, Inc. v. Hudson, 186 Ga. App. 508, 367 S.E.2d 823 (1988); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Spell, 191 Ga. App. 851, 383 S.E.2d 207 (1989); AT & T Technologies v. Barrett, 195 Ga. App. 675, 395 S.E.2d 22 (1990); Coastal Transp. & Trading Co. v. Carpenter, 195 Ga. App. 789, 395 S.E.2d 266 (1990); Brown v. Transamerica IMS, 200 Ga. App. 272, 407 S.E.2d 430 (1991); Hall & Sosebee Trucking Co. v. Smith, 201 Ga. App. 282, 410 S.E.2d 784 (1991); Claxton Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 201 Ga. App. 371, 411 S.E.2d 109 (1991); Mintz v. Norton Co., 209 Ga. App. 109, 432 S.E.2d 583 (1993); Contract Harvesters v. Clark, 211 Ga. App. 297, 439 S.E.2d 30 (1993); Gaddis v. Georgia Mt. Contractors, 213 Ga. App. 126, 443 S.E.2d 710 (1994); Pitts v. Gofer Courier Serv., 216 Ga. App. 219, 453 S.E.2d 505 (1995); Crider's Furs, Inc. v. Atkinson, 221 Ga. App. 681, 472 S.E.2d 507 (1996); Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Arline, 225 Ga. App. 800, 484 S.E.2d 678 (1997); Logan v. St. Joseph Hosp., 227 Ga. App. 853, 490 S.E.2d 483 (1997); O'Kelley v. Hall County Bd. of Educ., 243 Ga. App. 522, 532 S.E.2d 427 (2000); AFLAC, Inc. v. Hardy, 250 Ga. App. 570, 552 S.E.2d 505 (2001); Atlas Constr. Co. v. Pena, 268 Ga. App. 566, 602 S.E.2d 151 (2004); Martines v. Worley & Sons Constr., 278 Ga. App. 26, 628 S.E.2d 113 (2006); Goswick v. Murray County Bd. of Educ., 281 Ga. App. 442, 636 S.E.2d 133 (2006); Flores v. Keener, 302 Ga. App. 275, 690 S.E.2d 903 (2010); Stokes v. Coweta County Bd. of Educ., 313 Ga. App. 505, 722 S.E.2d 118 (2012).
Transmittal of Record
Provision as to transmittal of papers directory.
- Provision in this section that in the event an appeal was filed from the award of the department (now board) to the superior court the department (now board) shall, within 30 days of filing of the appeal, transmit all papers and documents then on file in their office in the matter, was directory. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Nuckolls, 69 Ga. App. 649, 26 S.E.2d 473 (1943).
Appellant not charged with delay not caused by appellant or attorney.
- When neither appellant nor appellant's attorney was in any way connected with the delay in transmittal, so as to prevent the board from transmitting the appeal, the court should not make appellant or appellant's counsel suffer for such delay. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Nuckolls, 69 Ga. App. 649, 26 S.E.2d 473 (1943).
All papers on file properly transmitted.
- By virtue of this section, it was proper for the board to transmit certified copies of all papers on file in its department to the clerk of the superior court, even though such papers were not physically in the presence of the director at the hearing and were not formally introduced in evidence. Rourke v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 187 Ga. 636, 1 S.E.2d 728 (1939).
Findings and Awards, Generally
Board vested with exclusive authority to make findings.
- While a finding by the board of a beginning point for temporary total disability benefits might have been an oversight or a typographical error, the Court of Appeals could not substitute a finding of a date inasmuch as the exclusive authority to make findings of fact in claims under the Workers' Compensation Act, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq., is vested in the board. Holt's Bakery v. Hutchinson, 177 Ga. App. 154, 338 S.E.2d 742 (1985).
Court erred by substituting its own finding.
- Since the record contained some evidence to support the Board's finding, the court erred by substituting its own finding that the employee's left knee problems were first manifested on a much later date than determined by the Workers' Compensation Board. Baugh-Carroll v. Hospital Auth., 248 Ga. App. 591, 545 S.E.2d 690 (2001).
Trial court erred by reversing a decision denying the claim for workers' compensation benefits because the award was not legally erroneous and was supported by some evidence that the claimant failed to carry the burden of proving by a preponderance of competent and credible evidence that the former employer was the employer when last injuriously exposed to asbestos. McKenney's, Inc. v. Sinyard, 350 Ga. App. 260, 828 S.E.2d 639 (2019), cert. denied, No. S19C1348, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 25 (Ga. 2020).
Findings need to refer to all evidence.
- Superior court may remand a case to the board based upon uncertainty that all the evidence had been considered. Nevertheless, the mere failure to refer to all the evidence in the findings of fact does not establish that the board did not consider the evidence in its review of the matter. Henderson v. Mrs. Smith's Frozen Foods, 182 Ga. App. 829, 357 S.E.2d 271 (1987).
Conclusive if supported by any evidence.
- Trial court erred as a matter of law in reversing the award of the State Board of Workers' Compensation because there was some evidence to support the award of the Board. Harris v. Seaboard Farms, 207 Ga. App. 147, 427 S.E.2d 524 (1993).
Superior court's discretion not equivalent to that exercised on petitions for certiorari or motions for new trial.
- In considering an appeal from an award of the commission (now board), the judge of the superior court does not have that discretion to set aside an order or decree which the judge exercises in passing upon petitions for certiorari and motions for new trial. Macon v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 41 Ga. App. 774, 154 S.E. 702 (1930).
Discretion of the judge of the superior court on appeal from or award of the department (now board) is not the same as on a motion for new trial of a case tried before the judge. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Griggs, 48 Ga. App. 585, 173 S.E. 194 (1934).
Judge of the superior court cannot legally set aside an order or decree of the department (now board) when there is any competent evidence to sustain it; the judge does not have that discretion which the judge may exercise in passing upon a motion for a first new trial or a petition for certiorari when the evidence would have authorized a finding or judgment for either party. Peninsular Life Ins. Co. v. Brand, 57 Ga. App. 526, 196 S.E. 264 (1938).
Rule as to affirmance of first grant of new trial inapplicable.
- When finding of facts by the commission (now board) is not demanded as a matter of law, though being within its power, free from fraud and supported by evidence, holding of the superior court erroneously setting aside the finding, upon one of the grounds enumerated in Ga. L. 1920, p. 167, § 59 (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-105), should not be sustained by the Court of Appeals on the theory that it was the first grant of a new trial. Maryland Cas. Co. v. England, 160 Ga. 810, 129 S.E. 75 (1925).
Rule of the appellate courts, as to affirmance of the first grant of a new trial, is not to be applied to a judgment of the superior court setting aside an award of the department (now board). Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Griggs, 48 Ga. App. 585, 173 S.E. 194 (1934).
Discretion of judge of the superior court on appeal from an award of the board is not the same as on a motion for new trial of a case tried before the judge, and rule of the appellate courts as to affirmance of the first grant of a new trial is not to be applied to a judgment of the superior court setting aside such an award. Davis v. Bibb Mfg. Co., 75 Ga. App. 515, 43 S.E.2d 780 (1947). See also Macon v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 41 Ga. App. 774, 154 S.E. 702 (1930).
Power of the superior court to set aside an award of the board is not analogous to the power of the court to grant new trials, and an order of the court setting aside such an award should not be affirmed on the theory that it is the first grant of a new trial when the finding of the board was not demanded as a matter of law. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Wofford, 81 Ga. App. 421, 58 S.E.2d 853 (1950).
Newly discovered evidence is not a ground for setting aside an award, and when there is evidence in the record supporting the findings of fact and award as made, such findings and award may not be set aside merely to enable losing party to introduce additional evidence at another hearing. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Wofford, 81 Ga. App. 421, 58 S.E.2d 853 (1950).
Effect of newly discovered evidence.
- There is no provision of law authorizing judge of superior court to set aside award of the board on the ground of newly discovered evidence. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ragan, 191 Ga. 811, 14 S.E.2d 88 (1941).
In exercising appellate power granted to judges of the superior courts in regard to workers' compensation cases, such judges are not authorized to hear evidence, but must consider only the record on appeal; newly discovered evidence is not a statutory ground for reversal, for which reason it may not be considered. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Dimaio, 120 Ga. App. 214, 170 S.E.2d 258 (1969).
If there is any evidence in the record to support them, findings and award must be affirmed. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Mullis, 75 Ga. App. 233, 43 S.E.2d 122 (1947); McKerley v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 96 Ga. App. 723, 101 S.E.2d 103 (1957); Hudgens v. Meeks & Hammond Lumber Co., 97 Ga. App. 95, 102 S.E.2d 71 (1958); Troup County v. Henderson, 104 Ga. App. 29, 121 S.E.2d 65 (1961); Continental Cas. Co. v. Weise, 136 Ga. App. 353, 221 S.E.2d 461 (1975); Speight v. Container Corp. of Am., 138 Ga. App. 45, 225 S.E.2d 496 (1976); International Ins. Co. v. Bachelor, 143 Ga. App. 852, 240 S.E.2d 222 (1977).
If there is competent evidence in the record to sustain a general award denying compensation, not based on any particular unauthorized findings of fact, the reviewing court is without authority to set it aside; this is true even if some findings of fact by the board are unauthorized, whether based on findings not logically tenable or whether based on illegally admitted testimony or other evidence. Hayslip v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 72 Ga. App. 509, 34 S.E.2d 319 (1945).
When an award is in favor of the employer, the claimant cannot have it set aside if there is any evidence to support it; before claimant can reverse and set aside this award, a finding for compensation must be demanded by the evidence. Whitener v. Baly Tire Co., 98 Ga. App. 257, 105 S.E.2d 775 (1958).
When there is competent evidence to support a particular finding of fact, even though the board predicates its finding on an erroneous theory, the award will not be set aside. Skinner Poultry Co. v. Mapp, 98 Ga. App. 772, 106 S.E.2d 825 (1958).
When there is any evidence to sustain the findings of fact of a deputy director, a director (now member or administrative law judge), or the board, such findings and the award based thereon will not be disturbed by the courts. Samples v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 99 Ga. App. 41, 107 S.E.2d 574 (1959); Crawford W. Long Hosp. v. Mitchell, 100 Ga. App. 276, 111 S.E.2d 120 (1959).
When there is any evidence to support the award of the board, neither the superior court nor the Court of Appeals have any authority to review the evidence and decide that the weight of the evidence is contrary to the award; if authorized, the award must be affirmed, even though it was based on an erroneous finding and conclusion of fact. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 99 Ga. App. 124, 108 S.E.2d 180 (1959).
If an award of the board is authorized by any competent evidence, it must be affirmed even if the board or hearing director (now member or administrative law judge) considered illegal evidence or assigned erroneous reasons for the award, provided that the award was not based on an erroneous legal theory which precluded consideration by the board or hearing director of evidence which, if the evidence had been considered, would have authorized a contrary result. Miller v. Travelers Ins. Co., 111 Ga. App. 245, 141 S.E.2d 223 (1965).
Any competent supporting evidence is all that is required to sustain findings of fact and an award of the full board. Rosser v. Meriwether County, 125 Ga. App. 239, 186 S.E.2d 788 (1971).
Findings and award on same footing as jury verdict.
- With respect to the sufficiency of the evidence to support it, an award made by the commission (now board) stands in the Court of Appeals upon the same footing as the verdict of a jury approved by the trial judge in other cases. London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Shockley, 31 Ga. App. 762, 122 S.E. 99 (1924); Jackson v. Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co., 33 Ga. App. 35, 125 S.E. 515 (1924); Davis v. Bibb Mfg. Co., 75 Ga. App. 515, 43 S.E.2d 780 (1947).
Findings of fact made by the department (now board) within its powers are, in the absence of fraud, conclusive, provided there is any supporting evidence, and with respect to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain an award, such award stands in the Court of Appeals upon the same footing as the verdict of a jury approved by a trial judge. Burdett v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 40 Ga. App. 92, 149 S.E. 55 (1929); Liberty Lumber Co. v. Silas, 49 Ga. App. 262, 175 S.E. 265 (1934); Butler v. Mitchell, 49 Ga. App. 315, 175 S.E. 271 (1934).
With respect to the sufficiency of the evidence to support it, an award made by a single commissioner (now administrative law judge) of the commission (now board), approved by the superior court, stands in the Court of Appeals as the verdict of a jury approved by the trial judge does in other cases. Campbell Coal Co. v. Render, 48 Ga. App. 547, 173 S.E. 245 (1934).
Findings of fact of a single director of the department (now board), when approved on review by the full department (now board), stand in the Court of Appeals on the same footing as the verdict of a jury, and when supported by some competent evidence will not be disturbed. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Maddox, 52 Ga. App. 416, 183 S.E. 570 (1935).
On appeal to the superior court, an award of the board stands on the same footing as the verdict of a jury which is supported by some evidence and which has been approved by the trial judge. Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Jackson, 68 Ga. App. 447, 23 S.E.2d 191 (1942).
When the evidence was conflicting on the material issues involved in a workers' compensation action, and there was some competent evidence to support the findings and award of the board, the award could not be set aside by the Court of Appeals; such findings and award stand on the same footing as the verdict of a jury which is authorized by the evidence and approved by the court. Davis v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 72 Ga. App. 783, 35 S.E.2d 203 (1945).
Conclusive Effect of Findings or Award
Purpose of making findings of the commission (now board) upon facts conclusive was to avoid delay, which is often the subject of the complaint. Continental Cas. Co. v. Caldwell, 55 Ga. App. 17, 189 S.E. 408 (1936).
Neither superior court nor Court of Appeals may substitute itself as factfinder in lieu of the board. Atkinson v. Home Indem. Co., 141 Ga. App. 687, 234 S.E.2d 359 (1977).
The board, not the courts, constitutes the factfinding body and its findings of fact are not to be set aside because the reviewing court disagrees with the conclusions drawn therefrom. St. Paul Ins. Co. v. Henley, 141 Ga. App. 581, 234 S.E.2d 159 (1977).
When there is conflicting evidence the resolution of discrepancies and the determination of witnesses' credibility is ordinarily for the administrative law judge or the board as finders of fact. Only when there is plain error of fact or an error purely of law is an appellate court authorized to reverse the board's award. Carroll v. Dan River Mills, Inc., 169 Ga. App. 558, 313 S.E.2d 741 (1984).
Findings of fact are conclusive if supported by any evidence.
- Findings of the commission (now board) on questions of fact, if supported by any evidence, are conclusive. New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Sumrell, 30 Ga. App. 682, 118 S.E. 786 (1923); Independence Indem. Co. v. Sprayberry, 171 Ga. 565, 156 S.E. 230 (1930); Continental Cas. Co. v. Caldwell, 55 Ga. App. 17, 189 S.E. 408 (1936); Shivers v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 75 Ga. App. 409, 43 S.E.2d 429 (1947); Hamner v. White, 80 Ga. App. 648, 56 S.E.2d 653 (1949); Adams v. Johnson, 88 Ga. App. 94, 76 S.E.2d 135 (1953); Employees Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Young, 134 Ga. App. 369, 214 S.E.2d 381 (1975); Iso-Graphics, Inc. v. Evans, 205 Ga. App. 880, 424 S.E.2d 24 (1992); Smith v. Brown Steel, 232 Ga. App. 698, 503 S.E.2d 592 (1998).
Findings of facts by the board, in the absence of fraud, when supported by any evidence, are conclusive and cannot be reviewed by any court. New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Sumrell, 30 Ga. App. 682, 118 S.E. 786 (1923); London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Shockley, 31 Ga. App. 762, 122 S.E. 99 (1924); American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Adams, 32 Ga. App. 759, 124 S.E. 801 (1924); Jackson v. Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co., 33 Ga. App. 35, 125 S.E. 515 (1924); Integrity Mut. Cas. Co. v. Hankins, 33 Ga. App. 339, 126 S.E. 554 (1925); Maryland Cas. Co. v. England, 160 Ga. 810, 129 S.E. 75 (1925); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Hall, 34 Ga. App. 307, 129 S.E. 305 (1925); Macon v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 41 Ga. App. 774, 154 S.E. 702 (1930); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Wilson, 48 Ga. App. 34, 171 S.E. 827 (1933); Brown v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 49 Ga. App. 99, 174 S.E. 359 (1934); Scott v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 49 Ga. App. 157, 174 S.E. 629 (1934); Continental Cas. Co. v. Caldwell, 55 Ga. App. 17, 189 S.E. 408 (1936); Continental Cas. Co. v. Bennett, 69 Ga. App. 683, 26 S.E.2d 682 (1943); Young v. Demos, 70 Ga. App. 577, 28 S.E.2d 891 (1944); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Hopkins, 71 Ga. App. 175, 30 S.E.2d 357 (1944); Davis v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 72 Ga. App. 783, 35 S.E.2d 203 (1945); Stapleton v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 74 Ga. App. 86, 38 S.E.2d 848 (1946); Glens Falls Indem. Co. v. Clark, 75 Ga. App. 453, 43 S.E.2d 752 (1947); Hughes v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 76 Ga. App. 785, 47 S.E.2d 143 (1948); Johnson v. Fireman's Fund Indem. Co., 79 Ga. App. 187, 53 S.E.2d 204 (1949); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Braswell, 85 Ga. App. 487, 69 S.E.2d 385 (1952); Daniel v. Ford Motor Co., 88 Ga. App. 58, 76 S.E.2d 66 (1953); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Hammond, 90 Ga. App. 595, 83 S.E.2d 576 (1954); Dill v. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Co., 95 Ga. App. 60, 96 S.E.2d 638 (1957); Wiley v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 98 Ga. App. 241, 105 S.E.2d 377 (1958); Atlantic Co. v. Moseley, 99 Ga. App. 534, 109 S.E.2d 74, rev'd on other grounds, 215 Ga. 530, 111 S.E.2d 239 (1959); Wilkins v. Employers Mut. Liability Ins. Co., 101 Ga. App. 467, 114 S.E.2d 216 (1960); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Cox, 101 Ga. App. 789, 115 S.E.2d 452 (1960); Pan Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Cothran, 109 Ga. App. 332, 136 S.E.2d 163 (1964); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Childers, 110 Ga. App. 466, 138 S.E.2d 923 (1964); Jeffers v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 115 Ga. App. 528, 154 S.E.2d 801 (1967); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Hall, 128 Ga. App. 71, 195 S.E.2d 679 (1973); Dollar v. Hunt's Supermarket, 132 Ga. App. 5, 207 S.E.2d 208 (1974); Roberts v. L.B. Foster Co., 143 Ga. App. 880, 240 S.E.2d 235 (1977).
Findings of fact by the board within its power are, in the absence of fraud, binding and conclusive upon all the courts, if there is any evidence to support such findings. Home Indem. Co. v. Googe, 45 Ga. App. 302, 164 S.E. 479 (1932); Ballard v. Butler, 45 Ga. App. 837, 166 S.E. 220 (1932); Fralish v. Royal Indem. Co., 53 Ga. App. 557, 186 S.E. 567 (1936); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Holloway, 58 Ga. App. 542, 199 S.E. 334 (1938); McDonald-Haynes v. Minyard, 69 Ga. App. 479, 26 S.E.2d 138 (1943); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Blackshear, 197 Ga. 334, 28 S.E.2d 860 (1944); Givens v. Travelers Ins. Co., 71 Ga. App. 50, 30 S.E.2d 115 (1944); McClain v. Travelers Ins. Co., 71 Ga. App. 659, 31 S.E.2d 830 (1944); Redd v. United States Cas. Co., 83 Ga. App. 838, 65 S.E.2d 255 (1951); Borden Foods Co. v. Dorsey, 112 Ga. App. 838, 146 S.E.2d 532 (1965); Davidson v. Employers Ins., 139 Ga. App. 621, 229 S.E.2d 97 (1976).
Findings of fact made by the board, when authorized by any evidence, are binding upon the courts. Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Kiker, 45 Ga. App. 706, 165 S.E. 850 (1932); Great Am. Indem. Co. v. Mitchell, 49 Ga. App. 378, 175 S.E. 400 (1934); Fox v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 125 Ga. App. 285, 187 S.E.2d 305 (1972); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Purcell, 152 Ga. App. 279, 262 S.E.2d 566 (1979).
Findings on questions of fact by the department (now board) are conclusive when supported by the evidence, and the superior court is without authority to set aside those findings. Small v. Nu Grape Co. of Am., 46 Ga. App. 306, 167 S.E. 607 (1933).
When findings of facts by a single commissioner (now administrative law judge) were affirmed by the full commission (now board) with one dissent, and the matter was appealed to the superior court, when the findings of the commission (now board) were approved and the appeal overruled, there being evidence upon which to base such findings, they were, in the absence of fraud, binding upon the Court of Appeals, and would not be disturbed. Campbell Coal Co. v. Render, 48 Ga. App. 547, 173 S.E. 245 (1934).
Finding of single director (now member or administrative law judge) that there had been no change in condition of claimant is conclusive upon the superior court on appeal. Ingram v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 62 Ga. App. 789, 10 S.E.2d 99 (1940).
When there is evidence to support the findings of the board, the Court of Appeals is without authority to interfere with such findings. Smith v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 63 Ga. App. 898, 12 S.E.2d 366 (1940).
When findings of fact by the board are supported by any evidence, they are conclusive and must be affirmed by the court on appeal. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Sisson, 198 Ga. 623, 32 S.E.2d 295 (1944); Royal Indem. Co. v. Coulter, 213 Ga. 277, 98 S.E.2d 899 (1957), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Schwartz v. Greenbaum, 236 Ga. 476, 224 S.E.2d 38 (1976); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Gore, 153 Ga. App. 448, 265 S.E.2d 370 (1980).
If the findings of fact by the board are supported by some competent evidence, and, there is no fraud involved and the finding is not contrary to law, it is conclusive on the Court of Appeals. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Mullis, 75 Ga. App. 233, 43 S.E.2d 122 (1947).
When, after considering the whole record, the Court of Appeals is convinced that there is sufficient competent evidence to sustain the award of the hearing director and of the full board, that court is without authority to disturb the findings. Watkins v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 75 Ga. App. 462, 43 S.E.2d 549 (1947).
In the absence of fraud, findings of fact made by the director (now member or administrative law judge) and approved on appeal by the full board are binding on the courts if there is any evidence to support them, and when no error of law appears such findings will not be disturbed. United States Cas. Co. v. Kelly, 78 Ga. App. 112, 50 S.E.2d 238 (1948).
When there is evidence to sustain the ultimate finding of fact, the finding of the board should be affirmed. Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Gilliam, 88 Ga. App. 451, 76 S.E.2d 834 (1953).
Findings of fact by a director of the board, approved by the full board, are conclusive on appeal if supported by any competent evidence. Atlantic Co. v. Moseley, 215 Ga. 530, 111 S.E.2d 239 (1959).
Under this section, findings of fact made by the board should not be disturbed when they are supported by competent evidence. Johnson v. Great S. Trucking Co., 101 Ga. App. 472, 114 S.E.2d 209 (1960).
If there is any competent evidence in the record to support the findings of fact of the board in matters properly before it, the findings are conclusive on the courts on appeal. Holcombe v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 102 Ga. App. 587, 116 S.E.2d 891 (1960); McElreath v. McElreath, 155 Ga. App. 826, 273 S.E.2d 205 (1980).
Courts are bound by the findings of the board if there is any competent evidence to support them. Lyons v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 127 Ga. App. 268, 193 S.E.2d 244 (1972); Employees Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Young, 134 Ga. App. 369, 214 S.E.2d 381 (1975).
Findings of fact by a director (now member or administrative law judge) of the board, when supported by any evidence, are conclusive and binding upon the courts, and the judge of the superior court has no authority to set aside an award based on such findings merely because the judge disagrees with the conclusions reached therein. Lockhart v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 141 Ga. App. 476, 233 S.E.2d 810 (1977).
An award of the State Board of Workers' Compensation should be affirmed if there is any evidence to sustain it, even though the evidence is not altogether complete and satisfactory. Atkinson v. Home Indem. Co., 141 Ga. App. 687, 234 S.E.2d 359 (1977).
Finding of fact by an administrative law judge or the State Board of Workers' Compensation, when supported by any evidence, is conclusive and binding on a reviewing court. Home Indem. Co. v. Swindle, 146 Ga. App. 520, 246 S.E.2d 507 (1978).
Finding of fact by the board, when supported by any evidence, is conclusive and binding upon the court, and a judge of the superior court does not have authority to set aside an award based on those findings of fact. Banks v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 160 Ga. App. 18, 286 S.E.2d 309 (1981).
When the testimony of the claimant provided "any evidence" in support of the administrative law judge's and board's findings, the superior court erred in substituting its judgment for that of the board in weighing the credibility of the claimant's testimony, and finding no competent evidence in support of the board's award. Maddox v. Elbert County Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 191 Ga. App. 478, 382 S.E.2d 150, cert. denied, 191 Ga. App. 922, 382 S.E.2d 150 (1989).
In the absence of fraud, the findings of the board are conclusive and shall not be set aside unless it is found that there is not sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the board's decision. Elbert County Bd. of Comm'rs v. Burnett, 200 Ga. App. 379, 408 S.E.2d 168 (1991).
When the superior court could not conclude that evidence of claimant's prior neck/back injury had not been considered at all by the board, it was without authority to remand the case for a new analysis thereof. Porter v. Ingles Mkt., Inc., 219 Ga. App. 145, 464 S.E.2d 212 (1995).
When a workers' compensation claimant testified that a work-related injury occurred on a date prior to the date the claimant stopped working, this provided "any evidence" in support of the factual findings of an administrative law judge and the State Board of Workers' Compensation (board) that the injury occurred on the date to which the claimant testified; therefore, a trial court reviewing the board's decision was obligated to accept that finding and could not substitute its own judgment for that of the board, even though an expert witness testified that the claimant's compensable injury occurred on a later date. Oconee Area Home Care Servs. v. Burton, 275 Ga. App. 784, 621 S.E.2d 859 (2005).
While using a heating pad on a sore hip that had been injured in a work-related accident, a worker fell asleep and sustained third-degree burns to the hip. The Georgia State Board of Workers' Compensation properly ruled that the burn was not a compensable superadded injury as there was some evidence to support the Board's findings that the heating pad, which had not been prescribed by a physician, was not reasonable and necessary treatment under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-200(a), and that the burn was not a natural consequence of the hip injury. City of Atlanta v. Roach, 297 Ga. App. 408, 677 S.E.2d 426 (2009).
Finding is binding notwithstanding erroneous rulings on other matters.
- Fact that one or more of the facts found by the board are erroneously found does not necessarily mean that the finding as to the ultimate fact is harmful error. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Sisson, 198 Ga. 623, 32 S.E.2d 295 (1944).
Hearing director (now administrative law judge) acts in lieu of and for the board, and the director's findings of fact are conclusive unless set aside; hence, when the board does not set the findings aside but approves them and bases an improper ruling of law thereon, the superior court, in holding that the board made an erroneous ruling of law, is bound by the facts as found by the single director and adopted by the board. Automatic Sprinkler Corp. of Am. v. Rucker, 87 Ga. App. 375, 73 S.E.2d 609 (1952).
When the board makes a finding of fact which is supported by the evidence, such finding is conclusive and will not be reversed, even though the board has made other findings of fact not essential to the judgment of the case and not authorized by the evidence. Barbree v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 105 Ga. App. 186, 123 S.E.2d 905 (1962).
Unauthorized finding may be set aside.
- Finding of the director (now member or administrative law judge), if authorized by the evidence, is final and will not be set aside, but if the finding is not authorized by the evidence, or a different finding is demanded by the evidence, it may be set aside by the courts. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Curry, 187 Ga. 342, 200 S.E. 150 (1938).
Review by court of application of law to facts authorized.
- Department (now board), hearing claims under the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.), acts as a jury; however, assuming its findings of fact to be true, application of the law to these facts may be reviewed by the Court of Appeals. Scott v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 49 Ga. App. 157, 174 S.E. 629 (1934).
Legal precision and nicety are not to be insisted upon in findings of fact of the board, and that construction of the findings which would render the judgment valid should be adopted in preference to a construction which would render the judgment invalid, when the construction is reasonable and can fairly be applied. Employees Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Young, 134 Ga. App. 369, 214 S.E.2d 381 (1975).
When findings are demanded as matter of law.
- In order to render any finding of fact demanded as a matter of law, not only must there be no controversy in the evidence material to the issue involved, but the implications and inferences which logically and properly arise from the evidence must necessarily lead to only the one conclusion. Stapleton v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 74 Ga. App. 86, 38 S.E.2d 848 (1946); Coulter v. Royal Indem. Co., 95 Ga. App. 124, 97 S.E.2d 358, rev'd on other grounds, 213 Ga. 277, 98 S.E.2d 899 (1957).
Credibility and conflicts for determination by board.
- Weight and credit to be given to the testimony of witnesses and also the conflicts in the evidence are matters for determination by the board. B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Arnold, 88 Ga. App. 64, 76 S.E.2d 20 (1953); Wiley v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 98 Ga. App. 241, 105 S.E.2d 377 (1958).
Court of Appeals could not reverse finding by the board crediting testimony of a witness to the effect that claimant was not engaged in helping a fellow employee move a platform in connection with the moving of which claimant contended claimant was injured, even though there was testimony to the contrary. Hayslip v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 72 Ga. App. 509, 34 S.E.2d 319 (1945).
In awarding temporary disability benefits, an administrative law judge was permitted to rely on the claimant's testimony that the claimant was unable to perform the claimant's work for the employer due to the claimant's work-related injury in operating the employer's equipment and the appellate court lacked the authority to resolve the questions of credibility and conflicts in the evidence identified by the employer. Milliken & Co. v. Poythress, 257 Ga. App. 586, 571 S.E.2d 509 (2002).
Court of Appeals powerless to reverse findings based on opinion evidence.
- In a hearing before the board to determine whether there had been a change in condition of the claimant, when the only evidence as to the change was opinion evidence, the Court of Appeals was powerless to reverse findings of fact of the board when there was any legal evidence in the record to support its finding, in the absence of fraud. Evans v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 62 Ga. App. 666, 9 S.E.2d 706 (1940).
Province of board to resolve conflicts in medical testimony.
- In workers' compensation proceeding, it was within the province of the fact-finding board to pass upon those issues of fact which arose by reason of conflicts in the testimony of doctors who testified for the opposing parties. Chevrolet-Atlanta Div., GMC v. Nash, 81 Ga. App. 671, 59 S.E.2d 681 (1950).
Medical testimony that given event could have precipitated injury is sufficient to authorize finding that it did so, and will support an award of compensation even though the evidence shows that the injury could have had a different cause. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Hogue, 130 Ga. App. 844, 204 S.E.2d 760 (1974).
Award upheld when no evidence work caused heart attack.
- "Any evidence" rule precluded the superior court's reversal of the board's award, when there was ample evidence to support a finding that the deceased employee died of a heart attack and that the evidence did not show the work the employee did on the date of death was a precipitating or aggravating cause. G & H Loggins, Inc. v. Burch, 178 Ga. App. 28, 341 S.E.2d 868 (1986).
Award supported by doctors' testimony regarding heat stroke.
- Even though the preponderance of the medical evidence may have contradicted any causative relationship between the heat stroke suffered by the claimant while employed as a deputy sheriff and claimant's subsequent incapacitating mental/emotional condition, the opinions of two doctors, one of whom felt that there was a connection between the stroke and claimant's depression, and the other of whom noted the claimant's history of hypertension and recent strokes and concluded that the claimant was suffering from severe depression and anxiety secondary to medical problems, constituted the requisite "any evidence" to support the award. Walton County Bd. of Comm'rs v. Williams, 171 Ga. App. 779, 320 S.E.2d 846 (1984).
Finding as to adequate notice conclusive.
- When a finding of fact by the board on the question of adequate notice is supported by any evidence, though the evidence is in conflict, the finding is conclusive and on appeal must be affirmed by the court. Bryant v. J.C. Distribs., Inc., 108 Ga. App. 401, 133 S.E.2d 109 (1963).
Whether failure to give notice falls within exception as question of fact.
- Whether or not failure to give notice of accident comes within one of the exceptions set forth by former Code 1933, § 114-303 (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-80), so as to prevent such failure from operating as a bar to an award of compensation, was a question of fact to be determined by the board, and its finding upon that question of fact, if supported by the evidence, was, in the absence of fraud, conclusive. Kresge v. Holley, 104 Ga. App. 144, 121 S.E.2d 182 (1961).
Conclusive finding that employment contract was for service outside state.
- Finding of fact by deputy director (now member or administrative judge) and by the full board on appeal that the plaintiff's contract of employment was expressly for service exclusively outside of this state and hence that the board did not have jurisdiction of the case was conclusive on the superior court and Court of Appeals. Fenster v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 107 Ga. App. 821, 131 S.E.2d 564 (1963).
Conclusive effect of findings that claimant is employee entitled to compensation.
- When evidence authorizes an inference that a person is an employee entitled to compensation, a finding to that effect by the commission (now board) is conclusive and will not be set aside. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Bacon, 30 Ga. App. 728, 119 S.E. 458 (1923).
Finding of commission (now board) that beneficiary was an employee entitled to compensation is conclusive when authorized by the evidence. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Bacon, 30 Ga. App. 728, 119 S.E. 458 (1923).
If there is competent evidence in the record from which the board could have entered an award predicated on finding the fact that claimants were in fact employees then the award must stand. Malcom v. Sudderth, 98 Ga. App. 674, 106 S.E.2d 367 (1958).
Whether accident resulted in injury and arose out of and in course of employment are fact questions. Davidson v. Employers Ins., 139 Ga. App. 621, 229 S.E.2d 97 (1976).
When there is a conflict in the evidence, one view tending to establish that the accident was within the employment and the other negativing it, and the commission (now board) accepts one view rather than the other, its finding is conclusive. Southeastern Express Co. v. Edmondson, 30 Ga. App. 697, 119 S.E. 39 (1923).
There being some evidence in the case to substantiate the finding of fact of a single director (now member) of the department (now board), which was approved by the whole department (now board) and affirmed by the superior court, that claimant sustained an accident which arose out of and in the course of employment and was disabled from doing any kind of manual labor, then the Court of Appeals would not disturb those findings. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Brown, 48 Ga. App. 822, 173 S.E. 925 (1934).
When employee is injured in the scope of employment and the evidence before the board reflects that such was the case, the appellate court will not reverse that finding on appeal. Fulton County Civil Court v. Elzey, 101 Ga. App. 520, 114 S.E.2d 314 (1960).
Once a determination of the administrative law judge and the full board as to whether a person was acting in the course of the person's employment is made, it becomes conclusive and binding as to all questions of fact, so long as there is any evidence to support it. Lewis v. Maryland Cas. Co., 137 Ga. App. 842, 225 S.E.2d 91 (1976).
When the facts in a workers' compensation case are undisputed, question of whether the injury arose out of and in the course of employment is a question of law. Parker v. Travelers Ins. Co., 142 Ga. App. 711, 236 S.E.2d 915 (1977); McElreath v. McElreath, 155 Ga. App. 826, 273 S.E.2d 205 (1980).
Court will not disturb finding of board that injury occurred from "horseplay" on the job, when there was evidence to support such finding. Kight v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 141 Ga. App. 409, 233 S.E.2d 453 (1977).
In a workers' compensation case, after the hearing director (now administrative law judge) found that employee was injured when engaging in sport or "horseplay", and this finding was amply supported by the uncontradicted and uncontroverted testimony of the witness, under the "any evidence" rule this finding could not be set aside. Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Scott, 215 Ga. 491, 111 S.E.2d 223 (1959).
When evidence authorized finding that there was no causal connection between death of claimant and employment, that finding was conclusive and would not be reversed, even though the board made other findings of fact not essential to the judgment in the case and not authorized by the evidence. Samples v. Roadway Express Ins., 113 Ga. App. 391, 148 S.E.2d 198 (1966).
Willful misconduct or failure to use safety appliances as questions of fact.
- Whether an employee was guilty of willful misconduct or was guilty of willful failure or refusal to use safety appliances are questions of fact for the board, and the findings of the board upon these questions are final and will not be disturbed when supported by evidence. Herman v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 71 Ga. App. 464, 31 S.E.2d 100 (1944).
When full board has found that stated circumstances amounted to willful misconduct constituting the proximate cause of claimant's injuries, and have entered an award which was supported by some evidence, the Court of Appeals would not disturb such award. Goddard v. Jackson-Atlantic, Inc., 129 Ga. App. 68, 198 S.E.2d 699 (1973).
Whether particular job is within claimant's capacity is a factual determination within the province of the director (now administrative law judge) who has before the director testimony concerning the nature of the work, a complete medical report on the claimant, and the physical presence of claimant personally. Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Allen, 123 Ga. App. 741, 182 S.E.2d 508 (1971).
Finding of change of condition and increase in disability binding.
- Finding of the board that claimant's condition had changed and claimant's disability had increased was supported by the testimony of the physician designated by the board to examine claimant and by an observation of claimant's injury and disability by the director (now administrative law judge) on the hearing, and was binding on the Court of Appeals. London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Pittman, 69 Ga. App. 146, 25 S.E.2d 60 (1943).
When it is an open question under the evidence whether disability is attributable to a change in condition or is the result of another accident, and the board finds only a change in condition, and no error of law appears, neither the appellate court nor the lower court has any authority to disturb the action of the board. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Gattis, 119 Ga. App. 16, 165 S.E.2d 875 (1969).
Finding as to propriety of lump-sum award.
- When the evidence, although contradictory, is sufficient to authorize the essential finding of fact that a lump-sum award will be in the best interest of the employee or the employee's dependents, the lump-sum award will not be reversed by the courts, as the findings of fact made by the board within its power, in the absence of fraud, are conclusive. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Williams, 109 Ga. App. 719, 137 S.E.2d 391 (1964), overruled on other grounds, Johnson v. Atlanta Dairies Coop., 172 Ga. App. 403, 323 S.E.2d 185 (1984).
Findings of board that claimant has or has not carried burden of proof are binding on the courts if there is any evidence to sustain them. General Accident, Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Titus, 104 Ga. App. 85, 121 S.E.2d 196 (1961).
Burden of proof is on claimant to establish the fact the claimant has sustained an accidental injury such as is contemplated by the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.), and when the board finds as a fact that this burden has not been carried by claimant, this finding is binding on all courts when there is evidence in the record to support it. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Harden, 64 Ga. App. 593, 13 S.E.2d 685 (1941).
Although burden of proof is on claimant to show that the injury arose both out of and in the course of employment, finding by the board that claimant has carried such burden of proof is conclusive upon the courts if there is any evidence to support such finding. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Casey, 91 Ga. App. 694, 86 S.E.2d 697 (1955).
While burden of proof is on claimant to establish that employee sustained an accidental injury such as is contemplated by the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.), a finding of fact by a director (now member or administrative law judge) of the board that claimant has carried such burden is conclusive upon the courts if there is any evidence to support it. Truelove v. Hulette, 103 Ga. App. 641, 120 S.E.2d 342 (1961).
Board without authority to determine cessation of disability in advance.
- Superior court did not err in recommitting case to the board for the purpose of taking additional testimony on appeal of compensation award by employee, when employee had, subsequent to the board hearing, undergone a needed operation, for the reason that the board was without authority to determine in advance whether the operation would be successful or that disability would cease by a certain date. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Horton, 103 Ga. App. 171, 118 S.E.2d 597 (1961).
Board's award, when supported by any evidence, is conclusive and binding. Mansfield Enters., Inc. v. Warren, 154 Ga. App. 863, 270 S.E.2d 72 (1980).
Affirmation of award required when evidence exists.
- Judgment of superior court approving award must be affirmed when appellate court cannot say that there is no evidence to support the finding of the commission (now board). Maryland Cas. Co. v. Turk, 36 Ga. App. 199, 136 S.E. 87 (1926).
It is error for court to set aside award when there is sufficient competent evidence to sustain it. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Griggs, 48 Ga. App. 585, 173 S.E. 194 (1934); Milam v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Ga. App. 614, 7 S.E.2d 37 (1940); Frost v. Morone, 130 Ga. App. 878, 204 S.E.2d 796 (1974).
Award of the board based on any evidence is beyond the authority of the appellate court to disturb, except when fraud in its procurement is shown. Continental Cas. Co. v. Bennett, 69 Ga. App. 683, 26 S.E.2d 682 (1943).
Award made upon review by all the directors (now members) of the board, affirming an award by a single director upon issues of fact, is conclusive as to those issues if there is any evidence to sustain it; and, in the absence of fraud, such award cannot be set aside. Reeves v. Royal Indem. Co., 73 Ga. App. 2, 35 S.E.2d 473 (1945).
When there is any competent evidence to support an award of the board, in the absence of fraud, the superior court and Court of Appeals are without authority to set it aside. Watkins v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 75 Ga. App. 462, 43 S.E.2d 549 (1947).
Award made by the board, in the absence of fraud, is binding on all courts if there is any evidence to sustain it. Davis v. Bibb Mfg. Co., 75 Ga. App. 515, 43 S.E.2d 780 (1947).
In reviewing an award by the board denying compensation, the courts must affirm the award of the board if there is evidence favorable to the employer authorizing the award. Johnson v. Fireman's Fund Indem. Co., 79 Ga. App. 187, 53 S.E.2d 204 (1949).
Award made upon review by all the directors (now members) of the board, affirming an award by a single director upon issues of fact, is conclusive as to those issues, if there is any evidence to sustain it, and in the absence of fraud, such award cannot be set aside. Employers Ins. Co. v. Bass, 81 Ga. App. 306, 58 S.E.2d 516 (1950).
When appeal is based on ground that there is not sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant directors in making award complained of, the Court of Appeals will look to the record to see whether the award is supported by any competent evidence, and, when so supported, must affirm the order. Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Hall, 85 Ga. App. 574, 69 S.E.2d 802 (1952).
Award by a single director (now member), affirmed by the full board, is conclusive as to all issues of fact when there is any evidence to support the findings with respect thereto, and the Court of Appeals is without authority to interfere with such an award. Atlanta Newspapers, Inc. v. Clements, 88 Ga. App. 648, 76 S.E.2d 830 (1953).
When evidence authorized award of compensation by the full board to claimant, and no error of law appeared, trial court erred in reversing and setting aside such award of the full board, which affirmed the award of compensation by the single director. Thomas v. Fulton Bag & Cotton Mills, 89 Ga. App. 844, 81 S.E.2d 511 (1954).
When question is one of fact, award will be affirmed if there is any competent evidence to sustain it, or if the evidence, construed in the light most favorable to the employer, would authorize the award. Coulter v. Royal Indem. Co., 95 Ga. App. 124, 97 S.E.2d 358, rev'd on other grounds, 213 Ga. 277, 98 S.E.2d 899 (1957).
When there is any evidence to support an award of the full board, that award cannot, in the absence of some error of law, be reversed by the superior court or the appellate court on appeal. Short v. Glendale Mills, Inc., 95 Ga. App. 238, 97 S.E.2d 541 (1957).
When there is any evidence to support an award of the board, it will not be disturbed on review. Padgett v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 96 Ga. App. 463, 100 S.E.2d 150 (1957); Independent Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Craton, 102 Ga. App. 78, 115 S.E.2d 636 (1960); Bituminous Cas. Co. v. Sharpe, 128 Ga. App. 695, 197 S.E.2d 741 (1973); Pearce v. Pacific Employers Ins. Group, 131 Ga. App. 792, 207 S.E.2d 207 (1974).
Award of the board which is supported by any competent evidence must, in the absence of fraud or a mistake of law, be affirmed by the reviewing court. Hall v. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 96 Ga. App. 567, 101 S.E.2d 94 (1957).
When award did not show that it was based on any evidence which should not have been considered, and was based on some evidence, although such award may not have been demanded, neither the superior court nor the Court of Appeals was authorized to disturb it. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Doyle, 96 Ga. App. 745, 101 S.E.2d 600 (1957).
Award made on finding of facts, supported by any evidence, must be affirmed by the appellate court. Coulter v. Royal Indem. Co., 95 Ga. App. 124, 97 S.E.2d 358, rev'd on other grounds, 213 Ga. 277, 98 S.E.2d 899 (1957).
When award of the board is supported by any evidence, no error of law appearing, it must be affirmed on appeal. Milledgeville State Hosp. v. Norris, 101 Ga. App. 502, 114 S.E.2d 298 (1960).
Finding of fact by a director or deputy director (now member) of the board, when supported by any evidence and in the absence of fraud, is conclusive and binding upon the courts, and the judge of the superior court does not have any authority to set aside an award based on those findings of fact merely because the judge disagrees with the conclusions reached therein. Department of Revenue v. Graham, 102 Ga. App. 756, 117 S.E.2d 902 (1960).
When award of the board denying compensation is authorized by the evidence, and no error of law appears, judge of the superior court does not err in affirming such award on appeal. Dudley v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 115 Ga. App. 411, 154 S.E.2d 699 (1967).
When there is some evidence of probative value to show disability from an injury and to support an award, and no error of law appears, the Court of Appeals must affirm the order of the lower court. J.D. Jewell, Inc. v. Marchbanks, 119 Ga. App. 669, 168 S.E.2d 206 (1969).
In a workers' compensation case, the award of the board has the same effect as the verdict of a jury, and it must be upheld if there is "any evidence" to support it. Adams v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 125 Ga. App. 232, 186 S.E.2d 784 (1971); Lyons v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 127 Ga. App. 268, 193 S.E.2d 244 (1972).
Award of the board should and will be affirmed if there is any evidence to sustain it, even though the evidence is not altogether complete and satisfactory. Jackson v. Armstrong, 149 Ga. App. 617, 257 S.E.2d 46 (1979).
Because the finding of the Appellate Division of the State Board of Workers' Compensation that an employee's injuries were not catastrophic was supported by some evidence, the superior court erred in weighing the evidence and in substituting the court's judgment for that of the Appellate Division; the findings of an orthopedist who evaluated the employee and other doctors, together with a spine specialist's written assessment and testimony, provided evidence that at least by the time of the Appellate Division's judgment, the employee's back injury was not of a nature and severity that the injury prevented the employee from being able to perform any work available in substantial numbers within the national economy for which the employee was otherwise qualified. Bonus Stores, Inc. v. Hensley, 309 Ga. App. 129, 710 S.E.2d 201 (2011).
Board's award final when testimony would have supported finding either way.
- When testimony in a compensation hearing would have supported a verdict either way, the finding of the commission (now board) is final. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Reed, 56 Ga. App. 68, 192 S.E. 325 (1937).
Award, when possible, should be given construction which will uphold and validate it, rather than one which would defeat and invalidate it. Dixie-Cole Transf. Trucking Co. v. Fudge, 147 Ga. App. 306, 248 S.E.2d 694 (1978).
Recommitment, Remand, or Entry of Judgment
Superior court's authority limited.
- On appeal in a workers' compensation case, superior court has authority and jurisdiction only to affirm or reverse as a matter of law and sometimes to give directions. American Cas. Co. v. Harris, 96 Ga. App. 720, 101 S.E.2d 618 (1957).
Superior court may not vacate and set aside a corrected award of the Workers' Compensation Board as being null and void and of no effect whatsoever. Denton v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 158 Ga. App. 849, 282 S.E.2d 350 (1981).
A trial court acted outside the scope of its authority, as set forth in O.C.G.A. § 34-9-105, by vacating a decision of the state board of workers' compensation that had denied benefits to a claimant, as there was evidence to support the decision in that none of the claimant's treating doctors had diagnosed the claimant with a work-related injury. YKK (USA), Inc. v. Patterson, 287 Ga. App. 537, 652 S.E.2d 187 (2007).
Trial court followed an improper procedure when it remanded a workers' compensation case to the original ALJ who had decided the case and bypassing the state board of workers' compensation as O.C.G.A. § 34-9-105(c) set forth when the trial court was authorized to set aside an award, based on specific grounds, and its authority to recommit the controversy to the board only for further hearing or proceedings. YKK (USA), Inc. v. Patterson, 287 Ga. App. 537, 652 S.E.2d 187 (2007).
Definite determination of jurisdiction required.
- Superior court committed error when in considering whether it had jurisdiction over an appeal to determine the propriety of the Workers' Compensation Board's inaction, it merely ordered that if one alternative analysis was correct the board was to commence review of the appeal, but if the second alternative analysis was correct, the order was of no force and effect; the court must make a determination as to its jurisdiction and if jurisdiction is established it must either affirm, reverse, or remand the claim to the board. Forsyth County Bd. of Educ. v. Trusty, 184 Ga. App. 193, 361 S.E.2d 55 (1987).
Correction of record to reflect timely remand order.
- Superior court's remand order was not null and void, even though it was not entered within 20 days of the hearing as required by O.C.G.A. § 34-9-105(b), when the court corrected the record to reflect that the order was filed the day it was rendered, which was within the 20-day statutory period. Sunbelt Specialties v. Keith, 201 Ga. App. 167, 410 S.E.2d 364 (1991).
This section required the court to affirm an award if not set aside on one or more statutory grounds. Butler v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 88 Ga. App. 620, 76 S.E.2d 813 (1953).
If there was any evidence to sustain the findings of fact of the board, the appellate courts will not set the award aside in the absence of one or more of the grounds enumerated in this section. Fulmer v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 85 Ga. App. 102, 68 S.E.2d 180 (1951).
Superior court may set aside an award and remand case with instructions to the board, but it can do so only upon one or more of the grounds specified in former Code 1933, § 114-710 (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-105). Butler v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 88 Ga. App. 620, 76 S.E.2d 813 (1953).
When findings of the board were authorized by the evidence and the award was not erroneous for any of the reasons set out in this section, it was error for the superior court, on appeal, to remand the case for the taking of further testimony and, in effect, to set the award aside. Butler v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 88 Ga. App. 620, 76 S.E.2d 813 (1953).
Court of Appeals will not upset findings of fact or conclusions of the full board except upon the clear statutory grounds set forth in this section. Independent Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Craton, 102 Ga. App. 78, 115 S.E.2d 636 (1960).
While the findings of fact of the board are conclusive and binding if supported by any competent evidence, courts are authorized to set aside an award in five enumerated situations. Holcombe v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 102 Ga. App. 587, 116 S.E.2d 891 (1960).
On review of an award by the board, the superior court can only reverse the award for one of the reasons provided by this section. Callaway Mills Co. v. Hurley, 104 Ga. App. 811, 123 S.E.2d 7 (1961).
Upon appeal from an order of the board granting or denying compensation, the decision of the board cannot be set aside if there was any evidence to support it, unless one or more of the grounds of reversal authorized in this section was present. American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Gay, 104 Ga. App. 840, 123 S.E.2d 287 (1961).
Under this section, the court must affirm the award unless it was set aside on one or more of the statutory grounds stated therein; the order of the court remanding the case to the board, in the absence of setting aside the award on one of the statutory grounds, was therefore unauthorized. Maczko v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 116 Ga. App. 247, 157 S.E.2d 44 (1967).
Findings of fact by the board, supported by any evidence, were conclusive and binding on the courts on appeal, and in the absence of any error in the record for any of the reasons stated in this section, the superior court had no authority to sustain an appeal and remand the controversy to the board for further proceedings. Haney v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 117 Ga. App. 221, 160 S.E.2d 211 (1968).
This section provided that the finding of fact made by the members of the board within their power shall, in the absence of fraud, be conclusive, but that, upon appeal, the superior court shall set aside the order or decree of the members of the board if any one or more of five listed conditions appeared in the record of the case. Roper Corp. v. Reynolds, 142 Ga. App. 402, 236 S.E.2d 103 (1977).
Grounds for setting aside award.
- When the facts found by the director do not support the order or decree or when there is not sufficient competent evidence to warrant them in making the award complained of, or when the directors acted without or in excess of their powers, or when the award was procured by fraud, the superior court should set such award aside on appeal, and the appellate court will affirm that judgment. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Maddox, 52 Ga. App. 416, 183 S.E. 570 (1935).
Judge of the superior court may reverse the award on the ground that the facts found do not support the order or decree; the judge may also, in such case, enter up a proper judgment upon the findings of fact as made. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp. v. Hollifield, 93 Ga. App. 51, 90 S.E.2d 681 (1955).
Court of Appeals may set aside an order of the board if there is no sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the order or decree, of if the order or decree is contrary to law. Parks v. American Fid. & Cas. Co., 97 Ga. App. 833, 104 S.E.2d 624 (1958).
Because the Appellate Division of the State Board of Workers' Compensation misconstrued the legal framework for determining whether an injury arose out of employment and, therefore, rendered a decision contrary to law, the superior court was authorized to set aside the Appellate Division's decision under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-105(c)(5), and reinstate the claimant's award. Cartersville City Schs. v. Johnson, 345 Ga. App. 290, 812 S.E.2d 605 (2018), cert. denied, No. S18C1069, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 699 (Ga. 2018).
Recommitment to board is proper when award has not been filed and a copy thereof has not been sent to the parties at dispute. Free v. Associated Indem. Corp., 78 Ga. App. 839, 52 S.E.2d 325 (1949).
Recommitment when board has failed to weigh all evidence.
- Whenever the courts feel that in making findings of facts the board has failed to weigh all the evidence, the practice has been generally to recommit the case to the board for further consideration. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Merritt, 124 Ga. App. 42, 183 S.E.2d 73 (1971).
When there was doubt as to whether certain medical testimony was considered, the case would be reversed with direction that it be remanded to the board for further consideration. West Point Pepperell, Inc. v. Payne, 151 Ga. App. 541, 260 S.E.2d 412 (1979).
No authority to remand for further medical evidence when evidence supports award.
- When award of the board is supported by any evidence, the superior court is without authority to set it aside and remand to the board for the taking of further medical evidence. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Hogue, 130 Ga. App. 844, 204 S.E.2d 760 (1974).
Trial court erred in remanding the case to the appellate division on grounds that newly discovered medical evidence existed since the record contained sufficient evidence to support the award made. Moffitt Constr., Inc. v. Barnes, 263 Ga. App. 175, 587 S.E.2d 293 (2003).
Remand for correction of undisputed misstatement of fact.
- When there is an undisputed misstatement of fact in award, which court cannot say is immaterial as a matter of law, the case should be remanded to the board to correct its finding and make an award with the correct finding taken into consideration. Assurance Co. of Am. v. Shepherd, 155 Ga. App. 36, 270 S.E.2d 268 (1980).
Remand is not proper when there is some evidence in the record supporting the findings of fact by the administrative law judge or the board. Ansa Mufflers Corp. v. Law, 192 Ga. App. 45, 383 S.E.2d 574, cert. denied, 192 Ga. App. 901, 383 S.E.2d 574 (1989).
Remand for further findings when award based on erroneous legal theory.
- When it affirmatively appears from the award in a workers' compensation proceeding that the award is based upon an erroneous legal theory, and that for that reason the board or hearing director has not considered all of the evidence in light of correct and applicable legal principles, the case should be remanded to the board for further findings. Barbree v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 105 Ga. App. 186, 123 S.E.2d 905 (1962); Miller v. Travelers Ins. Co., 111 Ga. App. 245, 141 S.E.2d 223 (1965); Commonwealth Ins. Co. v. Arnold, 112 Ga. App. 140, 144 S.E.2d 194 (1965); GMC v. Hargis, 114 Ga. App. 143, 150 S.E.2d 303 (1966); Clark v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 131 Ga. App. 809, 207 S.E.2d 222 (1974); Mansfield Enters., Inc. v. Warren, 154 Ga. App. 863, 270 S.E.2d 72 (1980).
When workers' compensation case was decided on an erroneous legal theory, the board acted in excess of its powers, and judgment of the superior court reversing the board and remanding must be affirmed. Zurich Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 123 Ga. App. 582, 181 S.E.2d 923 (1971), later appeal, 127 Ga. App. 113, 192 S.E.2d 533 (1972).
Reversal of award based on erroneous conclusion from law and facts.
- Finding of facts of the board is controlling in the superior court and on the Court of Appeals in the absence of fraud, when such finding is supported by any competent evidence, but when the board arrives at an award by basing such findings on an erroneous conclusion drawn from the facts and the law applicable thereto, that award may be reversed by the superior court. Parks v. American Fid. & Cas. Co., 97 Ga. App. 833, 104 S.E.2d 624 (1958).
When an award of the board is supported by competent evidence, neither the superior court nor the Court of Appeals may disturb the award, but an award of that board based on an erroneous conclusion of law must be reversed. Shore v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 102 Ga. App. 431, 116 S.E.2d 526 (1960).
Award affirmed by operation of law.
- Award of State Board of Workers' Compensation was affirmed by operation of law when signed order of superior court reversing the award was not entered within the 20-day time limit of O.C.G.A. § 34-9-105. Buschel v. Kysor/Warren, 213 Ga. App. 91, 444 S.E.2d 105 (1994); MacKenzie v. Sav-A-Lot Food Store, 226 Ga. App. 32, 485 S.E.2d 559 (1997); Pine Timber Trucking Co. v. Teal, 230 Ga. App. 362, 496 S.E.2d 270 (1998).
Motion seeking recommitment on ground of newly discovered evidence properly dismissed.
- Motion seeking to have case recommitted to the department (now board) for further hearing because of alleged newly discovered evidence, purpose of which was evidently to procure another hearing or trial before the department (now board), would be declined. Continental Cas. Co. v. Caldwell, 55 Ga. App. 17, 189 S.E. 408 (1936).
Remand for taking of additional evidence as to whether injury arose in course of employment.
- When award of the board was set aside by the superior court on the ground that the evidence did not authorize the finding that injury to the employee arose out of and in the course of employment, it was within the power of the court to recommit the controversy, under this section, for the sole purpose of the hearing of additional evidence on whether the injury arose out of and in the course of employment, even when additional evidence could have been discovered and presented at the first trial before the board in the exercise of ordinary diligence by claimant. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Cox, 191 Ga. 143, 11 S.E.2d 661, answer conformed to, 63 Ga. App. 763, 12 S.E.2d 110 (1940).
Setting aside of award when only one legal conclusion possible.
- When there is no conflict in the evidence, and but one legal conclusion can be reached therefrom, namely, that the accident causing injury to claimant did not arise out of and in course of employment, award by the board granting compensation must be set aside by the court on proper appeal. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Fulmer, 81 Ga. App. 97, 57 S.E.2d 865 (1950), later appeal, 85 Ga. App. 102, 68 S.E.2d 180 (1951).
Error to refer case back for additional findings when findings supported by competent evidence.
- Judge of superior court erred in referring case back to the full board with authority to find facts different from those findings made by the single director (now member or administrative law judge) when the only findings of facts were those of the single director, which were, in effect, approved by the full board; it is the duty of the superior court and appellate court to sustain the findings of facts by the single director if there is any competent evidence to support such findings. Automatic Sprinkler Corp. of Am. v. Rucker, 87 Ga. App. 375, 73 S.E.2d 609 (1952).
If there are no findings upon which award may be made, judge should remand the case to the board with direction that it hear evidence on the matter. General Accident, Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Titus, 104 Ga. App. 85, 121 S.E.2d 196 (1961).
Superior court, in reversing an award of the board, may in a proper case enter final judgment upon the findings of fact as made by the board; however, if there are no findings of fact upon which an award may be made, the superior court must remand the case to the board for the purpose of making findings of fact and, when necessary, to hear new evidence. Employees Ins. Co. v. Amerson, 109 Ga. App. 275, 136 S.E.2d 12 (1964).
Superior court was without authority to remand award to board for additional findings when there was evidence to support the award. Randall & Lewis Lumber Co. v. Randall, 177 Ga. App. 665, 340 S.E.2d 644 (1986).
Courts may not substitute own judgments on facts.
- It is improper for the judge of the superior court and the judges of the Court of Appeals to presume to substitute their judgments for the judgment of the deputy director or directors (now members) of the board on the facts of the case, and no ruling can be made by a court on what that judgment should or should not be. Department of Revenue v. Graham, 102 Ga. App. 756, 117 S.E.2d 902 (1960).
However strongly the judge of the superior court and judges of the Court of Appeals might feel constrained to disagree with the award of the deputy director (now member or administrative law judge) no power resides in the courts to substitute their judgment for that of the deputy director; the weight and credit to be given to expert testimony is a question exclusively for decision by the fact-finding tribunal. Department of Revenue v. Graham, 102 Ga. App. 756, 117 S.E.2d 902 (1960).
Judge of the superior court may reverse the decision of the board on the grounds stated in this section, but may not make findings of fact and enter an award thereon. General Accident, Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Titus, 104 Ga. App. 85, 121 S.E.2d 196 (1961).
Nothing for judge to base judgment on absent findings by board.
- On appeal from decision of the board to the superior court, judge thereof is not vested with any fact-finding power, and hence when the board on its de novo trial of claim for compensation neither adopted deputy director's (now member's or administrative law judge's) findings of fact as its own nor made its own independent findings of fact as it was authorized to do, there was nothing on which judge could base a final judgment awarding compensation to claimant. Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. West, 213 Ga. 296, 99 S.E.2d 89 (1957).
Reversal when award demanded by evidence.
- Even though the board held that injury to claimant was not compensable, the superior court judge did not err in reversing that finding on the ground that the evidence demanded a finding that the employee was entitled to compensation under the workers' compensation law (see now O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1 et seq.). Columbia Cas. Co. v. Parham, 69 Ga. App. 258, 25 S.E.2d 147 (1943).
Judge of the superior court did not err in setting aside award denying compensation when claimant was entitled to compensation as a matter of law under the record. Manufacturers Cas. Ins. Co. v. Mansfield, 78 Ga. App. 248, 50 S.E.2d 370 (1948).
Recommitment or remand not necessary when findings require denial.
- When the findings made require denial of compensation, the case need not be recommitted or remanded to the board, because the findings made eliminate the necessity of considering any further findings. GMC v. Martin, 119 Ga. App. 279, 167 S.E.2d 211 (1969).
Authority to render final judgment when question is one of law.
- Superior court has jurisdiction and authority on appeal to render final judgment on findings of fact by the board, sustained by evidence, and it is not required that the case be remanded to the board for further action in accordance with the opinion and judgment of that court, when the question is purely one of law and there are no further facts to be determined by the board. Georgia Ins. Serv. v. Lord, 83 Ga. App. 28, 62 S.E.2d 402 (1950).
Entry of judgment on reversal of award based on erroneous conclusion.
- On appeal of claimant from an award made on an erroneous basis, superior court is authorized to enter proper final judgment upon the findings as made. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Brock, 35 Ga. App. 772, 135 S.E. 103 (1926), rev'd on other grounds, 165 Ga. 771, 142 S.E. 101 (1928).
When award of the board is based on an erroneous conclusion drawn from the facts and the law applicable thereto, it is proper for judge of the superior court to reverse such award and enter such judgment in the case as is proper under the law and the facts as disclosed by the record in the case. Glens Falls Indem. Co. v. Clark, 75 Ga. App. 453, 43 S.E.2d 752 (1947); Automatic Sprinkler Corp. of Am. v. Rucker, 87 Ga. App. 375, 73 S.E.2d 609 (1952); Coulter v. Royal Indem. Co., 95 Ga. App. 124, 97 S.E.2d 358, rev'd on other grounds, 213 Ga. 277, 98 S.E.2d 899 (1957); Crawford W. Long Hosp. v. Mitchell, 100 Ga. App. 276, 111 S.E.2d 120 (1959).
Court without authority to render judgment pursuant to lump-sum agreement not approved by board.
- When the department (now board) makes an award in favor of claimant for compensation payable in a certain amount weekly during disability, the superior court has no authority or jurisdiction, on appeal, to render final judgment for a lump sum in favor of claimant in full and final settlement of the claim, pursuant to agreement of the parties not approved by the department (now board). Department of Indus. Relations v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 177 Ga. 669, 170 S.E. 883, answer conformed to, 47 Ga. App. 553, 171 S.E. 169 (1933); Wilkins v. Travelers Ins. Co., 52 Ga. App. 142, 182 S.E. 628 (1935).
Superior court has no power to reverse an award of the board based upon sufficient competent evidence, nor to render an award by consent of the parties after they enter into a lump sum settlement without authority from the board. King v. Fulton Bag & Cotton Mills, 99 Ga. App. 340, 108 S.E.2d 765 (1959).
Award may not be set aside because of introduction of hearsay testimony. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Griggs, 48 Ga. App. 585, 173 S.E. 194 (1934).
Admission of hearsay over a party's objection would not justify setting aside a finding of the commission (now board) that work was not being done through an independent contractor. Davis v. Menefee, 34 Ga. App. 813, 131 S.E. 527 (1926).
Precise deficiencies to be pointed out in recommitting case.
- When superior court, in reviewing the findings of the commission (now board), recommits the controversy to the commission (now board) for further hearing or proceedings, it is essential that the judgment be accompanied by an opinion directing the attention of the commission (now board) to the precise errors to be cured or the precise deficiencies to be supplied upon reconsideration of the case. Austin Bros. Bridge Co. v. Whitmire, 31 Ga. App. 560, 121 S.E. 345 (1924).
Judgment recommitting case sufficiently indicated question for determination on another hearing before commission (now board) when it recited that the evidence was insufficient to establish dependency for a period of three months prior to the injury and was not sufficiently definite and clear as to expense of last illness and funeral bills and directed the commission (now board) to receive testimony as to these amounts. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Bartlett, 37 Ga. App. 777, 142 S.E. 189 (1928).
Board confined by specific instructions of court on recommitment.
- When, on appeal, superior court recommits a case to the department (now board) for a further hearing, with specific instructions as to the scope and character of the new hearing, this judgment confines the department (now board), upon another hearing of the case, to a determination of the questions directed by the court. Woodruff v. Miller, 48 Ga. App. 305, 172 S.E. 738 (1934).
Award properly upheld.
- When order of the commission (now board) denying compensation was not erroneous upon a given ground and was not affected by an erroneous finding as to lack of notice, it would be sustained irrespective of any error affecting a finding that there was a lack of notice. Maryland Cas. Co. v. England, 34 Ga. App. 354, 129 S.E. 446 (1925).
When findings of fact by the board were not inconsistent, supported the award, and were themselves supported by evidence, superior court did not err in denying an appeal from the board's award of death benefits to claimant. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. King, 88 Ga. App. 176, 76 S.E.2d 81 (1953).
Remand or reversal held improper.
- When there was evidence authorizing finding by the board that there had been no change in claimant's physical condition since a previous award of compensation, and there were facts and circumstances which authorized the board to determine that claimant was justified in refusing to submit oneself to another examination by a physician, the superior court erred in setting aside the finding and award of the board and remanding the case to the board with instructions that payments of compensation to claimant be suspended until claimant complied with the employer's request to submit to examination. Daniel v. Ford Motor Co., 88 Ga. App. 58, 76 S.E.2d 66 (1953).
When there is some evidence to support determination of the board that condition of claimant has improved to the extent that claimant is no longer entitled to compensation, the action of the superior court on appeal in reversing the award of the board is unauthorized. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Hendrix, 119 Ga. App. 770, 168 S.E.2d 862 (1969).
Denial of compensation properly set aside.
- Denial of compensation for the death of an employee, when the evidence was that death resulted from tuberculosis which the employee had in a latent stage, but which flared into activity as a result of an injury arising out of and in the course of employment, was properly set aside by the superior court. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Maddox, 52 Ga. App. 416, 183 S.E. 570 (1935).
Reversal of judgment when not supported by evidence.
- Judgment of the superior court affirming award of the commission (now board) in a case when the evidence failed to show that death of deceased arose out of and in course of employment would be reversed upon appeal to the Court of Appeals. Georgia Cas. Co. v. Kilburn, 36 Ga. App. 761, 138 S.E. 257 (1927).
Remand for further consideration held proper.
- When hearing director (now administrative law judge) applied strict rules covering compensation for hernia cases, whereas deceased died of coronary occlusion, and did not show relationship between accident and operation on one hand and operation and coronary occlusion on the other, hearing director made a mistake in considering the facts, and it was within the jurisdiction of the appellate court to remand the case to the board for further consideration. Parks v. American Fid. & Cas. Co., 97 Ga. App. 833, 104 S.E.2d 624 (1958).
Remand for proper findings required.
- When finding of a single director (now member or administrative law judge) that the director did not know what blinded claimant but that it had its beginning in an accident and injury sustained in the course of employment and resulting in total loss of an eye was not supported by other findings of facts, the superior court erred in failing to sustain appeal of insurance carrier on ground that the facts found did not support the award, and in failing to remand the case to the full board to make proper findings of fact based on the evidence. Fireman's Fund Indem. Co. v. Peeples, 97 Ga. App. 896, 104 S.E.2d 664 (1958).
Remand for introduction of new evidence improper absent motion.
- Superior court did not err in failing to remand an appeal to the full board for introduction of new evidence by the employer when it did not appear on the record that any motion to that effect had been made. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Nix, 141 Ga. App. 342, 233 S.E.2d 468 (1977).
Case was remanded for further proceedings when the superior court erred in substituting its findings of fact for those of the full board so as to mandate an ultimate award in favor of the employee. Department of Pub. Safety v. Boatright, 188 Ga. App. 612, 373 S.E.2d 770 (1988).
Remand not warranted by insignificant factual misstatements.
- Factual misstatements contained in the award regarding the results of an electromyelogram (EMG) study and the date when surgery was performed were not of such significance as to warrant a remand. Chevrolet-Pontiac-Canada Group, GMC v. Millar, 182 Ga. App. 889, 357 S.E.2d 598 (1987).
Award of attorney's fees held unsupported by evidence.
- It is error for the board to treat an award for temporary total disability as though it were for permanent total disability and to award as attorney's fees in a lump sum the final one-third of the maximum benefits which could possibly accrue, as it is possible that compensation awarded as attorney's fees might never become due; hence, the court would hold that the award of attorney's fees in the lump sum was without evidence to support it. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Fuller, 102 Ga. App. 384, 116 S.E.2d 628 (1960).
Appellate division properly substituted its own findings.
- Judgment setting aside the appellate division's decision was reversed because as to the medical benefits issue, the appellate division found that the ALJ's award did not meet the evidentiary standards of O.C.G.A. § 34-9-103(a) due to lack of evidence of disability, substituted the court's own alternative findings, and ruled that the claimant was not entitled to ongoing medical benefits, which findings could not be disturbed since there was evidence to support the findings. J&R Schugel Trucking, Inc. v. Logan, 336 Ga. App. 899, 785 S.E.2d 581 (2016).
Supersedeas
Only effect of supersedeas under this section was to divest the board of jurisdiction with respect to enforcement of the judgment appealed from, so that pending adjudication in the Court of Appeals of the issue, any attempted exercise of jurisdiction affecting the rights of the parties as determined by the judgment appealed from is coram non judice and void. Ingram v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 63 Ga. App. 493, 11 S.E.2d 499 (1940).
With respect to particular issue determined.
- Pending appeal, supersedeas provided by this section related only to suspension of jurisdiction with respect to the particular issue determined by the judgment appealed from. Ingram v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 63 Ga. App. 493, 11 S.E.2d 499 (1940).
Application based on change in condition since hearing not precluded by pendency of appeal.
- Pendency in the Court of Appeals of appeal from judgment of the superior court affirming the board in denying an increase in compensation on account of an alleged change in condition since original award does not deprive the board of jurisdiction to entertain another application from claimant for additional compensation on account of a change in condition arising since the hearing upon which the award appealed from was based. Ingram v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 63 Ga. App. 493, 11 S.E.2d 499 (1940).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d.
- 82 Am. Jur. 2d, Workers' Compensation, § 632 et seq.
C.J.S.- 100A C.J.S., Workers' Compensation, § 1299 et seq.
ALR.
- Denial of review of facts on appeal from commission or other body established under Workmen's Compensation Act as denial of due process of law, 39 A.L.R. 1064.
Constitutionality, construction, application, and effect of provisions of Workmen's Compensation Acts in relation to costs or expenses on appeal or review, 79 A.L.R. 678.
Disregard of rules of evidence or rules for examination of witnesses which obtain in court trials as affecting conclusiveness of decision of commissioner or arbitrator under Workmen's Compensation Law, 87 A.L.R. 777.
Res judicata as regards decisions or awards under Workmen's Compensation Acts, 122 A.L.R. 550.
Right of one who is excluded or ignored by bureau's award of compensation to another to appeal therefrom, 128 A.L.R. 1490.
Workmen's compensation: character or status of right or claim within provision of act requiring or authorizing approval by the court or commission of settlement or compromise, 153 A.L.R. 285.
Workmen's compensation: time and jurisdiction for review, reopening, modification, or reinstatement of award or agreement, 165 A.L.R. 9.
Attorneys' fee awards under 5 USCS § 7701(g), which allows award of attorneys' fees to prevailing employee for appeal to merit systems protection board from adverse employment decision, 143 A.L.R. Fed. 145.