No person who commits murder or voluntary manslaughter or who conspires with another to commit murder shall receive any benefits from any insurance policy on the life of the deceased, even though the person so killing or conspiring be named beneficiary in the insurance policy. A plea of guilty or a judicial finding of guilt not reversed or otherwise set aside as to any of such crimes shall be prima-facie evidence of guilt in determining rights under this Code section. All right, interest, estate, and proceeds in such an insurance policy shall go to the other heirs of the deceased who may be entitled thereto by the laws of descent and distribution of this state, unless secondary beneficiaries be named in the policy, in which event such secondary beneficiaries shall take.
(Code 1933, § 56-2506, enacted by Ga. L. 1960, p. 289, § 1.)
Cross references.- Homicide generally, § 16-5-1 et seq.
Law reviews.- For annual survey of insurance law, see 56 Mercer L. Rev. 253 (2004). For note, "Vesting Title in a Murderer: Where is the Equity in the Georgia Supreme Court's Interpretation of the Slayer Statute in Levenson?," see 45 Ga. L. Rev. 877 (2011).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Primary purpose of this section is to reduce the profits of crime. National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Thornton, 125 Ga. App. 589, 188 S.E.2d 435 (1972).
Murderer of insured cannot claim proceeds of policy on insured's life.
- There exists throughout the United States a common-law principle that one who has murdered an insured cannot thereafter claim the proceeds of the policy of insurance on the victim's life. Moore v. Moore, 228 Ga. 489, 186 S.E.2d 531 (1971).
It is a well settled rule that a beneficiary in a life insurance policy who murders or feloniously causes the death of the insured forfeits all rights which the beneficiary may have in or under the policy. This rule is based upon public policy and upon the principle that no one shall be allowed to benefit from his or her own wrong; it is applicable in both state and federal jurisdictions. Moore v. Moore, 228 Ga. 489, 186 S.E.2d 531 (1971).
Language was the same in both Ga. L. 1960, p. 289,
§ 1 and former Code 1933, § 113-909 (see O.C.G.A. § 33-25-13). - Former Code 1933, § 113-909 could or could not throw the assets there specified into the estate, depending upon the instrument executed by the decedent, but if the assets were a part of the estate, then the right to administer the assets was in the administrator or executor but former Code 1933, §§ 56-905 and 56-2505 (see O.C.G.A. § 33-25-11) specifically excluded the proceeds of life insurance policies made payable to beneficiaries (other than the insured, the insured's administrator, or the person procuring the policy) from the estate and established the right of the beneficiary as paramount to that of creditors and representatives of the insured. National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Thornton, 125 Ga. App. 589, 188 S.E.2d 435 (1972).
Rights of those who kill by accident or negligence not impaired.
- Statutes that embody the public policy of Georgia of prohibiting wrongdoers from profiting from their crimes, O.C.G.A. §§ 17-14-31,33-25-13, and53-1-5, only prevent those who feloniously and intentionally kill, O.C.G.A. § 53-1-5(a), or those who commit murder or voluntary manslaughter, O.C.G.A. § 33-25-13, from sharing, respectively, in the decedent's estate or insurance policy proceeds; if a public policy may be gleaned from these statutes, it is a policy that prohibits those who commit murder or voluntary manslaughter from profiting from the victim's death, but these statutes do not impair the rights of those who kill by accident or negligence, who kill in self-defense or pursuant to any other legal justification, or who kill while legally insane because simply admitting to having committed a homicide does not make one a wrongdoer under Georgia law. Bruscato v. O'Brien, 307 Ga. App. 452, 705 S.E.2d 275 (2010).
Insured must affirmatively indicate that estate is intended as beneficiary.
- Legislative scheme under former Code 1933, § 56-2506 (see O.C.G.A. § 33-25-13) and former Code 1933, § 113-909 was clear that, unless the insured affirmatively indicated that the estate was intended as beneficiary, the policy proceeds go to the beneficiary as against the claims of creditors or personal representatives of the deceased; this was generally true even when no beneficiary was named in the policy but a statute indicated for whose benefit the proceeds were to be used in such event. National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Thornton, 125 Ga. App. 589, 188 S.E.2d 435 (1972).
Payment to insured's estate when insured killed beneficiary and then committed suicide.
- When insured could have changed beneficiary at any time, this section does not prohibit the payment of proceeds from life insurance policies to the insured's estate when the insured killed the policies' beneficiary and then committed suicide. Willis v. Frazier, 128 Ga. App. 748, 197 S.E.2d 830 (1973).
Evidence of conviction.
- Certified copies of judgment entered on a cobeneficiary's manslaughter conviction in the death of the insured was prima facie evidence of cobeneficiary's guilt and sufficient to establish that cobeneficiary was not entitled to life insurance benefits. Stephens v. Adkins, 214 Ga. App. 653, 448 S.E.2d 734 (1994).
Under O.C.G.A. § 33-25-13, an individual's conviction in a criminal prosecution for a murder or voluntary manslaughter of an insured may serve as prima facie evidence of guilt in a civil proceeding brought pursuant to § 33-25-13 upon either the exhaustion of the individual's right to a direct appeal or the expiration of time within which a first direct appeal could have been timely filed; this construction furthers the public policy upon which § 33-25-13 is based, to insure that the individual shall not be allowed to benefit from the individual's own wrong, and affords the individual the opportunity to challenge a criminal conviction through a direct appeal before imperiling the individual's rights to any insurance benefits. Slakman v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 277 Ga. 189, 587 S.E.2d 24 (2003).
Because a husband had been convicted of killing his wife, the estate executors were entitled to summary judgment for an order of distribution of life insurance proceeds under O.C.G.A. § 33-25-13. The husband's criminal conviction was prima facie evidence under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-3 (see O.C.G.A. § 24-14-3) that he was guilty of his wife's murder for the purpose of determining that he could not receive proceeds of an insurance policy on her life. Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Adamo, 286 Fed. Appx. 625 (11th Cir. 2008)(Unpublished).
Certified copy of spouse's involuntary manslaughter conviction may not be considered as evidence that the spouse was innocent of an intentional homicide. Neal v. Neal, 160 Ga. App. 771, 287 S.E.2d 109 (1982).
When substantial fact issues existed as to whether an insurance policy provision transferring ownership to the insured was activated in an apparent murder/suicide case, and whether the insured had murdered the insured's spouse, the owner of the policy, it was error of the court to grant summary judgment. Bland v. Ussery, 172 Ga. App. 131, 322 S.E.2d 335 (1984).
Existence of genuine issue of fact as to whether beneficiary was perpetrator.
- Summary judgment was improperly granted to a beneficiary in an insurer's interpleader action to determine whether the beneficiary was entitled to the life insurance policy proceeds of the insured, the beneficiary's wife, because evidence that the insured died of a gunshot wound while in Mexico, that the beneficiary was carrying a gun while in Mexico, and that the beneficiary lied about the insured's cause of death created a genuine issue of fact as to whether the beneficiary's recovery was barred under O.C.G.A. § 33-25-13; the fact that the beneficiary had been acquitted of the insured's murder had no impact on the outcome of the civil case because the civil case had a different burden of proof. Cantera v. Am. Heritage Life Ins. Co., 274 Ga. App. 307, 617 S.E.2d 259 (2005).
Murder-suicide.
- When the risk for which the insured and insurer contracted included coverage only for accidental injury and excluded coverage for the intentional acts of a named beneficiary, the intentional homicide of one spouse by the other, suicidal spouse, a named beneficiary, was excluded from coverage under the contract terms and no proceeds were due to the victim's estate. Continental Cas. Co. v. Young, 181 Ga. App. 791, 354 S.E.2d 1 (1987).
Cited in Fannin v. Fannin, 133 Ga. App. 681, 212 S.E.2d 16 (1975); Stephens v. Adkins, 226 Ga. App. 648, 487 S.E.2d 440 (1997); Tolbert v. State, 282 Ga. 254, 647 S.E.2d 555 (2007); Levenson v. Word, 294 Ga. App. 104, 668 S.E.2d 763 (2008).
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Proceeds from state life insurance policy not payable to murderer.
- When the surviving spouse of a state employee has been convicted of the employee's murder, and the surviving spouse was the beneficiary in the employee's state life insurance policy, the proceeds should be paid to the employee's estate, rather than to the surviving spouse; survivor's benefits under the retirement system, however, must be paid to the surviving spouse. 1972 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U72-61.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d.
- 44A Am. Jur. 2d, Insurance, §§ 1671 et seq., 2028.
C.J.S.- 46 C.J.S., Insurance, § 1231.
ALR.
- Effect of unsuccessful attempt to change beneficiary of life insurance, 24 A.L.R. 750.
Construction and effect of provision relieving insurer if insured dies by hand of beneficiary, "except by accident,", 28 A.L.R. 832.
Right to proceeds of life insurance, as between estate of murdered insured and alternative beneficiary named in policy, where murderer was made primary beneficiary, 26 A.L.R.2d 987.
Killing of insured by beneficiary as affecting life insurance or its proceeds, 27 A.L.R.3d 794.