(3.1) "Automated claims adjudication system" means a preprogrammed computer system designed for the collection, data entry, calculation, and final resolution of property insurance claims used only for portable electronics as defined in paragraph (1) of subsection (d) of Code Section 33-23-12 which:
(10.1) "Limited subagent" means an individual licensed on behalf of a licensed agent pursuant to Code Section 33-23-12.
(Code 1981, §33-23-1, enacted by Ga. L. 1992, p. 2830, § 1; Ga. L. 1995, p. 1011, §§ 1, 2; Ga. L. 1999, p. 878, § 2; Ga. L. 2001, p. 925, § 1; Ga. L. 2008, p. 1076, § 1/SB 113; Ga. L. 2012, p. 1350, §§ 3, 4, 5/HB 1067; Ga. L. 2012, p. 1040, §§ 4, 5, 6/SB 203; Ga. L. 2014, p. 181, §§ 1, 2/HB 610.)
Law reviews.- For annual survey of real property law, see 68 Mercer L. Rev. 231 (2016).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Editor's notes.
- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Civil Code 1910, § 2443 and former Code 1933 §§ 56-501, 56-502, and 56-508 are included in the annotations for this Code section.
Constitutionality.
- Part of former Civil Code 1910, § 2443, defining who is an agent, was not unconstitutional because it impaired the obligation of contracts. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. v. Walker, 150 Ga. 163, 103 S.E. 407 (1920) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 2443).
Person authorized to solicit applications is "agent."
- Person who had no authority to make, alter, vary, or discharge any policy contract, but was a soliciting or special agent with authority to solicit applications for insurance and to offer all such applications to the company, was an agent of the insurance company. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Harrington, 75 Ga. App. 759, 44 S.E.2d 457 (1947) (decided under former Code 1933, § 56-502).
Corporation may not be agent.
- There is no decision which has construed the word "individual" as used in defining agent to include a corporation. Robinson v. Franwylie, Inc., 145 Ga. App. 507, 244 S.E.2d 73 (1978) (decided under former Code 1933, § 56-801).
Bankruptcy debtors who administered employment benefit plans were fiduciaries for purposes of nondischargeability of debts to the plans under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) as licensed insurance agents since O.C.G.A. § 33-23-35(b) created an express statutory trust, and the debtors' administration of the plans through a corporation did not abrogate the debtors' fiduciary status as individuals under O.C.G.A. § 33-23-1. Nat'l Air Traffic Controllers Assoc. v. Davenport (In re Davenport), Bankr. (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Sept. 6, 2007).
Employer obtaining group insurance is insurer's agent in effectuating policy.
- Employer who obtains a group policy of insurance covering an employee is, for the purpose of doing every act necessary to effectuate the purpose of the policy, the agent of the insurance company issuing the policy. Cason v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 91 Ga. App. 323, 85 S.E.2d 568 (1954).
City as agent.
- Former Code 1933, § 56-2301 (see O.C.G.A. § 33-24-34), when construed with the statute existing at the time of its enactment, former Code 1933, § 56-501 (see O.C.G.A. § 33-23-1), indicated that cities were empowered to enter into agreements with insurance companies to furnish such insurance in the same manner and in the same capacity as would a nongovernmental employer, i.e., as an agent of the insurance company. Cason v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 91 Ga. App. 323, 85 S.E.2d 568 (1954).
Employer's knowledge may estop insurer to interpose defense.
- When an insurance company, through the agency of the deceased's employer, had knowledge that the deceased was ineligible for insurance under the policy increase certificate issued to the deceased and, in these circumstances, had accepted the premiums necessary to keep the certificate, the insurance company was estopped to interpose the defense that the deceased was not entitled to protection under the certificate. Cason v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 91 Ga. App. 323, 85 S.E.2d 568 (1954) (decided under former Code 1933, § 56-501).
Representative of master policyholder represents insurer, not insured, in attempting to cancel coverage.- When an insurance company had issued a master policy of group life insurance to an incorporated association, when a representative of the association wrote a letter notifying a partner that none of the members of the partnership were entitled to a $10,000.00 policy under the master policy, the author of the letter was not acting as the agent of the insured rather than the insurance company when the author wrote the letter, since in this state the association was the agent of the insurance company and not of the insured; the action of the association's representative did not cancel out the $10,000.00 policy. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Burch, 293 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1961) (decided under former Code 1933, § 56-501).
Person administering group policy need not be licensed as agent.
- Effect of former paragraph (b)(2) was that a person who served the master policyholder in administering the details of group insurance was exempted from the licensing requirements of these statutes. Piedmont S. Life Ins. Co. v. Gunter, 108 Ga. App. 236, 132 S.E.2d 527 (1963) (decided under former Code 1933, § 56-801).
Section does not affect application and policy provisions as to agent's authority.- Provisions defining who are agents of an insurance company as a part of an act designed to make insurance companies and the companies' agents qualify and obtain certificates before the Insurance Commissioner and pay certain fees, but not attempting to define the authority of any agent, does not affect the provisions of the application and policy touching the authority of agents. Saul v. New York Life Ins. Co., 92 F.2d 665 (5th Cir. 1937) (decided under former Code 1910, § 2443).
Section does not make soliciting agent officer of company.
- This section which, in effect, makes a soliciting agent of an insurance company its agent for all purposes does not go to the extent of making a soliciting agent an officer of the company authorized to create a new contract, which would be necessary to validate reinstatement of a lapsed policy on false evidence of insurability, contrary to the provisions of the policy. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Odom, 93 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 566, 58 S. Ct. 948, 82 L. Ed. 1532 (1938) (decided under former Code 1933, § 56-501).
Section does not authorize agent to issue oral binder.
- Even if the acts of a party were such as to bring the party within the statutory definition of an agent under the provisions of former paragraph (a)(3) of former Code 1933, § 56-801 (see O.C.G.A. § 33-23-1), this would not automatically clothe the party with power to issue a valid oral binder as recognized under Ga. L. 1960, p. 289, § 1 (see O.C.G.A § 33-24-33(a)). Southeastern Fid. Fire Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 118 Ga. App. 861, 165 S.E.2d 887 (1968) (decided under former Code 1933, § 56-801).
Every person procuring property insurance for another is not made insurer's agent.
- It cannot be said that every person who procures insurance to cover the property of another is the agent of the company from whom the insurance is purchased and not the person for whom the insurance is sought. Georgia Ins. Serv., Inc. v. Wise, 97 Ga. App. 461, 103 S.E.2d 445 (1958) (decided under former Code 1933, § 56-501).
Broker is agent of insurer, not insured, under section.
- It seems to be necessary under former paragraph (a)(4) that an independent broker be the agent of the insured rather than the insurer. Canal Ins. Co. v. Lawson, 123 Ga. App. 376, 181 S.E.2d 91 (1971) (decided under former Code 1933, § 56-801).
Cited in Kennesaw Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Hendricks, 108 Ga. App. 148, 132 S.E.2d 152 (1963); Kelley v. Montgomery, 108 Ga. App. 271, 132 S.E.2d 857 (1963); Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Nash, 228 Ga. 719, 187 S.E.2d 662 (1972); Stewart v. Georgia Mut. Ins. Co., 159 Ga. App. 91, 282 S.E.2d 728 (1981); Seals v. Hygrade Distrib. & Delivery Sys., Inc., 249 Ga. App. 574, 549 S.E.2d 412 (2001).
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Editor's notes.
- In light of the similarities of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1933, §§ 56-501 and 56-801 are included in the annotations for this Code section.
Teachers collecting applications and premiums from pupils not agents.- When folders are being distributed by the county superintendent of schools to all of the superintendent's teachers, who in turn distribute the folders to the school children who return the application and the premium to the teachers, who are required to complete the applications and keep a record of the applications, this is not doing an insurance business through unlicensed agents. 1957 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 165 (decided under former Code 1933, § 56-501).
Person selected in law firm as attorney-in-fact for court bonds is "limited agent."- All types of court bonds were included in the definition given in former paragraph (a)(9) of this section, and the individual selected in a law firm as an attorney-in-fact would be a "limited agent." 1963-65 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 133 (decided under former Code 1933, § 56-801).
Authority of unlicensed administrative personnel.- Administrative personnel in the office of an insurance agent who perform clerical duties of opening envelopes containing premium checks need not be licensed as insurance agents. 1994 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U94-15.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d.
- 43 Am. Jur. 2d, Insurance, § 109 et seq.
C.J.S.- 44 C.J.S., Insurance, §§ 65, 259 et seq., 305.
ALR.
- Whom does agent represent in soliciting or taking application for reinstatement of insurance policy, 23 A.L.R. 1201.
Right of insurer to challenge agent's classification of risk, 29 A.L.R. 99.
Meaning of term "solicit" in statute relating to insurance agents, 48 A.L.R. 1173.
Statutory declaration that one who does certain prescribed acts for a surety company or an insurance company shall be deemed as acting as its agent as affected by other party's knowledge of, or opportunity to know, limitations of his actual authority, 88 A.L.R. 291.
Right of insurance company, in view of its public interest, to reject applications for insurance, 107 A.L.R. 1421; 123 A.L.R. 139.
Insured's responsibility for false answers inserted by insurer's agent in application following correct answers by insured, or incorrect answers suggested by agent, 26 A.L.R.3d 6.
Excess carrier's right to maintain action against primary liability insurer for wrongful failure to settle claim against insured, 10 A.L.R.4th 879.