However, if such device shall be required as a result of a new road being constructed over an existing railroad, 100 percent of such cost shall be the responsibility of the department, county, or municipality involved; and, if such device shall be required as the result of a new railroad, 100 percent of such cost shall be the responsibility of the railroad.
(Ga. L. 1927, p. 299, §§ 3, 7; Code 1933, §§ 95-1903, 95-1907; Code 1933, § 95-1907.1, enacted by Ga. L. 1967, p. 458, § 1; Code 1933, § 95A-1014, enacted by Ga. L. 1973, p. 947, § 1; Ga. L. 2008, p. 497, § 2/HB 426.)
Cross references.- Further provisions regarding installation of protective devices at grade crossings, § 46-8-194 et seq.
Editor's notes.- Ga. L. 2008, p. 497, § 1/HB 426, not codified by the General Assembly, provides that: "The General Assembly is interested in increasing safety at railroad crossings, especially crossings used by school buses, and therefore finds that certain legislation may enhance such safety."
Law reviews.- For comment, "Commercial Transportation," see 69 Mercer L. Rev. 1087 (2018).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Editor's notes.
- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under Ga. L. 1967, p. 433, which was subsequently repealed but was succeeded by provisions in this Code section, are included in the annotations for this Code section.
Common law action against railroad precluded.
- Georgia Code of Public Transportation, O.C.G.A. § 32-1-1 et seq., precluded a common law cause of action against a railroad for the failure to install adequate protective devices at a grade crossing on a public road since the railroad had not been requested to do so by the appropriate governmental entity. Southern Ry. v. Georgia Kraft Co., 188 Ga. App. 623, 373 S.E.2d 774 (1988).
Because the Georgia Code of Public Transportation, O.C.G.A. § 32-1-1 et seq., abrogated any common law duty on the part of defendant railroad to install adequate signal equipment at a railroad crossing where the driver's car was struck by a train, the common law negligence claim asserted by plaintiffs, the driver's survivors, was dismissed for failure to state a claim; under O.C.G.A. § 32-6-51, the railroad company would have acted in violation of Georgia law if the company erected traffic signals on the public road unless the company was required or authorized to do so by § 32-6-51(d), O.C.G.A. § 32-6-50, or some "other law," and O.C.G.A. § 32-6-200 delegated responsibility for the installation of protective devices on public roads to the appropriate governmental entity. Bentley v. CSX Transp., Inc., 437 F. Supp. 2d 1327 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
Applicability to private crossings.
- O.C.G.A. § 32-6-200 relates to the installation of protective devices at grade crossings on the state highway system, the county road systems, and the municipal street systems, but, by the statute's terms, not to the installation of protective devices at private crossings. Central of Ga. R.R. v. Markert, 200 Ga. App. 851, 410 S.E.2d 437 (1991), cert. denied, 200 Ga. App. 895, 410 S.E.2d 437 (1991), but see CSX Transp., Inc. v. Trism Specialized Carriers, Inc., 9 F. Supp. 2d 1374 (N.D. Ga. 1998), aff'd, 182 F.3d 788 (11th Cir. 1999).
Absence of private crossings from the ambit of O.C.G.A. § 32-6-200 merely shows that there is no statutory duty as to the installation of protective devices at such crossings, and that railroads may not be held negligent per se as to the installation of protective devices at such crossings. It does not establish that there is no common law duty as to the installation of protective devices at such crossings so that railroads may not be held liable for common law negligence with regard to the installation of protective devices at such crossings. Central of Ga. R.R. v. Markert, 200 Ga. App. 851, 410 S.E.2d 437 (1991), cert. denied, 200 Ga. App. 895, 410 S.E.2d 437 (1991), but see CSX Transp., Inc. v. Trism Specialized Carriers, Inc., 9 F. Supp. 2d 1374 (N.D. Ga. 1998), aff'd, 182 F.3d 788 (11th Cir. 1999).
Municipal traffic protection requirements.
- Section provides sole and exclusive method whereby a municipality may require traffic protection at a grade crossing. Georgia S. & Fla. Ry. v. Odom, 242 Ga. 169, 249 S.E.2d 545 (1978).
Constitutionality of municipal ordinance.
- Municipal ordinance requiring flag person to be placed at grade crossing violates the Georgia Constitution. Georgia S. & Fla. Ry. v. Odom, 242 Ga. 169, 249 S.E.2d 545 (1978).
Unsafe conditions.
- Authority of a railroad to initiate certain curative action for a potentially unsafe condition was affirmatively redelegated in O.C.G.A. § 32-6-200, and, thus, the common-law duties the railroad owed to motorists regarding unsafe conditions was not contradicted or placed exclusively on governmental entities. Fortner v. Town of Register, 278 Ga. 625, 604 S.E.2d 175 (2004).
City has no duty of care with regard to automatic signals at railroad crossings except, in the city's judgment, to require installation of the signals. Hancock v. City of Dalton, 131 Ga. App. 178, 205 S.E.2d 470 (1974) (decided under Ga. L. 1967, p. 433).
O.C.G.A. § 32-6-200 creates no affirmative duty on behalf of a municipality to install protective devices, and when the city had provided a cross buck and stop sign in the exercise of the city's discretionary judgment, the city was not liable for the city's failure to install additional signs. Biggers ex rel. Key v. Southern Ry., 820 F. Supp. 1409 (N.D. Ga. 1993), but see CSX Transp., Inc. v. Trism Specialized Carriers, Inc., 9 F. Supp. 2d 1374 (N.D. Ga. 1998), aff'd, 182 F.3d 788 (11th Cir. 1999).
City's failure to enforce ordinance does not constitute nuisance.
- Failure of city to enforce the city's ordinance requiring signals at all railroad crossings or terms of contract to pay for installation of signals does not involve maintenance of a nuisance. Hancock v. City of Dalton, 131 Ga. App. 178, 205 S.E.2d 470 (1974) (decided under Ga. L. 1967, p. 433).
Condition of zoning ordinance upheld.
- Condition of a zoning ordinance requiring an auction company to pay for traffic signals at a railroad crossing on a road leading to the company's property did not violate O.C.G.A. § 32-6-200; the statute does not prevent a county from requiring, as a condition of zoning, that a landowner reimburse the county for the county's share of the costs associated with the acquisition and installation of protective devices. Combs v. Atlanta Auto Auction, Inc., 287 Ga. App. 9, 650 S.E.2d 709 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1876, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 156 (Ga. 2008).
Trial court erred by denying the railroad's motion for summary judgment on the plaintiffs' claims based on inadequate signage at the railroad crossing and the decision to reopen the roadway because it was the Georgia Department of Transportation's responsibility to designate the location for, and the manner of placement of, the traffic control devices and signage. DOT v. Delor, 351 Ga. App. 414, 830 S.E.2d 519 (2019), cert. denied, No. S20C0086, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 260 (Ga. 2020).
Jury instructions.- In a wrongful death action, the district court did not err by instructing the jury concerning the railroad's duty to maintain traffic control devices because taking all of the instructions together, the jury was properly informed that the railroad could not be held liable for the decision about which warning device to put in place or continue in place, but the railroad could be held liable for any failure to repair an existing warning light. Wright v. CSX Transp., Inc., 375 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2004).
Cited in Murray v. Ga. DOT, 284 Ga. App. 263, 644 S.E.2d 290 (2007).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
- Customary or statutory signal from train as measure of railroad's duty as to warning at highway crossing, 5 A.L.R.2d 112.