(Code 1981, §29-2-8, enacted by Ga. L. 2004, p. 161, § 1.)
Law reviews.- For annual survey article discussing wills, trusts and administration of estates, see 52 Mercer L. Rev. 481 (2000). For article, "Wills, Trusts & Administration of Estates," see 53 Mercer L. Rev. 499 (2001).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Editor's notes.
- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former O.C.G.A. § 29-4-4.1 are included in the annotations for this Code section.
Best interest standard requires clear and convincing evidence of harm to the child.
- Best interests of the child standard in O.C.G.A. § 29-2-8(b) required a guardian to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the child would suffer physical or emotional harm if custody were awarded to the biological parent and that continuation of the guardianship would promote the child's welfare and happiness. With this narrowing construction, the best interest of the child standard in § 29-2-8(b) was constitutional. Boddie v. Daniels, 288 Ga. 143, 702 S.E.2d 172 (2010).
In a mother's petition to terminate her parents' temporary guardianship over her child under O.C.G.A. § 15-11-14, the trial court erred in failing to consider whether the grandparents proved by clear and convincing evidence that termination would cause the child physical or long-term emotional harm; therefore, remand was required for further consideration. In the Interest of K. M., 344 Ga. App. 838, 811 S.E.2d 505 (2018).
Petition to terminate temporary guardianship denied.
- Mother's petition to terminate the temporary guardianship was properly denied because the temporary guardian and the temporary guardian's wife had been the caretakers of the child for the vast majority of the child's life, since the mother gave the child up; the child had formed a psychological bond with the temporary guardian and the wife, calling them "mommy" and "daddy," while referring to the mother by the mother's first name; the mother had emotionally, physically, and financially neglected the child for the vast majority of the child's life; and continuation of the temporary guardianship would best promote the child's welfare and happiness given that the child had bonded with, and thrived in the care of, the temporary guardian. In the Interest of J. L., 352 Ga. App. 125, 834 S.E.2d 141 (2019).
Temporary guardianship dissolved.
- Under former O.C.G.A. § 29-4-4.1(c), the trial court correctly dissolved guardianship under former § 29-4-4.1 since guardianship at time of its creation was intended to be or was represented to be temporary in nature. Hays v. Jeng, 184 Ga. App. 157, 360 S.E.2d 913 (1987) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 29-4-4.1)
Appointment to provide health insurance denied.
- Since the child was living with the mother, who was not alleged to be incompetent or under any duress or difficulty with respect to her parental responsibilities, the court properly refused to appoint a temporary guardian solely for the provision of health insurance. In re Roscoe, 242 Ga. App. 440, 529 S.E.2d 897 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 29-4-4.1)
Cited in Brown v. King, 193 Ga. App. 495, 388 S.E.2d 400 (1989).
OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Editor's notes.
- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, opinions under former O.C.G.A. § 29-4-4.1 are included in the annotations for this Code section.
Cannot appoint permanent guardian where child has living parent.
- Unless an appointment of a temporary guardian was made under former O.C.G.A. § 29-4-4.1, a probate court was without authority to appoint a guardian of the person for a minor child if the child had living parents, unless the parents relinquished or forfeited their rights in the child. 1983 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U83-37 (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 29-4-4.1).
PART 4 STANDBY GUARDIANS
29-2-9. Definitions.
As used in this part, the term:
(Code 1981, §29-2-9, enacted by Ga. L. 2004, p. 161, § 1.)