The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, including the party calling the witness.
(Code 1981, §24-6-607, enacted by Ga. L. 2011, p. 99, § 2/HB 24.)
Cross references.- Mode and order of witness interrogation and presentation, § 24-6-611.
Who may impeach a witness, Fed. R. Evid. 607.
JUDICIAL DECISIONSANALYSIS
General Consideration
Editor's note.
- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1873, § 3869, former Code 1882, § 3869, former Ga. L. 1890-91, p. 78, § 1, former Civil Code 1895, § 5290, former Penal Code 1895, § 1024, former Civil Code 1910, § 5879, former Penal Code 1910, § 1050, former Code 1933, § 38-1801, and former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-81 are included in the annotations for this Code section.
Neither the arrest nor the indictment of a witness was impeaching, since, until proof of conviction, the witness was protected by the legal presumption of innocence. Hood v. State, 179 Ga. App. 387, 346 S.E.2d 867 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-81).
Failure to charge former statute was not error in absence of a timely written request. Wilson v. State, 235 Ga. 470, 219 S.E.2d 756 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1801).
Cited in Lupoe v. State, 300 Ga. 233, 794 S.E.2d 67 (2016); Strong v. State, Ga. , 845 S.E.2d 653 (2020).
Impeachment of Own Witness
1. In General
Former statute prohibited a party from impeaching the party's own witness.
- See Ellenburg v. State, 239 Ga. 309, 236 S.E.2d 650 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1801).
Even if a trial court erred by allowing the state to impeach the state's own witness with a prior statement when the witness could not vouch for the statement's accuracy pursuant to former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-81, no harm resulted due to the overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt. Coleman v. State, 278 Ga. 486, 604 S.E.2d 151 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-81).
Broad construction.
- Right to impeach one's own witness was broadly construed. Canady v. State, 147 Ga. App. 640, 249 S.E.2d 690 (1978) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1801); Robinson v. State, 150 Ga. App. 642, 258 S.E.2d 294 (1979);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1801).
Strict construction.
- Party may be "misled" but not "entrapped," since the former statute, which was in derogation of the common law and must be construed strictly, used the word "entrapped" and not "misled." Jeens v. Wrightsville & T.R.R., 144 Ga. 48, 85 S.E. 1055 (1915) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5879); Jenkins v. State, 73 Ga. App. 515, 37 S.E.2d 230 (1946);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1801).
Applicability to state.
- Former statute applied to the state as well as to the defendant. Dixon v. State, 86 Ga. 754, 13 S.E. 87 (1891) (decided under former Ga. L. 1890-91, p. 78, § 1).
Treatment as hostile witness.
- Trial court did not err in declaring that defendant's cousin, who had earlier pled guilty to the theft for which the defendant was on trial, was a hostile witness and in allowing the state to ask the cousin leading questions because the trial court had great latitude to allow the state to treat a person as a hostile witness and propound leading questions, and allowing it in the present case was proper because the state was not aware that the cousin would change the cousin's testimony at trial from earlier statements the cousin had made about the theft. Wilson v. State, 258 Ga. App. 166, 573 S.E.2d 432 (2002) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-81).
Effect of exercising constitutional privilege.
- After defendant's counsel pled entrapment but when called upon to testify, the defendant took advantage under oath of the constitutional privilege of refusing to answer on the ground that to answer might tend to incriminate the defendant, and thereafter counsel attempted to cross-examine the witness as to what this witness told counsel about the circumstances surrounding this matter, the court erred in refusing to allow a thorough and sifting cross-examination of the witness as to the entrapment. Interstate Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Wilmont, 123 Ga. App. 337, 180 S.E.2d 913 (1971) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1801).
Entrapment referred to the right of a party to impeach the party's own witness after the party testified to matters which were contradictory to statements previously made, authorizing a thorough and sifting cross-examination of the party's own witness. Interstate Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Wilmont, 123 Ga. App. 337, 180 S.E.2d 913 (1971) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1801).
Testimony cannot be withdrawn.
- Witness who delivered testimony hurtful to the party introducing the witness cannot be withdrawn; but if the party was entrapped by the witness, the law permitted the witness's impeachment by the party introducing the witness. Zipperer v. Mayor of Savannah, 128 Ga. 135, 57 S.E. 311 (1907) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5290).
Showing contradictions of facts.
- Although a party may not impeach the party's own witness, unless entrapped by the party, the party may show that the facts are different from the statement of the witness. Cronan v. Roberts & Co., 65 Ga. 678 (1880) (decided under former Code 1873, § 3869); Hollingsworth v. State, 79 Ga. 605, 4 S.E. 560 (1887); McElmurray v. Turner, 86 Ga. 215, 12 S.E. 359 (1890) (decided under former Code 1882, § 3869); Christian v. Macon Ry. & Light Co., 120 Ga. 314, 47 S.E. 923 (1904); Moultrie Repair Co. v. Hill, 120 Ga. 730, 48 S.E. 143 (1904) (decided under former Code 1882, § 3869); Robert R. Sizer & Co. v. G. T. Melton & Sons, 129 Ga. 143, 58 S.E. 1055 (1907); Luke v. Cannon, 4 Ga. App. 538, 62 S.E. 110 (1908) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5290); Sessions v. State, 6 Ga. App. 336, 64 S.E. 1101 (1909); Carter & Martin v. Carter, 7 Ga. App. 216, 66 S.E. 630 (1909) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5290); Southern Ry. v. Wessinger, 32 Ga. App. 551, 124 S.E. 100; 32 Ga. App. 807 (1924) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5290); Lewis v. American Rd. Ins. Co., 119 Ga. App. 507, 167 S.E.2d 729 (1969);(decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5290);(decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5290);(decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5290);cert. denied,(decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5879);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1801).
Refusal to respond to questions in discovery proceedings was not tantamount to making a statement or giving testimony contradictory to testimony on trial. Lewis v. American Rd. Ins. Co., 119 Ga. App. 507, 167 S.E.2d 729 (1969) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1801).
Putting witness up merely for purpose of discrediting the witness, or merely to lay a foundation for the witness to be contradicted on a material point and thereby rendered unworthy of belief, was reversible error. Eberhart v. State, 121 Ga. App. 663, 175 S.E.2d 73 (1970) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1801).
Proof of bad character.
- One who knows the general bad character of a witness by reason of previous felony convictions should not be allowed first to impliedly accredit the witness by offering the witness before a jury as worthy of belief, and then, when entrapped by the witness's testimony, prove, in addition to the contradictory statements by which the witness was surprised and deceived, the general bad character which neither surprised nor misled the witness. Kitchens v. Hall, 116 Ga. App. 41, 156 S.E.2d 920 (1967) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1801).
Use of misdemeanor convictions to impeach.
- Trial court did not err by refusing to allow the defendant to impeach the defendant's own witness, who had not been declared hostile, by proof of convictions of misdemeanors involving moral turpitude. Paradise v. State, 212 Ga. App. 166, 441 S.E.2d 497 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-81).
Either party could waive the former statutory requirements and allow a party to impeach the party's own witness without first having shown the court that the witness had entrapped the party. O'Dell v. State, 120 Ga. 152, 47 S.E. 577 (1904) (decided under former Penal Code 1895, § 1024).
Directing witness to time and place of previous testimony.
- Witness cannot be impeached by proof of contradictory statement until the witness's attention has been directed to the time, as well as the place, at which the alleged previous contradictory statements are alleged to have been made. Luke v. Cannon, 4 Ga. App. 538, 62 S.E. 110 (1908) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5290).
Admission for impeachment only.
- When impeachment is allowed, the prior inconsistent statement is admitted in evidence for impeachment purposes only.(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1801) Wilson v. State, 235 Ga. 470, 219 S.E.2d 756 (1975);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1801).
Impeachment of prior testimony.
- Trial court did not err in allowing one of the state's witnesses to testify that another state witness told the witness immediately before the shooting that the witness saw the defendant get a gun from the car in which the defendant was a passenger that night because the statement was offered and admitted to impeach the other witness's prior testimony that the witness had never witnessed the defendant retrieve anything from the car after the concert. Anderson v. State, 286 Ga. 57, 685 S.E.2d 716 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-81).
Improper admission of inconsistent statement harmless error.
- In a divorce proceeding, admission of the testimony of a witness called by a spouse that impeached the testimony of the other spouse's lover, also called by the spouse, would have been proper as prior inconsistent statements under former O.C.G.A. §§ 24-9-81 and24-9-83 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 24-6-607,24-6-608, and24-6-613), but the timing of the impeaching testimony before the lover's testimony made the admission improper; there was no harm in the error, however, because the spouse's lover was called as a witness and was questioned about the contradictory statements. Moxley v. Moxley, 281 Ga. 326, 638 S.E.2d 284 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-81).
Deposition admitted for impeachment.
- When it appeared that the witness was questioned about the depositions while the witness was on the stand, and that the witness testified somewhat at variance from the depositions, it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to allow the depositions in evidence for the purpose of impeachment. Parker & Co. v. Glenn, 90 Ga. App. 500, 83 S.E.2d 263 (1954) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1801).
Admission of repudiated statement.
- It was not erroneous to admit written statement later repudiated by a witness, over the objection made to the state's admission, since the repudiation would tend to impeach the witness. Fincher v. State, 211 Ga. 89, 84 S.E.2d 76 (1954) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1801).
When, on direct examination, a witness testified that the witness lied in a statement the witness gave the police, the trial court did not err in allowing the state to impeach the state's own witness by admitting the witness's prior inconsistent statement as substantive evidence. Willis v. State, 214 Ga. App. 659, 448 S.E.2d 755 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-81).
Former statute inapplicable to witness who must explain or deny contradictory statement.
- First sentence of former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-81 was applicable to impeachment of witnesses by prior contradictory statements, but since a prior contradictory statement of a witness was admissible as substantive evidence, the first sentence was inapplicable to a witness who must be given an opportunity to explain or deny the prior contradictory statement. Riley v. State, 166 Ga. App. 369, 304 S.E.2d 497 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-81).
Inconsistent statement admissible for impeachment purposes only.
- When impeachment of one's own witness is allowed, the prior inconsistent statement is admitted in evidence for impeachment purposes only and not to prove the truth of the prior statement. Arnold v. State, 166 Ga. App. 313, 304 S.E.2d 118 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-81).
Use of prior inconsistent statements.
- Prior inconsistent statement of a witness who takes the stand and is subject to cross-examination is admissible as substantive evidence and is not limited in value only to impeachment purposes. Ranger v. State, 249 Ga. 315, 290 S.E.2d 63 (1982) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-81); Riley v. State, 166 Ga. App. 369, 304 S.E.2d 497 (1983); Jackson v. Ensley, 168 Ga. App. 822, 310 S.E.2d 707 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-81);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-81).
In defendant's trial on a charge that the defendant molested his 13-year-old stepdaughter by touching her "private area" and placing his hands under her shirt, the record did not support defendant's claim that the state called the stepdaughter's mother solely for the purpose of impeaching her, and the trial court properly allowed the state to call two investigators to testify that the mother gave them a statement that was not the same as her testimony at trial. Black v. State, 261 Ga. App. 263, 582 S.E.2d 213 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-81).
Witness's testimony that the witness did not recall details included in a prior statement given to police was inconsistent with the prior statement about those details, and thus, the requirements of former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-81 were met; a trial court thus properly allowed the state to impeach the state's own witness who denied having previously identified the defendant as the shooter in a murder incident. Cummings v. State, 280 Ga. 831, 632 S.E.2d 152 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-81).
Defendant as witness for state.
- Introduction by state in a criminal prosecution of defendant's statement to police did not make defendant a witness for the state. Wiley v. State, 250 Ga. 343, 296 S.E.2d 714 (1982) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-81).
When counsel elicits testimony unfavorable to a client, counsel will not be heard to object to the testimony, no matter how prejudicial the testimony may be, if the testimony is a direct and pertinent response to the question propounded. Rutland v. State, 158 Ga. App. 315, 279 S.E.2d 757 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1801).
2. What Must Be Shown
Statement made to party or attorney.
- Party may not impeach party's own witness by proof of a previous contradictory statement, even if the party claims to have been surprised and entrapped, unless the statement was made directly to the party or the party's attorney, or was made to some third person with instruction to communicate it or for the purpose of being communicated to the party or the party's counsel. Jeens v. Wrightsville & T.R.R., 144 Ga. 48, 85 S.E. 1055 (1915) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5879); Carter v. State, 17 Ga. App. 244, 86 S.E. 413 (1915); Burns v. State, 20 Ga. App. 77, 92 S.E. 548 (1917) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1050); Allen v. State, 71 Ga. App. 517, 31 S.E.2d 107 (1944); Sparks v. State, 209 Ga. 250, 71 S.E.2d 608 (1952) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1050);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1801);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1801).
Statements made to others.
- Prior inconsistent statements made by a witness called by the state were not limited to those given to police investigators or prosecuting attorneys. Park v. State, 230 Ga. App. 274, 495 S.E.2d 886 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-81).
Showing of entrapment required.
- Prosecutor must show to the court that the prosecutor has been entrapped by the witness by a previous contradictory statement. Jenkins v. State, 73 Ga. App. 515, 37 S.E.2d 230 (1946) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1801).
One's own witness may be impeached when one can show the court that one has been entrapped by that witness by a previous contradictory statement. James v. State, 157 Ga. App. 763, 278 S.E.2d 696 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1801).
Party may not impeach party's own witness without a showing of entrapment. Hood v. State, 179 Ga. App. 387, 346 S.E.2d 867 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-81).
Impeachment error absent entrapment.
- Admittance of a certified copy of a witness's prior felony conviction was harmful error if it was for the purpose of impeachment, no announcement having been made by the state that this witness was being called for the purpose of cross-examination and no entrapment on the part of the witness having been shown. Hicks v. State, 204 Ga. App. 232, 418 S.E.2d 794 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-81).
Surprise and prejudice.
- Term "entrapment" required that one desiring to impeach one's own witness show both surprise and prejudice by the actual testimony as opposed to the earlier statement. Wilson v. State, 235 Ga. 470, 219 S.E.2d 756 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1801).
While a defendant was entitled to cross-examine a state's witness about pending criminal charges to show the witness's bias, that right did not extend to the defendant's own witness when the defendant failed to show surprise or entrapment by the witness's previous contradictory statement. Arnold v. State, 284 Ga. App. 598, 645 S.E.2d 68 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-81).
Total surprise unnecessary.
- To establish entrapment, it is not required that the witness's testimony be a total surprise or that it be affirmatively damaging. Wilson v. State, 235 Ga. 470, 219 S.E.2d 756 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1801); Ellenburg v. State, 239 Ga. 309, 236 S.E.2d 650 (1977); Johnson v. State, 150 Ga. App. 405, 258 S.E.2d 22 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1801); Wofford v. State, 152 Ga. App. 739, 263 S.E.2d 707 (1979); Bryant v. State, 155 Ga. App. 652, 271 S.E.2d 904 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1801); Andrews v. State, 156 Ga. App. 734, 275 S.E.2d 782 (1980); Young v. State, 156 Ga. App. 865, 275 S.E.2d 804 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1801); Ingram v. State, 161 Ga. App. 5, 288 S.E.2d 842 (1982); Davis v. State, 249 Ga. 309, 290 S.E.2d 273 (1982) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1801);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1801);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1801);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-81);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-81).
Prior showing of surprise unnecessary.
- Since it is not error for the trial judge to allow an attorney to cross-examine and lead the witness without first subjecting the attorney personally to an examination, any rule under which a showing of surprise and prejudice must first be made is wrong. Wilson v. State, 235 Ga. 470, 219 S.E.2d 756 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1801).
What constitutes surprise.
- Even though the state in a criminal case knows of a repudiation of an earlier statement by one of the state's witnesses before one testifies at trial, if it only goes to the details of the defendant's alleged confession, there is still sufficient "surprise" to admit into evidence the witness's prior statement for impeachment purposes only. Wilson v. State, 235 Ga. 470, 219 S.E.2d 756 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1801).
Showing of surprise was no longer required before a party was allowed to impeach the party's own witness. Davis v. State, 249 Ga. 309, 290 S.E.2d 273 (1982) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-81); Coleman v. State, 162 Ga. App. 340, 291 S.E.2d 402 (1982);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-81).
Showing of surprise was no longer required under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-81. Coleman v. State, 162 Ga. App. 340, 291 S.E.2d 402 (1982) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-81).
Surprise or prejudice unnecessary.
- To meet the requirement of establishing entrapment before one might impeach one's own witness, a showing of prejudice or surprise was no longer necessary. Peterson v. State, 166 Ga. App. 719, 305 S.E.2d 447 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-81).
Refusing party opportunity to introduce further testimony.
- There is no abuse of discretion if the trial court refuses party opportunity to introduce further evidence which would impeach the party's previous testimony absent surprise or entrapment. Gorrell v. Fowler, 248 Ga. 801, 286 S.E.2d 13, appeal dismissed, 457 U.S. 1113, 102 S. Ct. 2918, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1324 (1982) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1801).
Belief of prosecutor.
- To establish entrapment, it was sufficient that the prosecutor believed the witness would testify consistently with the earlier testimony. Johnson v. State, 150 Ga. App. 405, 258 S.E.2d 22 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1801); Bryant v. State, 155 Ga. App. 652, 271 S.E.2d 904 (1980);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1801).
Statement by district attorney that the district attorney was surprised by the testimony was sufficient, in the absence of a showing to the contrary, to show entrapment. Thomas v. State, 239 Ga. 734, 238 S.E.2d 888 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1801); James v. State, 157 Ga. App. 763, 278 S.E.2d 696 (1981); Foskey v. State, 229 Ga. App. 209, 493 S.E.2d 595 (1997) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1801);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-81).
Testimony failing to bolster case.
- Trial court did not err in allowing the district attorney to impeach the state's own witness by introducing prior inconsistent statements, even though the witness's testimony did not damage the state's case save by failing to bolster the case as hoped. Wilson v. State, 235 Ga. 470, 219 S.E.2d 756 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1801).
Inconsistent testimony.
- Impeachment is allowed when the testimony is merely "inconsistent" with a prior written statement. Wilson v. State, 235 Ga. 470, 219 S.E.2d 756 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1801).
Although the requirements of surprise and prejudice have been removed from the element of entrapment, the plain language of former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-81 still required as a threshold matter a showing that the witness made a statement inconsistent with the witness's testimony at trial. Jones v. State, 270 Ga. 25, 505 S.E.2d 749 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-81).
No entrapment shown.
- Evidence did not show that the prosecutor was entrapped by a witness. King v. State, 166 Ga. 10, 142 S.E. 160 (1928) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1801).
Examination of Opposite Party
Balancing of rights.
- Former Code 1933, § 38-1801, providing for the right of thorough and sifting cross-examination, must be balanced with former Code 1933, § 38-1704 (see now O.C.G.A §§ 24-9-611 and24-6-623), protecting the right of a witness to be examined only as to relevant matter and to be protected from improper questions and from harsh or insulting demeanor. Crawford v. State, 144 Ga. App. 622, 241 S.E.2d 492 (1978), overruled on other grounds, Stephens v. State, 245 Ga. 825, 268 S.E.2d 330 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-1801).
Calling opposite party for purposes of impeachment.
- When defendant was not permitted to recall the victim as the defendant's own witness for purposes of impeachment, since there was no showing of entrapment, this was not permitted. Mingo v. State, 195 Ga. App. 438, 394 S.E.2d 104 (1990) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-81).
There was no prohibition about the prior inconsistent statement being lengthier than the in-court testimony; also, the fact that a witness admitted to making the inconsistent pre-trial statement did not render the statement inadmissible. Warner v. State, 281 Ga. 763, 642 S.E.2d 821 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-81).
Testimony of deceased party.
- Defendant can introduce former testimony of deceased plaintiff, and then impeach the testimony by the defendant's own testimony. McLendon v. Baldwin, 166 Ga. 794, 144 S.E. 271 (1928), later appeal, 170 Ga. 437, 153 S.E. 18 (1930) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5879).
Defendant's mother questioned about prior inconsistent statement.
- State properly questioned the defendant's mother as to whether the mother believed that the crimes defendant was on trial for were gang-related as the question was asked for the purpose of laying a foundation to introduce the mother's prior inconsistent statement after the mother had testified in response to a defense question that the mother did not believe that defendant was involved in gang activity, pursuant to former O.C.G.A. §§ 24-9-81 and24-9-83. Garrett v. State, 280 Ga. 30, 622 S.E.2d 323 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-81).
Examination of Own Witness
Use of inconsistent prior statements.
- Because a state witness, who was also one of defendant's cohorts, was evasive concerning the facts stated in the witness's prior interview and also testified to facts that were inconsistent with those previously stated in the interview, the trial court did not err in permitting the state to ask leading questions or in allowing the taped interview to be introduced into evidence. Johnson v. State, 279 Ga. App. 489, 631 S.E.2d 720 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-81).
Because the prosecuting attorney laid a proper foundation for a witness's prior inconsistent statement by questioning the witness about the circumstances of the witness's earlier statement to investigators and affording the witness an opportunity to admit, explain, or deny the prior contradictory statement about not seeing a gun during the rough play between the defendant and others prior to the murders, the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion when the court admitted the witness's earlier statement. Edwards v. State, 293 Ga. 612, 748 S.E.2d 870 (2013).
Trial court did not err in admitting extrinsic evidence of the cousin's prior inconsistent statements because the state complied with the prerequisites of O.C.G.A. § 24-6-613(b) as both the prosecutor and defense counsel examined the witness as to each of the prior inconsistent statements and the witness was afforded an opportunity to explain or to deny the prior inconsistent statements, which entitled the prosecutor to ask leading questions. McNair v. State, 330 Ga. App. 478, 767 S.E.2d 290 (2014).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d.
- 81 Am. Jur. 2d, Witnesses, §§ 447 et seq., 501, 506, 509.
ALR.
- Estoppel of party to contradict what he testified to, adversely to his present opponent, in a prior action to which he was not a party, 5 A.L.R. 1505.
Impeaching witness examined by both parties, 54 A.L.R. 1374.
Right of party surprised by unfavorable testimony of own witness to ask him concerning previous inconsistent statements, 74 A.L.R. 1042.
Proper practice and relief on development of hostility by party's own witness, 117 A.L.R. 326.
May a witness who testifies to facts be impeached by showing of prior inconsistent expressions of opinion by him, 158 A.L.R. 820.
Federal Civil Procedure Rule 43(b), and similar state rule, relating to the calling and interrogation of adverse party as witness at trial, 35 A.L.R.2d 756.
Right of counsel representing party at trial, but employed by his liability insurer, to cross-examine or impeach him for asserted contradictory statements, 48 A.L.R.2d 1239.
Party litigant in civil personal injury or death case as bound by conflicting testimony of his own medical witnesses, 53 A.L.R.2d 1229.
Who is "employee" within statute permitting examination, as adverse witness, of employee of party, 56 A.L.R.2d 1108.
Admissibility and effect, on issue of party's credibility or merits of his case, of evidence of attempts to intimidate or influence witness in civil action, 4 A.L.R.4th 829.
What constitutes crime involving "dishonesty or false statement" under Rule 609(a)(2) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 83 A.L.R.5th 277.
Propriety, under Uniform Rule of Evidence 607, of impeachment of party's own witness, 3 A.L.R.6th 269.