As used in this chapter, the term "relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
(Code 1981, §24-4-401, enacted by Ga. L. 2011, p. 99, § 2/HB 24.)
Cross references.- Test for relevant evidence, Fed. R. Evid. 401.
Law reviews.- For article, "The Myth of Conditional Relevancy," see 14 Ga. L. Rev. 435 (1980). For article, "'They Say He's Gay': The Admissibility of Evidence of Sexual Orientation," see 37 Ga. L. Rev. 793 (2003). For annual survey on evidence law, see 70 Mercer L. Rev. 97 (2018). For note discussing the possible uses of video tape and its admissibility as evidence, see 5 Ga. St. B.J. 393 (1969). For comment discussing the admissibility of ex parte affidavit in nonjury situations, in light of Camp v. Camp, 213 Ga. 65, 97 S.E.2d 125 (1957), see 20 Ga. B.J. 392 (1958). For comment discussing admissibility of relevant motion picture films, in light of Long v. General Elec. Co., 213 Ga. 809, 102 S.E.2d 9 (1958), see 22 Ga. B.J. 92 (1959).
JUDICIAL DECISIONSANALYSIS
General Consideration
Editor's notes.
- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Civil Code 1895, § 5158, former Civil Code 1910, § 5744, former Code 1933, § 38-201, and former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1 are included in the annotations for this Code section.
It is error to admit irrelevant evidence. Mercer v. Woodard, 166 Ga. App. 119, 303 S.E.2d 475 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Admission of irrelevant evidence is not a ground for reversal unless it can be shown the evidence was prejudicial. Hill v. State, 177 Ga. App. 850, 341 S.E.2d 322 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Objecting party failed to carry burden of proving that admission of evidence unduly prejudicial to that party's rights. DOT v. 2.734 Acres of Land, 168 Ga. App. 541, 309 S.E.2d 816 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
When testimony is part material and in part irrelevant, a general objection to the whole is not well taken; if however, the objecting party points out the irrelevant portion of the testimony offered, it is not error for the court to reject the evidence in toto, when the party offering the evidence fails to segregate the relevant portions from those which are irrelevant; and when it is shown that designated portions of the evidence are irrelevant, but the court over such objection admits the testimony as a whole, a new trial will be granted provided such irrelevant testimony could have been harmful to the complaining party. Taintor v. Rogers, 197 Ga. 872, 30 S.E.2d 892 (1944) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201) Serdula v. State, Ga. App. , 845 S.E.2d 362 (2020);.
Cited in Dunbar v. State, Ga. , 845 S.E.2d 607 (2020); Richardson v. State, 308 Ga. 70, 838 S.E.2d 759 (2020); Morgan v. State, 307 Ga. 889, 838 S.E.2d 878 (2020); Chatham v. Gardner Excavating, Inc., 353 Ga. App. 806, 840 S.E.2d 46 (2020); Hill v. State, Ga. , S.E.2d (Sept. 28, 2020).
Relevancy Defined
Any evidence is relevant which logically tends to prove or disprove a material fact which is at issue in the case, and every act or circumstance serving to elucidate or to throw light upon a material issue or issues is relevant. Sample v. Lipscomb, 18 Ga. 554 (1855) (decided under former law); Walker v. Roberts, 20 Ga. 15 (1856); Alexander v. State, 7 Ga. App. 88, 66 S.E. 274 (1909) (decided under former law); Carter v. Marble Prods., Inc., 179 Ga. 122, 175 S.E. 480 (1934); Rogers v. State, 80 Ga. App. 585, 56 S.E.2d 633 (1949) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5158); MacNerland v. Johnson, 137 Ga. App. 541, 224 S.E.2d 431 (1976); Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank v. Hodnett, 139 Ga. App. 839, 229 S.E.2d 792 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Johnson v. State, 148 Ga. App. 702, 252 S.E.2d 205 (1979); Bunge v. State, 149 Ga. App. 712, 256 S.E.2d 23 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Brooks v. State, 244 Ga. 574, 261 S.E.2d 379 (1979); Kelly v. Floor Bazaar, Inc., 153 Ga. App. 163, 264 S.E.2d 697 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Williams v. State, 153 Ga. App. 890, 267 S.E.2d 305 (1980); Chambers v. State, 154 Ga. App. 620, 269 S.E.2d 42 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Guest v. State, 155 Ga. App. 374, 270 S.E.2d 904 (1980); DOT v. Delta Mach. Prods. Co., 157 Ga. App. 423, 278 S.E.2d 73 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201).
Every fact or circumstance serving to elucidate or throw light upon the issue being tried constitutes proper evidence in the case. A.A.A. Hwy. Express, Inc. v. Hagler, 72 Ga. App. 519, 34 S.E.2d 462 (1945) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Miller Serv., Inc. v. Miller, 76 Ga. App. 143, 45 S.E.2d 466 (1947); 77 Ga. App. 413, 48 S.E.2d 761 (1948), later appeal, Hodnett v. Hodnett, 99 Ga. App. 285, 109 S.E.2d 285 (1959) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); DOT v. Delta Mach. Prods. Co., 157 Ga. App. 423, 278 S.E.2d 73 (1981);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201).
Evidence is relevant if the evidence renders the desired inference more probable than it would be without the evidence. Baker v. State, 246 Ga. 317, 271 S.E.2d 360 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201).
Any evidence is relevant which logically tends to prove or to disprove a material fact which is at issue in the case, and every act or circumstance serving to elucidate or to throw light upon a material issue or issues is relevant. Owens v. State, 248 Ga. 629, 284 S.E.2d 408 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201).
Any fact is relevant which, when taken alone or in connection with another or others, would warrant the drawing by the jury of a logical inference with reference to the issue on trial. Pope v. Triangle Chem. Co., 157 Ga. App. 386, 277 S.E.2d 758 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201).
Evidence of victim's gang membership irrelevant.
- Trial court did not commit plain error by excluding evidence that the first victim was a member of a street gang because any such affiliation was irrelevant and had no connection to the shooting; and the defendant provided nothing to indicate that the motivation for the shooting, or anything related to the shooting for that matter, was related to street gang activity. Walton v. State, 303 Ga. 11, 810 S.E.2d 134 (2018).
Evidence of witness's feelings towards parties.
- Former O.C.G.A. §§ 24-2-1 and24-9-68 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 24-4-401 through24-4-403 and24-9-622) should be considered in pari materia; thus, even if testimony sought to be admitted relates to the feelings a witness has toward a party, if that particular feeling would have no relevance to the questions being tried by the jury, then such evidence may be excluded in the sound discretion of the trial court. Lockett v. State, 217 Ga. App. 328, 457 S.E.2d 579 (1995) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Crime participant's testimony relevant.
- During the appellant's trial for felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, it was not error to admit the testimony of a witness related to their personal observations as a participant and witness to the crimes as the testimony clearly was damaging to the appellant's defense, it was relevant to establish the appellant's guilt and the circumstances surrounding the charged crimes, and did not improperly place the appellant's character in issue. Williams v. State, 298 Ga. 538, 783 S.E.2d 594 (2016).
Testimony on use of Facebook.
- Trial court did not err by excluding as irrelevant the testimony of a witness the defendant sought to have testify regarding the witness's general experience using Facebook because the testimony was not relevant to a replaced juror's personal style. Smith v. State, 335 Ga. App. 497, 782 S.E.2d 305 (2016).
Consideration of relevancy in motion to strike.
- Georgia Supreme Court held that courts should not ordinarily decide to strike a portion of the complaint on the grounds that the material could not possibly be relevant on the sterile field of pleading alone; relevance, which is a broad concept even in the trial context, O.C.G.A. § 24-4-401, is viewed even more liberally in the context of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(f) motions. Chappuis v. Ortho Sport & Spine Physicians Savannah, LLC, 305 Ga. 401, 825 S.E.2d 206 (2019).
Consideration of relevancy in motion to strike.
- Georgia Supreme Court held that courts should not ordinarily decide to strike a portion of the complaint on the grounds that the material could not possibly be relevant on the sterile field of pleading alone; relevance, which is a broad concept even in the trial context, O.C.G.A. § 24-4-401, is viewed even more liberally in the context of O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(f) motions. Chappuis v. Ortho Sport & Spine Physicians Savannah, LLC, 305 Ga. 401, 825 S.E.2d 206 (2019).
Criteria of Admissibility
Questions as to the relevancy and admissibility of the testimony are properly for the court, and the question must be determined in each case according to the facts of that particular case and in accordance with the teachings of reason and judicial experience. Dumas v. State, 131 Ga. App. 79, 205 S.E.2d 119 (1974) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); MacNerland v. Johnson, 137 Ga. App. 541, 224 S.E.2d 431 (1976); Downs v. State, 145 Ga. App. 588, 244 S.E.2d 113 (1978) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Church's Fried Chicken, Inc. v. Lewis, 150 Ga. App. 154, 256 S.E.2d 916 (1979); Henderson v. State, 153 Ga. App. 801, 266 S.E.2d 522 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Williams v. State, 153 Ga. App. 890, 267 S.E.2d 305 (1980); Chambers v. State, 154 Ga. App. 620, 269 S.E.2d 42 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Brand v. State, 154 Ga. App. 781, 270 S.E.2d 206 (1980); Guest v. State, 155 Ga. App. 374, 270 S.E.2d 904 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Baker v. State, 246 Ga. 317, 271 S.E.2d 360 (1980);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201).
Admissibility of evidence is a matter which rests largely within the sound discretion of the trial court, and if an item of evidence has a tendency to help establish a fact in issue, that is sufficient to make the evidence relevant and admissible. Lewis v. State, 158 Ga. App. 586, 281 S.E.2d 331 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201).
Insufficient funds evidence relevant and admissible.
- Trial court did not err when the court allowed the state to introduce evidence that, on the date of the death of the defendant's wife, the defendant received an email notifying the defendant that the defendant had insufficient funds in the defendant's bank account because it was within the discretion of the trial court to conclude that the evidence was relevant to show that the defendant was under some degree of financial stress and had some reason to be upset on the day of the killing; and the prejudicial effect of the evidence, if any, was minimal and not unfair. McClain v. State, 303 Ga. 6, 810 S.E.2d 77 (2018).
Evidence of defendants' financial worth.
- In a premises liability suit, the trial court erred by excluding evidence of the defendants' security expenditures by failing to determine whether the financial worth of the defendants was relevant to the issue since the plaintiffs contended that such evidence would show that the defendants' increased security expenditures constituted only a small percentage of the defendants' security budget. Cham v. ECI Mgmt. Corp., 353 Ga. App. 162, 836 S.E.2d 555 (2019).
Question for the jury.
- When facts are such that the jury, if permitted to hear the facts, may or may not make an inference pertinent to the issue, according to the view which the jury may take of the facts, in connection with the other facts in evidence, the facts are such that the jury ought to be permitted to hear the facts. Williams v. State, 153 Ga. App. 890, 267 S.E.2d 305 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Chambers v. State, 154 Ga. App. 620, 269 S.E.2d 42 (1980); Brand v. State, 154 Ga. App. 781, 270 S.E.2d 206 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Paxton v. State, 160 Ga. App. 19, 285 S.E.2d 741 (1981);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201).
Relevant evidence cannot be kept from the jury by admission of the fact or waiver of the requirement of proof. Franklin v. State, 245 Ga. 141, 263 S.E.2d 666, cert. denied, 447 U.S. 930, 100 S. Ct. 3029, 65 L. Ed. 2d 1124 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Dick v. State, 246 Ga. 697, 273 S.E.2d 124 (1980); 451 U.S. 976, 101 S. Ct. 2059, 68 L. Ed. 2d 357 (1981), cert denied,(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201).
If the evidence offered by a party is of doubtful relevancy, the evidence should nevertheless be admitted and the weight of the evidence left to the jury. Continental Trust Co. v. Bank of Harrison, 36 Ga. App. 149, 136 S.E. 319 (1926) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5744); Brown v. Wilson, 55 Ga. App. 262, 189 S.E. 860 (1937); A.A.A. Hwy. Express, Inc. v. Hagler, 72 Ga. App. 519, 34 S.E.2d 462 (1945) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Smith v. Davis, 76 Ga. App. 154, 45 S.E.2d 237 (1947); Miller Serv., Inc. v. Miller, 76 Ga. App. 143, 45 S.E.2d 466 (1947) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); 77 Ga. App. 413, 48 S.E.2d 761 (1948); Manners v. State, 77 Ga. App. 843, 50 S.E.2d 158 (1948) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Burton v. Campbell Coal Co., 95 Ga. App. 338, 97 S.E.2d 924 (1957); Carroll v. Hayes, 98 Ga. App. 450, 105 S.E.2d 755 (1958), later appeal, Smith v. Morning News, Inc., 99 Ga. App. 547, 109 S.E.2d 639 (1959) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank v. Hodnett, 139 Ga. App. 839, 229 S.E.2d 792 (1976); Johnson v. State, 148 Ga. App. 702, 252 S.E.2d 205 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Calhoun v. Branan, 149 Ga. App. 160, 253 S.E.2d 838 (1979); Williams v. State, 153 Ga. App. 890, 267 S.E.2d 305 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); DOT v. Delta Mach. Prods. Co., 157 Ga. App. 423, 278 S.E.2d 73 (1981); Lewis v. State, 158 Ga. App. 586, 281 S.E.2d 331 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Owens v. State, 248 Ga. 629, 284 S.E.2d 408 (1981);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201).
Question as to admissibility of evidence is not to be determined by the evidence's weight; if the evidence has any probative value, however small, and is otherwise competent, the evidence should be admitted. Fuller v. State, 196 Ga. 237, 26 S.E.2d 281 (1943) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201).
Res gestae.
- In a murder trial, the trial court did not err in admitting the defendant's own evidence that the defendant had been free-basing cocaine the night before the killing and again on the day of the killing; this evidence, as part and parcel of the crime and as res gestae, was admissible even though the killing did not appear to have directly involved drug usage and even though the evidence incidentally put the defendant's character in issue. Latham v. State, 195 Ga. App. 355, 393 S.E.2d 498 (1990) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Mere circumstance that certain evidence may fall short of proving a fact is not a sufficient reason for excluding that evidence; unless otherwise objectionable, the evidence should be admitted, even though the evidence may only tend to prove the matter in issue. Livingston v. Barnett, 193 Ga. 640, 19 S.E.2d 385 (1942) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Miller Serv., Inc. v. Miller, 76 Ga. App. 143, 45 S.E.2d 466 (1947); 77 Ga. App. 413, 48 S.E.2d 761 (1948), later appeal, Rogers v. State, 80 Ga. App. 585, 56 S.E.2d 633 (1949) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Chambers v. State, 154 Ga. App. 620, 269 S.E.2d 42 (1980);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201).
When the admissibility of evidence is doubtful, the burden is on the objecting party to show wherein it is inadmissible. Smith v. Morning News, Inc., 99 Ga. App. 547, 109 S.E.2d 639 (1959) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201).
When evidence is admitted for one purpose, it is not error for the court to fail to instruct the jury to limit the jury's consideration to the one purpose for which the evidence is admissible, in the absence of a request to so instruct the jury. Tankersley v. State, 155 Ga. App. 917, 273 S.E.2d 862 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201).
Relevant evidence is not subject to an objection that the evidence might inflame the minds of the jury or prejudice the jury and this is true even when the offered evidence is only cumulative; this rule favors the admission of any relevant evidence, no matter how slight the probative value. Sprouse v. State, 242 Ga. 831, 252 S.E.2d 173 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201).
Evidence indirectly relevant.
- Evidence which is only indirectly relevant to the issue on trial, but which tends somewhat to illustrate the issue, and to aid the jury in arriving at the truth of the matter, should be admitted. Brown v. Wilson, 55 Ga. App. 262, 189 S.E. 860 (1937) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); A.A.A. Hwy. Express, Inc. v. Hagler, 72 Ga. App. 519, 34 S.E.2d 462 (1945); Smith v. Davis, 76 Ga. App. 154, 45 S.E.2d 237 (1947) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Kalish v. King Cabinet Co., 140 Ga. App. 345, 232 S.E.2d 86 (1976); Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Mowery, 145 Ga. App. 45, 244 S.E.2d 573 (1978) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201).
Evidence of similar occurrences is admitted when it appears that all the essential physical conditions on two occasions are identical; for under such circumstances the observed uniformity of nature raises an inference that like causes will produce like results, even though there may be some dissimilarity of conditions in respect to matters which cannot reasonably be expected to have affected the result. McCrea v. Georgia Power Co., 46 Ga. App. 276, 167 S.E. 540 (1933) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201).
Evidence excludable.
- It is not error to refuse to receive evidence not pertinent to the proceeding. Stalvey v. Varn Motors & Fin. Co., 56 Ga. App. 696, 193 S.E. 627 (1937) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Gaskill v. Brown, 103 Ga. App. 33, 118 S.E.2d 113 (1961); Roberts v. Farmer, 127 Ga. App. 237, 193 S.E.2d 216 (1972) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201).
County was properly precluded from introducing evidence of a school district's condemnation of a landowner's property to indirectly show that the value of the property the county was condemning was less than that proposed by the landowner's expert. The admission of such evidence would have been improper because: (1) the landowner's compulsory sale of the property to the school district a year after the county initiated the county's condemnation action would not have affected the value of the land at the time of the county's taking a year earlier; and (2) the school district's inability to use the property as rezoned did not change the fact that the property was already in the process of being rezoned in a manner that affected the property's value for purposes of just and adequate compensation to the landowner at the time of the county's taking. Gwinnett County v. Howington, 280 Ga. App. 347, 634 S.E.2d 157 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
In a medical malpractice action, even if evidence of the doctor's professional liability policy, which a decedent's executrix sought as impeachment evidence, consisted of a prior inconsistent statement by the doctor, the trial court properly excluded evidence of the policy, as well as its inclusion in the court's instruction to the jury, as it involved a collateral matter and was more prejudicial than probative. King v. Zakaria, 280 Ga. App. 570, 634 S.E.2d 444 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Grounds for new trial.
- While generally the admission of irrelevant testimony or illegal evidence, which is wholly immaterial, will not be cause for the grant of a new trial, it will be such ground if it appears of sufficient consequence to injuriously affect the complaining party. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Thornton, 119 Ga. 455, 46 S.E. 678 (1904) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5158); McGriff v. McGriff, 154 Ga. 560, 115 S.E. 21 (1922); McDaniel v. State, 197 Ga. 757, 30 S.E.2d 612 (1944) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5744); Dismuke v. State, 142 Ga. App. 381, 236 S.E.2d 12 (1977); Drew v. Collins, 153 Ga. App. 794, 266 S.E.2d 570 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Murdock v. Godwin, 154 Ga. App. 824, 269 S.E.2d 905 (1980);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201).
In a negligent misrepresentation action filed by a business against the business's accountants, the business was entitled to a new trial as the trial court twice erred by admitting irrelevant and prejudicial evidence that: (1) the business was sold for $65.5 million in 2005, in order to establish the business's 1993 value, as the sale was too remote, the business had undergone physical changes since the sale, and the market conditions had also changed; and (2) the loans from a shareholder to purchase and operate the business were later reclassified as a shareholder investment of capital, and that the debt owed to the shareholder was forgiven in exchange for the issuance of additional stock in the business as such was irrelevant to the determination of whether the business was entitled to direct damages. Atlando Holdings, LLC v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 290 Ga. App. 665, 660 S.E.2d 463 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Conjectural testimony not competent evidence.
- Testimony as to what one thinks would have been the result of an occurrence had the occurrence happened in a particular way is not competent evidence, being merely conjectural and without probative value. Queen v. Patent Scaffolding Co., 46 Ga. App. 364, 167 S.E. 789 (1933) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201).
Foundation for introduction of evidence must be laid.
- There is no legal ground to complain of the failure to admit certain evidence or testimony when it is not shown what the evidence or testimony would have been. Lakeview Estates Homeowners Corp. v. Hilltop Enters. of Ga., Inc., 153 Ga. App. 323, 265 S.E.2d 120 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201).
Relevant Evidence in Civil Cases
Evidence relevant.
- See Benton v. Roberts, 41 Ga. App. 189, 152 S.E. 141 (1930) (issue not raised in pleadings) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5744); Queen v. Patent Scaffolding Co., 46 Ga. App. 364, 167 S.E. 789 (1933) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5744); Miller v. Clermont Banking Co., 180 Ga. 556, 179 S.E. 718 (1935); A.A.A. Hwy. Express, Inc. v. Hagler, 72 Ga. App. 519, 34 S.E.2d 462 (1945) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Wade v. Drinkard, 76 Ga. App. 159, 45 S.E.2d 231 (1947); Norton v. Norton, 213 Ga. 384, 99 S.E.2d 139 (1957) (custom, practice, and habit) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Gallant v. Gallant, 223 Ga. 397, 156 S.E.2d 61 (1967); Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Mowery, 145 Ga. App. 45, 244 S.E.2d 573 (1978) (treatment of one spouse by another in divorce proceedings) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Harley-Davidson Motor Co. v. Daniel, 244 Ga. 284, 260 S.E.2d 20 (1979) (financial status of spouse in divorce proceedings) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Gwinnett Com. Bank v. Flake, 151 Ga. App. 578, 260 S.E.2d 523 (1979) (medical treatment for accidental injury) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Sasser v. Lester, 153 Ga. App. 220, 264 S.E.2d 728 (1980) (manufacturer's recall letter) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Ponder v. Ponder, 251 Ga. 323, 304 S.E.2d 61 (1983) (documentary evidence) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Spencer v. Kyle Realty Co., 225 Ga. App. 203, 483 S.E.2d 639 (1997) (insurance) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201);(income tax returns) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Evidence of the abusive and violent relationship between a murder victim and a defendant was relevant under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 24-4-401 through24-4-403) to show defendant's motive, intent, and bent of mind, and the remoteness of events relating to such relationship affected the weight of the evidence but not the admissibility of the evidence. Mote v. State, 277 Ga. 429, 588 S.E.2d 748 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1066, 124 S. Ct. 2395, 158 L. Ed. 2d 968 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Evidence that a college had removed credit hours from a student's transcript was relevant to the student's claim for breach of contract damages as the student could recover the cost of tuition for classes the student was forced to repeat due to the college's actions. Morehouse College, Inc. v. McGaha, 277 Ga. App. 529, 627 S.E.2d 39 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
In a dispute over two subdivision lots, the trial court did not err in admitting evidence that was cumulative to evidence showing a legal property owner's record title. The evidence was not hearsay, as alleged by a claimant who sought title to that property by prescription; further, the evidence was relevant to the issue of whether a claimant's adverse possession ripened into title by prescription. Smith v. Stacey, 281 Ga. 601, 642 S.E.2d 28 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
In a divorce case after the wife was awarded child support, the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in overruling the husband's objection to the wife's questions regarding checks that had been paid to him but that he had not deposited into his bank account. The wife was entitled to inquire whether the deposited and undeposited checks matched the amount of income reported by the husband. Leggette v. Leggette, 284 Ga. 432, 668 S.E.2d 251 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Evidence of diminished value after unauthorized cutting of timber.
- Holder of a security deed on property from which timber was cut without authorization was not entitled to damages for the diminished value of the property, but only for the value of the trees; however, evidence of diminished value was relevant for purposes of attorney's fees and punitive damages. Redcedar, LLC v. CML-GA Social Circle, LLC, 341 Ga. App. 110, 798 S.E.2d 334 (2017).
Homeowner countersued a contractor for fraud. Testimony by a subcontractor that the contractor's project supervisor told the subcontractor to increase the bid because the homeowner was "loaded" was not hearsay because the testimony was not admitted to show the truth of the matters asserted, and the testimony was a circumstance relevant to the fraud claim. Lumpkin v. Deventer N. Am., Inc., 295 Ga. App. 312, 672 S.E.2d 405 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
A trial court did not err in admitting evidence that a nursing home was short staffed, lacked various supplies, that residents, including the deceased patient, were observed soiled with urine and waste, and that residents, including the patient, were not turned as often as required, as relevant under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 24-4-401 through24-4-403). The witnesses were certified nursing assistants who were directly involved in patient care while the patient was a resident, and the evidence showed both negligence and that the nursing home was aware of these conditions and did nothing to correct them. Tucker Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Mosby, 303 Ga. App. 80, 692 S.E.2d 727 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Evidence in legal malpractice cases.
- Rules of the State Bar of Georgia, while not determinative of the standard of care applicable in a legal malpractice case, may be considered along with other facts and circumstances to determine whether an attorney treated a client with the requisite degree of skill and care. Watkins & Watkins, P.C. v. Williams, 238 Ga. App. 646, 518 S.E.2d 704 (1999) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
In a legal malpractice action arising from attorney's alleged filing of a voluntary dismissal based upon the erroneous and negligent assumption that the underlying medical malpractice case could be re-filed, the trial court abused its discretion in granting defendant attorneys' motion in limine effectively prohibiting plaintiffs from introducing expert testimony related to the issue of whether, but for the attorneys' negligence, the plaintiffs would have prevailed in the underlying action. It was an abuse of discretion to conlude that plaintiffs were categorically restricted to the evidence already in the record at the time the attorneys represented them. Blackwell v. Potts, 266 Ga. App. 702, 598 S.E.2d 1 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Evidence in condemnation case.
- Trial court erred in denying a housing authority's motion in limine in a condemnation case seeking to exclude evidence of the commercial value of the land at issue; since the property was restricted by a federal court order for use as a public playground, there was no basis for the admission of evidence regarding any potential commercial value that the property could have had under other, non-existent circumstances. Housing Auth. of Macon v. Younis, 279 Ga. App. 599, 631 S.E.2d 802 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Trial court properly granted the Georgia Department of Transportation's (DOT) motion in limine to preclude a property owner from questioning an expert witness about the fact that the expert had been originally hired by the DOT in the DOT's condemnation proceeding as that information was not relevant to the just and adequate compensation determination. H.D. McCondichie Props. v. Ga. DOT, 280 Ga. App. 197, 633 S.E.2d 558 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
In a condemnation action, the trial court erred in denying a lessor's motion in limine to exclude evidence of the lessor's entitlement to statutory pre-judgment interest under O.C.G.A. § 32-3-19 because the fact that the trial court could later instruct the jury to disregard irrelevant evidence was not a reason to allow the jury to hear the irrelevant evidence; under the statutory framework of § 32-3-19, the amount of pre-judgment interest due a condemnee is determined after the jury enters a verdict. CNL APF Partners, LP v. DOT, 307 Ga. App. 511, 705 S.E.2d 862 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
In a condemnation proceeding, the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in denying the lessees' motion in limine to exclude evidence that the lessees and the lessor knew of the possible condemnation when the lessees sold the property to the lessor because the Georgia Department of Transportation (DOT) sought to use the evidence to discredit the estimate the lessees and lessor made of the property's market value at the time of the taking by challenging the use of the sale as a factor in reaching that estimate used in that way, the evidence of the knowledge of a possible condemnation would bear, at least indirectly, on the question of the just and adequate compensation due the condemnees. CNL APF Partners, LP v. DOT, 307 Ga. App. 511, 705 S.E.2d 862 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
In a condemnation proceeding, the trial court did not err in denying a motion in limine to exclude evidence of the rent a lessee charged a sublessee for use of the property before the lessee sold the property to a lessor because the evidence bore upon the property's market value. CNL APF Partners, LP v. DOT, 307 Ga. App. 511, 705 S.E.2d 862 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
In a condemnation proceeding, the trial court erred in denying the lessees' motion in limine to exclude evidence of the cause of the fire that damaged the restaurant that was on the real property at issue because evidence concerning the reasons giving rise to the uncertainty in insurance coverage (i.e., the cause of the fire), as opposed to the fact of uncertainty, was not relevant to the issue of just and adequate compensation. CNL APF Partners, LP v. DOT, 307 Ga. App. 511, 705 S.E.2d 862 (2010) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Evidence in negligent construction cases.
- Builder sued homeowners to recover for services rendered in constructing a house under a theory of quantum meruit; the homeowners alleged negligent construction. The trial court properly admitted evidence of the homeowners' listing price for the home as the court instructed the jury that this evidence could be considered only to show the homeowners' opinion of the home's value, in regard to the quantum meruit and negligent construction claims, not to show the home's fair market value. Biederbeck v. Marbut, 294 Ga. App. 799, 670 S.E.2d 483 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Similar transaction evidence on failure to pay.
- In an action alleging an automobile company's negligent design and placement of the fuel system in a car model, evidence relating to crash tests on vehicles from which the car model involved in the automobile collision evolved, a composite video tape of crash tests and related exhibits and internal documents were relevant to the issue of the automobile manufacturer's continuing negligence in regard to its knowledge of the safety hazard, its failure to warn the public of the danger and its continued marketing of the dangerous product, as well as to the issue of callous disregard upon which basis punitive damages were sought. Ford Motor Co. v. Stubblefield, 171 Ga. App. 331, 319 S.E.2d 470 (1984) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
In an action to recover expert fees, admitting evidence of defendant's failure to pay another expert was not error because of the similarity of the transactions involved and the issues of bad faith and fraud. Kent v. White, 238 Ga. App. 792, 520 S.E.2d 481 (1999) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Evidence of witness's compensation relevant.
- In a products liability case, the prejudicial effect of admitting evidence of a car manufacturer's CEO's compensation did not so dramatically outweigh its probative value that it required reversal of the jury verdict; the actions of the CEO in allegedly interfering with a government recall of the vehicle made the CEO's credibility and bias relevant. Chrysler Group, LLC v. Walden, 303 Ga. 358, 812 S.E.2d 244 (2018).
Contract damages.
- In an action alleging that defendant company breached a sales representative agreement by removing areas from the representative's territory and by repeatedly reducing the commission rate below that provided in the agreement, evidence of actual commissions earned in the representative's territory was relevant to prove the representative's claim for damages. Douglas & Lomason Co. v. Hall, 212 Ga. App. 475, 441 S.E.2d 870 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Summary judgment affidavit was not relevant to material issue.
- Partial summary judgment pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56 was properly granted to a labor supplier in a construction company's counterclaim alleging tortuous interference with the company's contractual relations, based on an allegedly illegal lien filed by the supplier against a property, when no factual basis was found for the counterclaim and, accordingly, it was dismissed; it was noted that the affidavit of the administrative manager of the company contained irrelevant matter which was properly excluded under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 24-4-401 through24-4-403), as it related to the supplier's failure to sign a lien waiver and it had no logical bearing to the material fact in issue and, further, it was found to be inadmissible hearsay under former O.C.G.A. § 24-3-1(a) (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 24-8-801 and24-8-802). Langley v. Nat'l Labor Group, Inc., 262 Ga. App. 749, 586 S.E.2d 418 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Prior lease violations.
- Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion by admitting evidence of previous lease violations in eviction proceedings instituted primarily for a tenant's child's criminal activity, but secondarily based on serious and repeated violations of the material terms of the tenant's lease with a public housing authority; the prior violations were relevant to the secondary reason for terminating the tenant's lease. Martinez v. Hous. Auth., 264 Ga. App. 282, 590 S.E.2d 245 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Autopsy photographs.
- In a wrongful death action, it was not error for the trial court to refuse to allow publication to the jury of autopsy pictures of the decedent's bowel. Cornelius v. Macon-Bibb County Hosp. Auth., 243 Ga. App. 480, 533 S.E.2d 420 (2000) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Trial court did not err in allowing certain autopsy photographs of the victim to be admitted because the challenged photographs did not depict the victim's autopsy incisions, and the photographs were not especially gory or gruesome in the context of autopsy photographs in a murder case; the photographs were relevant to show the nature and location of the victim's injuries, which corroborated the state's evidence of the circumstances of the killing; contrary to the defendant's assertion, the victim did not die solely from manual strangulation, but also from blunt force head trauma, and the photographs illustrated the nature and extent of the physical beating and resulting trauma sustained by the victim; and exclusion based on unfair prejudice was not warranted. Pike v. State, 302 Ga. 795, 809 S.E.2d 756 (2018).
Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion by admitting into evidence an autopsy photograph as relevant evidence because, even though the trial court concluded that the photograph was unpleasant to look at, the court also concluded that the medical examiner stated that the examiner's explanation of the trajectory and direction of the gunshot could be better explained by the examiner through the use of the photograph. Mitchell v. State, 307 Ga. 855, 838 S.E.2d 847 (2020).
Testimony by officer regarding merger.
- Testimony by an officer and agent of the successor legal entity regarding the merger was relevant and material to explain the course of conduct and corporate intent of the successor corporation after the merger and how the official came to have custody of the records. NationsBank v. Tucker, 231 Ga. App. 622, 500 S.E.2d 378 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Photos in condemnation cases.
- Trial court properly refused to admit photos of a subdivision, tendered by a utility to rebut testimony by the condemnees' appraiser that property around power lines was usually the last piece of residential property to be developed, and was usually relegated to low income housing because the utility: (1) failed to authenticate the pictures by showing the identity or address of the subdivision; (2) failed to present any evidence as to the value of the property in the pictures; and (3) failed to demonstrate whether the subdivision was built before or after the power lines were installed. Ga. Power Co. v. Jones, 277 Ga. App. 332, 626 S.E.2d 554 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Background and testimony about impact.
- Trial court did not err in preventing an invitee from providing the jury with background information regarding the effects of the injuries on the parties as: (1) the invitee cited no authorities to support this proposition; (2) lost wages were not an element of damages in a loss of consortium claim; (3) witness after witness testified about the effects of the invitee's injury on the invitee and the family; and (4) the issue was moot because a loss of consortium claim was derivative of the invitee's claim, and the jury declined to award the invitee any damages. Magill v. Edd Kirby Chevrolet, Inc., 277 Ga. App. 619, 627 S.E.2d 207 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Breach of contract.
- In a breach of contract suit brought by a contractor who was engaged to advertise a computer program, the trial court properly excluded as irrelevant evidence regarding the purported illegality of the sale of the program as the reason why the defendants stopped selling the program was irrelevant to the issue of whether the contractor was owed commissions from past sales; even if it was relevant, the trial court was authorized to conclude that the substantially prejudicial impact of the evidence far outweighed any probative value. Smith v. Saulsbury, 286 Ga. App. 322, 649 S.E.2d 344 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
With regard to debtor's claim against creditor for intentional infliction of emotional distress, trial court properly excluded as irrelevant the testimony of debtor's coworker that creditor had been calling coworker at work because it mistook coworker for debtor; this conduct did not affect debtor, who was not aware of it until after debtor had a confrontation with creditor and its employees, and thus the conduct was irrelevant to issue of whether creditor's and employees' conduct was extreme or outrageous. Cook v. Covington Credit of Ga., Inc., 290 Ga. App. 825, 660 S.E.2d 855 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Evidence of bad faith excluded.
- Trial court properly granted an insurer's motion in limine to exclude all evidence of bad faith and claims handling from the coverage trial because the trial court reasonably concluded that information involving bad faith and whether the insurer acted appropriately with respect to claims administration exceeded the scope of the coverage issues; the trial court found that issues regarding the insurer's handling of the claim and whether the insurer abided by the insurer's claims manual related to bad faith, not coverage, and thus could not be addressed by either party during the coverage phase. Saye v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 311 Ga. App. 74, 714 S.E.2d 614 (2011), cert. denied, No. S11C1857, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 984 (Ga. 2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Trial court did not err in refusing to permit record title holder's descendants to show that a developer agreed to pay a property owner for an easement on the property because the trial court correctly limited the evidence to the issue of adverse possession; the developer's offer to pay the owner was irrelevant to the issues decided by the jury. DeFoor v. DeFoor, 290 Ga. 540, 722 S.E.2d 697 (2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Witness failure to appear for lack of timely subpoena service.
- In a personal injury action, because a driver waited until the eve of trial to serve the doctor with a subpoena, the trial court: (1) did not abuse the court's discretion in determining that such service was not reasonable under former O.C.G.A. § 24-10-25(a) (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-13-26); and (2) did not err in refusing to grant the driver a continuance or citing the physician in contempt for failing to appear in court; moreover, since the subpoena was unenforceable, evidence surrounding the doctor's failure to appear became irrelevant under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 24-4-401 through24-4-403). Buster v. Poole, 279 Ga. App. 828, 632 S.E.2d 680 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Document which is not relevant to any issue in a civil action is properly excluded. Farris v. Pazol, 166 Ga. App. 760, 305 S.E.2d 472 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1); City of Dalton v. Smith, 210 Ga. App. 858, 437 S.E.2d 827 (1993);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Evidence of settlements with other tortfeasors.
- In an action against a vascular surgeon for medical negligence in ordering an arteriogram to be performed on a patient and in not being available to direct complications resulting therefrom, it was error to admit evidence of plaintiff's settlements with other alleged tortfeasors since the relevant issues were whether the defendant doctor was negligent and, if so, the damages for which the plaintiff should be compensated. Allison v. Patel, 211 Ga. App. 376, 438 S.E.2d 920 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Fact and amount of a settlement with other parties is not relevant to the amount of damages to be awarded and were properly excluded from the jury's consideration. Bryant v. Haynie, 216 Ga. App. 430, 454 S.E.2d 533 (1995) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Limine ruling not violated.
- Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in concluding that an insurer did not violate the court's limine ruling excluding all evidence of bad faith and claims handling by submitting evidence that an insured did not claim that a disability arose from injury until after the insured's benefits were terminated under the sickness clause of the insurance policy because evidence relating to how the insurer characterized the condition was relevant to whether the condition arose from an injury or a sickness; although the insurer's assertion that the insured received payment under the policy potentially touched on claims handling, it also gave the jury context for how the disability claim and the litigation arose. Saye v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 311 Ga. App. 74, 714 S.E.2d 614 (2011), cert. denied, No. S11C1857, 2011 Ga. LEXIS 984 (Ga. 2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Testimony on date rape drug admitted.
- Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in denying an auto driver's motion in limine and in permitting a man, with whom the driver had been prior to an auto accident, to testify that the driver of the car, who collided the driver's car with another vehicle, had been at the man's residence to provide sex for money as the evidence was relevant to the driver's defense that the man had secretly slipped the driver a date rape drug, causing the driver to flee from the man. Further, the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in granting the motion to the extent that the man could only testify as to the woman being a prostitute as impeachment evidence. Jackson v. Heard, 264 Ga. App. 620, 591 S.E.2d 487 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Observations of teacher's conduct in student's class were relevant and material to the issue of the teacher's alleged mistreatment of the student. Houston v. Kinder-Care Learning Ctrs., Inc., 208 Ga. App. 235, 430 S.E.2d 24 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Lottery ticket investigator's statement was relevant.
- In a dispute over a $1 million lottery ticket, an investigator's testimony regarding the investigator's conversations with one claimant, including that the claimant did not remember what gas station the claimant purchased the ticket from and that the claimant claimed to always play the numbers on the ticket, which was a quick pick ticket, was highly relevant to the main issue in the case and was properly allowed. Heard v. Payne, 350 Ga. App. 283, 828 S.E.2d 657 (2019), cert. denied, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 19 (Ga. 2020).
Evidence in malicious prosecution case.
- Malicious prosecution case was remanded to the trial court because the trial court, after concluding that the plaintiff's past criminal history was relevant, should have thereafter considered whether the plaintiff's prior arrests nevertheless should be excluded because of their inherently prejudicial nature or because those arrests potentially would confuse or mislead the jury. Rivers v. K-Mart Corp., 321 Ga. App. 788, 743 S.E.2d 464 (2013).
Relevant Evidence in Criminal Cases
Character.
- General character of the defendant and the defendant's conduct in other transactions is irrelevant unless the defendant chooses to put the defendant's character in issue. Bacon v. State, 209 Ga. 261, 71 S.E.2d 615 (1952) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Brown v. State, 118 Ga. App. 617, 165 S.E.2d 185 (1968); Dawson v. State, 120 Ga. App. 242, 170 S.E.2d 45 (1969) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Wooten v. State, 125 Ga. App. 635, 188 S.E.2d 409 (1972); Nooner v. State, 131 Ga. App. 563, 206 S.E.2d 660 (1974) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Mikle v. State, 236 Ga. 748, 225 S.E.2d 275 (1976); Brown v. State, 237 Ga. 467, 228 S.E.2d 853 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201).
For cases concerning evidence of state of mind, plan, intent, or motive.
- See Thomas v. State, 244 Ga. 608, 261 S.E.2d 389 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Smith v. State, 151 Ga. App. 697, 261 S.E.2d 439 (1979); Walker v. State, 156 Ga. App. 842, 275 S.E.2d 755 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201).
As defendant, a sheriff, was not empowered to use the sheriff's department as defendant's personal domain, evidence of corruption in the sheriff's office was relevant and admissible, and the prosecution was well within bounds when the prosecution theorized that defendant killed the victim, a political opponent, to prevent the victim from uncovering evidence of defendant's corruption. Dorsey v. State, 279 Ga. 534, 615 S.E.2d 512 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
By placing intent at issue by claiming at trial that the defendant's delusions completely negated criminal intent, the state needed evidence that the defendant acted with intent to commit the crimes of murder and possession of a firearm; thus, the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in admitting evidence of a prior New York crime since as to both crimes, the defendant used a handgun to assault people that the defendant perceived had committed an offense against the defendant. Castillo-Velasquez v. State, 305 Ga. 644, 827 S.E.2d 257 (2019).
Evidence of the counterfeit bills that were released from the appellant's vehicle were relevant to explain why the appellant fled from law enforcement and engaged in dangerous behavior leading up to the fatal crash because, though motive was not an essential element of any offense, evidence of motive was generally relevant in murder prosecutions, and trial counsel did not perform deficiently in failing to object. Calhoun v. State, 308 Ga. 146, 839 S.E.2d 612 (2020).
Defendant's demeanor at the time of arrest.
- Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion by allowing a detective who arrested defendant after defendant took a woman's purse to testify that, when defendant was arrested, defendant was uncooperative, verbally combative, and smelled of alcohol. Moore v. State, 265 Ga. App. 511, 594 S.E.2d 734 (2004) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Circumstances of defendant's arrest.
- Gun was properly admitted into evidence at a trial on sex offenses because the gun was relevant to the issue of a witness's alleged bias and was also admissible as evidence of the circumstances of the defendant's arrest; on the night of the defendant's arrest, the witness told the police that the defendant had just raped the witness's niece and was carrying a 9mm gun. Ward v. State, 274 Ga. App. 511, 618 S.E.2d 154 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Trial court did not err in admitting evidence that police were at the defendant's residence to serve defendant with an arrest warrant because that evidence did not improperly place the issue of character into evidence, but was necessary to explain why police were able to detain, handcuff, and search the defendant. Moreover, a limiting instruction was also issued advising the jurors that they were not to consider the warrant for any purpose other than to explain the officers' presence at the defendant's home. Thrasher v. State, 289 Ga. App. 399, 657 S.E.2d 316 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Evidence discovered in search of co-indictee's home.
- Evidence recovered by law enforcement during a search of the co-indictee's home, including marijuana, baggies and a digital scale, was clearly relevant and admissible as the defendant and the co-indictee were jointly charged with conspiracy to distribute marijuana based upon their attempt to sell marijuana to the victim prior to the victim's death; furthermore, for the same reasons, the defendant failed to show that the admission of that evidence was more prejudicial than probative. Thorpe v. State, 304 Ga. 266, 818 S.E.2d 547 (2018).
Commission of independent offenses.
- Evidence which in any manner shows or tends to show that the accused has committed another crime separate and distinct from that for which the accused is on trial is generally irrelevant and inadmissible, unless there be shown some logical connection between the two from which it can be said that proof of the one tends to establish the other. Patterson v. State, 121 Ga. App. 159, 172 S.E.2d 873 (1970); Wooten v. State, 125 Ga. App. 635, 188 S.E.2d 409 (1972) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Banks v. State, 169 Ga. App. 645, 314 S.E.2d 480 (1984);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Evidence which shows or tends to show that the defendant has committed another crime independent of the offenses for which defendant is on trial is irrelevant and inadmissible. Laney v. State, 159 Ga. App. 609, 284 S.E.2d 114 (1981) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Evidence not relevant to intent.
- Trial court erred in excluding proffered evidence regarding how the detention center handled the defendant and the other detainee after the fight, because the proffered evidence dealt with administrative actions or decisions that occurred after the defendant struck the officer and those actions or decisions were not part of the circumstances connected with the act for which the defendant was accused and, thus, was not relevant under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1 to the issue of intent. Hickey v. State, 325 Ga. App. 496, 753 S.E.2d 143 (2013)(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-4).
Evidence showing res gestae.
- Trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion for mistrial after one of the child victims testified that defendant battered the child's grandmother shortly after the grandmother stumbled upon defendant molesting that child as the evidence supported a finding that this battering was part of the res gestae of the child molestation crime. Prather v. State, 279 Ga. App. 552, 631 S.E.2d 758 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Because the evidence presented against both the defendants showed numerous connections between the crimes such that proof of the former tended to prove the latter, and a vehicle theft committed by both the defendants earlier in the day could be considered a continuation of a crime spree and therefore admissible as part of the res gestae, the trial court did not err in admitting the evidence as similar crimes evidence. Richard v. State, 287 Ga. App. 399, 651 S.E.2d 514 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Evidence that the defendant was a drug dealer and gave the police a false name when questioned after the alleged crime was committed was admissible as relevant and part of the res gestae as the former was incidental to and followed directly from the defendant's participation in the sale of marijuana to the victim, and the latter was part of what transpired shortly after the commission of the victim's murder; moreover, this was true even if the defendant's character was incidentally placed in issue. Roberts v. State, 282 Ga. 548, 651 S.E.2d 689 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Evidence that the defendant hid under a bed when police came to execute an arrest warrant was properly admitted as the evidence was part of the res gestae of the arrest. Gilford v. State, 295 Ga. App. 651, 673 S.E.2d 40 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C0827, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 258 (Ga. 2009), overruled on other grounds by State v. Lane, 2020 Ga. LEXIS 98 (Ga. 2020) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Admission of other acts evidence in murder trial constituted harmless error.
- Trial court abused the court's discretion admitting 2005 shooting evidence of the appellant's firing a handgun, but that error was harmless in light of the array of other strong evidence demonstrating the appellant's guilt and considering it was an evidentiary error and not of constitutional dimensions; given the overall strength of the other evidence of the appellant's guilt, the Georgia Supreme Court held that it was highly probable that erroneously admitted evidence of the 2005 shooting did not contribute to the jury's verdict. Jackson v. State, 306 Ga. 69, 829 S.E.2d 142 (2019).
When evidence of other crime admissible.
- When evidence is relevant for purpose of showing circumstances of arrest, it will not be excluded because the evidence incidentally shows commission of another crime. Ray v. State, 157 Ga. App. 519, 277 S.E.2d 804 (1981) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Two competing principles must be considered in deciding whether to admit testimony relating to an offense other than the one charged: on the one hand, there is the rule that evidence of the commission of a crime other than the one charged is generally not admissible; on the other hand, there is the rule that testimony as to the circumstances connected with the arrest is admissible. Bryan v. State, 157 Ga. App. 635, 278 S.E.2d 177 (1981) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Evidence of other crimes may be admitted if there is sufficient similarity or connection between the other crimes and the crime charged that proof of the former tends to prove the latter. Ballweg v. State, 158 Ga. App. 576, 281 S.E.2d 319 (1981) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
While no gun was used in committing the crimes for which the defendant was being tried, evidence of the gun used in a prior aggravated assault and armed robbery of a separate victim was relevant to the charges being tried because the evidence connected the defendant to the identification documents presented to police in close proximity to the instant victim's body by the person who had custody of the victim's car on the day the victim was killed. Brooks v. State, 281 Ga. 514, 640 S.E.2d 280 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Because evidence of the defendant's prior drug use, and history of crimes committed against family members fueled by that drug use, were properly admitted as relevant to the crime's charged, despite incidentally placing the defendant's character in issue, convictions for both aggravated assault and simple assault were upheld on appeal. Jones v. State, 283 Ga. App. 812, 642 S.E.2d 887 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Trial court's ruling that the other-acts evidence would not be admitted was vacated because the appellate court could not discern whether the trial court considered whether the defendants had taken affirmative steps to withdraw intent as an element to be proved by the state or whether it compared the state of mind involved in the extrinsic offenses with that involved in the charged offenses before finding that the other-acts evidence constituted nothing more than inadmissible propensity evidence. State v. Brown, 333 Ga. App. 643, 777 S.E.2d 27 (2015).
Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion by allowing the state to introduce evidence of the defendant's prior driving under the influence (DUI) conviction because the evidence was not unduly prejudicial as the relevance of the prior DUI was heightened since the defendant's defense was that the defendant did not drive the vehicle while intoxicated but drank after stopping; thus, the prior DUI was relevant to the intent to drive while intoxicated since the defendant did so before. King v. State, 338 Ga. App. 783, 792 S.E.2d 414 (2016).
Other acts evidence regarding two earlier instances of obstructing a law enforcement officer was relevant and admissible because, by expressly challenging whether the officer was lawfully discharging the officer's official duties, the defendant implicitly challenged the defendant's own knowledge that the officer's commands to the defendant were lawful; and it established that, on past occasions, the defendant had encountered officers under similar circumstances and been apprehended or accused of obstructing the officers when the defendant fled, such that the defendant knew that the officer's command that the defendant talk with the officer was made in the lawful discharge of the officer's official duties and that the defendant was not free to flee. Green v. State, 339 Ga. App. 263, 793 S.E.2d 156 (2016).
Testimony regarding similar transactions that occurred years earlier was properly admitted as it was relevant to show the defendant's lustful disposition with respect to preteen or teenaged girls and the defendant's pattern of molesting young girls with whom the defendant was living. Harris v. State, 340 Ga. App. 865, 798 S.E.2d 498 (2017).
O.C.G.A. § 24-4-404(b) only relates to "other" crimes, wrongs, or acts that are independent of or extrinsic to the charged offense. If the other crime, wrong, or act is intrinsic to the charged offense or inextricably intertwined with it, it is admissible under O.C.G.A. § 24-4-401. Such evidence was called part of the res gestae of the offense under the rules in effect prior to the new Evidence Code, adopted in 2013. State v. Battle, 344 Ga. App. 565, 812 S.E.2d 1 (2018).
Although a prior victim's testimony was remote in time, the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in allowing the prior instance of child molestation to be admitted because it was relevant to show the defendant's lustful disposition with respect to younger females. Wilson v. State, 354 Ga. App. 64, 840 S.E.2d 601 (2020).
Trial court did not plainly err in admitting the defendant's Mississippi driving record which related to a prior DUI conviction because the defendant failed to identify any specific evidence that could have been presented to prove the defendant had notice that the defendant was driving on a suspended license and, as the defendant admitted, the redacted driving record was clearly relevant. Hines v. State, 350 Ga. App. 752, 830 S.E.2d 380 (2019).
Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion by allowing the admission of evidence regarding the defendant's prior drug possession arrest because the evidence of prior drug activity was highly probative of intent to sell a controlled substance for which the defendant was on trial and the prior act of drug possession happended while the defendant was driving a car in the same area where the sale of the methamphetamine during the first buy occurred. Moton v. State, 351 Ga. App. 789, 833 S.E.2d 171 (2019).
Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion when the court concluded that the evidence of two prior acts was relevant because the 2002 attack showed that the defendant, when affronted by a romantic partner, would call on male friends to help subdue the partner, as well as the 2003 vase-throwing incident with the defendant biting the victim, were both strikingly similar to the assault upon the defendant's boyfriend, which resulted in the boyfriend's death. Morgan v. State, 354 Ga. App. 754, 841 S.E.2d 430 (2020).
Evidence of defendant's gang affiliation and claimed prior murders relevant after defendant opened door.
- In the defendant's murder trial, defense counsel opened the door to evidence from two witnesses about the defendant's gang activities and prior murders by suggesting that the witnesses had named the defendant as the shooter because the witnesses were afraid of the actual shooter; this evidence was relevant under O.C.G.A. § 24-4-401 and not unduly prejudicial under O.C.G.A. § 24-4-403. Strother v. State, 305 Ga. 838, 828 S.E.2d 327 (2019).
Prior convictions inadmissible.
- In a malice murder and aggravated assault case, because the defendant never claimed, nor was there any evidence to suggest, that the shooting was the result of an accident or mistake, whether the defendant's actions were the result of an accident or mistake was irrelevant, and it was error for the trial court to admit the 2006 guilty pleas to aggravated assault. Brown v. State, 303 Ga. 158, 810 S.E.2d 145 (2018).
Prior conviction of person not testifying inadmissible.
- Defendant's attempt to introduce a prior conviction of a person who did not testify or appear at the trial was correctly rejected by the trial court as irrelevant to the issues on trial. Holder v. State, 194 Ga. App. 790, 391 S.E.2d 808 (1990) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Criminal convictions of a person not called as a witness were not admissible for purposes of impeachment, and since the person's criminal history was not otherwise relevant, its exclusion under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 24-4-401 through24-4-403) was proper. Gadson v. State, 252 Ga. App. 347, 556 S.E.2d 449 (2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Testimony that defendant was suspected of the theft of a gun used in committing offenses was probative of whether defendant was in possession of a particular gun, the purpose for which the testimony was offered. Baker v. State, 225 Ga. App. 848, 485 S.E.2d 548 (1997) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Prior difficulties evidence.
- When the defendant was charged with aggravated assault, evidence of a previous incident when the defendant had punched the victim in the face while the victim was sleeping was admissible as prior difficulties evidence because the evidence was relevant to show the defendant's motive, intent, and bent of mind. McCullors v. State, 291 Ga. App. 393, 662 S.E.2d 197 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Testimony by the victims' mother regarding the defendant's prior history of violence toward the children or in the children's presence was relevant as probative of the defendant's ability to execute the threats to which the victims had testified. Allen v. State, 345 Ga. App. 599, 814 S.E.2d 740 (2018).
Prior conduct by victim.
- In a murder prosecution in which the defendant admitted that the defendant killed the victim, but claimed that the defendant was justified in doing so because of his daughter's molestation by the victim, evidence of the alleged molestation was not relevant since the law will not justify a killing for deliberate revenge no matter how grievous the past wrong may have been. Brown v. State, 270 Ga. 601, 512 S.E.2d 260 (1999) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Testimony that defendant was suspected of the theft of a gun used in committing offenses was probative of whether defendant was in possession of a particular gun, the purpose for which the testimony was offered. Baker v. State, 225 Ga. App. 848, 485 S.E.2d 548 (1997) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
In a prosecution for rape, the trial court properly barred defendant's crossexamination of a police officer about whether the victim's stepfather told the officer that someone had told the stepfather that the victim was pregnant. Lee v. State, 241 Ga. App. 182, 525 S.E.2d 426 (1999) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Trial court's error in not permitting the defendant to show that the wife's minor daughter, whom the defendant was charged with molesting, made an allegation of molestation with respect to another individual that the daughter later denied, was harmless given the overwhelming evidence against defendant, including the facts that there was photographic evidence that the daughter was molested in the defendant's bedroom, that the wife and the daughter's uncle both identified the daughter in the photographs, that a Polaroid camera like that used to take the photographs was found in defendant's home, that the wife had testified that she had not left the daughter alone in the house with any man other than defendant, and that the photographs were found in a house owned by defendant in a file containing personal items. Holloway v. State, 278 Ga. App. 709, 629 S.E.2d 447 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
In a prosecution for child molestation, aggravated child molestation, and statutory rape allegedly committed by the defendant against three of the defendant's children, testimony from one of the defendant's other sons concerning similar transactions committed against him was properly admitted in order to show the defendant's bent of mind and lustful disposition towards the defendant's own children. McCoy v. State, 278 Ga. App. 492, 629 S.E.2d 493 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
In a felony murder and aggravated assault prosecution, the trial court did not err in excluding evidence of the victim's prior violent acts, given that at the time of the confrontation with the defendant, the victim was no longer the aggressor, any prior confrontation between the two had already ended, and when the defendant confronted the victim with a loaded gun, the defendant became the aggressor, precipitating the deadly confrontation that ensued; hence, the defendant failed to make a prima facie showing of justification. Milner v. State, 281 Ga. 612, 641 S.E.2d 517 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Evidence of victim's violent acts.
- Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in excluding evidence that the victim pulled a gun on a third person at a dice game the week prior to the murder because the defendant failed to show how that evidence met basic admissibility requirements as to relevancy and offered nothing more than speculation and conjecture that the third person could have been involved in the victim's murder, regardless of the applicability of O.C.G.A. § 24-4-404(b). Roberts v. State, 305 Ga. 257, 824 S.E.2d 326 (2019).
Evidence of victim's relationship.
- In a murder prosecution in which the victim's body was never found, evidence of the victim's relationships at the time of the victim's disappearance was relevant because it rendered the inference that the victim did not run away but was killed more probable than it would be without the evidence. Hinton v. State, 280 Ga. 811, 631 S.E.2d 365 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
In a murder trial, testimony from the victim's girlfriend regarding their relationship was not irrelevant; the girlfriend called police to report that the victim was missing, and she explained that she did so because of their relationship. Simmons v. State, 282 Ga. 183, 646 S.E.2d 55 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Because the victim's understanding of what the state had to prove to obtain a conviction was irrelevant, the defendant was properly curtailed from questioning the victim on this matter. Mayhew v. State, 299 Ga. App. 313, 682 S.E.2d 594 (2009), cert. denied, No. S09C2059, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 786 (Ga. 2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Evidence rehabilitating victim's credibility not relevant or admissible.
- Trial court erred in permitting the state to elicit testimony that the co-defendant's father attempted to influence the victim by bribing the victim into changing the victim's account of what took place as a means of rehabilitating the victim's credibility because the state did not contend that cross-examination of the victim included any manner of impeachment that would permit introduction of the complained-of evidence as being generally relevant; and there was no rule that generally opened the door to otherwise inadmissible evidence. Belcher v. State, 344 Ga. App. 729, 812 S.E.2d 51 (2018).
Evidence regarding victim's use of seatbelt.
- Trial court properly excluded evidence of seatbelt-use because evidence of the victim's failure to wear a seatbelt was irrelevant to causation and inadmissible in a criminal case as it did not tend to make it either more or less probable that an accident caused by the defendant proximately caused the victim's death, in violation of the statutes for homicide by vehicle in the first degree predicated on a hit-and-run offense and for hit and run. State v. Mondor, 306 Ga. 338, 830 S.E.2d 206 (2019).
Items found at the scene of the defendant's arrest are relevant and are admissible at trial. Thompson v. State, 168 Ga. App. 734, 310 S.E.2d 725 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Evidence of defendant's 28 years of physical and psychological abuse by defendant's two former spouses was properly excluded at defendant's trial for murder since the defendant was permitted to adequately testify as to the facts in the defendant's relationship with the victim which allegedly caused the defendant's fear of the victim. Clenney v. State, 256 Ga. 116, 344 S.E.2d 216 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Evidence victim's father was sexual abuse victim irrelevant.
- Since there was no logical link between the fact that the victim had a father who also claimed to be a victim of sexual abuse and a conclusion that the victim might therefore be an unreliable witness whose testimony regarding the defendant's actions was not worthy of belief, the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in finding that any evidence that the victim's father suffered sexual abuse was irrelevant. Morris v. State, 341 Ga. App. 568, 802 S.E.2d 13 (2017).
Victim's condition relevant in cruelty to children case.
- Trial court did not commit reversible error when the court permitted the state to bring the first victim into the courtroom because evidence of the first victim's condition was clearly relevant to the state's cruelty to children in the first and second charges, including that the defendant caused the first victim bodily harm by rendering the first victim's brain, a member of the first victim's body, useless by violently shaking the victim, causing permanent brain damage; the probative value of viewing the victim was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice; and under the Crime Victims' Bill of Rights statute, O.C.G.A. § 17-7-1 et seq., the first victim had the right to be present at the trial. Freeman v. State, 333 Ga. App. 6, 775 S.E.2d 258 (2015).
Flight, even an escape from jail after the offense, is a circumstance which may be weighed by the jury in connection with other circumstances to determine the guilt of the accused. The fact that an escape from the courthouse during trial was involved does not remove such conduct from former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 24-4-401 through24-4-403). Smith v. State, 184 Ga. App. 739, 362 S.E.2d 384, cert. denied, 184 Ga. App. 910, 362 S.E.2d 384 (1987) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Chain of custody and tampering.
- In proving chain of custody, the state is not required to show that a substance is guarded each minute the substance is in one's custody, and in the absence of a showing to the contrary, the chain is not thereby broken. Williams v. State, 153 Ga. App. 421, 265 S.E.2d 341 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201).
When there is only a bare speculation of tampering, it is proper to admit the evidence and let what doubt remains go to the weight of the evidence. Williams v. State, 153 Ga. App. 421, 265 S.E.2d 341 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Mayfield v. State, 153 Ga. App. 459, 265 S.E.2d 366 (1980); Thompson v. State, 154 Ga. App. 704, 269 S.E.2d 474 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201).
Because defendant produced no affirmative evidence of tampering, substitution, or mishandling of the methamphetamine at the crime lab, there was no error in treating the crime lab as a single link in the chain of custody for admissibility purposes. Eaton v. State, 294 Ga. App. 124, 668 S.E.2d 770 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Exclusion of battered person's syndrome evidence.
- If the defendant suffered from a psychological condition that caused the defendant to believe the defendant had to hurt the defendant's child to help the child, the only way the jury could know about such a condition was through expert testimony, and thus, it was error to exclude the defendant's proffered expert testimony of battered person syndrome; however, such error was harmless given the overwhelming weight of evidence which established that the defendant's conduct was knowing, if not intentional. Pickle v. State, 280 Ga. App. 821, 635 S.E.2d 197 (2006), cert. denied, No. S06C2150, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 110, 111 (Ga. 2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Refusal to allow defendant to stipulate to intercourse in rape trial.
- Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion when the court refused to allow a defendant to stipulate to having sex with a rape victim in an effort to keep evidence of the victim's rape related pregnancy, her subsequent abortion, and DNA evidence that showed that there was a 99.9969% probability that the defendant had fathered the aborted fetus from being presented to the jury; the evidence was relevant to the state's case against the defendant, particularly because the defendant had denied any sexual contact with the victim, and the defendant could not selectively choose which incriminating evidence the defendant would admit to. Mims v. State, 291 Ga. App. 777, 662 S.E.2d 867 (2008), cert. denied, No. S08C1691, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 768 (Ga. 2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Evidence of license suspension agreement relevant in DUI case.
- In a DUI case under O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(a)(1), evidence of an agreement the defendant entered in an administrative license suspension (ALS) proceeding, in which the defendant agreed to plead guilty to DUI in exchange for the return of the defendant's license, was relevant and admissible in the defendant's DUI case although the defendant later decided not to plead guilty and go to trial, and although the agreement did not recite that it could be used against the defendant at trial. Smith v. State, 345 Ga. App. 43, 812 S.E.2d 117 (2018).
Admission of horizontal gaze nystagmus test.
- In the defendant's DUI trial, O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(a)(1), horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test was properly admitted, although the defendant stated the defendant had taken Prozac, which would influence the results, because the evidence was relevant as to whether the defendant showed signs of impairment, O.C.G.A. § 24-4-401, and the defendant remained free to attempt to persuade the factfinder that the testimony be afforded little weight under the circumstances. Cherry v. State, 345 Ga. App. 409, 813 S.E.2d 408 (2018), cert. denied, No. S18C1104, 2018 Ga. LEXIS 720 (Ga. 2018).
Video admissible in DUI case.
- Trial court did not err by allowing the state to admit demonstrative evidence of video clips showing three types of horizontal gaze nystagmus because the officer's testimony made clear that the video clips were not of the defendant, but that in the substantial particulars, the conditions of the video clips and the officer's observations of the defendant were similar as both showed the same kind of nystagmus. Monroe v. State, 340 Ga. App. 373, 797 S.E.2d 245 (2017).
For cases concerning photographic and diagrammatic evidence.
- See Smith v. State, 202 Ga. 851, 45 S.E.2d 267 (1947) (general admissibility) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Crittenden v. State, 98 Ga. App. 329, 105 S.E.2d 778 (1958) (skid marks) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Brooks v. State, 244 Ga. 574, 261 S.E.2d 379 (1979) (photograph of rape victim's injuries) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Gates v. State, 244 Ga. 587, 261 S.E.2d 349 (1979) (videotape recording) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Williams v. State, 151 Ga. App. 683, 261 S.E.2d 430 (1979) (shoes and footprints) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Wofford v. State, 152 Ga. App. 739, 263 S.E.2d 707 (1979) (diagrams of scene of crime) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Miller v. State, 94 Ga. App. 259, 94 S.E.2d 120 (1956) (photographs of liquor) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Brooks v. State, 244 Ga. 574, 261 S.E.2d 379 (1979) (photograph of teeth marks on victim's breast) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); City Council v. Lee, 153 Ga. App. 94, 264 S.E.2d 683 (1980) (movie film) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Craft v. State, 154 Ga. App. 682, 269 S.E.2d 490 (1980) (authentication) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Craft v. State, 154 Ga. App. 682, 269 S.E.2d 490 (1980) (change in scene photographed) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Tatum v. State, 206 Ga. 171, 56 S.E.2d 518 (1949) (photographs of deceased after death) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Blount v. State, 214 Ga. 433, 105 S.E.2d 304 (1958) (photographs of deceased, an ax, and wooden bar) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Williams v. State, 151 Ga. App. 765, 261 S.E.2d 487 (1979) ("gruesome" photographs of deceased victim) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Moses v. State, 245 Ga. 180, 263 S.E.2d 916 (1980), overruled on other grounds, Nagel v. State, 262 Ga. 888, 427 S.E.2d 490 (1993) (photograph of deceased) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Gaylor v. State, 247 Ga. 759, 279 S.E.2d 207 (1981) (photograph of deceased) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Williams v. State, 255 Ga. 97, 335 S.E.2d 553 (1985) (photograph of child in hospital bed surrounded by medical equipment) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1); Gosdin v. State, 176 Ga. App. 381, 336 S.E.2d 261 (1985) (photograph of defendant printed from negative taken from camera allegedly stolen by defendant) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1); Pittman v. State, 178 Ga. App. 693, 344 S.E.2d 511 (1986) (anatomically correct diagram of child molestation victim's body) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Defendant's conviction for aggravated child molestation under O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4 was affirmed because the trial court did not commit plain error by admitting photographs of the victim's injuries as the photographs were material and relevant to issues raised at trial, and the photographs were admissible even if the photographs, to some extent, duplicated other photographs. Robinson v. State, 342 Ga. App. 624, 805 S.E.2d 103 (2017).
Exhibits properly admitted.
- There was no prejudice to the defendant in the admission of exhibits which merely showed the lead fragments, displayed against a neutral background, that were removed from the victim's head; admission of evidence of "prior difficulties" between the two groups was proper to explain how two people became the innocent victims of the two groups' hostilities. Perry v. State, 276 Ga. 836, 585 S.E.2d 614, rev'd, 276 Ga. 839, 584 S.E.2d 253 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Photos were arguably objectionable.
- Three photos from the hospital series that did not depict the victim at all were arguably objectionable by counsel and an objection may have been sustained under O.C.G.A. § 24-4-403 as to relevancy but no ineffective assistance of counsel was shown based on the other evidence against the appellant being strong and the appellant failing to show a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different. Davis v. State, 299 Ga. 180, 787 S.E.2d 221 (2016).
Photographs of the victim of a crime are admissible when the photographs are relevant on the issues in the case, although the photographs may be inflammatory and prejudicial to the accused. Whitaker v. State, 246 Ga. 163, 269 S.E.2d 436 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201).
When defendants contended defendants were not responsible for the injuries and poor physical condition of deceased child, 12 photos of the body and one of clothing were relevant to the issues in the case to show the unlikelihood that these injuries would have been self-inflicted or accidental, as were autopsy photographs of a fractured rib. Lackey v. State, 246 Ga. 331, 271 S.E.2d 478 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201).
Photographs of body of victim showing the body's location when found and various aspects of the wounds causing death were relevant and material to show that the victim was bludgeoned and shot twice in the head. Knowles v. State, 246 Ga. 378, 271 S.E.2d 615 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Dick v. State, 246 Ga. 697, 273 S.E.2d 124 (1980); Strickland v. State, 247 Ga. 219, 275 S.E.2d 29 (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); 454 U.S. 882, 102 S. Ct. 365, 70 L. Ed. 2d 192 (1981);cert. denied,(photographs of victims of crime, wounds, location) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201).
In a prosecution for a violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2), as the indictment alleged that the aggravated assault was committed with objects likely to cause serious bodily injury (a broom handle and the defendant's feet and hands), photos depicting the condition of the victim, one of which depicted the defendant's foot print on the victim's face, were relevant to establish the nature and extent of the injury. Massey v. State, 278 Ga. App. 303, 628 S.E.2d 706 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Trial court did not err by admitting three photographs of a victim's bullet wound to the head and two photographs of defendant's handgun as the photographs were not repetitive or cumulative, and the photographs presented the evidence from different distances and vantage points in order to accurately depict the nature and location of the victim's wound and the location of the weapon when the weapon was found; moreover, the victim's injuries and the weapon used to inflict those injuries were obviously relevant to the charges against defendant. Smith v. State, 279 Ga. App. 211, 630 S.E.2d 833 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Defendant's motion for a mistrial based on the admission of a photograph of the victim's head was not an abuse of discretion as: (1) if pre-autopsy photographs were relevant and material to any issue in the case, those photographs were admissible even if those photographs were duplicative and might inflame the jury; (2) photographs showing the extent and nature of the victim's wounds were material and relevant, even if the cause of death was not in dispute; (3) the state had the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant caused the death of the victim with malice aforethought; and (4) the photograph was relevant to the state's claim that the defendant had done so by shooting a single shot into the victim's head. Bradley v. State, 281 Ga. 173, 637 S.E.2d 19 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Trial court properly admitted one of three photographs of the victim's body which showed an exterior mark of strangulation as such was not overly gruesome and inflammatory; moreover, pre-incision photos of a victim which depicted the location and nature of the victim's wounds were admissible as both relevant and material. McWilliams v. State, 280 Ga. 724, 632 S.E.2d 127 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Photographs of a victim's body, after the body had been taken to the crime lab, were material, relevant, and admissible as the photographs showed the location, nature, and extent of the victim's multiple gunshot wounds. Thomason v. State, 281 Ga. 429, 637 S.E.2d 639 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Photograph showing the victim's vagina and bloody underwear was relevant to show that the victim had been raped and to refute the defendant's assertion that her injuries resulted from a kick to the groin. Smith v. State, 291 Ga. App. 545, 662 S.E.2d 323 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in admitting the autopsy photographs of the victim because the photographs were relevant as the medical examiner testified that the photographs showed the internal injuries that caused the victim's death that were not evident from the pre-incision photographs; the fact that the defendant might not have disputed the cause of death did not diminish the relevance of the photographs; and the trial court considered whether the probative value of the photographs was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Dailey v. State, 297 Ga. 442, 774 S.E.2d 672 (2015).
Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion by admitting into evidence an autopsy photograph showing the victim's exposed brain because the photograph was relevant as evidence of the severity of the victim's injury, the single photograph was not particularly gory or gruesome, and the court concluded that the trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in deciding that the photograph's probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Flowers v. State, 307 Ga. 618, 837 S.E.2d 824 (2020).
Autopsy photo admissible.
- Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in admitting an autopsy photo after the medical examiner explained that the only way the examiner could get the trajectory probes through the victim's body was in the manner depicted in the photo. Venturino v. State, 306 Ga. 391, 830 S.E.2d 110 (2019).
Photographs posted on social media.
- Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion when the court found that a photograph that a friend took of the three defendants during the trial and posted on social media was relevant to show that the three defendants were members of a gang as the state also introduced other photographs of the three defendants that the same friend posted on social media and that depicted the defendants allegedly throwing gang signs. Anthony v. State, 303 Ga. 399, 811 S.E.2d 399 (2018).
Video recordings from officers' body cameras relevant.
- After the defendant murdered the defendant's two infant daughters by drowning the children, the video-recordings of the crime scene taken from the body cameras of two police officers who responded to the defendant's 911 call were relevant and admissible, with the exception of the last four minutes of the second recording, because those portions as a whole were relevant to show the children's manner of death; the video-recordings were not needlessly cumulative of the manner of death as the state was not required to stipulate to the cause of death and the circumstances surrounding the murders; and the video-recordings were probative of matters other than the manner of death, including rebutting the defendant's insanity defense. Morgan v. State, 307 Ga. 889, 838 S.E.2d 878 (2020).
Photograph of coconspirator with another person irrelevant.
- Trial court did not err in excluding a photograph of one of the state's witnesses on the beach with a person defendant claimed committed the murders as irrelevant, O.C.G.A. § 24-4-401, because the photograph established at most that the two were acquainted, which was not in dispute. Jones v. State, 305 Ga. 750, 827 S.E.2d 879 (2019).
Skeletal remains.
- Trial court did not err in admitting the victim's skeletal remains in a murder trial since the remains were used to illustrate portions of the testimony of an expert forensic anthropologist. Quedens v. State, 280 Ga. 355, 629 S.E.2d 197 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Tape of prior telephone conversation with witness admissible for impeachment.
- In a trial for theft by deception, the trial court erred in ruling inadmissible the tape recording of a telephone conversation between a witness and defendant's father after a determination was made, through questions posed to the witness and defendant's father, that it was authentic, accurate and complete and since it was offered for impeachment by showing discrepancies between the witness's representations about certain facts made during the telephone conversation and the witness's trial testimony regarding those same facts pertaining to the issues of whether defendant intended to deceive clients. Riceman v. State, 166 Ga. App. 825, 305 S.E.2d 595 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Trial court properly disallowed forensic pathologist (as defense witness) to testify: (1) why neurologists and neurosurgeons consulted with the pathologist; and (2) that many cases of suspected child abuse in which the pathologist had been consulted had been determined to be accidental; as neither response would have tended to show the guilt or innocence of the defendant of the offense of aggravated battery for which defendant was being tried. Cohn v. State, 186 Ga. App. 816, 368 S.E.2d 572 (1988) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Recorded telephone conversations made from jail.
- Defendant's recorded telephone conversations made from jail were relevant and admissible: (1) to show the defendant's consciousness of guilt for the armed robbery as the defendant admonished a witness for divulging the defendant's name to the police; the defendant asked the witness if the witness told the police that the defendant had a gun; and the defendant told the witness that the police pressure should not get to the witness as the witness had not done anything; and (2) to corroborate the witness's testimony that the defendant had told the witness not to give the defendant's name to the police; further, the probative value of the recorded telephone calls was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Anderson v. State, 337 Ga. App. 739, 788 S.E.2d 831 (2016).
Admission of defendant's tattoo irrelevant, but harmless.
- Trial court abused the court's discretion in overruling the defendant's relevancy objection to questions about the defendant's tattoos, but the error was harmless as the properly admitted evidence proving the defendant's guilt was overwhelming given that several witnesses and the defendant testified the defendant was alone with the victim when the symptoms started, the defendant admitted to squeezing the baby, and expert testimony established that the symptoms would have been immediately apparent. Smith v. State, 299 Ga. 424, 788 S.E.2d 433 (2016).
Admission of medical records on mental health.
- Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to present available evidence corroborating the defendant's testimony about the defendant's mental health because trial counsel correctly recognized that under the rule of completeness, the state could have sought to admit portions of the medical records from prison, as well as medical records from other facilities, that were unfavorable to the defendant. Castillo-Velasquez v. State, 305 Ga. 644, 827 S.E.2d 257 (2019).
Exclusion of evidence regarding lack of history of mental illness.
- Evidence regarding the defendant's lack of history of mental illness was properly excluded because the defendant did not raise any type of mental-health related defense for which evidence of psychological evaluations might have been relevant; the defendant pointed to no legal authority for the proposition that a defendant should be permitted to introduce expert testimony that the defendant had no history of mental illness in order to show that the defendant did not intend to commit a crime; and there was no authority suggesting that evidence of the defendant's lack of mental illness had any tendency to make the existence of any fact that was of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable. Sullivan v. State, 308 Ga. 772, 843 S.E.2d 411 (2020).
Police dogs.
- Even when it is shown that a dog is of pure blood and of a stock characterized by acuteness of scent and power of discrimination, it must also be established that the dog is possessed of these qualities, and has been trained or tested in their exercise in the tracking of human beings, and that these facts must appear from the testimony of some person who has personal knowledge thereof. O'Quinn v. State, 153 Ga. App. 467, 265 S.E.2d 824 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201).
Trial court improperly granted the state's motion to quash the defendant's subpoena for all records and documents pertaining to the drug detection dog and the dog's handler involved in the detection of drugs in the defendant's luggage because the appellate court could not determine from the existing record whether the training materials were relevant to the issue of reliability of the drug dog as certification of the drug dog on the day of the alert did not preclude a challenge to its reliability; other than the blanket assertion that training materials were irrelevant to show reliability, the state offered no other basis for the state's objection to the subpoena; and the trial court had the discretion to modify the subpoena if the subpoena was overly broad. Harris v. State, 341 Ga. App. 831, 802 S.E.2d 708 (2017).
Prior verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity irrelevant in subsequent prosecution.
- Defendant's mental state at defendant's previous trial for burglary and assault to commit rape at which defendant was found not guilty by reason of insanity was irrelevant to any issue in defendant's subsequent trial for another rape and thus was properly excluded. Crapse v. State, 180 Ga. App. 321, 349 S.E.2d 190 (1986) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Prior acquittals irrelevant in perjury trial.
- Prior acquittals in two trials for child molestation had no probative value in a trial for perjury committed at those trials because evidence of the acquittals was neither relevant nor material to any issue in the perjury case. West v. State, 228 Ga. App. 713, 492 S.E.2d 576 (1997) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Pretrial identifications.
- Victim's pretrial identifications of defendant and codefendant, as being the persons riding together in the automobile in which they ultimately were arrested and in which a .25 caliber pistol was found, were relevant within the meaning of former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1 (see now O.C.G.A. §§ 24-4-401 through24-4-403). If evidence is relevant, no matter how slightly, the evidence generally should be admitted and the weight of the evidence left to the jury. Buckner v. State, 209 Ga. App. 107, 433 S.E.2d 94 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Trial court did not err in denying a motion in limine to exclude the testimony of a state witness that allegedly placed the defendant's character in issue because the testimony was relevant to establish the defendant's identity and appearance on that date of the charged crime, and was not rendered inadmissible merely because the testimony incidentally placed the defendant's character in issue. Moreover, the defendant's trial counsel conceded that the witness's testimony regarding the description was admissible. Buice v. State, 289 Ga. App. 415, 657 S.E.2d 326 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Movie about body disposal.
- In a joint trial of two defendants, the trial court did not err in showing the jury portions of a movie which depicted a method of disposing of a murdered victim's body as: (1) such was relevant to show a bent of mind, despite the fact that it could have placed the first defendant's character in issue; and (2) the jury could have made the permissible inference that the first defendant was encouraged by the movie to order the manner of disposing of the victim's body; moreover, because the second defendant failed to request a cautionary instruction to adequately protect from this inference, the second defendant could not complain of the inference on appeal. Oree v. State, 280 Ga. 588, 630 S.E.2d 390 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Expert testimony on Chinese culture which defendant claimed would have cast light on the defendant's motivations, state of mind, and actions was properly excluded since such evidence would not have aided the jury in the jury's search for the truth. Lee v. State, 262 Ga. 593, 423 S.E.2d 249 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Stipulation at administrative license suspension hearing relevant.
- Defendant's stipulation at the administrative license suspension hearing that the defendant would plead guilty to driving under the influence of alcohol in exchange for the return of the defendant's driver's license was relevant to, though certainly not dispositive of, the charge that the defendant was driving under the influence of alcohol. Flading v. State, 327 Ga. App. 346, 759 S.E.2d 67 (2014).
Relevance of evidence found.
- See Posey v. State, 46 Ga. App. 290, 167 S.E. 340 (1933) (exhibit of child) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Miller v. State, 53 Ga. App. 275, 185 S.E. 372 (1936) (burglary) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Wynes v. State, 182 Ga. 434, 185 S.E. 711 (1936) (experiments) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Bryant v. State, 197 Ga. 641, 30 S.E.2d 259 (1944) (other person as guilty party) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Ledbetter v. State, 51 Ga. App. 560, 181 S.E. 120 (1935) (possession of liquor) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Rogers v. State, 80 Ga. App. 585, 56 S.E.2d 633 (1949) (chain of circumstances) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Hatcher v. State, 94 Ga. App. 270, 94 S.E.2d 110 (1956) (unlawful possession of whiskey) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Yawn v. State, 94 Ga. App. 400, 94 S.E.2d 769 (1956) (stolen goods) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Duffey v. State, 151 Ga. App. 673, 261 S.E.2d 421 (1979) (photographic lineup in armed robbery) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Gray v. State, 151 Ga. App. 684, 261 S.E.2d 402 (1979) (identification procedure) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Riden v. State, 151 Ga. App. 654, 261 S.E.2d 409 (1979) (documentary evidence) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Flynt v. State, 153 Ga. App. 232, 264 S.E.2d 669, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888, 101 S. Ct. 245, 66 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1980) (statement indicating consciousness of guilt) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Hudgins v. State, 153 Ga. App. 601, 266 S.E.2d 283 (1980) (escape from confinement) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Clark v. State, 149 Ga. App. 641, 255 S.E.2d 110 (1979) (deadly weapons) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Whitacre v. State, 155 Ga. App. 359, 270 S.E.2d 894 (1980) (drug paraphernalia) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Marshall v. State, 153 Ga. App. 198, 264 S.E.2d 718 (1980) (contents of paper bag) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Herron v. State, 155 Ga. App. 791, 272 S.E.2d 756 (1980) (child molestation case) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Stevens v. State, 247 Ga. 698, 278 S.E.2d 398 (1981), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1213, 103 S. Ct. 3551, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1398 (1983) (identity and background of murder victim) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Wortham v. State, 158 Ga. App. 19, 279 S.E.2d 287 (1981) (drug paraphernalia) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Kelley v. State, 160 Ga. App. 343, 287 S.E.2d 68 (1981) (value of stolen items) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201); Harrell v. State, 249 Ga. 48, 288 S.E.2d 192 (1982) (psychiatric testimony) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1); Williams v. State, 250 Ga. 553, 300 S.E.2d 301 (1983), overruled on other grounds by Venturino v. State, 830 S.E.2d 110, 2019 Ga. LEXIS 435 (Ga. 2019) (murder case) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1); Ponder v. Ponder, 251 Ga. 323, 304 S.E.2d 61 (1983) (dispute between parents and family member) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1); Hubbard v. State, 167 Ga. App. 32, 305 S.E.2d 849 (1983) (theft by taking case) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1); Griffin v. State, 243 Ga. App. 282, 531 S.E.2d 175 (2000) (fingerprints) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Probative value of the probation officer's testimony about a phone number that the defendant had given to the officer that linked the defendant to the phone from which numerous calls were placed to one of the murder victims on the day of the murders was not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect because the testimony of the probation officer was clearly relevant; it had substantial probative value; although other evidence in the record tended to establish the connection between the defendant and one of the murder victims, none of it established a connection as directly or strongly as the testimony of the probation officer; and other evidence informed the jury that the defendant was on probation. Huff v. State, 299 Ga. 801, 792 S.E.2d 368 (2016).
Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in allowing the admission of evidence of the defendant's friend's gang affiliation given the state's purpose, to show a connection between the robbery and murder and the foreseeable consequence of the defendant's participation in the robbery of the victim. Davis v. State, 301 Ga. 397, 801 S.E.2d 897 (2017).
Evidence that the defendant physically abused the mother was admissible at a trial for rape and aggravated child molestation as to the defendant's stepdaughter because the evidence was probative of whether the defendant's behavior created a threatening atmosphere in the home and tended to explain the stepdaughter's reluctance to disclose the abuse. Thomas v. State, 354 Ga. App. 815, 841 S.E.2d 458 (2020).
Signs and fliers relevant to show defendant's bent of mind.
- Images and language incorporated into the sign and fliers that the defendant displayed or distributed concerning the defendant's child's mother, the victim, at or near the victim's workplace demonstrated the state of the relationship between the defendant and the victim, and were "highly relevant" to show the defendant's abusive bent of mind toward the victim. Hudson v. State, 321 Ga. App. 702, 742 S.E.2d 516 (2013).
Testimony of medical examiner relevant.
- Trial court did not err in permitting a medical examiner to testify that inasmuch as the victim's body was discovered in a wooded area approximately 20 miles from the victim's house, the victim's death was "most likely" a homicide; defendant did not object to the testimony and the testimony was not improper under the circumstances of the case. Watson v. State, 278 Ga. 763, 604 S.E.2d 804 (2004), overruled on other grounds by State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 838 S.E.2d 808 (2020) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Hypnotic session was relevant evidence.
- Witness was properly permitted to testify even though the recording of the witness's hypnotic session was unavailable and the witness's pre-hypnotic oral statement was not reduced contemporaneously to a writing as the trial court went to great lengths to ensure that the witness's testimony was not tainted or corrupted by hypnotic suggestion and all of the testimony was cumulative of other evidence admitted. Watson v. State, 278 Ga. 763, 604 S.E.2d 804 (2004), overruled on other grounds by State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 838 S.E.2d 808 (2020) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Officer's testimony relevant.
- Trial court properly admitted a police officer's testimony that the officer learned from independent sources that the officer was searching for a suspect named "Little B" as several witnesses referred to defendant by the defendant's nickname and it was necessary to establish that "Little B" and defendant were the same person. Lewis v. State, 279 Ga. 69, 608 S.E.2d 602, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 987, 126 S. Ct. 571, 163 L. Ed. 2d 478 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Although the state prematurely bolstered a child victim's testimony, the parties knew that the victim's credibility would be immediately undermined; evidence that defendant told the victim that a relative had been imprisoned for improper "touching" and that defendant masturbated with the victim's underwear were admissible as relevant. Robinson v. State, 275 Ga. App. 537, 621 S.E.2d 770 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Defendant did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel for the failure of counsel to object to a passing reference to defendant's incarceration as the reason for defendant not being arrested sooner and to the initial arrest as being part of a "roundup"; all of the circumstances connected with a defendant's arrest were admissible, even those that established the commission of another criminal offense, if they were relevant and the testimony was relevant to counter any accusation that defendant's arrest was delayed due to lack of identification. Butler v. State, 277 Ga. App. 57, 625 S.E.2d 458 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Trial court did not err by permitting a law-enforcement officer to testify about the pernicious effects of heroin and addiction because the testimony put in context what heroin was and the testimony was relevant to explain why someone might engage in an enterprise to distribute heroin and possess a trafficking amount, and to explain why heroin was a Schedule I controlled substance. Jones v. State, 339 Ga. App. 95, 791 S.E.2d 625 (2016).
Testimony of nurse treating child relevant.
- In a defendant's trial for cruelty to a child, a nurse's testimony as to the nurse's decision to report an incident to explain the hospital's course of conduct regarding a child services agency was relevant to the child's care and future well-being; the trial court had wide discretion in determining relevancy and materiality and, where relevancy was doubtful, the evidence was properly admitted and the weight of the evidence left for the jury's determination. Revells v. State, 283 Ga. App. 59, 640 S.E.2d 587 (2006) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Excluded testimony relevant to explain impetus for defendant's actions.
- Trial court erred in excluding testimony from a witness that, during a lengthy conversation with the defendant after the defendant killed the defendant's wife, the defendant told the witness that the wife had been unfaithful, that the defendant did not mean for the wife's death to happen, and the defendant loved the wife, because such testimony was relevant to explain the impetus for the defendant's actions. Allaben v. State, 299 Ga. 253, 787 S.E.2d 711 (2016).
Written note relevant.
- Because a note found in the defendant's truck contained information that could have linked the note's author to the armed robbery charged, such was properly admitted as relevant; any issue as to whether the note was written by the defendant or by someone else was an issue affecting the weight of the evidence, not the admissibility of the evidence, and therefore was for the jury to decide. Clark v. State, 283 Ga. App. 884, 642 S.E.2d 900 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Possession of a handgun was relevant.
- Evidence that the defendant was in possession of a handgun "around the time of the shooting" was relevant and material to a charge of possession of a weapon by a convicted felon. Jones v. State, 282 Ga. 306, 647 S.E.2d 576 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
In an assault trial, after the defendant claimed that the victim had raped the defendant's sibling, evidence that one of the defendant's parents was indicted for extortion and other offenses in connection with the rape charge and that the parent pled guilty to some charges was properly admitted; the indictment and plea, as well as the fact that the indictment led to the dismissal of the rape charges, were relevant to the issue of the victim's credibility. Gonzales v. State, 286 Ga. App. 821, 650 S.E.2d 401 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1765, 2008 Ga. LEXIS 70 (Ga. 2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Because the trial court erroneously excluded evidence relevant to the defendant's claim that there was provocation sufficient to excuse the use of the fighting words the defendant uttered and made the basis of a disorderly conduct charge, the defendant's conviction was reversed; moreover, in determining whether or not there was sufficient provocation for the defendant's use of the fighting words uttered, the jury was entitled to consider all the facts and circumstances tending to prove provocation, not just facts and circumstances contemporaneous with the use of the fighting words. Talmadge v. State, 287 Ga. App. 332, 651 S.E.2d 469 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in admitting the revolver found in the defendant's vehicle into evidence as it was relevant to whether the defendant had threatened the judge who presided over the defendant's divorce and the judge's family, and to whether the defendant was in the process of executing the steps outlined in a letter to the judge, which included a plan to kill the judge's family, motivated by revenge. Satterfield v. State, 339 Ga. App. 15, 792 S.E.2d 451 (2016).
Testimony about drugs was relevant.
- In a child molestation case, the victim's testimony that the defendant gave the victim drugs and that this always led up to sexual intercourse was relevant, as the testimony had some bearing on the issues being tried. Boynton v. State, 287 Ga. App. 778, 653 S.E.2d 110 (2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Evidence that a drug defendant went to a hotel room to have sex was relevant and admissible to support the state's theory that the defendant was at the hotel room to exchange sex for drugs. Gassett v. State, 289 Ga. App. 792, 658 S.E.2d 366 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Testimony about blood test relevant.
- Trial court did not abuse the court's discretion in allowing an arresting officer to testify that the defendant had requested and received an independent blood test in accordance with the defendant's rights under implied consent laws as the defendant contested the results of the state's blood test, arguing that the results were skewed and unreliable due to the unknown storage conditions of the defendant's blood sample while in route to a lab. Consequently, the fact that the defendant requested and received an independent test which the defendant failed to produce at trial was relevant to a material issue in the case. Schlanger v. State, 290 Ga. App. 407, 659 S.E.2d 823 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Admission of weapon relevant.
- There was no merit to the defendant's claim that it was error to admit a knife into evidence. The fact that a knife was found on the defendant's person at the time of the defendant's arrest was clearly relevant to the issue of whether the defendant, who was convicted of aggravated assault, had assaulted the victim with a deadly weapon. Brown v. State, 293 Ga. App. 224, 666 S.E.2d 600 (2008) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Because the crimes committed by defendant following the shooting of the victim were relevant to show defendant's attempt to obtain money and vehicles to flee following the shooting, the trial court did not err in admitting the evidence in question. Hardnett v. State, 285 Ga. 470, 678 S.E.2d 323 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Discovery of relevant evidence properly allowed.
- In a prosecution for DUI, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress the blood test evidence, as the trial court properly allowed the discovery of notes, memoranda, graphs, or computer printouts pertaining to the blood sample taken, as well as all chain of custody documentation, because they were the only items deemed relevant to the prosecution; suppression of the blood test results was not required as the defendant waived error on appeal as to the absence of one of the two lab testers. Cottrell v. State, 287 Ga. App. 89, 651 S.E.2d 444 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1894, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 816 (Ga. 2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
In a theft by taking case, the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion to compel a response to the defendant's subpoena duces tecum as the defendant met the burden of showing the relevance of the evidence sought in the subpoena because the defendant demonstrated that the defendant sought the documents not just for use in cross-examining the pharmacy owner, but also to prove the volume of cash that the pharmacy used to pay its cash-based employees and that the defendant took cash out of the register at the employer's direction to pay those employees and other expenses. Gregg v. State, 331 Ga. App. 833, 771 S.E.2d 486 (2015).
Evidence cumulative of defendant's testimony.
- Trial court did not err by limiting the testimony of a witness because the defendant did not establish that the witness's testimony was relevant to the aggravated stalking offenses as charged; the excluded evidence would have been cumulative of the defendant's trial testimony that the defendant was not personally following or watching the victim. Brooks v. State, 313 Ga. App. 789, 723 S.E.2d 29 (2012), cert. denied, No. S12C0974, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 1035 (Ga. 2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Molestation allegations not relevant.
- Trial court did not err by excluding the proffered testimony of a witness concerning allegations of abuse by the victim's son against the daughter of the defendant and the victim because the trial court was authorized to conclude that the substantive molestation allegations were not relevant to the aggravated stalking charges against the defendant; the defendant was otherwise allowed to challenge the victim's motives and truthfulness without interjecting immaterial matter at the trial. Brooks v. State, 313 Ga. App. 789, 723 S.E.2d 29 (2012), cert. denied, No. S12C0974, 2012 Ga. LEXIS 1035 (Ga. 2012) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Evidence of plea not relevant or admissible.
- Because the reasoning behind the robbery by intimidation plea between the defendant and the DeKalb County prosecutor did not appear on the face of the document itself, and the defendant would not have been able to testify as to the prosecutor's reasons for accepting the defendant's plea, the evidence regarding the defendant's plea would not have made the defendant's desired inference that the defendant did not use a gun during the Gwinnett County robbery any more probable than it would have been without the evidence; thus, the trial court did not err by refusing to allow the defendant to present evidence of the plea. Johnson v. State, 331 Ga. App. 134, 770 S.E.2d 236 (2015), cert. denied, 2015 Ga. LEXIS 377 (Ga. 2015).
Evidence of bar's reputation for violent incidents inadmissible.
- When the defendant was convicted of, inter alia, malice murder and attempted murder, the trial court did not err in excluding the proffered evidence of 10 incidents at a bar because the evidence was not relevant to show that the dangerous, violent environment at the bar influenced the defendant's state of mind and made the defendant's extreme reaction to perceived threats from the victims reasonable as the defendant did not contend that the defendant knew about any of the proffered occurrences at the time of the shooting; none of the incidents showed a propensity for violence in either of the victims; and the evidence did not tend to make it more likely that the defendant reasonably believed that deadly force was necessary. Ramirez v. State, 303 Ga. 232, 811 S.E.2d 416 (2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 110, 2018 U.S. LEXIS 5541, 202 L. Ed. 2d 69 (U.S. 2018).
Requirements for Appeal
Error waived unless objected to at trial.
- Defendants are not entitled to appellate review of the issue of relevancy when the defendants fail to raise the issue at trial. Fain v. State, 165 Ga. App. 188, 300 S.E.2d 197 (1983) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-2-1).
Specific objection showing harmful error must be offered at the time irrelevant and immaterial evidence is presented, and it is too late to set forth for the first time in a ground of a motion for new trial, even though valid. McDaniel v. State, 197 Ga. 757, 30 S.E.2d 612 (1944) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201).
In order to raise on appeal contentions concerning admissibility of evidence, the specific ground of objection must be made at the time the evidence is offered, and a failure to do so will be considered as a waiver; all evidence is admitted as a matter of course unless a valid ground of objection is interposed. Sutphin v. McDaniel, 157 Ga. App. 732, 278 S.E.2d 490 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201).
Objection to evidence on grounds of prejudice and irrelevancy does not constitute a proper objection and does not therefore present the Court of Appeals with an issue for review. Bynum v. Standard (Chevron) Oil Co., 157 Ga. App. 819, 278 S.E.2d 669, cert. dismissed, 248 Ga. 429, 285 S.E.2d 186 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201).
Erroneous admission of evidence not grounds for reversal.
- Judgment will not be reversed because of the erroneous admission of evidence since at a subsequent stage of the trial, the evidence became relevant and admissible upon an issue later injected into the case. Fuller v. State, 197 Ga. 714, 30 S.E.2d 608 (1944) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-201).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d.
- 29 Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence, §§ 301, 537.
9A Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Evidence, § 11.
Excluding Illegally Obtained Evidence, 5 Am. Jur. Trials 331.
The Daubert Challenge to the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 60 Am. Jur. Trials 1.
C.J.S.- 31A C.J.S., Evidence, § 245 et seq. 32 C.J.S., Evidence, § 808 et seq.
ALR.
- Evidence of intemperate habits on question of damages from death or personal injuries, 9 A.L.R. 1405.
Admissibility of evidence as to insurance on issue of negligence in operation or care of automobile, 28 A.L.R. 516.
Competency or qualification of witness who had not seen or examined property before fire to testify as to damage by fire, 33 A.L.R. 297.
Evidence of experience with intruders on other occasions as admissible on issue of justification in defending premises, 45 A.L.R. 1418.
Admissibility of evidence, and propriety and effect of questions, statements, comments, etc., tending to show that defendant in a personal-injury or death action carries liability insurance, 56 A.L.R. 141; 74 A.L.R. 849; 95 A.L.R. 388; 105 A.L.R. 1319; 4 A.L.R.2d 761.
Evidence as to what was seen by use of mirror, 57 A.L.R. 409.
Evidence as to threats made to keep witness away from criminal trial, 62 A.L.R. 136.
Admissibility of expressions of pain or suffering by person injured, 64 A.L.R. 557.
Admissibility on question of justification for dismissal or discharge of officer or employee for incompetency, of evidence as to his experience in other similar office or employment, 65 A.L.R. 1096.
Admissibility on question as to quality, condition, or capacity of articles, machines, or apparatus, of evidence in regard to similar things manufactured or sold by the same person, 66 A.L.R. 81.
Admissibility of secondary evidence of incriminating document in possession of defendant, 67 A.L.R. 77.
Admissibility of declarations by one involved in an accident in relation to his employment by or agency for other person, 67 A.L.R. 170; 150 A.L.R. 623.
Relevancy of race, color, nationality, sex, age, etc., of person whose conduct is in question, 71 A.L.R. 1301; 145 A.L.R. 1362.
Admissibility of test or experiment after accident as bearing on condition of automobile at time of accident, 72 A.L.R. 863.
Admissibility in behalf of defendant in action for libel or slander of similar charges made by other persons against plaintiff, 74 A.L.R. 732.
Physical condition of place before or after event as evidence of condition at time of event, 80 A.L.R. 446.
Admissibility of evidence of other accidents on issue of negligence in respect of maintenance of electric wires, rails, etc., 81 A.L.R. 685.
Admissibility of statements or declarations of plaintiff's spouse in an action for alienation of affections for the purpose of showing his or her mental state, 82 A.L.R. 825.
Admissibility and weight on issue of mental capacity or undue influence in respect of will or conveyance, of instruments previously executed by the person in question, 82 A.L.R. 963.
Right of expert to give an opinion based on testimony of other witnesses not incorporated in a hypothetical question, 82 A.L.R. 1460.
Admissibility in prosecution for homicide of declarations indicating suicidal disposition on part of deceased, 83 A.L.R. 434.
Admissibility, and effect of admission, in condemnation proceedings of plans and specifications as regards the work to be done on, or the particular use to be made of, the land in question, 89 A.L.R. 879.
Admissibility in action for slander or libel of evidence of aversion or contempt manifested as consequence of libelous or slanderous publication, to show its hurtful tendency, 105 A.L.R. 944.
Admissibility and weight on question of materiality of misrepresentation, of testimony of officers or employees of insurer to effect that application would not have been accepted but for the misrepresentation, or that there was a rule or policy to reject risks of the kind that would have been shown but for the misrepresentation, 115 A.L.R. 100.
Liability as for malpractice as affected by failure to take or advise the taking of an X-ray picture after operation, or to resort to other means of determining advisability of a supplementary operation or special treatment, 115 A.L.R. 298.
Necessity of expert evidence to warrant submission to jury of issue as to permanency of injury or as to future pain and suffering, or to sustain award of damages on that basis, 115 A.L.R. 1149.
Admissibility of inculpatory statements made in presence of accused and not denied or contradicted by him, 115 A.L.R. 1510.
Admissibility in criminal prosecution of evidence of motive of one other than defendant to commit the crime, 121 A.L.R. 1362.
Evidence which indirectly or incidentally suggests poverty or wealth of party not in itself proper matter of proof, 122 A.L.R. 1408.
Evidence of acquisition or possession of money, source of which is not traced, as admissible against defendant in criminal case, 123 A.L.R. 119; 91 A.L.R.2d 1046.
Discretion of trial court in criminal case as to permitting or denying view of premises where crime was committed, 124 A.L.R. 841.
Admissibility on issue of negligence or contributory negligence of statements warning one of danger, 125 A.L.R. 645.
Right, in civil action for malicious prosecution, to prove or rely on facts not known to defendant when he began prosecution or action which show or tend to show guilt or liability of plaintiff, 125 A.L.R. 897.
Admissibility against defendant in criminal case of evidence, otherwise competent, as to other offense as affected by fact that a charge for such offense is pending against him, 125 A.L.R. 1036.
Admissibility, in action against manufacturer, packer, or bottler for personal injury due to defective or injurious condition of article, of evidence that like products were free from, or were subject to, defective or injurious conditions, 127 A.L.R. 1194.
Admissibility in action for death of evidence as to pecuniary condition of deceased, 128 A.L.R. 1084.
Admissibility, to show bias or interest of witness, of evidence that he or his employer had compensated the party for whom he testified, in circumstances creating right to subrogation, 128 A.L.R. 1110.
Expert and opinion evidence as regards fire, 131 A.L.R. 1113.
Admissibility, in support of general credibility of an accomplice-witness who has not been impeached, of evidence from nonaccomplice witness not otherwise relevant or of probative value as against defendant, 138 A.L.R. 1266.
Admissibility, in prosecution for burglary, of evidence that defendant, after alleged burglary, was in possession of burglarious tools and implements, 143 A.L.R. 1199.
Conduct of jury in nature of demonstration, test, or experiment during authorized view, 150 A.L.R. 958.
Motive in bringing action or choosing the forum or venue as proper matter for cross-examination, 157 A.L.R. 604.
Admissibility of photograph of corpse in prosecution for homicide or civil action for causing death, 159 A.L.R. 1413; 73 A.L.R.2d 769.
Admissibility of evidence of repairs, change of conditions, or precautions taken after accident, 170 A.L.R. 7; 64 A.L.R.2d 1151.
Admissibility of declarations by testator on issue of revocation of will, 172 A.L.R. 354.
Application of statute excluding testimony of one person because of death of another when invoked by or against one who sues or defends in two capacities, only one of which is within the statute, 172 A.L.R. 714.
Admissibility against beneficiary of life or accident insurance policy of statements of third persons included in or with proof of death, 1 A.L.R.2d 365.
Admissibility of evidence, and propriety and effect of questions, statements, comments, etc., tending to show that defendant in a personal-injury or death action carries liability insurance, 4 A.L.R.2d 761.
Admissibility of evidence as to financial condition of debtor on issue as to payment of debt, 9 A.L.R.2d 205.
Proof of prospective earning capacity of student or trainee, or of its loss, in action for personal injury or death, 15 A.L.R.2d 418.
Admissibility of declaration of persons other than members of family as to pedigree, 15 A.L.R.2d 1412.
Admissibility of evidence that defendant in negligence action has paid third persons on claims arising from the same transaction or incident as plaintiff's claim, 20 A.L.R.2d 304.
Admissibility of evidence as to tire tracks or marks on or near highway, 23 A.L.R.2d 112.
Physiological or psychological truth and deception tests, 23 A.L.R.2d 1306.
Admissibility in homicide prosecution for purpose of showing motive of evidence as to insurance policies on life of deceased naming accused as beneficiary, 28 A.L.R.2d 857.
Reference by counsel for prosecution in opening statement to matters which he does not later attempt to prove as ground for new trial, reversal, or modification, 28 A.L.R.2d 972.
Mode of establishing that information obtained by illegal wire tapping has or has not led to evidence introduced by prosecution, 28 A.L.R.2d 1055.
Lack of proper automobile registration or operator's license as evidence of operator's negligence, 29 A.L.R.2d 963.
Admissibility of evidence of absence of other accidents or injuries at place where injury or damage occurred, 31 A.L.R.2d 190.
Footprints as evidence, 35 A.L.R.2d 856.
Admissibility of evidence of absence of other accidents or injuries from a customary practice or method asserted to be negligent, 42 A.L.R.2d 1055.
Admissibility, in railroad crossing accident case, of evidence of other functional failures of railroad crossing devices and appliances of the same kind at other times, 46 A.L.R.2d 935.
Blood grouping tests, 46 A.L.R.2d 1000.
Prejudicial effect of prosecuting attorney's misconduct in physically exhibiting to jury objects or items not introduced as evidence, 46 A.L.R.2d 1423.
Admissibility in evidence of rules of defendant in action for negligence, 50 A.L.R.2d 16.
Admissibility in evidence of colored photographs, 53 A.L.R.2d 1102.
Admissibility of evidence as to experiments or tests in civil action for death, injury, or property damage against electric power company or the like, 54 A.L.R.2d 922.
Admissibility and permissible use, in malicious prosecution action, of documentary evidence showing that prior criminal proceedings against instant plaintiff were terminated in his favor, 57 A.L.R.2d 1086.
Admissibility in evidence of aerial photographs, 57 A.L.R.2d 1351.
Propriety, in trial of civil action, of use of skeleton or model of human body or part, 58 A.L.R.2d 689.
Prejudicial effect of admission, in personal injury action, of evidence as to financial or domestic circumstances of plaintiff, 59 A.L.R.2d 371.
Admissibility and propriety, in rape prosecution, of evidence that accused is married, has children, and the like, 62 A.L.R.2d 1067.
Admissibility, in nonstatutory rape prosecution, of evidence of pregnancy of prosecutrix, 62 A.L.R.2d 1083.
Admissibility of evidence of repairs, change of conditions, or precautions taken after accident, 64 A.L.R.2d 1151.
Admissibility of evidence of repairs, change of conditions, or precautions taken after accident, 64 A.L.R.2d 1296; 15 A.L.R.5th 119.
Admissibility of evidence of value or extent of decedent's estate in action against estate for reasonable value of services furnished decedent, 65 A.L.R.2d 945.
Propriety of permitting plaintiff in personal injury action to exhibit his person to jury, 66 A.L.R.2d 1334.
Admissibility, in civil case involving usury issue, of evidence of other assertedly usurious transactions, 67 A.L.R.2d 232.
Admissibility and propriety, in homicide prosecution, of evidence as to deceased's spouse and children, 67 A.L.R.2d 731.
Admissibility, in homicide prosecution, of deceased's clothing worn at time of killing, 68 A.L.R.2d 903.
Admissibility, on issue of defendant's negligence in respect of condition of place where plaintiff was injured, of evidence of prior accidents or injuries at same place, 70 A.L.R.2d 167; 21 A.L.R.4th 472.
Admissibility of photograph of corpse in prosecution for homicide or civil action for causing death, 73 A.L.R.2d 769.
Counsel's right in arguing civil case to read medical or other learned treatises to the jury, 72 A.L.R.2d 931.
Admissibility, in wrongful death action, of photograph of decedent made in his lifetime, 74 A.L.R.2d 928.
Admissibility of experimental evidence to determine chemical or physical qualities or character of material or substance, 76 A.L.R.2d 354.
Admissibility of experimental evidence as to explosion, 76 A.L.R.2d 402.
Admissibility of experimental evidence to show visibility or line of vision, 78 A.L.R.2d 152.
Admissibility of experimental evidence, skidding tests, or the like, relating to speed or control of motor vehicle, 78 A.L.R.2d 218.
Admissibility, in wrongful death action brought for benefit of minor children, of evidence of decedent's desertion, nonsupport, abandonment, or the like, of said children, 79 A.L.R.2d 819.
Admission of liability as affecting admissibility of evidence as to the circumstances of accident on issue of damages in a tort action for personal injury, wrongful death, or property damage, 80 A.L.R.2d 1224.
Counsel's use, in trial of condemnation proceeding, of chart, diagram or blackboard, not introduced in evidence, relating to damages or the value of the property condemned, 80 A.L.R.2d 1270.
Admissibility, as against objection of remoteness, of evidence as to past earnings, upon issue as to amount of damages in an action for personal injury or death, 81 A.L.R.2d 733.
Propriety, in trial of criminal case, of use of skeleton or model of human body or part, 83 A.L.R.2d 1097.
Admissibility in evidence of braces, crutches, or other prosthetic or orthopedic devices used by injured party, 83 A.L.R.2d 1271.
Propriety of permitting view by jury in civil personal injury or death action as affected by claimed change of conditions since accident or incident, 85 A.L.R.2d 512.
Propriety of reopening criminal case in order to present omitted or overlooked evidence, after submission to jury but before return of verdict, 87 A.L.R.2d 849.
Admissibility, in prosecution for assault or similar offense involving physical violence, of extent or effect of victim's injuries, 87 A.L.R.2d 926.
Admissibility of evidence of accused's good reputation as affected by remoteness of time to which it relates, 87 A.L.R.2d 968.
Suspension or revocation of driver's license for refusal to take sobriety test, 88 A.L.R.2d 1064.
Ruling on offer of proof as error, 89 A.L.R.2d 279.
Evidence of acquisition or possession of money, source of which is not traced, as admissible against defendant in criminal case, 91 A.L.R.2d 1046.
Admissibility in evidence of sample or samples of article or substance of which the quality, condition, or the like is involved in litigation, 95 A.L.R.2d 681.
Admissibility, in wrongful death action for pecuniary loss suffered by next of kin, etc., of evidence as to decedent's personal qualities with respect to sobriety or morality, 99 A.L.R.2d 972.
Financial worth of one or more of several joint defendants as proper matter for consideration in fixing punitive damages, 9 A.L.R.3d 692.
Admissibility, in prosecution for obtaining money or property by fraud or false pretenses, of evidence of subsequent payments made by accused to victim, 10 A.L.R.3d 572.
Workmen's compensation: use of medical books or treatises as independent evidence, 17 A.L.R.3d 993.
Eminent domain: admissibility of photographs or models of property condemned, 23 A.L.R.3d 825.
Admissibility of evidence of proposed or possible subdivision or platting of condemned land in issue of value in eminent domain proceedings, 26 A.L.R.3d 780.
Race or color of child as admissible in evidence on issue of legitimacy or paternity, or as basis of rebuttal or exception to presumption of legitimacy, 32 A.L.R.3d 1303.
Admissibility of evidence of family circumstances of parties in personal injury actions, 37 A.L.R.3d 1082.
Products liability: admissibility of evidence of other accidents to prove hazardous nature of product, 42 A.L.R.3d 780.
Admissibility of evidence that injured plaintiff received benefits from a collateral source, on issue of malingering or motivation to extend period of disability, 47 A.L.R.3d 234.
Propriety and prejudicial effect of prosecutor's remarks as to victim's age, family circumstances, or the like, 50 A.L.R.3d 8.
Admissibility of lie detector test taken upon stipulation that the result will be admissible in evidence, 53 A.L.R.3d 1005.
Admissibility, in disputed paternity proceedings, of evidence to rebut mother's claim of prior chastity, 59 A.L.R.3d 659.
Admissibility of evidence of subsequent repairs or other remedial measures in products liability cases, 74 A.L.R.3d 1001; 38 A.L.R.4th 583.
Admissibility in criminal case, on issue of defendant's guilt, of evidence that third person has attempted to influence a witness not to testify or to testify falsely, 79 A.L.R.3d 1156.
Municipal corporation's safety rules or regulations as admissible in evidence in action by private party against municipal corporation or its officers or employees for negligent operation of vehicle, 82 A.L.R.3d 1285.
Products liability: admissibility, against manufacturer, of product recall letter, 84 A.L.R.3d 1220.
Accused's right to discovery or inspection of records of prior complaints against, or similar personnel records of, peace officer involved in the case, 86 A.L.R.3d 1170.
Propriety and prejudicial effect of informing jury that accused has taken polygraph test, where results of test would be inadmissible in evidence, 88 A.L.R.3d 227.
Admissibility of evidence of, or propriety of comment as to, plaintiff spouse's remarriage, or possibility thereof, in action for damages for death of other spouse, 88 A.L.R.3d 926.
Admissibility of opinion evidence as to employability on issue of disability in health and accident insurance and workers' compensation cases, 89 A.L.R.3d 783.
Admissibility of hypnotic evidence at criminal trial, 92 A.L.R.3d 442.
Admissibility of evidence of subsequent criminal offenses as affected by proximity as to time and place, 92 A.L.R.3d 545.
Admissibility of photographs of stolen property, 94 A.L.R.3d 357.
Admissibility, in rape case, of evidence that accused raped or attempted to rape person other than prosecutrix, 2 A.L.R.4th 330.
Admissibility, weight, and sufficiency of blood-grouping tests in criminal cases, 2 A.L.R.4th 500.
Admissibility of evidence of accused's drug addiction or use to show motive for theft of property other than drugs, 2 A.L.R.4th 1298.
Propriety of requiring criminal defendant to exhibit self, or perform physical act, or participate in demonstration, during trial and in presence of jury, 3 A.L.R.4th 374.
Prosecutor's reference in opening statement to matters not provable or which he does not attempt to prove as ground for relief, 16 A.L.R.4th 810.
Modern status of rules as to admissibility of evidence of prior accidents or injuries at same place, 21 A.L.R.4th 472.
Modern status of rule regarding necessity for corroboration of victim's testimony in prosecution of sexual offense, 31 A.L.R.4th 120.
Emotional manifestations by victim or family of victim during criminal trial as ground for reversal, new trial, or mistrial, 31 A.L.R.4th 229.
Admissibility of visual recording of event or matter giving rise to litigation or prosecution, 41 A.L.R.4th 877.
Admissibility of bare footprint evidence, 45 A.L.R.4th 1178.
Products liability: admissibility of defendant's evidence of industry custom or practice in strict liability action, 47 A.L.R.4th 621.
Admissibility of voice stress evaluation test results or of statements made during test, 47 A.L.R.4th 1202.
Products liability: admissibility of evidence of absence of other accidents, 51 A.L.R.4th 1186.
Admissibility, in criminal cases, of evidence of electrophoresis of dried evidentiary bloodstains, 66 A.L.R.4th 588.
Prejudicial effect of bringing to jury's attention fact that plaintiff in personal injury or death action is entitled to workers' compensation benefits, 69 A.L.R.4th 131.
Impeachment or cross-examination of prosecuting witness in sexual offense trial by showing that similar charges were made against other persons, 71 A.L.R.4th 469.
Admissibility of evidence of absence of other accidents or injuries at place where injury or damage occurred, 10 A.L.R.5th 371.
Admissibility of evidence of polygraph test results, or offer or refusal to take test, in action for malicious prosecution, 10 A.L.R.5th 663.
Admissibility of evidence in homicide case that victim was threatened by other than defendant, 11 A.L.R.5th 831.
Ineffective assistance of counsel: battered spouse syndrome as defense to homicide or other criminal offense, 11 A.L.R.5th 871.
Admissibility of evidence of repairs, change of conditions, or precautions taken after accident - modern state cases, 15 A.L.R.5th 119.
Sufficiency of evidence that witness in criminal case was hypnotized, for purposes of determining admissibility of testimony given under hypnosis or of hypnotically enhanced testimony, 16 A.L.R.5th 841.
Admissibility in evidence of composite picture or sketch produced by police to identify offender, 23 A.L.R.5th 672.
Admissibility of government factfinding in products liability actions, 29 A.L.R.5th 534.
Admissibility of evidence relating to accused's attempt to commit suicide, 73 A.L.R.5th 615.
Evidence of trailing by dogs in criminal cases, 81 A.L.R.5th 563.
Admissibility of results of presumptive tests indicating presence of blood on object, 82 A.L.R.5th 67.
Admissibility of computer-generated animation, 111 A.L.R.5th 529.
Admissibility and use of evidence of nonuse of bicycle helmets, 2 A.L.R.6th 429.
Admissibility in state criminal case of results of polygraph (lie detector) test Post Daubert cases, 10 A.L.R.6th 463.
Admissibility of evidence of prior accidents or injuries at same place, 15 A.L.R.6th 1.
Admissibility and effect of evidence or comment on party's military service or lack thereof, 24 A.L.R.6th 747.
Admissibility, after enactment of Rule 411, Federal Rules of Evidence, of evidence of liability insurance in negligence actions, 40 A.L.R. Fed. 541.
Admissibility of evidence of medical defendant's apologetic statements or the like as evidence of negligence, 97 A.L.R.6th 519.
Construction and application of standard for reviewing challenges to sufficiency of evidence supporting conviction - Supreme Court cases, 76 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 295.
Use of tweets as evidence in civil and criminal trials, 25 A.L.R. Fed. 3d 5 (2017).