Inferences From Evidence or Lack Thereof

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In arriving at a verdict, the jury, from facts proved, and sometimes from the absence of counter evidence, may infer the existence of other facts reasonably and logically consequent on those proved.

(Code 1981, §24-14-9, enacted by Ga. L. 2011, p. 99, § 2/HB 24.)

Law reviews.

- For article, "The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur in Georgia," see 9 Ga. B.J. 31 (1946). For note, "Res Ipsa Loquitur and its Application in Georgia," see 14 Mercer L. Rev. 427 (1963).

JUDICIAL DECISIONS

ANALYSIS

  • General Consideration
  • Res Ipsa Loquitur

General Consideration

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Civil Code 1895, § 5157, former Civil Code 1910, § 5743, former Code 1933, § 38-123, and former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-9 are included in the annotations for this Code section.

Constitutionality.

- Presumption that allows, but does not require, the trier of fact to infer the elemental fact from proof by the prosecutor of the basic one and that places no burden of any kind on the defendant is not inherently unconstitutional, but is to be tested by a "rational connection" test asking if the ultimate fact to be presumed is more likely than not to flow from the proved fact. Whisenhunt v. State, 152 Ga. App. 829, 264 S.E.2d 271 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 886, 101 S. Ct. 241, 66 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-123).

Admissibility.

- When facts are such that the jury may or may not make an inference pertinent to the issue, the facts are such that the jury ought to be permitted to hear the facts. Brand v. State, 154 Ga. App. 781, 270 S.E.2d 206 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-123).

When facts are such that the jury, if permitted to hear the facts, may or may not make an inference pertinent to the issue, according to the view which the jury may take of the facts, in connection with the other facts in evidence, the facts are such that the jury ought to be permitted to hear those facts. Johnson v. State, 148 Ga. App. 702, 252 S.E.2d 205 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-123).

Inference of guilt.

- When there is some evidence from which the guilt of one accused of a crime can be legitimately inferred, it is entirely within the province of the jury to draw that inference. Johnson v. State, 148 Ga. App. 702, 252 S.E.2d 205 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-123).

Effect of positive and uncontradicted evidence.

- Finding of fact which may be inferred but is not demanded by circumstantial evidence has no probative value against positive and uncontradicted evidence that no such fact exists. Backus v. Ray Jones, Inc., 150 Ga. App. 753, 258 S.E.2d 693 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-123).

Directed verdict properly denied.

- In a medical malpractice action, the issue of reliance by a patient on a hospital to provide needed services and personnel was subject to proof by circumstantial evidence; thus, denial of a directed verdict in favor of the hospital was not error. Doctors Hosp. v. Bonner, 195 Ga. App. 152, 392 S.E.2d 897 (1990) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-9).

Flight is always a circumstance which may be shown and which the jury is authorized to take into account in determining guilt or innocence of an accused. Johnson v. State, 148 Ga. App. 702, 252 S.E.2d 205 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-123).

Jury was authorized to believe that defendant's attempts to flee when confronted by firefighters constituted circumstantial evidence of guilt. Williams v. State, 273 Ga. App. 213, 614 S.E.2d 834 (2005) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-9).

Evidence of a refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test is circumstantial evidence.

- There was ample evidence to support the defendant's DUI conviction, after the arresting officer testified that the officer smelled alcohol as the officer approached the defendant's van, that the defendant's eyes were red, glassy, and "hazed over," that the defendant's speech was slower than normal, and that the defendant performed poorly on sobriety field tests, and the defendant's failure to submit to breath tests was circumstantial evidence of defendant's intoxication. Lucas v. State, 234 Ga. App. 534, 507 S.E.2d 253 (1998) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-9).

Doctrine of presumption of continuity.

- Whether the doctrine of presumption of continuity - a state of things once existing is presumed to continue until a change occurs - holds true in a particular case is a question for jury determination. Mattison v. Travelers Indem. Co., 157 Ga. App. 372, 277 S.E.2d 746 (1981) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-9).

Permissive inference almost identical to presumption of fact.

- No reversible error occurred when a trial court charged the jury in language of permissive inference rather than presumption of fact. A thin line exists at best between a permissible inference of fact and a rebuttable presumption of fact. Pouncey v. Adams, 206 Ga. App. 126, 424 S.E.2d 376 (1992) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-9).

Summary judgment determines only whether material fact exists.

- On summary judgment, a trial court determines only whether a material issue of fact exists, and such determination does not include "the discovery of the truth of such fact" or permit frustration of a plaintiff's constitutional right to a trial by jury "by inferring with the existence of other facts" from predicate evidence. Bruno's Food Stores, Inc. v. Taylor, 228 Ga. App. 439, 491 S.E.2d 881 (1997) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-9).

Res Ipsa Loquitur

Doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is embraced in this statute and the doctrine's application authorized by statute. Macon Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Chancey, 216 Ga. 61, 114 S.E.2d 517 (1960) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-123); Hospital Auth. v. Eason, 222 Ga. 536, 150 S.E.2d 812 (1966);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-123).

Elements of doctrine.

- In a tort action for personal injuries, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies when the following elements are present: (1) the injury must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's negligence; (2) the injury must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; (3) the injury must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff; and (4) the injury must have occurred absent an intervening cause which could have produced the injury. Kicklighter v. Nails by Jannee, Inc., 616 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-123).

Application of doctrine.

- When an event is unusual and extraordinary in nature, and there is nothing to indicate an external cause, but the peculiar character of the accident is sufficient within itself to indicate that the event must have been brought about by negligence on the part of someone, and when the most reasonable and probable inference which can be rationally drawn from the happening of such an event is that it would not and could not have taken place, had not the person charged with furnishing or maintaining the instrumentality causing the accident been guilty of the particular acts or omissions set forth by the plaintiff as constituting the actual cause, then the jury is authorized to apply the rule of evidence known as the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in determining whether or not the accident must have been thus occasioned. Chenall v. Palmer Brick Co., 117 Ga. 106, 43 S.E. 443 (1903) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5157); Sinkovitz v. Peters Land Co., 5 Ga. App. 788, 64 S.E. 93 (1909); Bonita Theatre v. Bridges, 31 Ga. App. 798, 122 S.E. 255 (1924) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5157); Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Shipp, 41 Ga. App. 705, 154 S.E. 385 (1930); Macon Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Crane, 55 Ga. App. 573, 190 S.E. 879 (1937) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5743); Macon Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Chancey, 216 Ga. 61, 114 S.E.2d 517 (1960); Hall v. Chastain, 246 Ga. 782, 273 S.E.2d 12 (1980) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5743);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-123);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-123);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-123).

Trial court committed reversible error, entitling the plaintiffs in a personal injury suit to a new trial after a verdict in favor of the defense was returned, by refusing to charge the jury on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur; here, the plaintiffs established the three elements necessary for the doctrine to apply, namely: that a 15-ton machine rolling off a trailer without explanation and crushing a car was an extraordinary event; that the defendant driver admitted that trailers do not ordinarily roll over and that the defendant driver was in exclusive control of the truck and trailer; and that the defendant driver testified twice that the plaintiffs did nothing to cause the accident. Doyle v. RST Constr. Specialty, Inc., 286 Ga. App. 53, 648 S.E.2d 664 (2007), cert. denied, No. S07C1631, 2007 Ga. LEXIS 860 (Ga. 2007) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-9).

Doctrine applied with caution.

- Doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, when applicable, should be applied with caution, and should be drawn by the jury only in extreme cases. Sinkovitz v. Peters Land Co., 5 Ga. App. 788, 64 S.E. 93 (1909) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5157); Miller v. Gerber Prods. Co., 207 Ga. 385, 62 S.E.2d 174 (1950);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-123).

Rule of evidence.

- Doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is simply a rule of circumstantial evidence which permits an inference to be drawn from proved facts. Cochrell v. Langley Mfg. Co., 5 Ga. App. 317, 63 S.E. 244 (1908) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5157); Armour & Co. v. Gulley, 61 Ga. App. 414, 6 S.E.2d 165 (1939); White v. Executive Comm. of Baptist Convention, 65 Ga. App. 840, 16 S.E.2d 605 (1941) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-123); Clayton Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coleman, 68 Ga. App. 302, 22 S.E.2d 768 (1942); Dalton Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Watkins, 70 Ga. App. 790, 29 S.E.2d 281 (1944) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-123); Miller v. Gerber Prods. Co., 207 Ga. 385, 62 S.E.2d 174 (1950);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-123);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-123);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-123).

Presumption of negligence not raised.

- Application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur does not raise a presumption of negligence, unless it is to the extent of getting a case to a jury only, but authorizes a jury in the jury's discretion to infer negligence. Wimpy v. Rogers, 58 Ga. App. 67, 197 S.E. 656 (1938) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-123).

Mere inference.

- Res ipsa loquitur creates a mere inference of fact and not a presumption of truth. DeVane v. Smith, 154 Ga. App. 442, 268 S.E.2d 711 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-123).

Inference is slight.

- Maxim res ipsa loquitur is applied with caution in every case and when applied, the inference is only prima facie, is generally slight, and is easily overcome. White v. Executive Comm. of Baptist Convention, 65 Ga. App. 840, 16 S.E.2d 605 (1941) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-123).

Exclusion of other hypotheses.

- In the application of the res ispa loquitor doctrine, if in the opinion of the jury the most reasonable and most probable inference which can be drawn from the nature and character of an extraordinary event is that it would not and could not have happened had not the defendant been guilty of the particular conduct charged, then there has been an exclusion in their minds of every other reasonable hypothesis, not by evidence, but by virtue of the peculiar nature and character of the event speaking for itself. Macon Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Chancey, 216 Ga. 561, 114 S.E.2d 517 (1960) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-123).

Negligence of defendant.

- Before the doctrine can be applied, the act must speak not only of negligence but of negligence on the part of the defendant. Payne v. Rome Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 10 Ga. App. 762, 73 S.E. 1087 (1912) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5743).

Probability of defendant's negligence.

- In order to invoke a theory of res ipsa loquitur, the plaintiff must prove "control" by evidence sufficient to permit a finding that there is a greater probability that the injury was the result of defendant's negligence than some other cause. Fender v. Colonial Stores, Inc., 138 Ga. App. 31, 225 S.E.2d 691 (1976) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-123).

No evidence of external cause.

- Doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable only in the absence of evidence as to an external cause of injury. Stanfield v. Gardner, 56 Ga. App. 634, 193 S.E. 375 (1937) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-123); Floyd v. Swift & Co., 59 Ga. App. 154, 200 S.E. 531 (1938);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-123).

Conclusions must be clear.

- When "the thing itself speaks" or "the obvious is self-evident," the obvious must be clearly seen, and what is spoken must be plain. If two images appear, or the statement spoken is ambiguous, before a legal verdict can be predicated thereon, the conclusions claimed must more clearly appear or be understood than any other or inconsistent theory. Armour & Co. v. Gulley, 61 Ga. App. 414, 6 S.E.2d 165 (1939) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-123); White v. Executive Comm. of Baptist Convention, 65 Ga. App. 840, 16 S.E.2d 605 (1941); Miller v. Gerber Prods. Co., 207 Ga. 385, 62 S.E.2d 174 (1950) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-123);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-123).

Inference of fact.

- When something unusual happens with respect to a defendant's property, over which defendant has control, and by such extraordinary occurrence a plaintiff is injured, an inference may in some case arise from an unexplained occurrence which has worked an injury to another that the defendant who had in charge the instrumentality which was the direct cause of the injury was guilty of negligence, which inference of negligence may or may not be drawn by the jury but, like the facts of negligence or no negligence, the inference which the jury may be authorized to draw is peculiarly an inference of fact, and it is not an inference of law. And, if from the facts an inference of negligence arises, it may be rebutted by the defendant, like any other inference arising from the proof submitted. Georgia Power Co. v. Stonecypher, 47 Ga. App. 386, 170 S.E. 530 (1933) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-123).

Inference authorized but not required.

- While negligence is never presumed from the mere fact of injury, the manner of the occurrence of the injury complained of, or the attendant circumstances, may sometimes well warrant an inference of negligence, such inference being one which the jury is authorized to draw, and not an inference which the jury is compelled to draw. Gainesville Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Stewart, 51 Ga. App. 102, 179 S.E. 734 (1935) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-123); Macon Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Chancey, 216 Ga. 61, 114 S.E.2d 517 (1960);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-123).

Inference based on proven facts.

- Before the jury could arrive at the ultimate fact by inference of the existence of other facts, the facts inferred must be reasonably and logically consequent upon proven facts; the jury cannot assume the ultimate fact merely from other facts which are based upon an inference rather than upon proof. Miller v. Gerber Prods. Co., 207 Ga. 385, 62 S.E.2d 174 (1950) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-123); Hospital Auth. v. Eason, 222 Ga. 536, 150 S.E.2d 812 (1966);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-123).

Inference based on circumstantial evidence.

- When the inference of negligence is dependent upon circumstantial evidence, and direct unambiguous testimony shows that the defendant was without negligence, a verdict for the plaintiff is unauthorized. Miller v. Gerber Prods. Co., 207 Ga. 385, 62 S.E.2d 174 (1950) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-123).

Inference based on inference.

- Proof of plaintiff's case resting upon inferences made from inferences is insufficient when the inference is too remote. Spruell v. Georgia Automatic Gas Appliance Co., 84 Ga. App. 657, 67 S.E.2d 178 (1951) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-123).

Intervening cause.

- When there is some intervention or intermediary cause which produces or could produce the injury complained of, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not applicable. Floyd v. Swift & Co., 59 Ga. App. 154, 200 S.E. 531 (1938) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-123); Miller v. Gerber Prods. Co., 207 Ga. 385, 62 S.E.2d 174 (1950); Rupek v. Pig'n Whistle, Inc., 94 Ga. App. 404, 94 S.E.2d 747 (1956) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-123);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-123).

Fact of injury.

- Mere fact of injury does not call for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Stansfield v. Gardner, 56 Ga. App. 634, 193 S.E. 375 (1937) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-123).

Question for jury.

- Maxim res ipsa loquitur is of limited application, and the process by which it is to be determined whether the physical facts and circumstances accompanying an injury are such that the act may be said itself to speak the negligence of the defendant is to be worked out by the jury, and not by the court. Chenall v. Palmer Brick Co., 117 Ga. 106, 43 S.E. 443 (1903) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5157); Sinkovitz v. Peters Land Co., 5 Ga. App. 788, 64 S.E. 93 (1909); Bonita Theatre v. Bridges, 31 Ga. App. 798, 122 S.E. 255 (1924) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5157); Dawson v. American Heritage Life Ins. Co., 121 Ga. App. 266, 173 S.E.2d 424 (1970);(decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5743);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-123).

Conclusions beyond evidence.

- In construing and applying testimony, reasonable inferences and deductions may be made, and conclusions may be reached that lie quite beyond the mere letter of the evidence. Armour & Co. v. Gulley, 61 Ga. App. 414, 6 S.E.2d 165 (1939) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-123).

Shifting of burden.

- If the extraordinary character of the occurrence is sufficient to raise an inference of the negligence alleged, a prima facia case is established, and the burden of disproving negligence is cast upon the defendant, to disprove negligence upon the defendant's part. Sinkovitz v. Peters Land Co., 5 Ga. App. 788, 64 S.E. 93 (1909) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5157); Macon Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Crane, 55 Ga. App. 573, 190 S.E. 879 (1937);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-123).

Burden of proof not shifted.

- Doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is merely a rule of evidence permitting the jury to draw the inference of negligence and does not have the effect of shifting the burden of proof. DeVane v. Smith, 154 Ga. App. 442, 268 S.E.2d 711 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-123).

Rebuttal by defendant.

- An inference of negligence may be rebutted by the defendant like any other presumption arising from proofs submitted. Chenall v. Palmer Brick Co., 117 Ga. 106, 43 S.E. 443 (1903) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5157).

Motion for nonsuit should not be granted when there is any evidence tending to sustain the plaintiff's action, or when the jury can fairly infer from the evidence a state of facts favorable to the plaintiff. Mason v. Hall, 72 Ga. App. 867, 35 S.E.2d 478 (1945) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-123).

Specific applications.

- Doctrine of res ispa loquitur has been applied in the following cases: Chenall v. Palmer Brick Co., 117 Ga. 106, 43 S.E. 443 (1903) (unexplained falling of brick arch) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5157); Rivers v. State, 118 Ga. 42, 44 S.E. 859 (1903) (purpose for leasing house) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5157); McDonnell v. Central of Ga. Ry., 118 Ga. 86, 44 S.E. 840 (1903) (explosion of boilers) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5157); Seaboard Air-Line Ry. v. Bishop, 132 Ga. 71, 63 S.E. 1103 (1909) (projecting nail) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5157); Payne v. Rome Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 10 Ga. App. 762, 73 S.E. 1087 (1912) (explosion of bottle) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5157); McPherson v. Capuano & Co., 31 Ga. App. 82, 121 S.E. 580 (1923) (illness following eating in restaurant) (decided under former Civil Code 1895, § 5157); Eckerd-Walton, Inc. v. Adams, 126 Ga. App. 210, 190 S.E.2d 490 (1972) (driving car through wall of building) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-123); Parrish v. State, 182 Ga. App. 247, 355 S.E.2d 682 (1987) (destruction of marijuana plants) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-9).

Proof insufficient.

- Mere proof that a hospital bed was on fire, from undetermined origin, was not sufficient to invoke res ipsa loquitur. Hospital Auth. v. Eason, 222 Ga. 536, 150 S.E.2d 812 (1966) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-123).

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR.

- Liability for injuries by breaking or bursting of container in which goods are sold, 4 A.L.R. 1094.

Applicability of res ipsa loquitur to fall of person, 5 A.L.R. 282.

Presumption of negligence from throwing passenger from seat, 5 A.L.R. 1034.

Res ipsa loquitur as applied to automobile accidents, 5 A.L.R. 1240; 12 A.L.R. 668; 64 A.L.R. 255; 93 A.L.R. 1101; 79 A.L.R.2d 6.

Application of res ipsa loquitur doctrine to injury to passenger from defective or dangerous condition of floor of car, 7 A.L.R. 1675.

Applicability of "res ipsa loquitur" to explosion of gases or chemicals, 8 A.L.R. 500; 39 A.L.R. 1006; 59 A.L.R. 593.

Res ipsa loquitur as affected by circumstances tending to negative negligence by defendant, 22 A.L.R. 1471.

Applicability of res ipsa loquitur in case of boiler explosion, 23 A.L.R. 484.

Res ipsa loquitur as applicable to injury to passenger in a collision where one of the vehicles is not within carrier's control, 25 A.L.R. 690; 83 A.L.R. 1163; 161 A.L.R. 1113.

Res ipsa loquitur distinguished from characterization of a known condition as negligence, and the establishment of negligence by circumstantial evidence, 59 A.L.R. 468; 78 A.L.R. 731; 141 A.L.R. 1016.

Res ipsa loquitur in its relation to burden of proof and burden of evidence, 59 A.L.R. 486; 92 A.L.R. 653.

Res ipsa loquitur as applicable in action against municipality for injuries from dangerous condition in parks, streets, or highways, 74 A.L.R. 1226.

Pleading particular cause of injury as waiver of right to rely on res ipsa loquitur, 79 A.L.R. 48; 160 A.L.R. 1450; 2 A.L.R.3d 1335.

Debtor's intent to defraud or delay creditors within contemplation of attachment statute as inferable as matter of law from fact that he has removed or is about to remove property from the state without making adequate provision for his creditors, 92 A.L.R. 966.

Right or duty of court to instruct jury as to presumptions, 103 A.L.R. 126.

Presumption of ownership of automobile by one in whose name it is registered or whose license plates it bears, 103 A.L.R. 138.

Presumption against suicide as evidence, 103 A.L.R. 185; 158 A.L.R. 747.

Presumption of negligence from foreign substance in food, 105 A.L.R. 1039.

Res ipsa loquitur, or presumption, or inference of negligence on part of carrier where passenger is injured by object coming from outside, through or against, car window, 129 A.L.R. 1340.

Liability of manufacturer or packer of defective article for injury to person or property of ultimate consumer who purchased from middleman, 140 A.L.R. 191; 142 A.L.R. 1490.

Presumption that public officers have properly performed their duty, as evidence, 141 A.L.R. 1037.

Res ipsa loquitur as applicable in action against landlord for injury to person or property due to condition of premises, 145 A.L.R. 870.

Res ipsa loquitur as applicable to injury to person in street by fall of object in course of construction or repair of building, 146 A.L.R. 523.

Res ipsa loquitur as applied to a collision between a moving automobile and a standing automobile or other vehicle, 151 A.L.R. 876.

May presumption rest upon admission by opponent's pleading without proof of constituent fact, 153 A.L.R. 1106.

Physicians and surgeons: presumption or inference of negligence in malpractice cases; res ipsa loquitur, 162 A.L.R. 1265; 82 A.L.R.2d 1262.

"Res ipsa loquitur" as a presumption or a mere permissible inference, 167 A.L.R. 658.

Res ipsa loquitur doctrine as affected by injured person's control over or connection with instrumentality, 169 A.L.R. 953.

Presumption of negligence from foreign substance in food, 171 A.L.R. 1209.

Right of plaintiff in res ipsa loquitur case to an instruction respecting inference by jury, 173 A.L.R. 880.

Application of res ipsa loquitur rule in case of injury or damages from heating unit, electrical appliance, etc., installed by defendant, 3 A.L.R.2d 1448.

Overcoming inference or presumption of driver's agency for owner, or latter's consent to operation, of automobile, 5 A.L.R.2d 196.

Res ipsa loquitur in aviation accidents, 6 A.L.R.2d 528.

Death of or injury to occupant of airplane from collision or near collision with another aircraft, 12 A.L.R.2d 677.

Applicability of res ipsa loquitur to injuries or death sustained by collapse, failure, or falling of scaffold, 22 A.L.R.2d 1176.

Applicability of res ipsa loquitur doctrine to fall of object or substance from ceiling of place of public resort, 24 A.L.R.2d 643.

Error as to instructions on burden of proof under doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as prejudicial, 29 A.L.R.2d 1390.

Proof, in absence of direct testimony by survivors or eyewitnesses, of who, among occupants of motor vehicle, was driving it at time of accident, 32 A.L.R.2d 988.

Evidence of specific negligence as affecting reliance on res ipsa loquitur, 33 A.L.R.2d 791.

Liability for injuries occasioned by falling of awning or the like, 34 A.L.R.2d 486.

Res ipsa loquitur in Federal Employers' Liability Act cases, 35 A.L.R.2d 475.

Applicability of res ipsa loquitur or doctrine of exclusive control to injury or damage caused by fall of object from train, 41 A.L.R.2d 932.

Res ipsa loquitur doctrine with respect to firearms accident, 46 A.L.R.2d 1216.

Presumption or prima facie case of negligence based on presence of foreign substance in bottled or canned beverage, 52 A.L.R.2d 117.

Applicability of res ipsa loquitur doctrine in nonautomatic elevator accident cases, 56 A.L.R.2d 1059.

Liability of proprietor of store, office, or similar business premises for injury from fall on floor made slippery by tracked-in or spilled water, oil, mud, snow, and the like, 62 A.L.R.2d 6.

Liability of proprietor of store, office, or similar business premises for injury from fall or steps made slippery by tracked-in or spilled water, oil, mud, snow, and the like, 62 A.L.R.2d 131.

Liability of proprietor of store, office, or similar business premises for injury from fall down open stairway, or into trap door or similar floor-level opening, 66 A.L.R.2d 331.

Liability of proprietor of store, office, or similar business premises for fall due to improper lighting of steps or stairway, 66 A.L.R.2d 443.

Liability to patron of scenic railway, roller coaster, or miniature railway, 66 A.L.R.2d 689.

Applicability of res ipsa loquitur doctrine where objects being transported fall from motor vehicle, 66 A.L.R.2d 1255.

Comment, in argument of civil case, on adversary's failure to call employee as witness, 68 A.L.R.2d 1072.

Applicability of res ipsa loquitur where injury or damage results from contact with open door or tailgate of motor vehicle, 71 A.L.R.2d 375.

Sufficiency of evidence, in absence of survivors or of eyewitnesses competent to testify, as to place or point of impact of motor vehicles going in opposite directions and involved in collision, 77 A.L.R.2d 580.

Liability of manufacturer or seller for injury caused by automobile or other vehicle, aircraft, boat, or their parts, supplies, or equipment, 78 A.L.R.2d 460.

Liability of manufacturer or seller for injury caused by industrial, business, or farm machinery, tools, equipment, or materials, 78 A.L.R.2d 594.

Liability of manufacturer or seller for injury caused by paint, cement, lumber, building supplies, ladders, small tools, and like products, 78 A.L.R.2d 696.

Liability of manufacturer or seller for injury caused by toys, games, athletic or sports equipment, or like products, 78 A.L.R.2d 738.

Applicability of res ipsa loquitur doctrine where motor vehicle leaves road, 79 A.L.R.2d 6.

Applicability of res ipsa loquitur doctrine where motor vehicle stops on highway, 79 A.L.R.2d 153.

Applicability of res ipsa loquitur doctrine where motor vehicle turns over on highway, 79 A.L.R.2d 211.

Physicians and surgeons: res ipsa loquitur, or presumption or inference of negligence, in malpractice cases, 82 A.L.R.2d 1262.

Liability of physician for injury to esophagus or other internal organs occurring in course of gastroscopic examination, 88 A.L.R.2d 297.

Liability of owner or operator of theater or other place of amusement to patron injured by condition of or defect in lavatory, restroom, or toilet facilities, 88 A.L.R.2d 1090.

Res ipsa loquitur as ground for direction of verdict in favor of plaintiff, 97 A.L.R.2d 522.

Res ipsa loquitur with respect to personal injuries or death on or about ship, 1 A.L.R.3d 642.

Modern trends as to pleading a particular cause of injury or act of negligence as waiving or barring the right to rely on res ipsa loquitur, 2 A.L.R.3d 1335.

Effect of presumption as evidence or upon burden of proof, where controverting evidence is introduced, 5 A.L.R.3d 19.

Modern status of the rules against basing an inference upon an inference or a presumption upon a presumption, 5 A.L.R.3d 100.

Relation back of presumption of continuance of condition of property, 7 A.L.R.3d 1302.

Res ipsa loquitur in actions against owner or occupant of premises for personal injury, death, or property damage caused by fire, 8 A.L.R.3d 974.

Hospital's liability for negligence in connection with preparation, storage, or dispensing of drug or medicine, 9 A.L.R.3d 579.

Res ipsa loquitur in action against hospital for injury to patient, 9 A.L.R.3d 1315; 49 A.L.R.4th 63.

Liability for accident occurring in motor transportation of house or similar structure on public streets or highways, 9 A.L.R.3d 1436.

Liability of water distributor for damage caused by water escaping from main, 20 A.L.R.3d 1294.

Water distributor's liability for injuries due to condition of service lines, meters, and the like, which serve individual consumer, 20 A.L.R.3d 1363.

Applicability of res ipsa loquitur where plaintiff must prove active or gross negligence, willful misconduct, recklessness, or the like, 23 A.L.R.3d 1083.

Hospital's liability for injuries sustained by patient as a result of restraints imposed on movement, 25 A.L.R.3d 1450.

Liability, because of improper loading, of railroad consignee or his employee injured while unloading car, 29 A.L.R.3d 1039.

Aviation: helicopter accidents, 35 A.L.R.3d 707.

Malpractice: attending physician's liability for injury caused by equipment furnished by hospital, 35 A.L.R.3d 1068.

Liability in connection with fire or explosion of explosives while being stored or transported, 35 A.L.R.3d 1177.

Liability for injury to guest in airplane, 40 A.L.R.3d 1117.

Liability of owner or proprietor for injury or death caused by collision with glass door, panel, or wall, 41 A.L.R.3d 176.

Liability of one selling or distributing liquid or bottled fuel gas, for personal injury, death, or property damage, 41 A.L.R.3d 782.

Liability for alleged negligence of independent servicer or repairer of aircraft, 41 A.L.R.3d 1320.

Liability of vendor or grantor of real estate for personal injury to purchaser or third person due to defective condition of premises, 48 A.L.R.3d 1027.

Products liability: proof of defect under doctrine of strict liability in tort, 51 A.L.R.3d 8.

Products liability: necessity and sufficiency of identification of defendant as manufacturer or seller of product alleged to have caused injury, 51 A.L.R.3d 1344.

Liability for injury to or death of passenger from accident due to physical condition of carrier's employee, 53 A.L.R.3d 669.

Presumption of negligence and application of res ipsa loquitur doctrine in action for injury or damage caused by accidental starting up of parked car, 55 A.L.R.3d 1260.

Validity and construction of statute creating presumption or inference of intent to sell from possession of specified quantity of illegal drugs, 60 A.L.R.3d 1128.

Liability of innkeeper to guest for injury due to fire, 60 A.L.R.3d 1217.

Liability of owner or operator for injury caused by door of automatic passenger elevator, 63 A.L.R.3d 893.

Liability for injury caused by fall of person into shaft, or by abrupt drop, sudden movement, or stopping between floors, of automatic passenger elevator, 64 A.L.R.3d 950.

Liability of installer or maintenance company for injury caused by door of automatic passenger elevator, 64 A.L.R.3d 1005.

Liability of owner or operator for injury caused by failure of automatic elevator to level at floor, 64 A.L.R.3d 1020.

Res ipsa loquitur as applied to accident resulting from wheel or part thereof becoming detached from motor vehicle, 79 A.L.R.3d 346.

Products liability: liability for injury or death allegedly caused by defective tires, 81 A.L.R.3d 318.

Products liability: liability for injury or death allegedly caused by defect in snowmobile or other recreational-purpose vehicle, 81 A.L.R.3d 394.

Products liability: liability for injury or death allegedly caused by defect in mobile home or trailer, 81 A.L.R.3d 421.

Liability of power company for injury or death resulting from contact of radio or television antenna with electrical line, 82 A.L.R.3d 113.

Liability of manufacturer, seller, or installer for personal injury caused by door glass, 84 A.L.R.3d 877.

Res ipsa loquitur as applicable in actions for damage to property by the overflow or escape of water, 91 A.L.R.3d 186.

Application of res ipsa loquitur doctrine to accidents incurred by passenger while boarding or alighting from a carrier, 93 A.L.R.3d 776.

Applicability of res ipsa loquitur doctrine in action for injury to patron of beauty salon, 93 A.L.R.3d 897.

Products liability: toys and games, 95 A.L.R.3d 390.

Products liability: personal injury or death allegedly caused by defect in aircraft or its parts, supplies, or equipment, 97 A.L.R.3d 627.

Liability for injury on, or in connection with, escalator, 1 A.L.R.4th 144.

Products liability: liability of manufacturer or seller for injury or death caused by defect in boat or its parts, supplies, or equipment, 1 A.L.R.4th 411.

Products liability: industrial accidents involving conveyor belts or systems, 2 A.L.R.4th 262.

Products liability: defective vehicular windows, 3 A.L.R.4th 489.

Products liability: farm machinery, 4 A.L.R.4th 13.

Products liability: elevators, 7 A.L.R.4th 852.

Products liability: stud guns, staple guns, or parts thereof, 8 A.L.R.4th 70.

Products liability: transformer and other electrical equipment, 10 A.L.R.4th 854.

Products liability: cranes and other lifting apparatuses, 13 A.L.R.4th 476.

Products liability: cement and concrete, 15 A.L.R.4th 1186.

Products liability: tire rims and wheels, 16 A.L.R.4th 137.

Products liability: firefighting equipment, 19 A.L.R.4th 326.

Destruction of ampoule used in alcohol breath test as warranting suppression of result of test, 19 A.L.R.4th 509.

Res ipsa loquitur as to cause of or liability for real-property fires, 21 A.L.R.4th 929.

Res ipsa loquitur in aviation accidents, 25 A.L.R.4th 1237.

Products liability: stud guns, staple guns, or parts thereof, 33 A.L.R.4th 1189.

Applicability of res ipsa loquitur in case of multiple, nonmedical defendants - modern status, 59 A.L.R.4th 201.

Products liability: building and construction lumber, 61 A.L.R.4th 121.

Strict products liability: product malfunction or occurrence of accident as evidence of defect, 65 A.L.R.4th 346.

Liability for injury incurred in operation of power golf cart, 66 A.L.R.4th 622.

Applicability of res ipsa loquitur in case of multiple medical defendants - modern status, 67 A.L.R.4th 544.

Products liability: industrial refrigerator equipment, 72 A.L.R.4th 90.

Products liability: scaffolds and scaffolding equipment, 74 A.L.R.4th 904.

Products liability: tractors, 75 A.L.R.4th 312.

Products liability: bicycles and accessories, 76 A.L.R.4th 117.

Products liability: exercise and related equipment, 76 A.L.R.4th 145.

Products liability: trampolines and similar devices, 76 A.L.R.4th 171.

Products liability: competitive sports equipment, 76 A.L.R.4th 201.

Products liability: skiing equipment, 76 A.L.R.4th 256.

Adverse presumption or inference based on failure to produce or examine codefendant or accomplice who is not on trial - modern criminal cases, 76 A.L.R.4th 812.

Adverse presumption or inference based on party's failure to produce or question examining doctor - modern cases, 77 A.L.R.4th 463.

Products liability: general recreational equipment, 77 A.L.R.4th 1121.

Products liability: mechanical amusement rides and devices, 77 A.L.R.4th 1152.

Adverse presumption or inference based on party's failure to produce or examine that party's attorney - modern cases, 78 A.L.R.4th 571.

Adverse presumption or inference based on party's failure to produce or examine witness who was occupant of vehicle involved in accident - modern cases, 78 A.L.R.4th 616.

Liability of proprietor of private gymnasium, reducing salon, or similar health club for injury to patron, 79 A.L.R.4th 127.

Adverse presumption or inference based on party's failure to produce or examine spouse - modern cases, 79 A.L.R.4th 694.

Adverse presumption or inference based on party's failure to produce or examine friend - modern cases, 79 A.L.R.4th 779.

Adverse presumption or inference based on party's failure to produce or examine family member other than spouse - modern cases, 80 A.L.R.4th 337.

Adverse presumption or inference based on party's failure to produce or examine witness with employment relationship to party - modern cases, 80 A.L.R.4th 405.

Adverse presumption or inference based on state's failure to produce or examine informant in criminal prosecution - modern cases, 80 A.L.R.4th 547.

Products liability: lubricating products and systems, 80 A.L.R.4th 972.

Adverse presumption or inference based on state's failure to produce or examine law enforcement personnel - modern cases, 81 A.L.R.4th 872.

Adverse presumption or inference based on party's failure to produce or examine transferor, transferee, broker, or other person allegedly involved in transaction at issue - modern cases, 81 A.L.R.4th 939.

Admissibility of DNA identification evidence, 84 A.L.R.4th 313.

Products liability: Mechanical amusement rides and devices, 3 A.L.R.5th 851.

Malpractice in diagnosis and treatment of male urinary tract and related organs, 48 A.L.R.5th 575.

Products liability: ladders, 81 A.L.R.5th 245.

ARTICLE 2 PRESUMPTIONS AND ESTOPPEL

Law reviews.

- For article on the 2011 enactment of this article, see 28 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 1 (2011).


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