Certain presumptions of law, such as the presumption of innocence, in some cases the presumption of guilt, the presumption of continuance of life for seven years, the presumption of a mental state once proved to exist, and all similar presumptions, may be rebutted by proof.
(Code 1981, §24-14-21, enacted by Ga. L. 2011, p. 99, § 2/HB 24.)
Cross references.- Presumption of death of missing person, § 53-9-1 et seq.
Law reviews.- For note, "Commitment and Release of Persons Found Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity: A Georgia Perspective," see 15 Ga. L. Rev. 1065 (1981). For comment regarding denial of due process through statute involving administration of estate of absentee minor, in light of Payne v. Home Sav. Bank, 193 Ga. 406, 18 S.E.2d 770 (1942), see 5 Ga. B.J. 62 (1943). For comment discussing the right to present evidence for the purposes of rebutting presumption, in light of Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 93 S. Ct. 2230, 37 L. Ed. 2d 63 (1973), see 10 Ga. St. B.J. 484 (1974).
JUDICIAL DECISIONSANALYSIS
General Consideration
Editor's notes.
- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under former Code 1863, § 3677, former Code 1882, § 3754, former Civil Code 1910, § 5740, former Penal Code 1910, § 1016, former Code 1933, § 38-118, and former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-21 are included in the annotations for this Code section.
Constitutionality.
- For a statutory presumption to pass constitutional muster, it must be shown with substantial assurance that the presumed fact was more likely than not to flow from the proved fact on which it was made to depend. Benham v. Edwards, 501 F. Supp. 1050 (N.D. Ga. 1980), aff'd in part and vacated in part on other grounds, 678 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1982), vacated, 463 U.S. 1222, 103 S. Ct. 3565, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1406 (1983) (remanded for further consideration in light of Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 103 S. Ct. 3043, 77 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1983) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-118)).
Former Code 1933, § 38-118 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-4-21) was not violative of the due process and equal protection guarantees of U.S. Const., amend. 14. Evans v. State, 159 Ga. App. 776, 285 S.E.2d 235 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-118).
Presumption of negligence against a railroad company, when property was injured by the running of its trains, was a disputable presumption, and could be rebutted like other such presumptions. Savannah, Florida & Western Ry. v. Gray, 77 Ga. 440, 3 S.E. 158 (1886) (decided under former Code 1882, § 3754).
Presumption of valuable consideration yielded to direct evidence.
- Prima facie presumption that negotiable paper was issued for a valuable consideration yielded to direct, uncontradicted and unimpeached evidence that there was in fact no consideration. In such a case, the plaintiff could not recover on the presumption alone, but would have to carry the whole case by virtue of a preponderance of the evidence. Goldstein v. Drexler, 102 Ga. App. 90, 115 S.E.2d 744 (1960) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-118).
Instruction on presumption of intended consequences.
- No unconstitutional shift of the burden of persuasion occurred when court's instruction on presumption of intended consequences was given with an instruction that a person was not presumed to act with criminal intent and that the presumption of intended consequence could be rebutted. Williams v. State, 157 Ga. App. 494, 277 S.E.2d 781 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-118).
When uncontradicted and unimpeached evidence was produced as to the real facts, any inference to the contrary disappeared, and did not create a conflict in the evidence so as to require its submission to a jury. International Computer Group, Inc. v. Data Gen. Corp., 159 Ga. App. 169, 283 S.E.2d 12 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-118).
Performance of official and social duties.
- Unless and until there be facts or circumstances to indicate to the contrary, it will be presumed that every person obeys the mandates of law and performs all of the person's official and social duties. Strother Ford, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 132 Ga. App. 268, 208 S.E.2d 25 (1974) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-118).
Jury determination of rebutted presumption.
- Presumptions in civil cases have an effect at two stages during a jury trial; when a party moves for a directed verdict; and when the trial court instructs the jury. Under Georgia law, a rebuttable presumption of law generally does not vanish when the opposing party introduces evidence contrary to the presumption, and it does not matter how much counter evidence the opponent has presented to rebut the presumed fact; the presumption remains alive through jury instructions and can only disappear if the jury decides to discount the presumption. Beach v. Lipham, 276 Ga. 302, 578 S.E.2d 402 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-21).
Most rational hypothesis.
- Presumption of law was merely a circumstantial inference selected by the law as the most rational hypothesis from given facts, and may or may not be rebutted according to the quality of evidence introduced. Jefferson Std. Life Ins. Co. v. Bentley, 55 Ga. App. 272, 190 S.E. 50 (1937) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-118); Continental Assurance Co. v. Rothell, 121 Ga. App. 868, 176 S.E.2d 259 (1970); 227 Ga. 258, 181 S.E.2d 283, aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 123 Ga. App. 423, 181 S.E.2d 541 (1971), vacated on other grounds,(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-118).
Presumption yields to proved facts.
- Presumption of law yields to direct, positive, and uncontradicted evidence, i.e., it gives way to proved facts. Jefferson Std. Life Ins. Co. v. Bentley, 55 Ga. App. 272, 190 S.E. 50 (1937) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-118); Continental Assurance Co. v. Rothell, 121 Ga. App. 868, 176 S.E.2d 259 (1970); 227 Ga. 258, 181 S.E.2d 283, aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 123 Ga. App. 423, 181 S.E.2d 541 (1971), vacated on other grounds,(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-118).
Presumption of continuity.
- Under the doctrine known as the presumption of continuity, a status, when proved to exist, will be presumed to have continued to exist. Strother Ford, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 132 Ga. App. 268, 208 S.E.2d 25 (1974) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-118).
Presumption of demand for possession yields to direct evidence.
- While the defendant may not deny in the defendant's counter-affidavit that a demand for possession had been made upon the defendant by the plaintiff prior to the issuance of the dispossessory warrant, and defendant's failure to do so raises a presumption of law that such a demand was made, still such presumption must give way to the direct and positive testimony of the defendant on the trial that no demand was made upon the defendant for possession by anyone prior to the issuance of the dispossessory warrant. Bare presumptions of law give way to testimony, which may shift the burden of proof or of proceeding to the opposite party, and one is then not entitled to prevail upon the presumption alone. Ginn v. Johnson, 74 Ga. App. 35, 38 S.E.2d 753 (1946) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-118).
Medical negligence and due care pattern jury instructions.
- Although the presumption of due care pattern jury instructions was a correct statement of the law in discussing the presumption that health care professionals exercise due care, the pattern jury instruction needs to explain more clearly the presumption's relationship to the plaintiff's burden of proof and the defendant's standard of care. The jury needs to be instructed that: (1) the law presumes that physicians or other medical professionals perform medical services in an ordinarily skillful manner; (2) the person claiming an injury may overcome this legal presumption by introducing evidence that the physician did not treat the patient in an ordinarily skillful manner; (3) expert medical testimony is required to overcome the presumption; and (4) the plaintiff's burden in proving the physician's lack of due care and skill is by the preponderance of the evidence. These suggested changes are intended to uphold the tradition of having physicians judged by their peers while ensuring that jurors are instructed that the due-care presumption does not change the plaintiff's burden of proof in medical negligence cases. Beach v. Lipham, 276 Ga. 302, 578 S.E.2d 402 (2003) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-21).
Innocence.
- Every person charged with crime is presumed innocent until proven guilty by competent evidence. Thigpen v. State, 11 Ga. App. 846, 76 S.E. 596 (1912) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1016).
Continuity of domicile.
- Until evidence is introduced to the contrary, it is presumed that a person has not changed the person's residence or domicile. Strother Ford, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 132 Ga. App. 268, 208 S.E.2d 25 (1974) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-118).
Presumptions Regarding Death
Life.
- One of the presumptions of law in this state is "continuance of life for seven years." Poole v. State, 22 Ga. App. 248, 95 S.E. 935 (1918) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5740); Gantt v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 173 Ga. 323, 160 S.E. 345 (1931);(decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5740).
Presumption of life was not statutory.
- There was no express statutory provision in this state making absence from the state for seven years the ground of the presumption of death. The only provision in the Code with reference of such presumption was former Civil Code 1910, § 5740 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-4-21). There being no statutory provision, therefore, making mere absence from the state the ground of the presumption, the common-law rule must be applied, which was as ruled in Hansen v. Owens, 132 Ga. 648, 64 S.E. 800 (1909). Rudulph v. Brown, 150 Ga. 147, 103 S.E. 251 (1920) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5740).
Presumption of continuation of life ends.
- Presumption of the duration of life, with respect to people of whom no account can be given, ends at the expiration of seven years from the time when the people were last known to be living. Doe v. Roe, 1 Ga. 538 (1846) (decided under former law); Doe v. Roe & Benson, 26 Ga. 582 (1858); Executors of Adams v. Administrator of Jones, 39 Ga. 479 (1869) (decided under former law); Poole v. State, 22 Ga. App. 248, 95 S.E. 935 (1918); Gantt v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 41 Ga. App. 627, 154 S.E. 213 (1930) (decided under former Code 1863, § 3677). 173 Ga. 323, 160 S.E. 345 (1931) See also Pilgrim Health & Life Ins. Co. v. Shows, 60 Ga. App. 872, 5 S.E.2d 585 (1939) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5740);rev'd on other grounds,(decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5740);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-118).
Death occurring after seven years.
- In the absence of facts or circumstances tending to establish the date of death, death was presumed to have occurred at the expiration of seven years. Gantt v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 173 Ga. 323, 160 S.E. 345 (1931) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5740); Gantt v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 53 Ga. App. 425, 186 S.E. 458 (1936); Pfenning v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 60 Ga. App. 706, 4 S.E.2d 682 (1939) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-118); Payne v. Home Sav. Bank, 193 Ga. 406, 18 S.E.2d 770 (1942); Georgia Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Bloodworth, 120 Ga. App. 313, 170 S.E.2d 433 (1969) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-118);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-118);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-118).
Time of death must be proved.
- Presumption of law related only to the fact of death; the time of death, whenever it was material, must be a subject of distinct proof. Gantt v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 41 Ga. App. 627, 154 S.E. 213 (1930), rev'd on other grounds, 173 Ga. 323, 160 S.E. 345 (1931) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5740).
Presumption of death established by probate court.
- Order of probate court under former Code 1933, § 113-2601 (see now O.C.G.A. § 53-9-1) establishing presumption of death of insured constituted a rebuttable presumption of law in later case involving action on life insurance policy. Ritter v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 538 F. Supp. 398 (N.D. Ga. 1982) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-118).
Presumption of death of one moving to another state.
- In order to raise a presumption of the death of a person who moves from this state to a named point in another state, inquiry must be made at the last known domicile of the absentee at which the absentee resided in the other state; and it must be shown, by those who would be most likely to hear from the absentee, that the absentee was absent and unheard of in the last place of residence for seven years. Rudulph v. Brown, 150 Ga. 147, 103 S.E. 251 (1920) (decided under former Penal Code 1910, § 1016); National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Hankerson, 49 Ga. App. 350, 175 S.E. 590 (1934); Pilgrim Health & Life Ins. Co. v. Shows, 60 Ga. App. 872, 5 S.E.2d 585 (1939) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-118);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-118).
Evidence of absence of person from one's original place of residence will not raise the presumption of death, when it appears that the person has moved to another place and there located. National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Hankerson, 49 Ga. App. 350, 175 S.E. 590 (1934) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-118).
Issue of life or death for jury.
- When the presumption from absence is relied upon to show death, the issue as to life or death would be for the jury when the evidence tending to rebut the legal presumption is merely circumstantial, or when, notwithstanding direct or circumstantial rebuttal evidence, the bare legal presumption of death is itself supported by direct or circumstantial proof. But the mere legal presumption is completely overcome by positive, uncontradicted evidence that the person is in fact alive, and even by competent proof of the person's existence within the seven-year period. National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Hankerson, 49 Ga. App. 350, 175 S.E. 590 (1934) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-118).
No presumption of survival.
- When a family was absent for over seven years there would be no presumption that a husband survived his wife and daughter, or that he had no other children whom he survived. Cock v. Lipsey, 148 Ga. 322, 96 S.E. 628 (1918) (decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5740).
Insanity
Presumption of insanity not unconstitutionally irrebuttable.
- Construction of presumptions in former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-21 did not create a de facto irrebuttable (and, therefore, unconstitutional) presumption of insanity because the fact-finders duty not to disregard expert testimony applied to cases presuming sanity or insanity, and the court's standard of review and the findings and conclusions required for that review, ensure that the presumption of insanity cannot be applied irrebuttably. Nagel v. State, 262 Ga. 888, 427 S.E.2d 490 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-21).
Presumption of continuing insanity applied prospectively to future acts of the defendant, not retroactively to past behavior. Vanderpool v. State, 244 Ga. App. 804, 536 S.E.2d 821 (2000), cert denied, 532 U.S. 996, 121 S. Ct. 1658, 149 L. Ed. 2d 640 (2001) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-21).
To be constitutionally committed, the insanity-acquittee was entitled, as matter of equal protection, to a judicial determination which attained a greater degree of certainty than that generated by a scientifically unsupported presumption of insanity. Benham v. Edwards, 501 F. Supp. 1050 (N.D. Ga. 1980), aff'd in part and vacated in part on other grounds, 678 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1982), vacated, 463 U.S. 1222, 103 S. Ct. 3565, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1406 (1983) (remanded for further consideration in light of Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 103 S. Ct. 3043, 77 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1983) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-118)).
Presumption of continuation of a mental state comported with due process, because it was rational to assume that, once a mental state was proven to exist, that mental state continued to do so in the absence of evidence to the contrary. Clark v. State, 245 Ga. 629, 266 S.E.2d 466 (1980) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-118).
Continuation of mental condition.
- Mental condition, once proved to exist, was presumed to continue. Carter v. State, 225 Ga. 310, 168 S.E.2d 158 (1969) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-118); Boyd v. State, 207 Ga. 567, 63 S.E.2d 394 (1951); 234 Ga. 608, 216 S.E.2d 855 (1975), overruled on other grounds,(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-118).
Continuation of insanity.
- There was a presumption of continuation of insanity, once insanity was proved to exist. Dicken v. Johnson, 7 Ga. 484 (1849) (decided under former law); Terry v. Buffington, 11 Ga. 337, 56 Am. Dec. 423 (1852); Stanfield v. Hursey, 36 Ga. App. 394, 136 S.E. 826 (1927) (decided under former law);(decided under former Civil Code 1910, § 5740).
Defendant failed to carry the defendant's burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was sane after the defendant was found not guilty by reason of insanity on two stalking charges and was ordered into a civil commitment to a mental health facility; the verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity established both that the defendant committed the criminal offense and that the defendant did so because of a mental illness, and once the defendant was ruled insane, a presumption existed under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-21 that the insanity existed thereafter, and the defendant put on very little evidence to the contrary. Bonney v. State, 295 Ga. App. 706, 673 S.E.2d 102 (2009) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-21).
Trial court erred in denying a recommendation filed by the Department of Behavioral Health with Developmental Disabilities that a patient be moved to a group home for outpatient involuntary treatment because the preponderance of the evidence supported a finding that the patient overcame the presumption under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-21 of a continued need for inpatient involuntary treatment, and there was no evidence to support the trial court's finding that under O.C.G.A. § 37-3-1(9.1), the patient posed a substantial risk of imminent harm to the patient or others or was so unable to care for the patient's own physical health and safety as to create an imminently life-endangering crisis; the group home would have only two other suitable patient occupants, both of whom would be under the supervision of live-in supervisors and would have little opportunity to pressure the patient into misconduct, the patient would not be permitted to leave the group home unsupervised, the manager of the group home testified that as soon as patients were admitted into the group home and evaluated, an individualized service plan was created, and there was no statutory requirement that a plan existed prior to release. Nelor v. State, 309 Ga. App. 165, 709 S.E.2d 904 (2011) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-21).
Insanity of insanity-acquittee.
- When there has been a previous adjudication finding a defendant not guilty by reason of defendant's insanity, a presumption of such insanity exists at the commencement of a hearing to secure defendant's release. Pennewell v. State, 148 Ga. App. 611, 251 S.E.2d 832 (1979) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-118); Clark v. State, 245 Ga. 629, 266 S.E.2d 466 (1980);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-118).
Presumption of continued insanity for release applications.
- In deciding applications for release, the court may rely on the presumption of continued insanity and is not bound by the opinions of either lay or expert witnesses. Gross v. State, 210 Ga. App. 125, 435 S.E.2d 496 (1993) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-21).
Effect of release.
- Administrative release canceled the continuing presumption of insanity, although the prior adjudication was evidence tending to show mental condition and could be considered by the fact-finder to rebut the presumption of sanity. Gilbert v. State, 235 Ga. 501, 220 S.E.2d 262 (1975) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-118).
Denial of release held proper.
- Rational trier of fact could have found that appellant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the appellant was no longer insane and should be released from civil commitment since experts testified that the appellant became violently "psychotic" when the appellant engaged in substance abuse and that, although appellant might not exhibit violently "psychotic" behavior so long as the appellant underwent the regimen of "forced abstinence" in a hospital setting, there was nothing to show that, once released from that setting and regimen, the appellant would not again engage in substance abuse and commit yet another violent "psychotic" act. Nagel v. State, 264 Ga. 150, 442 S.E.2d 446 (1994) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-21).
Sanity after release from mental institution.
- Presumption of sanity prevailed even after a commitment to a mental institution if the accused had been released from that institution. Durham v. State, 239 Ga. 697, 238 S.E.2d 334 (1977) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-118).
Rebuttal not automatic.
- Presentation of evidence to the contrary did not automatically dissipate the presumption of sanity which existed by law. Moses v. State, 245 Ga. 180, 263 S.E.2d 916, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 849, 101 S. Ct. 138, 66 L. Ed. 2d 60 (1980), overruled on other grounds, Nagel v. State, 262 Ga. 888, 427 S.E.2d 490 (1993) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-118).
Court may presume insanity despite witnesses' opinions.
- Superior court, in deciding applications for release of a person committed upon a plea of insanity, may rely on the presumption of continued insanity and is not bound by the opinions of either lay or expert witnesses. The court also may take judicial notice of the evidence at trial pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-7-131(e). Butler v. State, 258 Ga. 344, 369 S.E.2d 252 (1988) (decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-21).
Verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity reflected two crucial factual determinations. First, such verdict indicated a determination beyond reasonable doubt by a finder of fact that the defendant committed the crime in question. Secondly, this verdict indicated finding that it had been demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant, at the time the criminal act was committed, met the criteria for civil commitment. Under former Code 1933, § 38-118 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-4-21), this mental state was presumed to continue so that the burden of proof in a release proceeding under former Code 1933, § 27-1503 (see now O.C.G.A. § 17-7-131) rested on the insanity acquittee. Whitfield v. State, 158 Ga. App. 660, 281 S.E.2d 643 (1981) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-118).
Marriage
Continuation of marriage.
- Marriage once shown to exist, nothing more appearing, was presumed to continue in existence until rebutted by proof of the marriage's dissolution. Walker v. Hall, 123 Ga. App. 457, 181 S.E.2d 508 (1971) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-118).
Prior marriage dissolved by death.
- Presumption that a first marriage was dissolved by death prevailed whether the time elapsing between the date the former spouse was last heard of and the second marriage was ten months or ten years. Longstreet v. Longstreet, 205 Ga. 255, 53 S.E.2d 480 (1949) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-118).
Ownership by husband.
- Husband is recognized by law as the head of his family and where he and wife reside together, the legal presumption is that the house and all the household effects, belong to the husband as the head of the family; this presumption of course is rebuttable. Kreutz v. State, 53 Ga. App. 219, 185 S.E. 371 (1936) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-118).
Conflicting presumptions.
- When the presumption of the validity of a marriage conflicts with the presumption of the continued life of a former spouse of one of the parties, if neither is aided by proof of facts or circumstances corroborating it, the presumption of the validity of the second marriage will prevail over the presumption of the continuance of life of the former spouse. Longstreet v. Longstreet, 205 Ga. 255, 53 S.E.2d 480 (1949) (decided under former Code 1933, § 38-118); Baker v. Musa, 170 Ga. App. 77, 316 S.E.2d 178 (1984);(decided under former O.C.G.A. § 24-4-21).
Officers
Officer's duties.
- All officers are presumed to have properly discharged their sworn official duties. Kirk v. State, 73 Ga. 620 (1884) (decided under former Code 1882, § 3754); Brantley v. Thompson, 216 Ga. 164, 115 S.E.2d 533 (1960);(decided under former Code 1933, § 38-118).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d.
- 29 Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence, § 212.
8A Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Death, § 168.
ALR.
- Validity of by-law of mutual benefit association preventing recovery upon presumption of death from seven years' absence, 17 A.L.R. 418; 21 A.L.R. 1346; 36 A.L.R. 982; 40 A.L.R. 1274.
Circumstances justifying inference of death of insured before the lapse of seven years from his disappearance, 34 A.L.R. 1389; 61 A.L.R. 1327.
Ownership of automobile as prima facie evidence of responsibility for negligence of person operating it, 42 A.L.R. 898; 74 A.L.R. 951; 96 A.L.R. 634.
Constitutionality of statutes or ordinances making one fact presumptive or prima facie evidence of another, 51 A.L.R. 1139; 86 A.L.R. 179; 162 A.L.R. 495.
Statutory or contractual limitation where presumption of death of the insured from seven years' absence is relied upon, 61 A.L.R. 686; 119 A.L.R. 1308.
Presumption of death from seven years' absence as affected by domestic troubles, 64 A.L.R. 1288.
Conclusiveness of uncontradicted testimony of interested witness where opposed to presumption, 72 A.L.R. 94.
Presumption of death of insured in relation to time of death as affecting failure to pay premiums during seven-year period, 75 A.L.R. 630.
Presumption of innocence as evidence, 94 A.L.R. 1042; 152 A.L.R. 626.
When finding or adjudication as to one's mental condition by official or body not clearly judicial is conclusive evidence or has effect of a judgment as regards legal mental status, 108 A.L.R. 47.
Insanity as affecting presumption against suicide, 112 A.L.R. 1278.
Admissibility of inculpatory statements made in presence of accused and not denied or contradicted by him, 115 A.L.R. 1510.
Direct evidence as to what took place at time of accident as displacing presumption arising from instinct of self-preservation that one was acting with concern for own safety, 116 A.L.R. 340.
Effect of words "value received" or similar words in written instrument, other than negotiable instrument or sealed instrument, to create presumption or make prima facie case of consideration, 116 A.L.R. 545.
Distinction between effect of fact to create presumption of further fact and its effect as prima facie evidence of the further fact in determining burden of proof and weight of evidence, 121 A.L.R. 1078.
Administration of estate of one the fact of whose death rests upon presumption or circumstantial evidence, 140 A.L.R. 1403.
Validity of marriage celebrated while spouse by former marriage of one of the parties was living and undivorced, in reliance upon presumption from lapse of time of death of such spouse, 144 A.L.R. 747.
Presumption against suicide as evidence, 158 A.L.R. 747.
Presumption and burden of proof as regards continuance or revocation of will produced for probate, 165 A.L.R. 1188.
Form and sufficiency of proof of death in case of insured's disappearance, 26 A.L.R.2d 1073.
Judicial notice of intoxicating quality, and the like, of a liquor or particular liquid, from its name, 49 A.L.R.2d 764.
Validity, construction, and effect of statutes or regulations making possession of fish or game, or of specified hunting or fishing equipment, prima facie evidence of violation, 81 A.L.R.2d 1093.
Necessity and sufficiency of showing of search and inquiry by one relying on presumption of death from seven years' absence, 99 A.L.R.2d 307.
Effect of presumption as evidence or upon burden of proof, where controverting evidence is introduced, 5 A.L.R.3d 19.
Modern status of the rules against basing an inference upon an inference or a presumption upon a presumption, 5 A.L.R.3d 100.
Relation back of presumption of continuance of condition of property, 7 A.L.R.3d 1302.
Application of res ipsa loquitur doctrine to accidents incurred by passenger while boarding or alighting from a carrier, 93 A.L.R.3d 776.
Medical malpractice: presumption or inference from failure of hospital or doctor to produce relevant medical records, 69 A.L.R.4th 906.