This article shall apply to all civil proceedings and, insofar as consistent with the Constitution, to all criminal proceedings.
(Code 1981, §24-13-20, enacted by Ga. L. 2011, p. 99, § 2/HB 24.)
Law reviews.- For article discussing available means of discovery for criminal cases in Georgia, see 12 Ga. St. B.J. 134 (1976). For note, "Criminal Discovery: The Use of Notices to Produce," see 30 Mercer L. Rev. 331 (1978).
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Editor's notes.
- In light of the similarity of the statutory provisions, decisions under Ga. L. 1966, p. 502, § 2 and former O.C.G.A. § 24-10-29 are included in the annotations for this Code section.
Limitation on use by state.
- Words "insofar as consistent with the Constitution" constituted a limitation on the state's use of subpoenas and notices to produce more than a limitation on its use by an accused. Brown v. State, 238 Ga. 98, 231 S.E.2d 65 (1976) (decided under former Ga. L. 1966, p. 502, § 2); Johnson v. State, 156 Ga. App. 496, 274 S.E.2d 837 (1980);.
Unconstitutional self-incrimination.
- State may not have used a notice to produce to reseize property and redivest the defendant of custody and possession by retaining the property and using the property as evidence in a criminal proceeding; unconstitutional self-incrimination would have been the result of compliance with the state's notice. Johnson v. State, 156 Ga. App. 496, 274 S.E.2d 837 (1980).
Notice to produce.
- Pursuant to Ga. L. 1966, p. 502, § 2 and former Code 1933, §§ 38-801 - 38-807 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-13-27), providing for notices to produce writing and tangible objects in lieu of subpoena, was applicable to criminal cases. Goldsmith v. State, 148 Ga. App. 786, 252 S.E.2d 657 (1979) (decided under former Ga. L. 1966, p. 502, § 2); Wilson v. State, 246 Ga. 62, 268 S.E.2d 895 (1980); 449 U.S. 1103, 101 S. Ct. 901, 66 L. Ed. 2d 830 (1981), cert. denied,.
Discovery as such not available to accused in criminal cases in Georgia, but a motion to produce books, writings, or other documents or tangible things pursuant to former Code 1933, §§ 38-801 and 38-802 (see now O.C.G.A. § 24-13-26) was applicable to criminal cases. Pryor v. State, 238 Ga. 698, 234 S.E.2d 918, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 935, 98 S. Ct. 422, 54 L. Ed. 2d 294 (1977), reh'g denied, 434 U.S. 1003, 98 S. Ct. 650, 54 L. Ed. 2d 500 (1977), overruled on other grounds by Drinkard v. Walker, 281 Ga. 211, 636 S.E.2d 530 (2006).
Exculpatory matter.
- Defendant was entitled to discovery of all exculpatory matter and anything in the district attorney's file which was favorable to defendant's defense. Maddox v. State, 136 Ga. App. 370, 221 S.E.2d 231 (1975).
Material creating reasonable doubt.
- Prosecutor was under a duty to furnish the defendant, without request, material which created a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt. Wilson v. State, 246 Ga. 62, 268 S.E.2d 895 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1103, 101 S. Ct. 901, 66 L. Ed. 2d 830 (1981).
Confidential informant.
- It was within the sound discretion of a trial court whether to require the state to disclose to the defendant the name and address of a confidential informant. Clayton v. State, 145 Ga. App. 541, 244 S.E.2d 67 (1978).
Reports and summaries made by police investigators were not the types of books, writings, or other documents or tangible things subject to a notice to produce. Bennett v. State, 158 Ga. App. 421, 280 S.E.2d 429 (1981).
Improper use of notice to produce.
- Defendant having "moved to suppress" the evidence by virtue of contesting the libel for condemnation of former Code 1933, § 79A-828 (see now O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49) and the state having failed to meet the state's burden in that regard, the state may not have used the notice to produce to "reseize" the property for evidentiary purposes. Johnson v. State, 156 Ga. App. 496, 274 S.E.2d 837 (1980).
Corporate document not protected by self-incrimination privilege.
- Defendant in a criminal case, an attorney who was the sole shareholder of a professional corporation, was properly held in civil contempt for not producing a noncompetition agreement between the corporation and a former employee. The agreement was a corporate document, and the defendant had been subpoenaed to produce the document as a corporate agent; thus, the defendant could not assert the defendant's personal right against self-incrimination and the small size of the corporation was immaterial. Thompson v. State, 294 Ga. App. 363, 670 S.E.2d 152 (2008).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
C.J.S.
- 32A C.J.S., Evidence, § 1013.
ALR.
- Subpoenaing unnecessary witnesses as contempt, 37 A.L.R. 1113.
Mandamus to compel court or judge to require witness to testify or produce documents, 41 A.L.R. 436.
Construction and application of provisions of Fair Labor Standards Act regarding investigatory subpoena duces tecum, 166 A.L.R. 553.